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In December 1875, President Ulysses S. Grant delivered his last annual
message to Congress. He warned of "the dangers threatening us" and the
"importance that all [men] should be possessed of education and intelligence,"
lest "ignorant men . . . sink into acquiescence to the will of intelligence,
whether directed by the demagogue or by priestcraft."' He recommended as
"the primary step" a constitutional amendment "making it the duty of each of
the several States to establish and forever maintain free public schools adequate
to the education of all of the children" and "prohibiting the granting of any
school funds, or school taxes ... for the benefit of or in aid... of any religious
sect or denomination."' 2 There was no mistaking what President Grant referred
to when he mentioned "demagogue," "priestcraft," and "religious sect" in con-
nection with public education. Since the Civil War, the political influence of
Catholics had become an important force in America, and in many states
Catholics had sought public funding for their schools and charities.
Congress responded promptly. Within a week, Representative James
Blaine, the powerful former Speaker of the House, introduced an amendment
that would become known as "the Blaine Amendment," which provided that
"no money raised by taxation in any State for the support of public schools...
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shall ever be under the control of any religious sect."3 In August 1876, the
House of Representatives approved the bill with the necessary two-thirds vote.4
The proposal, however, received a majority but not a two-thirds vote in the
Senate and failed.5
Although Congress never sent the Blaine Amendment to the states for rati-
fication, the states reacted to the national attention paid to the question of pub-
lic financing of sectarian schools by adopting their own "Little Blaine
Amendments." Between 1840 and 1875, nineteen states adopted some form of
constitutional restriction on sectarian institutions receiving state funds; by
1900, sixteen more states, plus the District of Columbia, had added such provi-
sions.6 Nevada was no exception. In 1877, the Nevada Legislature proposed
amending the Nevada Constitution to provide that "No public funds of any kind
or character whatever, State, County or Municipal, shall be used for sectarian
purposes."7 The amendment, Article 11, Section 10, became final in 1880.
Like the Little Blaine Amendments states adopted across the United
States, Nevada's Little Blaine Amendment responded to controversy in Nevada
over public funding of Catholic institutions. For years the legislature had
funded the Nevada Orphan Asylum, the largest orphanage in the state, operated
by the Sisters of Charity in Virginia City. In 1882, in Nevada ex rel. Nevada
Orphan Asylum v. Hallock,8 the Nevada Supreme Court held that the new
amendment barred the legislature from making any future contributions to the
orphanage. No Nevada court has had occasion to construe Section 10 since
Hallock.
Attention has again focused on public funding of sectarian institutions,
including schools and charitable activities. For example, in 1996 Congress
enacted the "Charitable Choice Act," which allows states participating in cer-
tain federally funded programs "to contract with religious organizations, or to
allow religious organizations to accept certificates, vouchers, or other forms of
disbursement [under these programs]." 9 And President Bush has announced
his interest in encouraging faith-based solutions in partnership with the federal
government.l° Additionally, a number of states have begun experiments with
3 4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875).
4 Alfred W. Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 HARV. L. REV. 939,
942 (1951).
5 Id. at 944.
6 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 647 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
7 NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 10.
8 16 Nev. 373 (1882).
9 Charitable Choice Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, tit. 1, § 104, 110 Stat. 2161 (1996)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 604(b) (1996)).
10 Marvin Olashy, First, Aim for That Compassionate Agenda, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2000,
at B1; Dana Milbank & Hamil R. Harris, Bush, Religious Leaders Meet President-Elect
Begins Faith-Based Initiative, Reaches for Blacks, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2000, at A6; Dana
Milbank, Bush's Faith-Based Group Initiative Will Meet Resistance, WASH. POST, Jan. 27,
2001, at Al0; Editorial, "Faith-Based" Charities, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Jan. 29, 2001, at 6B;
Dana Milbank, Bush Unveils "Faith-Based" Initiative Effort Will Team Agencies, Nonprofits
on Social Issues, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2001, at Al; Laurie Goodstein, Nudging Church-
State Line, Bush Invites Religious Groups to Seek Federal Aid, N.Y. TIMES, JAN. 30, 2001, at
A18; Jeffrey Rosen, Is Nothing Secular?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2001, § 6, at 40; Laura
Meckler, Bush Promotes Plan to Widen Religious Role in Social Services, LAS VEGAS REV.-
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school vouchers, and those may find support in the Bush administration as
well. 1' More importantly for Nevada, in 1999, the legislature authorized cities
J., Jan. 31, 2001, at 4A; Marc Lacey & Laurie Goodstein, Bush Fleshes Out Details of
Proposal to Expand Aid to Religious Organization, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2001, at A15; Dana
Milbank, New Director for Faith-Based Office: Bush Taps Jim Towey, a Veteran of the Hill
and Mother Teresa's Ministry, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2002, at A4; Caryle Murphy, Religious
Leaders Cautious on Bush Plan - Some Fear Dependency and Too Much Scrutiny, WASH.
POST, Feb. 1, 2001, at BI; J.R. Labbe, Undermining Religion's Theme, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
Feb. 11, 2001, at ID; Kenneth L. Woodward, Of God and Mammon, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 12,
2001, at 24; Martha Minow, Vouching for Equality: Religious Schools Can Rank Among the
Choices, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2002, at B5; Laurie Goodstein, Bush's Charity Plan is Rais-
ing Concerns for Religious Right, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2001; Editorial, Public Interests:
Faith and Parking, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2001; Elizabeth Becker, Aid on Track to Religious
Charities, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2001; Laurie Goodstein, Support for Relig-
ious-Based Plan is Hedged, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2001; Laurie Goodstein, Battle Lines
Grow on Plan to Assist Religious Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2001; Editorial, Why Not
Try Vouchers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2001; Elizabeth Becker, Bush's Plan to Aid Religious
Groups is Faulted, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2001; Elizabeth Becker, Senate Delays Legislation
on Aid to Church Charities, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2001; Mike Allen, Bush Aims to Get Faith
Initiative Back on Track: Stricter Rules to be Added for Use of Funds by Groups, WASH.
POST, June 25, 2001, at Al; Juliet Eilperin, For N.Y. Minister, a Faith-Based "No" to U.S.
Aid, WASH. POST, June 26, 2001, at A2; Editorial, The Reality of Faith-Based Programs,
WASH. POST, July 7, 2001, at A22; Richard Morin & Claudia Deane, Conflict Resolution
Starts on Faith-Based Plan, WASH. POST, July 10, 2001, at A19; David S. Broder, More Risk
Than Reward?, WASH. POST, July 11, 2001, at A19; Dana Milbank, Bush Drops Rule on
Hiring of Gays: Democrats - "Faith-Based" Initiative at Risk, WASH. POST, July 11, 2001,
at Al; Editorial, The Faith-Based Problem, WASH. POST, July 15, 2001, at B6; Dana
Milbank, House to Take Up Faith Initiative, WASH. POST, July 18, 2001, at A4; Editorial,
Bad Bill in the House, WASH. POST, July 19, 2001, at A26; Juliet Eilperin, Faith Initiative
Hits Snag in House: GOP Moderates' Bias Concerns Postpone Vote, WASH. POST, July 19,
2001, at Al; Juliet Eilperin, Faith-Based Initiative Wins House Approval, WASH. POST, July
20, 2001, at A1; Jill Zuckman, Bush Victory: House Oks Faith-Based Initiative, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., July 20, 2001; Steve Tetreault, Bush Allows Religious Groups to Bid for Federal
Funds to Run Social Programs, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 22, 2001; E.J. Dionne, Jr., Faith-
Based Defense, WASH. POST, July 27, 2001, at A31; Hamil R. Harris, Congregation Wins
Credit Union Charter in Temple Hills, Bush Administration Lobbies for Support of Faith-
Based Initiative, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2001, at B3; Dana Milbank, Senate Faith Initiative
Backer to Drop Disputed Provisions, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2001, at A2; E.J. Dionne, Jr., Not
Just Faith Is at Work Here, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2001, at A15; Mike Allen, "Faith-Based"
Backup Plan: Agencies Look to Lower Barriers to Social Services Contracts, WASH. POST,
Aug. 17, 2001, at A2; Dana Milbank, Dilulio Resigns from Top "Faith-Based" Post: Diffi-
culties with Initiative in Congress Marked Seven Months at White House, WASH. POST, Aug.
18, 2001, at A4; Dana Milbank, Bush Urges Senators to Act on Faith Bill, WASH. POST,
Aug. 19, 2001, at A4; John A. Clahoun, Faith and Funding Simplified, WASH. POST, Aug.
29, 2001, at A21; David S. Broder, Bush's Domestic Agenda Takes Back Seat: Education
Reform, Faith-Based Initiatives Vie for Attention with Terrorist Fight, WASH. POST, Oct. 15,
2001, at A4; Dana Milbank, Charity Bill Compromise is Reached, WASH. POST, Feb. 6,
2002, at Al; Dana Milbank, Bush Endorses Compromise in Senate on Aid to Charities,
WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2002, at A4.
II Florida enacted a voucher program in 1999. See Florida Set to Provide Education
Vouchers, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Apr. 28, 1999, at 13A. This program was challenged in the
Florida courts, and is currently remanded to the trial court level. See Bush v. Holmes, 767
So. 2d 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). Maine, Vermont, Cleveland, and Milwaukee also
have voucher programs for public education. See Catherine L. Crisham, Note, The Writing
Is on the Wall of Separation: Why the Supreme Court Should and Will Uphold Full-Choice
School Voucher Programs, 89 GEO. L.J. 225, 233-34 (2000).
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and counties to donate money or supplies to nonprofit organizations "created
for religious, charitable or education purposes."'
' 2
The U.S. Supreme Court has shown increased disposition to approve crea-
tive programs under which sectarian institutions or religiously motivated per-
sons can participate on an equal basis in public programs.' 3 This term, the
Supreme Court has heard arguments in a challenge to the constitutionality of
the Cleveland school voucher program. 4 As courts hear challenges to the con-
stitutionality of these programs under the First Amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution, they have also had to confront - many for the first time - the legacy of
post-reconstruction anti-Catholicism: Little Blaine Amendments.
In this article we consider the effect of Article 11, Section 10, of the
Nevada Constitution on any "charitable choice," school voucher, or similar pro-
gram that might be proposed in Nevada. We begin in Part I with a review of
the context for the federal Blaine Amendment and the resulting state efforts to
adopt their own such amendments. In Part II, we provide background on the
dispute over state funding of the Nevada Orphan Asylum, the adoption of Sec-
tion 10, and the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in Hallock. Although no
Nevada courts have considered Section 10 since Hallock, the Nevada Attorney
General has issued many opinions citing Section 10 and relying on Hallock.
We review these decisions as well in Part II. In Part III, we discuss recent
developments in the U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence,
explaining why those developments will permit states to look to their own First
Amendment-type restrictions, including Little Blaine Amendments. We con-
clude in Part IV with some thoughts on how Section 10 might be construed in
future cases in Nevada.
I. CATHOLIC SCHOOLS, POLITICAL INFLUENCE AND THE BLAINE
AMENDMENT BEFORE CONGRESS AND THE STATES
A. Catholics, Schools, and Public Funding
The Blaine Amendment struck deep at America's religious tolerance and
exposed a growing rift between Catholics and Protestants involving not only
schools, but politics, language, and culture. At the time of the founding, the
United States was overwhelmingly Protestant. Questions of religious tolerance
were largely questions of tolerance among competing Protestant sects; colonial
Americans "accepted some diversity in the beliefs of other Protestants, and
barely tolerated Catholicism and Judaism.""' The framers had recognized the
possibility that the Free Exercise Clause would apply to Muslims, Hindus, and
12 NEV. REV. STAT. 244.1505, 268.028 (1999).
13 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Witters v.
Wash. Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
14 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779 (argued Feb. 20, 2002).
1" Office of Legal Policy, Report to the Attorney General: Religious Liberty Under the
Free Exercise Clause 23 (1986).
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"pagans,"' 6 but at the time none of these groups represented any serious threat
to Protestant-homogenous Americans.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, things had changed.
Catholic immigration and evangelization had swelled the numbers of American
Catholics. At the time of the founding, less than one percent of Americans
were Catholics; by the end of the Civil War, that figure was more than ten
percent.'7 Catholics increased their representation in the U.S. population gen-
erally, and their influence was concentrated largely in northern cities, in some
of which they constituted a majority.' 8 As their numbers grew, Catholic politi-
cal influence increased as well, and by 1876, it was generally assumed that the
Catholic vote had "determined the results of elections since 1870."19 The Vati-
can Decree of Papal Infallibility of 1870 added to the anti-Catholic sentiment
during this time.2 °
Perhaps the greatest source of friction between the Protestant majority and
the Catholic minority was the public school system. In the colonial era, educa-
tion was the domain of the church. The states either supported the church-
established schools or claimed no role in education. These roles reversed in the
nineteenth century as Jacksonian populists insisted that states provide a free
public education to all people. In 1852, Massachusetts adopted the first com-
pulsory education law in the United States; other states followed after the Civil
War.2 1 The first public schools, although not devoted to the teachings of any
particular denomination, embraced the notion of a "civic religion." The
schools taught fundamental principles that emphasized the common ground
between the various Protestant sects, rather than their differences.22 The public
schools routinely required pupils to pray, sing hymns, and read from the Bible,
practices that the U.S. Supreme Court ended in the 1960s. 23 The public educa-
tion movement reached its apex in the 1920s in state laws requiring a public
education.2 4
16 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 194 (J. Elliot ed., 1836) (statement of James Iredell).
"7 Toby J. Heytens, Note, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117, 135
(2000).
18 Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38, 42-43
(1992).
19 Marie Carolyn Klinkhamer, The Blaine Amendment of 1875: Private Motives for Politi-
cal Action, 42 CATH. HIST. REV. 15, 32 (1957).
20 See ANSON PHELPS STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES
329 (1964).
21 ORVILLE H. ZABEL, GOD AND CAESAR IN NEBRASKA: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL RELATION-
SHIP OF CHURCH AND STATE, 1854-1954, at 86-87 (1955). See also Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 238-40 & n.7 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
22 See Green, supra note 18, at 45 n.46, 56 n.115.
23 See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (state-prescribed prayers); Abington Sch.
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (state-supported Bible readings).
24 See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding unconstitutional Oregon's
compulsory public education law). See also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the
Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child As Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995,
1017-18 (1992) ("The guiding sentiment [for the compulsory public education movement]
... seems to have been an odd commingling of patriotic fervor, blind faith in the cure-all
powers of common schooling, anti-Catholic and anti-foreign prejudice, and the conviction
that private and parochial schools were breeding grounds of Bolshevism.").
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From the Catholics' perspective, public schools were Protestant schools.
Catholics took offense at the form of the prayers offered in public schools, the
nature of the hymns, and that students read from the King James Version rather
than the preferred Catholic text, the Douay translation of the Bible. 25 Catholics
responded to these developments by demanding public funding for their own
schools, insisting that school boards stop religious exercises, and bringing suits
to halt what they regarded as Protestant indoctrination.2 6 Although Catholics
had successfully obtained some public funding for their schools and had long
obtained public funds for their charitable activities, 27 their attacks on the public
schools brought an enormous backlash in the form of Protestant calls for
prohibitions on public funding of religious education and charitable institutions.
B. The Blaine Amendment
The Catholic question had been fomenting for a long time before President
Grant called for a constitutional amendment. As early as 1871, members of
Congress, including Nevada Senator William Stewart, had proposed amending
the U.S. Constitution to prohibit federal, state, and local governments from
funding sectarian schools. 28 Four years later, the President entered the debate.
At a convention in Iowa, President Grant urged that Americans "[e]ncourage
free schools, and resolve that not one dollar, appropriated for their support,
shall be appropriated to the support of any sectarian schools ... [E]very child
growing up in the land [should be afforded] the opportunity of a good common
school education, unmixed with sectarian, pagan, or atheistical dogmas."2 9
Three months later, in December 1875, President Grant requested that Congress
consider a formal amendment:
I suggest for your earnest consideration - and most earnestly recommend it - that a
constitutional amendment be submitted to the Legislatures of the several States for
ratification making it the duty of each of the several States to establish and forever
maintain free public schools adequate to the education of all the children in the rudi-
mentary branches within their respective limits, irrespective of sex, color, birthplace,
or religions; forbidding the teaching in said schools of religious, atheistic, or pagan
tenets; and prohibiting the granting of any school funds, or school taxes, or any part
25 Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, The First Amendment, and State Con-
stitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 657, 666 (1998). See also WILLIAM G. Ross,
FORGING NEW FREEDOMS: NATIvISM, EDUCATION, AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1917-1927, at
20, 23 (1994).
26 Green, supra note 18, at 41, 44-47; Viteritti, supra note 25, at 670. See also Jeffrey
Rosen, Is Nothing Secular?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000, § 6 at 40. See generally LLOYD P.
JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL, 1825-1925 (1987); DIANE RAVITCH,
THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS: NEW YORK CITY, 1805-1973 (1974).
27 Green, supra note 18, at 43.
28 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 592 (1871) (statement of Sen. Warner; presenting a
petition from citizens in Indiana); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 730 (1870) (proposal
of Sen. Stewart). Stewart's proposed amendment read in part:
There shall be maintained in each State and Territory a system of free common schools; but
neither the United States nor any State, Territory, county, or municipal corporation shall aid in
the support of any school wherein the peculiar tenets of any religious denomination are taught.
Id. The Senate never acted on the proposal. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 206
(1871); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3892 (1872).
29 Quoted in Green, supra note 18, at 47.
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thereof, either by legislative, municipal, or other authority, for the benefit or in aid,
directly or indirectly, of any religious sect or denomination .... 30
A week later Representative James Blaine of Maine introduced in the
House of Representatives what would have become the Sixteenth Amendment
and became known as the "Blaine Amendment."'3 1 The proposed amendment
came before the House in August 1876, where it occasioned relatively little
debate.3 2 The debate began in the Senate about the same time, but was far
more extensive.3 3 We will not recount all of the debate, which has been
reviewed elsewhere, for its import (if any) on the question of whether the Four-
teenth Amendment made the First Amendment applicable to the states. 34 For
our purposes, we wish to review briefly the concerns senators expressed over
the amendment's application (or not) to sectarian charitable causes as well as to
sectarian schools.
The Blaine Amendment, as recommended by the House, was difficult to
decipher. The amendment forbade tax money or public lands devoted to "the
support of public schools" from being "divided between religious sects or
denominations." Did that mean that money that had not been earmarked for
use by public schools could be spent on sectarian education? Or did it mean
that no public funds could be used in support of sectarian education, but public
funds might be used in other sectarian activities? What, precisely, was the
scope of the Blaine Amendment? According to Senator Frelinghuysen, the
amendment proposed by the House "only applie[d] to a school fund .... There
is not a word in the amendment that prohibits public money from being appro-
30 4 CONG. REC. 175 (1876). At the end of his state of the union report, President Grant
repeated that "No sectarian tenets shall ever be taught in any school supported in whole or in
part by the State, nation, or by the proceeds of any tax levied upon any community." Id. at
181.
31 The amendment stated:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State for the support of public schools,
or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be
under the control of any religious sect, nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted be
divided between religious sects or denominations.
Id. at 205.
Blaine had served as Speaker of the House from 1866 to 1874, when the Republicans
lost control of the House of Representatives. Although Blaine introduced the proposed
amendment as a member of the House, by the time either house considered it, Blaine had
assumed a seat in the Senate. Blaine aspired to run for the presidency in 1876, and when he
failed to secure the nomination, he lost interest in the amendment and did not even vote on
the proposal. Green, supra note 18, at 53, 67-68.
32 4 CONG. REC. 5189-92 (1876) (The final vote was 180 to 7, with 98 not voting.).
33 See 4 CONG. REC. 5245-46, 5357, 5453-61, 5561-62, 5580-95 (1876).
14 See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 256-58 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 169-70 (1986); Jay S.
Bybee, Taking Liberties With the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1596-98 (1995); Daniel 0. Conkle,
Toward A General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 1115, 1137-39
(1988); Green, supra note 18; William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause:
Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 1208-11 (1990);
Alfred W. Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 HARV. L. REV. 939
(1951); F. William O'Brien, The States and "No Establishment": Proposed Amendments to
the Constitution Since 1798, 4 WASHBURN L.J. 183, 186-94 (1965).
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priated to theological seminaries, to reformatories, to monasteries, to nunneries,
to houses of the Good Shepherd, and many kindred purposes. 35 But Senator
Christiancy argued that the amendment did not prohibit "the States raising any
amount of money . . . to the support of private schools for instruction in the
religion of any sect. '"36
In response to these concerns, the Senate Judiciary Committee proposed a
much broader substitute, one that banned federal and state governments from
using any "revenue ...or loan of credit . . . for the support of any school,
education or other institution under the control of any religious or anti-religious
sect, organization, or denomination."3 7 Curiously, it specifically provided that
the amendment "shall not be construed to prohibit the reading of the Bible in
any school or institution."3 8 As we might have expected, the latter provision
stirred debate over whether reading the Bible was a religious activity or a secta-
rian activity and whether it was consistent with the Establishment Clause.39
Two things were clear from the subsequent Senate debates: the Blaine Amend-
ment was part of a larger Catholic-Protestant debate,4" and, as amended in the
Senate, the Amendment would have applied to orphanages and other chari-
ties. 4 In the end, the Blaine Amendment failed - barely - in the Senate,
twenty-eight to sixteen.42
35 4 CONG. REc. 5245 (1876) (statement of Sen. Frelinghuysen).
36 Id. (statement of Sen. Christiancy). See also id. at 5246 (statement of Sen. Morton).
17 Id. at 5453. The proposal read:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; and no religious test shall ever be required as qualification to any office or
public trust under any State. No public property and no public revenue of, nor any loan of credit
by or under the authority of, the United States, or any State, Territory, District, or municipal
corporation, shall be appropriated to or made or used for the support of any school, education or
other institution under the control of any religious or anti-religious sect, organization, or denomi-
nation, or wherein the particular creed or tenets of any religious or anti-religious sect, organiza-
tion, or denomination shall be taught. And no such particular creed or tenets shall be read or
taught in any school or institution supported in whole or in part by such revenue or loan of credit;
and no such appropriation or loan of credit shall be made to any religious or anti-religious sect,
organization, or denomination, or to promote its interests or tenets. This article shall not be
construed to prohibit the reading of the Bible in any school or institution; and it shall not have
the effect to impair rights of property already vested.
Sec. 2. Congress shall have power, by appropriate legislation, to provide for the prevention and
punishment of violations of this article.
38 Id.
" See, e.g., id. at 5562 (statement of Sen. Frelinghuysen), 5588 (statement of Sen.
Edmunds), 5590 (statement of Sen. Bogy), 5593 (statement of Sen. Eaton).
'4 See, e.g., id. at 5455 (statement of Sen. Randolph), 5562 (statement of Sen. Frelinghuy-
sen), 5585 (statement of Sen. Morton), 5589-90 (statement of Sen. Stevenson), 5590-91
(statement of Sen. Bogy), 5593 (statements of Sens. Eaton and Morton).
41 See, e.g., id. at 5561 (statement of Sen. Frelinghuysen), 5582 (statement of Sen. Kernan),
5585 (statement of Sen. Kernan), 5592 (statement of Sen. Eaton). Senator Eaton of Connect-
icut, for example, pointed out that in Hartford there were two asylums, one Catholic and one
Protestant, with about five hundred children. "Hartford.. . by this amendment cannot give a
thousand dollars a year to each of those two asylums although by doing it they should save
$20,000 a year. It is absurd." Id. at 5592.
42 Id. at 5595.
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C. "Little Blaine Amendments" and the States
What Congress failed to adopt for the nation, most of the states enacted for
themselves. The movement to adopt "Little Blaine Amendments" actually pre-
dated President Grant's call for a constitutional amendment, although the con-
troversy over the federal amendment surely reinforced state activity.
According to one count, by 1876 fourteen states had adopted some kind of
constitutional restriction on funding sectarian education.43 During the 1870s,
including the period following the debates over the Blaine Amendment, some
nine additional states (including Nevada) adopted Little Blaine Amendments.4 4
Additionally, Congress began requiring new states, as a condition of their
entering the union, to include some kind of Little Blaine Amendment in their
constitution.45 Whether by their own hand or by congressional mandate, by
1890, at least twenty-nine states had some kind of constitutional prohibition on
the use of public funds for sectarian education or other purposes.4 6
Some of the state provisions applied quite specifically to schools. Califor-
nia, for example, provided in its constitution of 1879:
No public money shall ever be appropriated for the support of any sectarian or
denominational school, or any school not under the exclusive control of the officers
of the public schools; nor shall any sectarian or denominational doctrine be taught, or
instruction thereon be permitted, directly or indirectly, in any of the common schools
of this State.
47
Other provisions adopted during this period reflected a somewhat broader
prohibition. The Illinois Constitution of 1870 prohibited the use of public
funds for church controlled schools and "anything in aid of any church or secta-
rian purpose. '48 The Illinois provision applied to more than churches, but was
not clear whether "sectarian purpose" included schools and charitable institu-
4 Green, supra note 18, at 43.
44 Viteritti, supra note 25, at 673 n.78. Professor Viteritti lists the states as Colorado, Illi-
nois, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Inexplicably,
he omits Nevada.
41 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 220 n.9 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
46 See Green, supra note 18, at 43; Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: Religious Free-
dom and Educational Opportunity Under Constitutional Federalism, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 113, 146 (1996); Viteritti, supra note 25, at 673-75. Congress also required states
entering the union after 1890 to adopt some kind of provision guaranteeing public schools
free from sectarian control. See Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 636 (Ariz. 1999) (Feld-
man, J., dissenting); Robert F. Utter & Edward J. Larson, Church and State on the Frontier:
The History of the Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Constitution, 15 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 451, 458-67 (1988).
There are some inconsistencies in the estimates of the number of states enacting Little
Blaine Amendments. See Heytens, supra note 17, at 123 n.32. As we have already noted,
supra note 44, Nevada is often omitted from such lists. We have not attempted to reconcile
the numbers. The current state provisions are listed, and many are discussed, in Frank R.
Kemerer, State Constitutions and School Vouchers, 120 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1997).
" CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8 (1879), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 432 (Francis Newton Thorpe, ed. 1909)
[hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS]. The current version is CAL. CONST. art.
16, § 5.
48 ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (1870), reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 47, at 1035.
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tions. Furthermore, the phrase "sectarian purpose" begged the question raised
during the Blaine Amendment debates whether educational instruction could be
religious without being "sectarian." A provision of the Florida Declaration of
Rights, adopted in 1885, simply prohibited aid to "any church, sect, or religious
denomination or .. .any sectarian institution. '49 It seems more likely that
Florida's provision would have prohibited aid to charitable institutions, so long
as they were maintained by a sect or religious denomination. South Dakota
was even more specific: "No money or property of the state shall be given or
appropriated for the benefit of any sectarian or religious society or institu-
tion."'50 Although the states adopted various Little Blaine Amendments, it is at
least clear that the states generally intended to forbid the use of public funds in
sectarian schools; and in some cases, it appears that the amendments extended
to other sectarian institutions as well.
II. THE NEVADA CONSTITUTION, RELIGION, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
A. The Nevada Constitution and Sectarian Instruction in Public Schools
When Congress authorized the people of the Territory of Nevada to adopt
a constitution and seek admission to the Union, it required as a condition that
Nevada secure "perfect toleration of religious sentiment" and that "no inhabi-
tant of said state shall ever be molested in person or property on account of his
or her mode of religious worship."'" Nevada adopted a provision, identical to
California's provision, protecting "free exercise" and "liberty of conscience. "52
The Nevada Constitution does not expressly prevent religious establishment,
although the Attorney General has so construed the free exercise provision.5 3
The Nevada Constitution placed special importance on education and
devoted Article 11 to the issue. Consistent with the nationwide movement
underway in the 1860s, the Nevada Constitution instructed the legislature to
provide for a "uniform system of common schools" and "to secure a general
attendance of the children in each school district upon said public schools."5 4
49 FLA. DECL. OF RTS. § 6 (1885), reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 47, at 733.
50 S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889), reprinted in 6 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 47, at 3370.
51 An Act to enable the People of Nevada to form a Constitution and State Government, § 4,
13 Stat. 31 (1864). Congress placed similar restrictions in the enabling acts for the constitu-
tions of Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and
Wyoming. See STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 20, at 158.
52 NEV. CONST. art. I, § 4. The provision reads:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or
preference shall forever be allowed in this State, and no person shall be rendered incompetent to
be a witness on account of his opinions on matters of his religious belief, but the liberty of
conscience hereby secured, shall not be so construed, as to excuse acts of licentiousness or
justify practices inconsistent with the peace, or safety of this State.
See CALIF. CONST. art. I, § 4 (1849), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 47, at 391. California's provision follows closely a provision in the New York
Constitution of 1777. N.Y. CONST. art. xxxviii (1777), reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 47, at 2636-37.
53 Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 320 (Mar. 3, 1954).
5' NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
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Although the original Nevada Constitution did not contain a formal Establish-
ment Clause, Article 11, Section 2 stated that any school district allowing
"instruction of a sectarian character" could be deprived of its portion of public
school funding. As if for further emphasis, Section 9 repeated that "No secta-
rian instruction shall be imparted or tolerated in any school or University that
may be established under this Constitution. '5 5 Although these provisions
applied only to public institutions, they raised, but left unanswered, an issue
brought up during the congressional debates over the Blaine Amendment: Is
"sectarian instruction" the same as "general religious instruction"?
Little guidance on this question is available from the constitutional
debates. One delegate stated that "[t]his matter of religious and sectarian influ-
ence in the public schools, is, of all things, most calculated to arouse suspicious
and jealousies in the public mind, and if the enemies of the Constitution can see
anything in our action on that subject to carp at, they will be sure to make the
greatest possible amount of capital out of it."56 Some members argued that the
Section 2 provision did not represent a positive prohibition against imparting
sectarian instruction, and therefore called for an addition to the section or per-
haps an entirely new provision to do that.57 The delegates settled on the idea of
a new section, as this would allow coverage of all levels of state-financed edu-
cation, including universities and colleges, which were not covered by Section
2. As Mr. Brosnan, the sponsor of the bill, stated, "let my amendment apply to
all the schools." 58 Brosnan's amendment became Section 9.59
B. The Nevada Constitution and the Nevada Orphan Asylum
In the same year that Nevadans adopted their constitution, Father
Manogue and the Sisters of Charity organized the Nevada Orphan Asylum.
6 0
They chose Virginia City as the site for the Asylum, probably because Storey
County had the largest population of any county in Nevada at that time and
because the high-risk nature of mining created a local need for an orphanage. 6 1
Despite the advent of such safety enhancements as square-set timbering and
improvements in other machinery used in the Comstock mines, the danger of
cave-ins, fire, falling timber within the mines, defective cables and other
machinery continued to make life in the mines hazardous. 62 The Asylum took
55 NEV. CONST. art. XI, §§ 2, 9. See also OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEED-
INGS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 565 (1866) [hereinaf-
ter OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES]. This Article was originally titled Article 12, but in
the final form of the Nevada Constitution became Article 11.
56 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES, supra note 55, at 566.
57 Id. at 660-61.
58 Id. at 661.
59 NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 9.
6 HUBERT HOWE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF NEVADA 1540-1888, at 301 (1981).
61 The census data from 1860 for Nevada are incomplete, as the territory was not organized
until 1861. However, in 1870 the state had a population of 42,491, of which 11,359 lived in
Storey County. The next largest county, Ormsby, had a population of 3,668. See U.S. Cen-
sus 1900, 30.
62 RUSSELL R. ELLIOTT, HISTORY OF NEVADA 144 (1973). As an example of this danger, in
the year 1878 there were twenty-six fatal accidents on the Comstock: "four from caving,
four from premature explosion of powder, six from falls unconnected with hoisting machin-
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in not only children without parents, but also those of single parents who felt
they could not adequately provide for the rearing of the child.6 3 The first build-
ing consisted of a single room for the sisters and the twelve orphans that consti-
tuted the original population.
A number of immigrant groups formed the backbone of the laboring class
on the Comstock, including the Welsh, who constituted the largest such
group, 64 the Germans, French, Italians, Hispanic, and the Cornish.6 5 Many of
the Cornish and Welsh were still in the area as a result of the California gold
rush. In 1870, the foreign-born residents of Virginia City outnumbered the
native-born residents, and even as late as 1880, when the mines had begun to
decline, there were almost four times as many foreign-born members of the
labor force as native-born.6 6 The major religious denominations of the area
were the Catholics, the Methodists, and the Episcopalians, with smaller groups
of Presbyterians and Baptists.67 Many of these groups held religious services
in the immigrants' native languages.68
By 1866, the Nevada Orphan Asylum had debts of over $8,000, and legis-
lators raised the question of public funding to aid the Asylum. 69 Senator Sum-
ner introduced a bill in January 1866 to appropriate $10,000 to the Asylum.70
The Virginia Daily Union called the bill "most meritorious," adding that the
benefits would be felt "more or less, throughout the State, and in equal propor-
tion as they are felt in our own vicinity."7 1 A petition from local businessmen
in support of the bill stated that the original hope that the Asylum could be
funded with local contributions had faded due to "the general depreciation of
the business interests of this section of the State," and that this downturn neces-
sitated some state support to allow the Asylum to continue operating.72
The Senate Committee on State Affairs visited the Asylum, filed a report
on the general conditions found there, and recommended passage of the
requested appropriation. The Committee concluded that it would be financially
impossible for the state to construct and maintain its own home and, therefore,
the state should fund the Asylum.73 The report summarily dismissed concerns
that an appropriation to the private institution would violate Article 11, Section
9 of the state constitution: "For numerous reasons, too obvious to require men-
ery, one from being crushed by a cage in motion, three from defective machinery in shaft
works, six from heat, and two from hoisting machinery."
63 Anne M. Butler, Mission in the Mountains: The Daughters of Charity in Virginia City, in
COMSTOCK WOMEN: THE MAKING OF A MINING COMMUNITY 156-57 (Ronald M. James &
C. Elizabeth Raymond eds., 1998). These one-parent children were often called "half-
orphans." See REPORT OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE STATE ORPHANS' HOME FOR
THE ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH FISCAL YEARS (1877).
64 ELLIOTT, supra note 62, at 148.
65 Butler, supra note 63, at 159.
66 ELLIOTT, supra note 62, at 141.
67 Id. at 373. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, or Mormon Church, was the
first to organize in the area, but by about 1857 that group had withdrawn to Utah territory.
68 Id. at 148.
69 A Law That Should Pass, VA. DAILY UNION, Feb. 8, 1866, at 2.
70 Nev. Senate Journal and Appendix, Second Session 30 (1866).
71 The Sisters of Charity, VA. DAILY UNION, Jan. 20, 1866, at 2.
72 The Orphan Asylum Bill, CARSON DAILY APPEAL, Feb. 3, 1866, at 2.
73 Nev. Senate Journal and Appendix, supra note 70, at 112.
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tion, this section is wholly inapplicable as against the appropriation asked in
this case."7 4 . When the bill came up for a final vote, Senator Lockwood
attempted to insert a section incorporating the language of Section 9, that "no
sectarian instruction shall be imparted or tolerated in any school or university
that may be established or maintained under this Act." This attempt failed, and
the bill passed the Senate and went to the Assembly.7 5
The Assembly also weighed the costs of Nevada establishing its own
orphanage versus the funding of the church-operated Asylum. The Committee
of Ways and Means recommended rejecting the Asylum bill, along with
another bill that would have funded an Episcopal Parish school, on the grounds
that both bills would enable the institutions to "train up the children in the
tenets or religious belief of the respective churches." 76 The Committee also
expressed concern that the funding would be used "in defraying the ordinary
current expenses" of the Asylum, thereby increasing the likelihood that the
Asylum would require an annual appropriation.7 7 A minority report argued
that the cost to the state of establishing its own orphanage would be "not less
than four times the amount here asked," and questioned whether the "injunction
... [to] feed and clothe and expend wearisome labor and undergo painful solic-
itude in the care of little orphan children" belonged to any one sect.78 Repre-
sentative Hinckley entered a protest against the bill, "considering it the first
step toward uniting Church and State" in Nevada.79 Despite the Committee's
recommendation, the Assembly passed the bill and sent it to the Governor.8 °
Governor Henry Blasdel vetoed the bill based on Article 8, Section 9, of
the state constitution.8" This section mandated that the state could only donate
money to "corporations formed for educational or charitable purposes" and, the
Governor argued, the Asylum did not meet this requirement because it had not
been incorporated.8" The Governor remarked that the framers of the constitu-
tion wisely included this as a debt control measure, and that, because of its
debts, the state was "not in a condition to make this donation, or any such,
however laudable."8 3 The Senate attempted but failed to override the veto.84
The actions of the Governor drew both criticism and praise from local newspa-
pers. The Virginia Daily Union opined that "Governor Blasdel is a conscien-
tious man and is possessed of constitutional venerance gratifying to behold, in
fact ... he would experience a happy dissolution could he quietly enfold him-
self within the pages of a ponderous Constitution and gently dissolute."8 5 The
Carson Daily Appeal supported the Governor's decision and criticized Senator
74 Id. at 113.
75 Id. at 147.
76 Nev. Assembly Journal and Appendix, Second Session 208 (1866).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 248-49.
'9 Good God!, VA. DAILY UNION, Feb. 28, 1866, at 2.
80 Two Important Bills Passed, CARSON DAILY APPEAL, Feb. 27, 1866, at 2.




84 Nev. Senate Journal and Appendix, supra note 70, at 253.
85 Truly Unfortunate, VA. DAILY UNION, Mar. 1, 1866, at 2.
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Sumner for having sponsored the Asylum bill for "his own advancement with
the Irish (whom he seems to be anxious to encourage in their clanishness)" and
for placing the Governor in the position of having to veto the legislation,
thereby diminishing his chances at being renominated for the governorship.8 6
During the next legislature session, Senator Sumner introduced a similar
bill to fund the Asylum. In the meantime, however, the Sisters of Charity had
incorporated the Asylum, thereby curing the Governor's previous objection to
state funding.87 The bill passed the Senate with little fanfare, but there was
again a protest over the possible connection of church and state.8 8 A Select
Committee reported favorably on the bill, arguing that the state "has not, and is
not likely in the near future, to provide a separate institution."8 9 The Assembly
agreed with the Senate and voted to provide $5000 to support the Asylum over
a two-year period. The bill, however, required that "in receiving or rejecting
applicants for admission into said Asylum, no distinction or preference shall be
made or given on account of the nationality or religion of the applicant, or his
or her parents."9 °
In the 1869 legislative session, the battle over the Asylum heated up. Sen-
ator Grey introduced Senate Bill 12, requesting $6000 in financial support for
the Asylum, which the Senate approved. 9 There was only modest discussion
of the sectarian purpose for this appropriation, and Senator Grey commented
that he "was glad to find that bigotry had narrowed itself down to a very small
compass."9 2 In the meantime, Assemblyman Potter introduced Assembly Bill
108, requesting funding for a State Orphan Home including $8000 to build or
purchase a suitable building in Carson City and $7000 for the support of the
orphans. 93 The Senate and Assembly approved both Senate Bill 12 and
Assembly Bill 108, and the Governor signed both.94
The legislature had determined both to establish a state orphanage and to
continue funding the Asylum. Any doubt as to the legislature's intentions was
dispelled by Section 13 of the act establishing the State Orphan Home, which
provided:
On or before the first day of October, A.D. 1870, it shall be the duty of the Board of
Directors of the State Orphan Home to notify the Trustees of the Nevada Orphan
Asylum that they will receive all orphans in their charge, and will bear all the neces-
sary expenses in their removal.95
86 Governor Blasdel and the Orphan Asylum Bill, CARSON DAILY APPEAL, Nov. 1, 1866, at
2.
87 Butler, supra note 63, at 153.
88 Nev. Senate Journal and Appendix, Third Session, 176 (1867).
89 Nev. Assembly Journal and Appendix, Third Session, 222 (1867).
90 1867 Nev. Stat. 130-31.
91 Nev. Senate Journal, Fourth Session, 21, 104 (1869); Senate - Ninth Day, TERRITORIAL
ENTERPRISE, Jan. 13, 1869, at 2.
92 Thirty-Second Day - Senate, TERRITORIAL ENTERPRISE, Feb. 5, 1869, at 2.
9' House - Forty-fourth Day, TERRITORIAL ENTERPRISE, Feb. 18, 1869, at 2. The act
required that the citizens of Ormsby County donate ten acres of land within Carson City.
The Orphans' Home, CARSON DAILY APPEAL, Oct. 7, 1869, at 3.
9 Nev. Assembly Journal, Fourth Session, 164-65, 281 (1869); Nev. Senate Journal, supra
note 91, at 284.
95 1869 Nev. Stat. 168.
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Any orphans in the charge of, or supported by, the state were to be
removed from the Asylum and placed in the State Orphans Home. It seems
obvious that if the state established its own orphanage and removed orphans it
was supporting from the Asylum that the legislature would no longer fund the
Asylum, and it might be forced to close. Perhaps the point was too obvious for
words, because there was no such discussion in the legislative debates.
The State Orphan Home apparently opened as scheduled in 1870. The
legislature, nevertheless, continued funding the Asylum in the 1871 term.96 In
the 1873 term, the Assembly considered funding the Asylum, but the bill was
withdrawn at the request of Sister Frederica, head of the Sisters of Charity at
the Asylum, who believed that the Asylum lacked support for further funding:
"[O]f late, a hostile feeling has risen against [the orphans]. If we are not enti-
tled to the appropriation in justice, we do not look for it in charity."9 7 She also
charged that the enemies of the Asylum had approached legislative candidates
and informed them that their support in the election depended on the candi-
dates' opposition to further funding for the Asylum.9 8 She felt the loss of fund-
ing was evidence of a larger anti-Catholic sentiment.99
The legislature eventually funded the State Orphan Home and directed that
orphans housed in the Asylum at state expense could be transferred "at any
time desired by the Trustees of the Nevada Orphan Asylum."'" This provision
was a minor change from the 1869 act, which directed that all orphans receiv-
ing state support should be transferred from the Asylum to the Home.
Although Nevada had established its own orphanage, it continued to fund the
Asylum, despite increasing controversy over the Asylum.'O°
C. The Passage of Nevada's Little Blaine Amendment
1. Section 10 Before the Assembly and the People
In February 1877, just six months after Congress considered the Blaine
Amendment, Assemblyman W.H. Botsford, representing Storey County, pro-
posed amending Article 11 of the Nevada Constitution. 0 2 The proposed Sec-
tion 10 read: "No public funds, of any kind or character whatever, State,
county, or municipal, shall be used for sectarian purposes."1 0 3 In order to
amend the Nevada Constitution, the resolution had to pass both houses of the
legislature in two succeeding legislative sessions, and then be approved by the
voters of the state."° The Assembly adopted the Joint Resolution unanimously
96 Nev. Journal of the Senate, Fifth Session, 101, 109 (1871); Nev. Journal of the Assembly,
Fifth Session, 103, 158, 319 (1871). The Act appropriated $5000 to the Asylum for two
years.
17 Butler, supra note 63, at 156. See also Nevada State Archives and Records Management,
State Children's Home History, at http://dmla.clan.lib.nv.us/docs/nsla/archives/archival/
exec/orphange.htm (last visited June 14, 2000); Nev. Journal of the Assembly 138, 202, 224
(1873).
98 Id.
99 Id. at 159.
"o 1873 Nev. Stat. 103-04.
10' There was no legislation concerning the Nevada Orphan Asylum in 1875.
102 Nevada Legislature, EUREKA DAILY REPUBLICAN, Feb. 20, 1877, at 2.
103 1877 Nev. Stat. 221.
"0 NEV. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
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on the day it was introduced,' °5 and the Senate passed the measure a week later
with only two dissenting votes. '0 6 The Nevada Daily Tribune praised Assem-
blyman Botsford for introducing the legislation and implied that the amend-
ment had its origins in the same anti-Catholic fervor sweeping the rest of the
nation.
This is a move in the right direction and will, we trust, meet with the hearty approval
of every citizen of Nevada... for this is a stepping stone to the final breaking up of a
power that has long cursed the world, and that is obtaining too much of a foothold in
these United States. '
0 7
Ironically, at the same time the legislature was considering the amend-
ment, Senator Frank Stewart of Storey County introduced a bill requesting a
"fund for the relief of the several orphan asylums" in the state.'0 8 The Senate
passed the bill easily.'0 9 The Assembly, however, rejected the bill on the first
reading." 0 The Territorial Enterprise supported the appropriation, arguing
that the State Orphan Home was full and that it would be less expensive for the
state to house any remaining orphans at other institutions within the state rather
than having to ship them to shelters in other states, the "other institutions"
being the Asylum operated by the Sisters of Charity in Virginia City. The
Enterprise urged that "[i]t is no appropriation of money for a sectarian purpose
and by no fair construction can be so esteemed. It is simply a matter of bread
and clothes for the children of Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and others who had
no religion but whose children need protection.'' l
The irony continued during the following legislative session. The Assem-
bly again approved the proposed amendment unanimously, and this time the
Senate did as well."' The proposal to amend the Constitution to prohibit pub-
lic funding of sectarian purposes could now be placed on the ballot in the 1880
general election. Just one month later, Senator Farrell, who had voted in favor
of the proposed amendment, introduced a bill authorizing funding for the Asy-
lum." '3 When the Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary recommended
rejection of the bill, the Senate voted to table the bill." 4
Question Two in the 1880 Nevada general election gave the voters their
chance to approve Section 10, which they did overwhelmingly by a vote of
14,216 to 672.1"5 At that time, there were 62,266 people living in Nevada, with
16,115 of those living in Storey County, home to the Asylum. 1 6 There is
105 Nev. Journal of the Assembly, Eighth Session, 238 (1877). Unfortunately, there are no
extant records of the debate, if any, over the Joint Resolution.
" Nev. Journal of the Senate, Eighth Session, 272 (1877).
107 A Much Needed Amendment, DAILY NEV. TRIB., Feb. 21, 1877, at 3.
108 Nev. Journal of the Senate, supra note 106, at 233.
109 Id. at 293-94.
110 Nev. Journal of the Assembly, supra note 105, at 330.
"' The Orphan Bill, TERRITORIAL ENTERPRISE, Feb. 25, 1877, at 2.
112 Nev. Journal of the Senate, Ninth Session 77, 79 (1879).
113 Id. at 252.
114 Id. at 263, 311.
"5 The vote meant that 95.5 percent approved the measure and only 4.5 percent rejected it.
DEAN HELLER, POLITICAL HISTORY OF NEVADA 269 (10th ed. 1997). The bill was mistak-
enly placed on the ballot in some counties in 1878, prior to its having been approved twice
by the legislature as required.
116 U.S. Census 1900 at 30.
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some question as to how much interest this question received in other parts of
the state. Several years after the passage of this Section 10, G. R. Alexander,
Superintendent of Schools for Lincoln County, stated that his district was
experiencing problems with sectarianism in their schools. Apparently some
teachers were using The Book of Mormon as a reader. His proposed solution to
this problem was that "every teacher should take the Constitutional oath, as our
Constitution provides, and that there should be a non-sectarian clause in addi-
tion."'1 7 While this is far from conclusive evidence of a lack of statewide
interest or knowledge of this amendment, it may help demonstrate the localized
nature of the concern generated by the activities of the Asylum.
2. Section 10 Before the Nevada Supreme Court
During the first legislative session following the approval of the amend-
ment, Assemblyman Mooney of Storey County introduced Bill 87, which once
again appropriated funds "for the relief of the several orphan asylums of this
State."' 18 The Assembly referred the bill to the Committee on State Institu-
tions, which recommended passage." 9 The Committee of the Whole also rec-
ommended passage, and the bill passed by a vote of thirty-seven to two.120 The
Carson Daily Index warned that passage of the bill threatened to make the
Asylum "a mere branch of the State Orphans' Home, so far as participation in
the funds of the State is concerned." 12 1 The Daily Index went on to state that
any money granted to the Asylum "is in contravention to the principle that no
moneys [sic] should be appropriated from the State Treasury for religious or
sectarian purposes."' 22 A few days later, the same newspaper stated that "[t]his
State has a charity of its own for which to provide, in the care of orphan chil-
dren. So long as the State expends its money in that direction, it ought not to
be called upon to support private sectarian charities of a similar nature.'"23
Despite the editorial pressure, the Senate passed the measure by a nineteen to
four vote, 124 and the Governor signed it into law. 125 A Daily Index editorial
stated that "[tihe disbursement of this money will be clearly for sectarian pur-
poses, contrary to the amendment to the Constitution that was adopted at the
last general election," adding that the State Controller, Treasurer, or Governor
could refuse to release the payment or that legal proceedings could be under-
taken "to restrain the payment of the monies, although we have not been
advised of any." 126
In July 1881, the Asylum attempted to collect the first installment of the
funding approved by the legislature.' 2 7 From the Governor to the Controller,
117 BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF THE STATE OF
NEVADA, 1883-1884, at 10.
"I Nev. Journal of the Assembly, Tenth Session, 125 (1881).
'19 Id. at 205.
120 Nev. Journal of the Assembly, Tenth Session, 213-14 (1881).
121 The Catholic Asylum Bill, CARSON DAILY INDEX, Feb. 20, 1881, at 2.
122 Id.
123 News of the Day, CARSON DAILY INDEX, Feb. 23, 1881, at 2.
124 Nev. Journal of the Senate, Tenth Session, 265 (1881).
125 Catholic Orphan Asylum, CARSON DAILY INDEX, June 3, 1881, at 3.
126 Id.
127 That Sectarian Bill, DAILY NEV. ST. J., Aug. 3, 1881, at 3.
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Nevada's executive officials doubted whether they could fund the Asylum con-
sistent with the Nevada Constitution. Governor John Kinkead signed the bill,
but stated that, in his view, the bill conflicted with the state constitution. "This
I believe is beyond the power of the Board of Examiners to determine and must
be settled by judicial decision."' 12 8 Secretary of State Jasper Barcock also
signed the bill, but stated that he doubted the constitutionality of the bill.
129
Attorney General M. A. Murphy declined to sign the bill "because I believe it
to be appropriating money for sectarian purposes, which we are forbidden to do
by Section 10 of Art. XI."'1 30 State Controller J. F. Hallock refused to sign or
pay the warrant for the same reasons.'
3 1
When Hallock refused to release the Asylum's funds authorized by the
legislature, the Asylum filed an original action in the Nevada Supreme Court,
seeking a writ of mandamus against the state controller to compel payments of
$1,279.79.132 In State ex rel. Nevada Orphan Asylum v. Hallock, the Nevada
Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Orville Leonard,
denied the writ on the grounds that the Asylum was a sectarian institution, and
therefore could not obtain state funding under Section 10.
Counsel for the Asylum offered a two-fold argument. First, they argued
that the term "sectarian" referred to those Christian doctrines upon which vari-
ous Christian denominations disagreed. By contrast, they argued, the word
"sectarian" did not include "the teaching of any doctrines upon which all Chris-
tian denominations agree .... Christianity [being] a part of the common law of
the state of Nevada."' 1 33 To the extent that the Asylum taught Protestant chil-
dren Christian doctrines, the Asylum was not engaged in "sectarian" activi-
ties. 1 34 Second, counsel for the Asylum contended that, in any event, monies
received from the state were used for housing and feeding children. Accord-
ingly, even if the Nevada Orphan Asylum were a "sectarian institution," state
monies were not being used for "sectarian purposes."' 135 The Attorney General
denied that Christianity was part of Nevada's law. He further argued that "sec-





132 State ex rel. Nev. Orphan Asylum v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373, 376 (1882).
113 Id. at 374 (argument for counsel for the Asylum).
134 There was conflicting testimony given at the hearing about the daily prayers. Sister
Vibianna testified that only Catholic children received Catholic instruction, while other chil-
dren could read works from the library during this time. She also stated that non-Catholic
children could attend the church of their choice if accompanied by a responsible party. Testi-
mony of Sister Vibianna at 5, Nev. Orphan Asylum v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373 (1882). Ida
Morgan, who had attended the Asylum school as a child, testified that no religious instruc-
tion occurred during her time at the Asylum. Testimony of Ida Morgan at 1, Hallock. How-
ever, Mary Elizabeth Stewart testified that the Sisters would not allow her to repeat the
prayers her mother taught her as a child, and that the Sisters required her to learn the Cate-
chism. Testimony of Mary Elizabeth Stewart at 2, Hallock. Clara Kenney also stated that
the Sisters required her to learn the Catechism, and that when she failed to repeat a portion of
it upon request from Sister Frederica, she was "whipped with a strap." Testimony of Clara
Kenney at 1-2, Hallock.
135 Hallock, 16 Nev. at 375 (argument for counsel for the Asylum).
136 Id. at 376 (argument for the Attorney General).
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lum by its nature was a "sectarian institution," it was barred from receiving
state funding for any purposes. 3 7
The Supreme Court characterized the issue as whether "the Nevada
Orphan Asylum [was] a sectarian institution, and would the payment of its
claim be using the state's funds for sectarian purposes."' 138 The court observed
that "it [was] not plain, from the amendment itself, what the people meant by
the words 'sectarian purposes,"' and that the court would examine the history
of state appropriations. The court found that, "with one exception, [the Nevada
Orphan Asylum] has been, and is the only applicant for state aid, where the
question of sectarianism could have been raised."' 39 From the fact that the
Nevada Orphan Asylum was the only institution "of a sectarian character" to
have applied and received state funds, the court deduced that "in the minds of
the people, the use of public funds for the benefit of [the Asylum] and kindred
institutions, was an evil which ought to be remedied."' 40 Indeed, the court
said, "[the Asylum's] continued applications greatly, if not entirely, impelled
the adoption of the constitutional amendment."'
' 4
'
The court thus suggested that the term "sectarian" had to be understood
against the background for the Amendment. If the Amendment did not apply to
the Asylum then, the court reasoned, it is not clear that it applied to any other
applicant for or recipient of state funds; the Amendment would have been
anticipatory, but would have had no relevance to any current problem. Since
the only party to which the Amendment could conceivably have applied was
the Nevada Orphan Asylum, the Asylum's activities must be the "sectarian
purposes" referred to in the Amendment.
The court addressed and rejected the Asylum's argument that "sectarian"
meant the matters of doctrine that divided religious denominations. Instead, the
court adopted a broader reading - the court called it the "popular sense" - in
which a religious sect defines a "distinct organization or party .... The framers
of the constitution undoubtedly considered the Roman Catholic a sectarian
137 Id. at 375-76 (argument for the Attorney General). The Attorney General's argument to
the Court demonstrates that the Attorney General did not believe that the Constitution for-
bade moral instruction, or even prayer in school:
The only institutions that are entitled to receive any portion of the State appropriation under the
Act of 1881, are those that are not controlled by any religious sect, are not confined to any one
class, are not presided over by any one religious sect or denomination. It must be open to all,
and no particular creed or religion be taught therein, but each and every inmate thereof is to be
permitted to say prayers that their mothers taught them, or need not say any if they do not feel so
disposed, nor should be they be required to be present while others are saying their's, should they
not be so inclined. This is the only construction that can be placed upon the Act, in face of
Section ten, Article Eleven of our Constitution.
Brief for Respondent at 9, Hallock.
"I Hallock, 16 Nev. at 378.
"9 Id. at 380. See also id. at 383. The court quoted extensively from the 1866 report of the
"senate committee of ways and means." See id. at 381. The report was prepared by the
Ways and Means Committee in the Assembly. See supra text accompanying notes 76-80.
140 Hallock, 16 Nev. at 383. The court's mention of "kindred institutions" probably referred
to the St. Mary's school, which the Sisters of Charity operated next to the Asylum. See id. at
375 (argument of the Attorney General).
141 Id. at 383.
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church."' 4 2 It was therefore irrelevant whether "Protestant children are taught
only those things which are common to all Christian people." Nor did it matter
that
Catholic parents desire their children taught the Catholic doctrines, or that Protestants
desire theirs to be instructed in Protestantism. The constitution prohibits the use of
any of the public funds for such purposes, whether their parents wish it or not .... It
is what is taught, not who are instructed, that must determine this question.
143
Finally, the court rejected the Asylum's claim that, even though it was a
sectarian institution, the funds went to non-sectarian purposes. For the court,
the state funds "would be used for the relief and support of a sectarian institu-
tion, and in part, at least, for sectarian purposes ... [I]t is impossible to separate
the legitimate use from that which is forbidden."' 44
In 1897, the Asylum and the St. Mary's school closed.
145
D. Subsequent Decisions in Nevada
Since the Hallock decision, no Nevada court, so far as we can determine,
has cited either Hallock or Section 10 for their substance. In fact, Hallock has
been cited exactly once by Nevada courts for any purpose. In State v. Grey, the
Nevada Supreme Court cited Hallock as evidence of the proper manner in
which to amend the Nevada Constitution.' 46 Thirteen other courts have cited
Hallock, 147 most notably Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 14 8 a case dealing with a constitutional challenge to state aid to non-
public, parochial schools.
Despite this dearth of additional judicial explanation of Section 10, the
Nevada Attorney General's office has published a number of opinions citing
Section 10 and referring to Hallock. These opinions, although quite uneven,
may add to our understanding of how Section 10 should be interpreted and
applied.
1. Religious Use of Public Facilities
In 1954 and 1955, public officials in Clark County requested the Attorney
General's opinion on whether religious groups could use public buildings. In
the first of these opinions, six religious denominations had applied to use
"school buildings for religious purposes, with or without rent for the prem-
142 Id. at 385.
143 Id. at 386.
'44 Id. at 388.
145 Butler, supra note 63, at 163.
146 State v. Grey, 32 P. 190, 193 (Nev. 1893) (Bigelow, J., concurring).
"I See Roberts v. Bradfield, 12 App. D.C. 453, 474 (1898); Bowker v. Baker, 167 P.2d
256, 259 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946); Bennett v. City of La Grange, 112 S.E. 482, 485 (Ga. 1922);
Cook County v. Chicago Indus. Sch. for Girls, 18 N.E. 183, 187 (III. 1888); Knowlton v.
Baumhover, 166 N.W. 202, 211 (Iowa 1918); Craig v. Mercy Hosp.-St. Mem'l, 45 So. 2d
809, 820 (Miss. 1950); Synod of Dakota v. State, 50 N.W. 632, 635 (S.D. 1891); State ex
rel. Weiss v. Dist. Bd. of Sch. Dist. No. 8 of City of Edgerton, 44 N.W. 967, 980 (Wis.
1890); In re Cummins, 20 Haw. 518, 525 (1911); Bd. of Ed. of Bait. County v. Wheat, 199
A. 628, 631(Md. 1938); Chance v. Miss. State Textbook Rating & Purchasing Bd., 200 So.
706, 715 (Miss. 1941); State v. Weedman, 226 N.W. 348, 359 (S.D. 1929).
148 403 U.S. 602, 649 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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ises."' 4 9 The opinion advised that the school board had "no authority under the
Constitution to let school buildings for religious purposes, with or without rent
for the premises."' 5 ° The Attorney General referred to various provisions of
the Nevada Constitution and Hallock, but relied, in large measure, on broad
principles derived from recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions. The following
year, however, the Attorney General issued a "clarification." Noting the lack
of municipal auditoria throughout the state, and the fact that, in smaller com-
munities, the only structure capable of housing a large gathering was the school
gymnasium, the Attorney General opined that the Nevada Constitution would
not be violated if a "school board [rented] a school auditorium or gymnasium to
a religious group for the purpose of presenting an exhibition or show, open to
the general public, which in no way attempted to impart, promulgate or dissem-
inate religious teachings or doctrines."' 5 1 The Attorney General also observed
that churches had requested permission to use schools and other public build-
ings after hours for church services; the opinion, however, did not address this
question directly. The ruling neither forbade nor approved use of public prop-
erty for church services, but the opinion contemplated that such groups would
pay rent for use of the facility.
In 1993, the Attorney General had occasion to reconsider those opinions
when she was asked whether the Clark County School District could open "its
limited public forum facilities to sectarian groups for religious teaching or pur-
pose." ' 52 The Attorney General found that such use would be permissible
under the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. With respect to Sec-
tion 10, however, the Attorney General concluded that
[i]f worship services were permitted in the limited public forum free of charge, Nev.
Const. art. 11, § 10 would clearly be violated. However, if the use of the facility was
conditioned upon a rental fee reflecting the cost to the school district for the proposed
use, no public funds would be expended for the sectarian purpose. 1
53
The opinion was notable because the Attorney General admitted that Sec-
tion 10 imposed constraints not found in the Establishment Clause, namely, that
religious organizations using public facilities must pay for such use.
2. Accommodation of Religious Practices in Public Programs
The Attorney General issued several opinions on the relationship between
public and parochial schools. In 1948, the Attorney General concluded that
public school officials had the discretion to dismiss children from school at
their parents' request in order to receive religious instruction.' 54 By 1954,
however, the Attorney General disapproved of a "release time" proposal under
149 Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 316 (1954).
150 Id.
151 Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 14 (1955).
152 Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 93-2 (1993).
153 Id. This opinion reversed Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 316 (1954), discussed above. The ques-
tion of access to public facilities continues. See Glenn Puit, City Will Permit Praying; Pol-
icy Changes After Interfaith Council Protests Ban From Public Facility, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
Feb. 26, 2001, at 1B (City of Las Vegas initially refused permission to an interfaith group to
use a public center because the tribute to Dr. Martin Luther King would have included
prayers; the city reversed itself).
' Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 684 (1948).
Summer/Fall 2002]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
which children in public schools could attend religious instruction off campus
during their study hall. 155 The opinion cited Section 10 and other provisions of
the Nevada Constitution as evidence that Nevada had "effectively erected 'a
wall of separation between Church and State,"' but largely tracked U.S.
Supreme Court decisions. The Attorney General also opined that Section 10
barred the school district from providing educational services to parochial stu-
dents who were ill and at home. 156 In 1965 the Attorney General disapproved a
"shared time" arrangement under which parochial students would enroll in pub-
lic school courses not offered in their private school.
157
The Attorney General subsequently considered whether state funds could
be used to hire a Chaplain for the Nevada Youth Training Center at Elko.
Under the proposal, the chaplain would not hold formal church services, but
would provide "religious instruction covering faith without referral to sect,
creed, or denomination."' 58 He would also interview each new inmate of the
Center to determine "religious interests, training and background and other
information concerning the family constellation."' 5 9 The Attorney General
ruled that such instruction would violate state and federal constitutions, stating
that there was no demonstration as to how the "religious counselling [sic] and
advice" or "religious instruction" contemplated by the contract "can be free of
sectarian indoctrination of some kind and to some degree."' 6 ° The Attorney
General also expressed concern over the captive nature of the audience; "the
element of coercion is indubitably present."' 6 The Attorney General con-
cluded, however, that his opinion would not forbid the "mere reading of the
Bible without comment of any kind."'
' 62
The Attorney General revisited the issue again in 1963, when the office
reviewed the constitutionality of NRS 209.050, which authorized the Nevada
State Prison to pay for chaplain services. The Attorney General stated that
Section 10's prohibition dealt primarily with "preventing sectarian religious
instruction in the public schools."'163 This concern grew in part from the cap-
tive nature of the school audience, and the receptiveness of the children's
minds to religious thought. As long as attendance to religious services was not
compulsory, the Attorney General had no objection to a prison chaplain con-
ducting services or to the state paying for the chaplains.
Section 10 also arose in the context of state employees taking leave with
pay in order to attend "Good Friday" services. The Attorney General ruled this
unconstitutional, stating that "attendance of Good Friday services would most
likely be viewed as a 'sectarian purpose' within the meaning" of the state con-
"' Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 320 (1954).
156 Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 56-209 (1956).
157 Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 278 (1965).




162 Id. The Attorney General relied on language from Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 442-44
(1962).
63 Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 67 (1963).
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stitution.' 6 The Attorney General added that it would be permissible for a
state employee to take leave without pay to attend such services, or attempt to
adjust their working hours to allow such attendance.
3. Public Funds and Religious Institutions
In 1941, the Attorney General considered whether state funds could be
used to support the hospitalization of crippled children at St. Mary's Hospital in
Reno. The Attorney General ruled that this use would not violate the state
constitution, as there would be "no attempt to instruct or guide these patients in
religious tenents [sic]" during their stay at the hospital, in contrast to the "chil-
dren in the orphan asylum [in Hallock, who] were given definite religious
instruction."' 65 Section 10 was not intended to "prevent necessary hospitaliza-
tion in sectarian hospitals where no instruction of any kind was imparted."'
16 6
In 1965, the Superintendent of Public Instruction asked if the State Depart-
ment of Education could accept federal funds under the Elementary and Secon-
dary Education Act. 167 One section of the Act allotted funds to state education
agencies to meet the needs of "educationally deprived children ... from low-
income families." The law specifically included such children enrolled in pri-
vate schools. The Attorney General opined that the federal requirement that
state agencies provide for children in private schools might "easily result in a
violation of Article XI, Sections 2 and 10 [of the Nevada Constitution]."' 168
Unfortunately, having made such a portentous statement, the opinion offered no
further analysis of those sections. Instead, quoting from Hallock and referring
generally to prior Attorney General opinions, the Attorney General concluded,
unhelpfully, that the Department of Education could accept federal funds so
long as the Department maintained "'separate the legitimate use (of funds)
from that which is forbidden. ' ' 169
In 1970, the Nevada Educational Communications Commission began a
program of providing instructional television broadcasts to schools within the
state, charging a flat fee for the service. The Commission asked the Attorney
General if it would be constitutionally permissible to offer these services to
private and parochial schools under the same fee schedule. The Attorney Gen-
eral ruled that this plan conformed to the state constitution, as the costs of the
programming would not increase due to the larger distribution, and in fact the
costs to the public schools would actually decline. The state was not providing
benefits to the parochial schools on account of their religious orientation.' 7 °
The Attorney General opinions we have considered span nearly sixty
years. It is difficult to make generalizations about Nevada's Little Blaine
I64 Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 79-A (1979). Curiously, the Attorney General borrowed the defini-
tion of the term "sectarian" not from Hallock, but rather from Gerhardt v. Heid, 267 N.W.
127 (N.D. 1936).
165 Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. B-40 (1941).
166 Id.
167 Elementary & Secondary Education Act, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27. See Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
168 Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 276 (1965).
169 Id. (quoting State ex rel. Nev. Orphan Asylum v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373, 388 (1882)).
170 Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 668 (1970).
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Amendment because the Attorney General's opinions (with a couple of excep-
tions) make little effort to distinguish Section 10 from the federal Establish-
ment Clause. Thus, while frequently citing Article 11, Section 10, the opinions
largely reach conclusions that reflect the then-current views of the U.S.
Supreme Court. This is understandable, of course, but it does not help us
understand what, if anything, Section 10 adds to the Establishment Clause.
Only recently has the Attorney General recognized that Section 10 serves a role
independent of the Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
In general, the Attorney General has concluded that Section 10 does not
bar state subsidies to sectarian institutions, such as hospitals or parochial
schools, where the purpose for the expenditure can be clearly identified and is
not sectarian in nature; the Attorney General has thus made some effort to
distinguish legitimate from illegitimate purposes. The Attorney General has
also held, generally, that Section 10 does not bar reasonable accommodations
to state employees or state prisoners. By contrast, the Attorney General, in
various opinions dealing with after-hours use of public facilities, remains
focused on the idea that use of public facilities subsidizes religious purposes;
the Attorney General has reached a similar conclusion with respect to offers of
services to religious institutions. In these instances, the Attorney General has
made clear that religious institutions must pay a reasonable fee for the use of
public buildings or receipt of government services and that this is a requirement
imposed by Section 10 of the Nevada Constitution and not necessarily by the
federal Establishment Clause. Accordingly, there does appear to be an area in
which Section 10 stands as a constraint independent of the U.S. Constitution.
III. RELIGIOUS PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC PROGRAMS: SOME
RECENT TRENDS
The states' Little Blaine Amendments have lain dormant for many years.
So far as we can determine, until very recently, no state has had the occasion to
decide any matter under its Little Blaine Amendment. Furthermore, the U.S.
Supreme Court has never had before it a challenge to the constitutionality of a
Little Blaine Amendment. Either no state had considered programs that might
run afoul of the amendments, or the Supreme Court's views of the Establish-
ment Clause of the U.S. Constitution precluded, as a practical matter, the need
to consider state legislation under the Little Blaine Amendments.
The time may have arrived when state and federal courts will have to
reexamine the application and constitutionality of the Little Blaine Amend-
ments. There has been a clear shift in the Supreme Court's Establishment and
Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence. At one time hostile to any notion of gov-
ernment funding of educational or charitable activities that were religiously
sponsored, the Court has become more solicitous of innovative partnerships
between governments and religious institutions. The Court's recent decisions
suggest that the Establishment Clause may not impede new government pro-
grams that involve religious institutions. The question becomes, do the Little
Blaine Amendments stand as such an impediment and, if so, are the Little
Blaine Amendments themselves constitutional?
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A. Religion, Liberty, and Equality
Professor Kurland once noted that the proper division between church and
state was an issue destined "to generate heat rather than light."17 ' In this sec-
tion, we review some of the recent trends in the religion clause cases in the
Supreme Court. What follows is an effort to make sense of some perceptible
changes in the Court's approach during the past decade. It is not an effort to
reformulate the Constitution's norms, but an effort to describe what the Court
has done.
Prior to 1990, the Supreme Court's religion clause jurisprudence
employed "religious liberty" as its guiding principle. For the Free Exercise
Clause, this meant that the First Amendment prohibited government from regu-
lating religious beliefs. 172 Additionally, government could not interfere with
religious practices unless the government had a compelling interest and its reg-
ulation was narrowly tailored to that interest. As announced, this was a very
religion-protective standard. For example, in Sherbert v. Verner,'7 3 South Car-
olina refused unemployment benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist who quit
because her employer required her to work on her Sabbath. The Court held that
South Carolina violated her Free Exercise rights: "The ruling forces her to
choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits,
on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to
accept work, on the other hand."' 174 By denying her benefits, South Carolina
had "penalize[d]" her free exercise and "constrained[ed]" her to abandon her
religious convictions. 175 Sherbert and the cases that followed it 1 76 appeared to
require governments to exempt religiously motivated persons from the laws.
Unfortunately, the Court had an easier time announcing the principle than
enforcing it. The Court rejected most free exercise claims, even where the
government's actions interfered with religious practices. 177
171 PHILLIP KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 15 (1962).
172 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
173 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
'74 id. at 404.
175 Id. at 406, 410.
176 See, e.g., Frazee v. I11. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (applying Sher-
bert to unemployment compensation claimant who refused to work on Sunday, though not a
member of a recognized sect); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136
(1987) (applying Sherbert to unemployment compensation claimant who adopted new relig-
ious beliefs after she began work and then refused to work on her Sabbath); Thomas v.
Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that Indiana
violated the Free Exercise Clause when it denied unemployment benefits to a Jehovah's
Witness who quit his job in plant manufacturing military equipment); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that Wisconsin violated the Free Exercise Clause by sanction-
ing Amish parents who refused for religious reasons to send their children to school); Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that South Carolina violated the Free Exercise
Clause when it denied unemployment benefits to Seventh Day Adventist who refused to
work on Saturdays).
177 See, e.g., Lyng v. N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (deny-
ing a Free Exercise claim by various Indian tribes that a Forest Service plan for harvesting
timber would destroy an area sacred to the tribes); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S.
342 (1987) (denying a Free Exercise claim by Muslim prisoners that a Pennsylvania work-
release policy interfered with their required worship services); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693
(1986) (denying a Free Exercise claim by Native Americans that the use of a social security
Summer/Fall 2002]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
On the Establishment Clause side, the Court regularly disqualified relig-
ious organizations from participating in many government programs, even as a
means of accommodating the religiously inclined.' 8 For example, in Aguilar
v. Felton,17 9 the Court struck down Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
School Act of 1965 insofar as it authorized financial assistance to private
schools serving at-risk students in low-income areas. New York had imple-
mented Title I by providing remedial reading and mathematics services to paro-
chial school students; the classes were taught by public school teachers who
volunteered to teach in the parochial schools. The Court concluded that the
program "inevitably result[ed] in the excessive entanglement of church and
state." 180
There was a certain logic and symmetry to the "liberty" theme in the
Court's religion cases. The Court came down hard on cozy relationships
between government and organized religion, but it also intervened to shield
religionists from especially intrusive government actions, particularly those that
trampled minority religious practices. While the Court barred organized reli-
gions under the Establishment Clause from participating in many governmental
programs, the disability was balanced out on the Free Exercise side because the
Court privileged religionists whose practices conflicted with the requirements
of the law. Religious affiliation was both benefit and curse under this scheme.
Indeed, the scheme was very conscious of religion.
The Court had difficulty maintaining the "liberty" model. The Court had a
terrible time distinguishing between government actions that directly benefited
religion and those that incidentally benefited religion. As a result, the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence was a mess. On the other hand, the Court,
for all of its professed admiration for religionists forced to choose between their
religious practices and government programs, had a hard time figuring out how
to exempt religionists from the laws.
number to obtain AFDC benefits violated their religious beliefs); Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503 (1986) (denying a Free Exercise claim by a Jewish serviceman that Air Force
policy would not allow him to wear his yarmulke).
178 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding unconstitutional a Louisi-
ana statute requiring public schools to teach "creation science" if they taught the theory of
human evolution); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (holding unconstitutional a federal
program providing remedial education to deprived children attending parochial schools),
overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373 (1985) (holding unconstitutional a Michigan program in which parochial school
teachers were paid with public monies to conduct evening community education classes at
the parochial school), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding unconstitutional an Alabama statute requiring schools
to have a moment of silence at the beginning of the day); Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a New York statute giving direct money
grants for building repair and maintenance to schools, public or private, that served low-
income areas); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding unconstitutional a Rhode
Island statute reimbursing nonpublic schools for teachers' salaries and textbooks used in
certain secular courses); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. 333 U.S. 203 (1948)
(holding unconstitutional an Illinois program releasing public school students to attend relig-
ious classes conducted at the public school).
179 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
18o Id. at 409.
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In 1990, without overruling any of its prior cases, the Court made a dra-
matic shift away from the theme of "religious liberty" to one of "religious
equality." Some cases decided during the 1980s under the Establishment
Clause presaged the shift, 181 but the change was most obvious in Employment
Division v. Smith. 182 In Smith, Oregon denied unemployment benefits to two
members of the Native American Church who were fired as drug rehabilitation
counselors for their use of peyote, a controlled substance. The Court held that
the Oregon decision did not violate the counselors' Free Exercise rights
because it had not singled the counselors out for their religious beliefs. In other
words, so long as Oregon dealt with all peyote-ingesting persons in the same
way, it would not violate the Free Exercise Clause; the Clause was violated
when a state prohibited acts "only when they are engaged in for religious rea-
sons, or only because of the religious belief that they display."1 83 The Court
refused to excuse the counselors, on the basis of their religiously motivated
conduct, from Oregon law: "the State is free to withhold unemployment com-
pensation from respondents for engaging in work-related misconduct, despite
its religious motivation." 1 84 Smith caused a firestorm because it appeared to be
a reversal of course.' 8 5 In fact, "the constitutional history of the free Exercise
Clause is almost completely against religious exemptions . . . [T]he aberrations
are Sherbert and [Wisconsin v.] Yoder, not Smith.' 8 6
Smith put the Court in an uncomfortable position, one that appeared hos-
tile to religion. If the Court followed its "liberty" cases, the Establishment
Clause prevented religious institutions from participating in certain government
programs on the same basis as secular institutions. On the other hand, after
Smith, there was no quid pro quo on the Free Exercise side; so long as the
181 See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (Adolescent Family Life Act, which
authorized federal grant recipients to involve "religious and charitable organizations," did
not violate the Establishment Clause on its face); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)
(upholding a Minnesota tax deduction for tuition at private schools (including parochial
schools)); Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding a
Washington program which paid for vocational rehabilitation services for a blind student
who used the grant at a Christian college to study for the ministry); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981) (holding unconstitutional a University of Missouri-Kansas City rule forbid-
ding student organizations from using university facilities for religious worship or teaching).
182 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
183 Id. at 877. Following Smith, the Court held in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), that the City of Hialeah had singled out a religious
group when it enacted a city ordinance barring the ritual slaughter of animals. The ordinance
barred only ritual slaughter, not slaughter for other purposes, such as consumption.
184 Smith, 494 U.S. at 876 (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 872 (1988)).
185 See, e.g., James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91
(1991); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990). Smith's defenders were slow to defend the Court's opinion, even
as they defended the result. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free
Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991).
186 Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of
Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555, 561-62 (1998). See also Jay S.
Bybee, Substantive Due Process and Free Exercise of Religion: Meyer, Pierce and the
Origins of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 887, 927-29 (1996) (explaining why
Yoder was "long on rhetoric and short on substance" and had "limited impact").
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government had not singled out religionists, they were to be treated the same as
everybody else. This appeared to be a very religion-hostile turn.
The Court closed this gap with a series of cases in which it held that
religious institutions might participate in government programs on the same
basis as other institutions. The Court held, for example, that the Establishment
Clause does not forbid a university from funding student magazines, even if
one of the magazines was religious in nature.187 A state may fund, under a
broad program to assist handicapped students, a signer for a deaf child, even
though the child attends parochial schools. 188 More recently, in Agostini v.
Felton, the Court approved federal programs that offer public diagnostic and
remedial services, even if the services are provided to parochial students at
school.' 89 And, in Mitchell v. Helms, the Court approved a Louisiana program
that loaned educational materials such as computers, projectors, and VCRs, to
private schools, including sectarian institutions.' 9 ° In both Agostini and Mitch-
ell, the Court overruled several of its Establishment Clause decisions that reli-
gionists had long derided as religion-hostile. 9
In sum, although the norm has shifted, once again there is symmetry and
logic to the Court's cases. In general, the Free Exercise Clause means that the
law may not discriminate against religionists; it does not mean that religionists
enjoy preferred status. On the Establishment Clause side, it means that the
First Amendment does specially disable religious institutions; they may partici-
pate in broad government programs on the same basis as non-sectarian institu-
tions. If the "liberty" model was religion-intensive, the Court's "equality"
model prefers to ignore religion. The shift also makes the religion clauses eas-
ier to administer because it reduces the courts' need to balance government's
impact on religious practices, or religious institutions' influence on
government.
B. Religion, Liberty and "Charitable Choice"
The shift in the Court's approach to religion cases has two important con-
sequences for our discussion. First, it makes it more likely that the Court will
approve of some form of "charitable choice" provisions or educational voucher
programs in which religious institutions seek to participate on an equal basis in
government programs. Second, if the Establishment Clause no longer bars
these programs, it makes it more likely that state courts will have to construe
their own constitutions, including their Little Blaine Amendments. The Court's
shift from "liberty" to "equality" in the Religion Clauses will place new empha-
187 Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
188 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993). See also Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
"' Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
190 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 825-29 (2000) (plurality opinion of Thomas, J.).
'9' Agostini overruled Felton and Ball. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 236. The Mitchell Court
overruled Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977). See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 835 (plurality opinion of Thomas, J.); id. at 837
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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sis on state free exercise and establishment clause provisions. 192 Although a
number of states have already construed their own establishment clauses or
Little Blaine Amendments to place greater restrictions on religious institutions'
participation in vouchers or other public programs,' 93 the Court's recent juris-
prudence raises the possibility that such religion-restrictive provisions are
themselves unconstitutional.'
94
Cases from Washington and Arizona provide an interesting context in
which to view these issues because the state supreme courts were construing
identical Little Blaine Amendments. Larry Witters was legally blind and quali-
fied for vocational assistance under Washington law. Washington, however,
denied his request for assistance because he would have used the assistance to
study at a Bible college in preparation for the ministry. The Washington
Supreme Court, construing the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution, stated that "[i]t is not the role of the state to pay for the religious
education of future ministers" and held that providing assistance to Witters
192 See, e.g., Heytens, supra note 17, at 117; Linda S. Wendtland, Note, Beyond The Estab-
lishment Clause: Enforcing Separation of Church and State Through State Constitutional
Provisions, 71 VA. L. REV. 625 (1985).
193 See, e.g., Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that the
Ohio Pilot Scholarship Program violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment),
cert. granted, Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779 (argued Feb. 20, 2002); Strout v. Albanese,
178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999) (upholding Maine statute authorizing direct grants for tuition
reimbursement for students attending non-sectarian high schools), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 931
(1999); R.I. Fed'n of Teachers, AFL-CIO v. Norberg, 630 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1980) (finding
unconstitutional under Establishment Clause of First Amendment a state statute allowing for
a state income tax deduction for expenses incurred by citizens having children in private
schools); Pub. Funds for Pub. Sch. of N.J. v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding
that state statute allowing state income tax deduction for taxpayers with children attending
non-public schools unconstitutional under Establishment Clause of First Amendment);
Columbia Union Coll. v. Oliver, 2000 U.S. Dist Lexis 13644 (D. Md. Aug. 17, 2000)
(allowing for private, religiously affiliated college to receive state funds under state's Sell-
inger Program); Opinion of the Justices, 616 A.2d 478 (N.H. 1992) (advisory opinion find-
ing unconstitutional proposed legislation allowing parent to send child to state approved
school, including sectarian schools, with state funding offsetting at least some of the tuition,
as violative of Part I, art. 7 of state constitution); People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 305
N.E.2d 129 (I11. 1973) (holding that state program providing state grant for partial expenses
to parents of children attending non-public schools unconstitutional under Establishment
Clause of First Amendment); Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999)
(upholding state education tuition program statute that excluded religious schools from
receipt of funds under program), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 947 (1999); Exeter-West Greenwich
Reg'l Sch. Dist. v. Pontarelli, 460 A.2d 934 (R.I. 1983) (affirming ruling that school district
which did not maintain its own high school, but paid tuition for its students to attend named
high school, did not have to pay high school student's tuition to attend religiously affiliated
school of student's choice); Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Educ., 738 A.2d 539
(Vt. 1999) (finding a tuition reimbursement scheme in violation of Ch. I, Art. 3 of state
constitution), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1066 (1999); Campbell v. Manchester Bd. of Sch. Dir.,
641 A.2d 352 (Vt. 1994) (finding no Establishment Clause violation resulting from program
where school board paid costs of high school student attending sectarian school as a result of
district not having its own high school); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998)
(upholding constitutionality of Milwaukee Parental Choice Program), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
997 (1998).
19 Heytens, supra note 17, at 125-31.
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would violate the Establishment Clause.' 95 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.
"Washington's program is 'made available generally without regard to the sec-
tarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited,'"
and is in no way skewed towards religion."' 96 The Court remanded the case,
however, for consideration under the Washington Constitution. On remand, the
Washington Supreme Court held that funding Witters's education would vio-
late Washington's Little Blaine Amendment. 197 Witters's petition fell "pre-
cisely within the clear language of the state constitutional prohibition against
applying public moneys to any religious instruction."' 9 8 Three justices dis-
sented. They would have held that "in granting Mr. Witters money for his
vocational training, the state is neither appropriating nor applying funds for
religious instruction. The state is merely appropriating public funds for a neu-
tral vocational rehabilitation program."' 199 The U.S. Supreme Court denied the
petition for certiorari.2z°
Contrast Witters with a recent decision of the Arizona Supreme Court con-
struing an identical provision in the Arizona Constitution. In Kotterman v. Kil-
lian,2 ° ' the petitioners challenged an Arizona statute that allowed a state tax
credit of up to $500 for a donation to a "school tuition organization," insofar as
such donations went to sectarian schools. Construing Arizona's Little Blaine
Amendment, 0 2 the Arizona Supreme Court held that the tax credit did not
constitute "public money" under its Little Blaine Amendment. A dissenting
justice identified Arizona's provision as identical to Washington's and noted
their connection to the larger debate over the federal Blaine Amendment and
Catholic education. He would have concluded that "the history and text of
Arizona's religion clauses make it clear that the delegates to the 1910 [Arizona
constitutional] convention were well aware of the recent sectarian battles and
the resulting Blaine Amendment and did not intend to give the Legislature the
power to subsidize a private, sectarian school system. 20 3
195 Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind ("Witters 1"), 689 P.2d 53 (Wash. 1984), rev'd
sub nom., Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
196 Witters 1, 474 U.S. at 487-88 (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782-83 n.38 (1973)).
197 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("No public money or property shall be appropriated for or
applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious
establishment."); see Witters 1, 689 P.2d at 64-65 (Utter, J., dissenting) (discussing the anti-
Catholic origins of the Washington provision).
198 Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind ("Witters H"), 771 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Wash.
1989), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 850 (1989).
199 Id. at 1125 (Utter, J., dissenting).
200 489 U.S. 850 (1989).
201 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999).
202 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 12 ("No public money or property shall be appropriated for or
applied to any religious worship, exercise, or instruction, or to the support of any religious
establishment."). See Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 624-25 (discussing the Blaine Amendment and
the history of the Arizona provision); Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 631-38 (Feldman, J., dissent-
ing) (same). See also ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 10 ("No tax shall be laid or appropriation of
public money made in aid of any church, or private or sectarian school, or any public service
corporation"); art. XI, § 7 ("No sectarian instruction shall be imparted in any school or State
education institution that may be established under this Constitution.").
203 Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 639 (Feldman, J., dissenting).
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The cases are not necessarily irreconcilable, but the contrasts are striking.
Arizona took a broader, more forgiving view of its Little Blaine Amendment,
even as it drew a narrow distinction between tax credits and "public money."
Washington took a much harder view of its Little Blaine Amendment, constru-
ing its provision to be narrower than the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution. Although the Supreme 'Court denied the petition for a writ of
certiorari in Witters H, little can be read into that action. The U.S. Supreme
Court has since built upon its Witters decision in Bowen, Zobrest, Lamb's
Chapel, Rosenberger, and Mitchell. These not only reaffirm Witters, but also
may suggest that it would violate the First Amendment for Washington to
refuse to allow Larry Witters to participate in a state program because of his
religious activities.
IV. NEVADA'S "LITTLE BLAINE AMENDMENT" AND THE FUTURE OF
RELIGIOUS PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC PROGRAMS
All of this leads to the ultimate question: What does Section 10 mean
today? What does it mean for a charitable choice or educational choice system
in the state of Nevada? The question does not simply invite speculation.
Although Nevada has not adopted a school voucher program nor, so far as we
are aware, have any affirmative steps been taken in that direction, 2° vouchers
have been the subject of much discussion in the recent presidential election,
and new proposals may be forthcoming. Aside from the question of vouchers,
however, Nevada has adopted a charitable choice provision. During the 1999
legislative session, the legislature passed Assembly Bill 318, which revised
provisions granting city and county authorities to expend money and convey
property to nonprofit organizations. Nev. Rev. Stat. 244.1505, for example,
currently provides that a county commission "may expend money for any pur-
pose which will provide a substantial benefit to the inhabitants of the county.
The board may grant all or part of the money to a nonprofit organization cre-
ated for religious, charitable or educational purposes to be expended for the
selected purpose."205 County commissions may also donate certain
"[c]ommodities, supplies, materials, and equipment" to nonprofit organizations,
including religious ones.2 °6 When making the grant, the county commission
must specify the purpose for the grant or donation and any conditions on the
expenditure or use of the property. 20 7 Does Section 244.028, authorizing the
"grant ... [of] money to a nonprofit organization created for religious ...
purposes" violate Section 10, which prohibits the use of "public [County] funds
... for sectarian purposes?"
204 A bill to establish a voucher program in Nevada died in committee during the 1999
legislative session. See Jennifer Crowe, Nevada Playing Catch-Up in Public School Alter-
natives, RENO GAZETrE-J., Dec. 5, 1999, available at http://www.rgj.comlnewsold/stories/
reno/ 944373450.htm.
205 NEV. REV. STAT. 244.1505.1 (1999). The legislature granted similar authority to cities.
NEV. REV. STAT. 268.028 (1999).
206 NEV. REV. STAT. 244.1505.2(a) (1999). Cf NEV. REV. STAT. 268.028.2 (1999) (similar
authority granted to cities).




In this final part we discuss how Nevada courts might construe Section 10.
We do not consider how the U.S. Supreme Court would view Nevada's charita-
ble choice program, aid to the Nevada Orphan's Asylum, or any other Nevada
program. We will, however, refer to U.S. cases as an aid to understanding how
Nevada courts might interpret Section 10 and to comprehending how, if at all,
decisions under the U.S. Constitution might inform that judgment.
A. Section 10 and the Meaning of "Public Funds"
Section 10 prohibits the use of "public funds," whether the funds originate
with the state, a county or a municipality, in support of sectarian purposes.
First, we should note that Nevada's Little Blaine Amendment is at least a con-
straint on state spending. Not everything that state government does involves
"public funds," but spending covers substantial territory; nearly every program
administered or supported by the state can be said to involve state funding.
Does Section 10 apply broadly to all matters in which "public funds" played
some role, or is it a more narrow constraint on line item spending? To illus-
trate: Is there a difference between direct state funding of the Nevada Orphan's
Asylum, which was religiously-sponsored, and state funding of public build-
ings, which might subsequently be made available to religious organizations on
a non-discriminatory basis? The Attorney General, at least, has taken the posi-
tion that the use of public buildings comes within Section 10's restriction on
the use of "public funds."2 °8
The Attorney General's expansive construction of Section 10 may have
significant collateral consequences for state and local administration. Suppose
that state and local governments were willing to make public property such as
schools or community and recreation centers available for occasional use by
private groups. Under the Attorney General's reading of Section 10, Nevada
must charge religious groups a fee for the use of the property. May Nevada
charge religious groups for the use of the property if it does not charge non-
religious groups? Such a policy would likely violate either the Free Exercise
Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution,2 0 9 and might
even violate the Liberty of Conscience Clause of the Nevada Constitution. 2 ,0
If so, Section 10 has become a much broader constraint on state activities,
because Nevada will have to choose between charging all groups for the use of
public property or not making public property available at all, neither of which
it was inclined to do in the first place.21 l
208 See Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 93-2 (Mar. 16, 1993).
209 See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993)
(striking down a school rule that permitted secular use of school property, but forbidding use
for religious purposes); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
(1995) (invalidating university policy that authorized payment for student publications, but
forbid payment for student publications that promoted belief in deity or an ultimate reality).
210 NEv. CONST. art. I, § 4 ("The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed in this State, and ...
the liberty of conscience hereby secured .... ).
211 See Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 93-2 (Mar. 16, 1993) (noting that under Clark County School
District rules some uses of school buildings were permitted free of charge, while others
required a fee; concluding that Section 10 requires sectarian groups to pay the cost associ-
ated with the use of the building).
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Furthermore, Article 11, Section 10, is not just a constraint on state spend-
ing. By its literal terms, Section 10 prohibits a particular use of "public funds."
We should note that Section 10 is phrased in the passive voice, thereby disguis-
ing the party(ies) to which it applies. 21 2 We assume that the various branches
of state and local government are barred from using public funds for sectarian
purposes, but Section 10 is not limited to state actors. Had that been the fram-
ers' intention, they could easily have forbidden the legislature from appropriat-
ing, and the executive from spending, funds for sectarian purposes. Instead, the
framers of Section 10 simply constrained the "use[ ]" of public funds, a restric-
tion that applies to private, as well as public, entities.
At what point do public funds cease to be the public's funds, so that Sec-
tion 10 no longer constrains their use? Suppose Nevada awarded a block grant
to the United Way to support efforts to feed the homeless, and the United Way
then devoted some part of the grant to Catholic Charities? Or suppose that an
individual donated foodstuffs purchased with state-issued food stamps to the
Salvation Army? Aside from the question whether feeding the homeless con-
stitutes a religious purpose, are the funds still public? Must the state place
conditions on the further use of state funds?2 13 In the education context, could
Nevada issue vouchers to parents, who could then use the voucher at a private
religious school? Can the parents act as a filter to avoid the restrictions Section
10 might impose on direct aid to a religious school? Or, consider Nevada's
new charitable choice provision. Suppose a county donated "[c]ommodities,
supplies, materials and equipment that the [county] determines to have reached
the end of their useful lives"21 4 to religious nonprofit organizations. The com-
modities, supplies, materials and equipment are not, strictly speaking, "public
funds," but they are likely items that the county purchased with public funds.
Is the donation subject to the Little Blaine Amendment? From an economic
perspective, there is no difference between donating funds and donating com-
modities, but government might have greater concerns over contributing money
than contributing commodities.2" 5 From a historical perspective, there is, of
course, an explanation for why Section 10 refers to "public funds": At the time
Nevadans adopted Section 10, their immediate concern was the line-item grant
of public funds, not public commodities, to a Catholic orphanage.
B. Section 10 and the Meaning of "Sectarian Purposes"
Nevada's Little Blaine Amendment revives a question raised during the
debates in Congress over the Blaine Amendment: Does the phrase "sectarian"
212 See Jay S. Bybee, Common Ground: Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and A Power
Theory of the First Amendment, 75 TUL. L. REV. 251, 319-21 (2000) (discussing the use of
passive voice and active voice in the U.S. Constitution). See also David M. Skover, The
Washington Constitutional "State Action" Doctrine: A Fundamental Right to State Action,
8 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 221, 224-45 (1985) (discussing the implications of use of passive
voice in the Washington Constitution).
213 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 815-19 (2000) (discussing "direct" and "indirect"
aid to religious institutions) (plurality opinion).
214 NEV. REV. STAT. 244.1505.2(a), 268.028.2 (2001).
215 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 818-20.
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refer to various religious sects or to religious denominations generally? 21 6 If
"sectarian" refers to religious sects, then Section 10 is largely a non-discrimina-
tion provision. It would not prevent Nevada from enacting a law that benefited
all private schools, including religious ones, because the law would not serve
"sectarian purposes." But it would forbid the state from picking and choosing
among religious sects - refusing to fund Baptist schools, for example, or fund-
ing only Lutheran schools. On the other hand, if "sectarian" refers to religion
generally, then Nevada could not enact a program under which private schools
might participate if that includes parochial schools.
There is language in Hallock that might be read to support either reading
of "sectarian." The court stated, somewhat ambiguously, that Section 10 means
that "public funds should not be used, directly or indirectly for the building up
of any sect," '2 17 which suggests that Section 10 would bar public funding of a
program that benefited any religious sect or denomination, irrespective of
whether the legislature made the program available on a nondiscriminatory
basis to all sects or denominations.2" 8 Elsewhere in Hallock, however, the
court read "sectarian" in its "popular sense" as a body of number of persons
united in tenets, but constituting a distinct organization or party, by holding
sentiments or doctrines different from those of other sects or people."2" 9 The
latter reading is consistent with Section 10's history. As the court noted in
Hallock, the Nevada Orphan Asylum's "continued application greatly, if not
entirely, impelled the adoption of the constitutional amendment. '22 0 Section
10 was a silver bullet, a constitutional fix for a particular problem: "the use of
public funds for the benefit of [the Asylum] and kindred institutions [St.
Mary's School], was an evil which ought to be remedied. 221
Given a choice, Nevada courts may wish to construe Section 10 to bar
state aid that is targeted to specific religious sects, and not to bar more inclusive
measures. In Mitchell, the plurality noted the "shameful pedigree" of state and
federal hostility to aid that found its way to religious institutions.
Opposition to aid to "sectarian" schools acquired prominence in the 1870's with Con-
gress's consideration (and near passage) of the Blaine Amendment, which would
have amended the Constitution to bar any aid to sectarian institutions. Consideration
of the amendment arose at a time of pervasive hostility to the Catholic Church and to
216 See supra text accompanying note 39. The term "sectarian" appears in two other provi-
sions of the Nevada Constitution; neither sheds light on this question. See NEV. CONST. art.
11, § 2 (the legislature shall provide for a uniform system of common schools ... and any
school district which shall allow instruction of a sectarian character therein may be deprived
of its proportion of the interest of the public school fund") and § 9 ("No sectarian instruction
shall be imparted or tolerated in any school or university that may be established under this
Constitution.").
217 State ex rel. Nev. Orphan Asylum v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373, 387 (1882).
28 See also Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 685 (Oct. 4, 1948) (citing Hallock and concluding that
"the reading of the Bible . . . singing of religious hymns, or the . . . introduction in the
schools of books, tracts, or papers of a sectarian or denominational character is forbidden by
.. . the Constitution of the State.") (emphasis added).
219 Hallock, 16 Nev. at 385.
220 Id. at 383.
221 Id.
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Catholics in general, and it was an open secret that "sectarian" was code for
"Catholic."
222
The Nevada courts may cure this latent hostility by reading Section 10 to mean
that the state cannot fund the purposes of a single religious sect, but that Sec-
tion 10 does not disqualify religious institutions from receiving state aid or
participating in state programs under a neutral scheme.
Second, what constitutes a sectarian "purpose"? Are all purposes for
which a sectarian institution might receive state funds, by definition, sectarian?
This is a difficult question. If everything a sectarian institution does serves a
sectarian purpose, then Nevada's charitable choice statutes are unconstitutional
on their face. In Hallock, the court was unwilling to separate the purely relig-
ious activities of the Asylum from those more generic activities such as hous-
ing, feeding, and clothing the orphans. The court found that, since at least
some part of any funds granted to the Asylum would support sectarian pur-
poses, that fact was sufficient to bring the funding with the Little Blaine
Amendment. "[I]t is impossible to separate the legitimate use from that which
is forbidden. 22 3 By contrast, the Attorney General has indicated a greater
willingness to separate legitimate and illegitimate uses of state funds by relig-
ious organizations.224
For federal Establishment Clause purposes, the U.S. Supreme Court has
taken a different approach. The Court once asked if the recipient of funds was
"pervasively sectarian," that is, whether state aid "flows to an institution in
which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are
subsumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifically religious
activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting. '"225 The Court expressed
concern, as did the Nevada Supreme Court in Hallock, that an institution might
be "so permeated with religion that the secular side cannot be separated from
the sectarian."'226 Yet even prior to Mitchell, the Court had noted that not every
act by a religious institution was necessarily religious: "the proposition that the
Establishment Clause prohibits any program which in some manner aids an
institution with a religious affiliation has consistently been rejected. ' 227 The
Court had upheld government grants to religious institutions. In Bradfield v.
Roberts, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a grant to a Catholic hospital for
building construction. Even though the hospital was "conducted under the aus-
pices of the Roman Catholic Church," which "exercise[d] great and perhaps
controlling influence over the management of the hospital," the hospital had a
limited mission and the Court declined to inquire into "the individual beliefs
upon religious matters of the various incorporators. 2 28 And in Bowen v. Ken-
drick,229 the Court held that the Adolescent Family Life Act did not violate the
Establishment Clause on its face. The Act authorized the funding of demon-
222 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000).
223 Hallock, 16 Nev. at 388.
224 See, e.g., Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 276 (Nov. 5, 1965).
225 Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973).
226 Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 759 (1975).
227 Hunt, 413 U.S. at 742.
228 Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 298 (1899).
229 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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stration grants for services and research in the area of adolescent sexual rela-
tions and pregnancy and required that grant applicants demonstrate how they
would, as appropriate, "involve religious and charitable organizations. 23 "[It]
is clear from the face of the statute that the [Act] was motivated primarily, if
not entirely, by a legitimate secular purpose - the elimination or reduction of
social and economic problems caused by teenage sexuality, pregnancy, and
parenthood. ' 231  The Court had "never held that religious institutions are dis-
abled by the First Amendment from participating in publicly sponsored social
welfare programs.
23 2
More recently, in Mitchell, the plurality discarded the "pervasively secta-
rian" terminology as "born of bigotry," "unnecessary," and "offensive. '233 It
was also inconsistent with the way the Court had historically and more recently
applied the Establishment Clause to government partnerships with religious
institutions. Lower courts, however, have been slow to embrace the point
because there was no majority opinion in Mitchell.2 34
These cases also help point a significant difference between the U.S.
Supreme Court's construction of the Establishment Clause and the text of Sec-
tion 10. Under the Supreme Court's traditional (and controversial) "Lemon
test," 235 the Court asks whether a statute has a "secular legislative purpose,"
whether "its principal or primary effect ... [is] one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion," and whether the statute fosters "excessive government entan-
glement with religion. ' 236 Note that under the Lemon test, the U.S. Supreme
Court asks whether the legislation has a secular purpose; it does not ask
whether the legislation might also serve some sectarian purpose. For the
Establishment Clause, it is sufficient if there is secular purpose, so long as any
other sectarian purpose does not result in the legislation's "principal or primary
effect" fostering religion. Section 10, by contrast, bans the use of public funds
for any "sectarian purpose" - apparently, irrespective of whether the uses of
230 42 U.S.C. § 300z-5(a)(21).
231 Bowen, 487 U.S. at 602.
232 Id. at 609.
233 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000). Justice Thomas, almost a year prior to his
plurality opinion in Mitchell, stated that the Court should discard the "pervasively sectarian"
test "and reaffirm that the Constitution requires, at a minimum, neutrality not hostility
towards religion." See Columbia Union Coll. v. Clark, 119 S. Ct. 2357, 2358 (2000) (mem.)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
234 See Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd. of the Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 117
F. Supp. 2d 693 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (finding that the "pervasively sectarian" test still applica-
ble in the wake of the plurality opinion in Mitchell); Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 538
S.E.2d 682 (Va. 2000) (same); Columbia Union Coll. v. Oliver, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13644
(D. Md. Aug. 17, 2000) (same).
235 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). For background on the controversy over
whether Lemon remains good law, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 795 (1993), and the responses thereto; Daniel 0. Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 865 (1993); Ira C. Lupu, Which Old Witch: A Comment on Profes-
sor Paulsen's Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 883 (1993); Richard S. Myers, A
Comment on the Death of Lemon, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 903 (1993).
236 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. In Mitchell, the Court applied two criteria: whether the
government's conduct advanced or endorsed religion. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 835.
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public funds would also serve a legitimate public purpose.2 37 Unless the
Nevada Supreme Court reads Section 10 to bar only the use of public funds that
serve "[principally] sectarian purposes," Section 10 is a more religion-hostile
constraint than the Establishment Clause.2 38
C. Section 10, Liberty and Equality
In the previous section, we suggested that there are a number of ambigui-
ties in the terms "public funds" and "sectarian purposes" that Nevada courts
may have to resolve. The choices Nevada courts have to make in construing
Section 10 fall along a broad continuum between "religion-hostile" and "relig-
ion friendly." Although, as we pointed out in the contrast between Washing-
ton's and Arizona's approaches to their own identically-phrased Little Blaine
Amendments, Nevada has some leeway under the U.S. Constitution in its inter-
pretation of Section 10, not all choices that Nevada could conceivably make
will pass muster under the federal Constitution. In its most recent decisions,
the U.S. Supreme Court has plainly favored treating religion on the same basis
as competing institutions - neither specially favored, nor specially disabled
under the federal constitution.
Suppose that Nevada construed Section 10 - in every respect - against
religious participation in public programs. Could Nevada fund private educa-
tion institutions through a voucher program if it excluded religious institutions
in order not to violate its Little Blaine Amendment? The Court's decisions in
Witters, Zobrest, Agostini, and Mitchell, suggest that a state may adopt neutral
programs that benefit religious institutions or persons participating in the pro-
gram. But Lambs' Chapel and Rosenberger further suggest that a state violates
some combination of the Free Speech, Free Exercise, or the Equal Protection
Clauses when it creates public programs from which it excludes religious insti-
tutions or persons because of their manifest religious affiliation. Does this
mean that when a state creates a program, it must include religious persons or
institutions in the program?
We are not yet prepared to say that the Supreme Court will demand that
states permit religious institutions to participate in public programs to the same
extent as other private, secular institutions. There are too many nuances in the
public programs, public participation, and religious worship to make such a
sweeping statement. Indeed, even as the Court approved a Louisiana program
loaning education materials and equipment to parochial schools, the plurality
warned that there are "'special Establishment Clause dangers' when money is
237 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 827 (plurality opinion) ("the religious nature of a recipient should
not matter to the constitutional analysis, so long as the recipient adequately furthers the
government's secular purpose").
238 If the Little Blaine Amendment applies to funding of any sectarian organization (because
their purposes must likewise be sectarian), then it is far more restrictive than the Establish-
ment Clause, because the federal programs approved in Agostini and Mitchell would surely
run afoul of a provision that forbid spending that benefited any sectarian purpose. Such a
construction, moreover, would be inconsistent with the Nevada Attorney General opinions
approving of chaplain services in Nevada prisons. See supra text accompanying notes 158-
62.
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given to religious schools or entities directly rather than . . . indirectly. ' 39
Moreover, both Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger involved religious institutions
excluded from programs because of the context of things they wished to say or
publish. Thus, both cases arose in the context of suppression of expression in a
limited public forum; charitable choice programs need not arise in such a con-
text. If the Court's Free Exercise and Equal Protection decisions would forbid
strict application of Section 10, the Court's Establishment Clause decisions
might inform any remaining applications, thus making Section 10 coextensive
with Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. There
is sufficient ambiguity in the federal Constitution to make the construction of
Section 10 important, but it is also not clear how much room the U.S. Supreme
Court's most recent pronouncements have even left Nevada (or any other state)
to maneuver.
Finally, Nevada could adopt the path of least resistance and announce that,
although Nevada has no formal Establishment Clause, the combination of the
Little Blaine Amendment and the Conscience Clause means that Nevada's pro-
visions are largely coextensive with federal protections found in the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. 240 This argument is plainly ahistorical, since the
Conscience Clause predates the Fourteenth Amendment and the Little Blaine
Amendment, although adopted after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and was adopted at a time when incorporation was controversial and long
before the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the doctrine.2 4 ' It is an argument
that is born of pragmatism, however. Perhaps, in the long view, it is the most
workable view of the Nevada Constitution. It would mean that there is no
effective gap between the federal and the state constitutions; Nevada will sim-
ply follow the lead of cases construing the U.S. Constitution.
V. CONCLUSION
The Bush Administration's focus on "charitable choice" programs,
together with a national trend towards innovative educational programs such as
vouchers, makes it likely that the Nevada courts will have to revisit Article 11,
Section 10 in the near future. And when the courts do, they will have to decide
how to construe an amendment that was drafted in a different era and for a
relatively narrow purpose, one goal of which to inhibit the influence of Catholi-
cism. Our history is replete with examples of laws motivated by prejudice.
Many such laws remain on the books, typically because those laws are no
longer enforced. Ironically, Nevada's Little Blaine Amendment found early
enforcement and fell into desuetude for more than a century. As faith-based
groups seek access on an equal basis to public programs and facilities, Section
10 may enjoy something of a revival. Nevada's courts will face some demand-
239 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 818-19 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 842 (1994)).
240 See Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 320 (Mar. 3, 1954) (citing NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 4 and conclud-
ing that "the Nevada Constitution, aside from the Fourteenth Amendment ... prohibits the
Legislature from making any law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof").
241 See Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties With the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1596-604 (1995).
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Discussions about "rights" lie at the center of constitutional discourse, and
those discussions are in turn heavily influenced by an approach to rights ques-
tions - I will call it the "persons and rights" approach - practiced by theorists
such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. This discourse often claims a sort of
moral superiority over a different, more consequentialist (and to some more
vulgar) mode of thought - an approach that seems more ascendant in noncon-
stitutional areas of law and that is most conspicuously manifest in law-and-
economics theorizing.' The supposed superiority of the persons and rights
approach lies in its reputed proclivity to respect the sanctity of persons,2 and to
avoid the counterintuitive or even monstrous conclusions to which a utilitarian
or consequentialist approach can notoriously lead in particular (often hypotheti-
cal and far-fetched) circumstances.3
My purpose in this essay is to show that the persons and rights approach
suffers from its own variety of moral obtuseness. More specifically, the per-
sons and rights approach routinely ignores the momentous implications of what
I will call "the logic of unrealized value" - a logic that we understand and
routinely accept in many domains of life and that a more consequentialist
approach has no difficulty in understanding. In ignoring or misunderstanding
that logic, the persons and rights approach is guilty, on a colossal scale, of what
in other contexts we would promptly recognize as demonstrable irrationality -
and at huge moral cost. Though this failure is not limited to any particular
moral question, it is perhaps most strikingly manifest in the context of the
"beginning of life" questions such as abortion and contraception. Reflection on
the implications of the logic of unrealized value for such questions suggests
that current debates about these issues are profoundly misconceived, and that
the most common arguments on all sides of the questions, both "pro-choice"
and "pro-life" arguments, are tainted by that misconception.
It should already be apparent that my principal thesis will be mainly, and
sweepingly, critical in nature. But lawyers and legal scholars are often inter-
ested primarily in the "bottom line." They read the last chapter first; often they
read only the last chapter (which is supposed to say "who's right and who's
wrong," and especially to explain "what to do" about the problem). So to antic-
* Robert and Marion Short Professor, Notre Dame Law School. I thank Rick Garnett,
Michael Perry, Rachel Smith, Jay Tidmarsh, George Wright, and participants in the legal
theory workshop at the University of Nevada for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
I Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 29 (5th ed. 1998) ("Another com-
mon criticism is that the normative underpinnings of the economic approach are so repulsive
that it is inconceivable that the legal system would embrace them.").
2 John Rawls, for example, rejects the consequentialist or utilitarian approach in favor of a
more ights-based position in part because "[ultilitarianism does not take seriously the dis-
tinction between persons." JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 27 (1971).
3 See infra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
MISSING PERSONS
ipate where this discussion may lead, and to save such single-minded readers
some time, let me confess at the outset that my objective is not to take any
particular side in specific controversies over, say, abortion; nor is it to nudge
constitutional discourse in the direction of consequentialist ethics. On the con-
trary, though my criticism is directed mainly against the persons and rights
approach, and though consequentialism is indeed more receptive than the per-
sons and rights approach to the logic of unrealized value, that logic raises
daunting moral and legal questions that neither approach seems competent to
address. If there is a normative conclusion that follows from my discussion, it
may be that "reason," or rationality (whether of the consequentialist or more
Kantian varieties), does not and cannot play anything like the preeminent role
in moral and legal thinking that it has traditionally played. Humans are, as
Pascal recognized at the opening of the era of modem rationalism, far more
creatures of imagination than of reason, and our legal and moral choices are
determined more by the concrete pictures we see, or can conjure up, than by
our theories or "Philosophers' Briefs."
I happen to think that a more vivid recognition of the limitations of reason
would have implications for constitutional law; it would subvert one of the
major justifications often given for letting constitutional law override more
pragmatic and democratic decision-making.4 But so far as I can see, nothing
follows in any purely deductive way from the present argument for any particu-
lar constitutional controversy.
I. THE "PERSONS AND RIGHTS" APPROACH
A quick review of how the moral stage is currently set will serve as a
necessary preliminary for my more specific argument. We can begin by recal-
ling that the bulk of modem moral thinking, especially within the legal acad-
emy, belongs to two sprawling and sometimes feuding families that sometimes
go under the surnames of Bentham and Kant.5 In many legal and public policy
discussions the Benthamite approach seems to predominate; thus, at least since
Holmes, legal scholars have yearned to convert law into a "policy science" that
would be utilitarian or at least consequentialist in some sense or another. The
law and economics movement is probably the most visible manifestation of this
consequentialist tendency. As noted, though, utilitarian moral thinking is often
accused of ignoring the sanctity of persons, or of leading to counterintuitive or
even monstrous conclusions.6 For example, from an unqualified utilitarian
standpoint Peter Singer seems on solid ground in arguing that there is nothing
I This suggestion is developed at length in STEVEN D. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
PRIDE OF REASON (1998).
5 These two contrasting outlooks are represented, at least in a rough sense, in the acrimoni-
ous exchange provoked by Judge Richard Posner's 1997 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures.
Compare Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1637 (1998) with Ronald Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1718
(1998).
6 J.J.C. Smart, though defending utilitarianism, concedes that "[i]t is not difficult to show
that utilitarianism could, in certain exceptional circumstances, have some very horrible con-
sequences." J.J.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in UTILITARIANISM:
FOR AND AGAINST 69 (1973).
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inherently immoral about infanticide 7 - a conclusion that many find appalling.
And at the other end of life, it seems quite plausible to suppose that a hard-
headed (and perhaps hard-hearted) utilitarian "felicific calculus" might justify
liquidating large numbers of elderly people who no longer enjoy good physical
and psychological health and who are unproductive or perhaps a net drain on
society. These conclusions are not certain, of course - given our inability actu-
ally to perform the necessary quantifications and computations of utility, no
moral conclusion is certain in a utilitarian scheme - but efforts to avoid them
on utilitarian assumptions (by invoking factors like "anxiety," for example)
often have a "rigged" feel about them.8
Indeed, the moral awkwardness might go much farther. The venerable
philosopher A. J. Ayer observes that most of the people in the world today lead
stunted, deprived lives in which pain and misery may far exceed happiness, so
that it is not rational for them "to wish their miseries prolonged."9 In utilitarian
terms, these people represent a net deficit. If Ayer is right about this, and if we
are in truth morally bound to achieve the maximum amount of happiness and
the minimum amount of pain, then it might seem that the only moral course is
to relieve these people of the burden of living. Probably the reform could be
carried out quietly and painlessly while the "deficit" people are asleep.
Macabre meditations of this kind may shock us into the Kantian corner.
So we may shun the consequentialist calculus in favor of a familiar strategy for
addressing moral and legal questions that I am calling the "persons and rights"
approach - an approach that, as noted, seems especially influential in constitu-
tional discourse. This approach can be described in terms of two central prem-
ises. One premise asserts that among all the various things that compose or
inhabit the universe, there is one class of entities - usually we call them "per-
7 See, e.g., PETER SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH 128-31 (1994).
8 Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 58 (1983):
[U]tilitarianism can lead to monstrous results. Were there a group of people at once so few
relative to the rest of society, so miserable, and so hated that their extermination would increase
the total happiness of society, the consistent utilitarian would find it hard to denounce their
extermination, although he would be entitled to note the anxiety costs that might be imposed on
people who feared they might be exterminated next.
Posner seeks to avoid such monstrous results by advocating a different form of consequen-
tialism in which what is maximized is not utility or happiness but rather "wealth." To critics,
however, this approach may seem even more monstrous, among other reasons because it
causes the abjectly poor to disappear from the calculation of value altogether. See id. at 61
("The individual who would like very much to have some good but is unwilling or unable to
pay for it - perhaps because he is destitute - does not value the good in the sense in which I
am using the term 'value.').
I Ayer reports that life has been and continues to be a net benefit for him because of
"[o]pportunities for travel, for acquiring pictorial skills and visiting galleries, for making and
listening to music, for reading a wide variety of books .... But most people do not enjoy
these opportunities, so the calculation comes out differently:
The vast majority of the human race, in Asia, in Latin America, in Africa, in the so-called
underclasses of the more affluent Western societies, are far too fully occupied in waging a losing
struggle to achieve a tolerable standard of living for it to be rational for them to wish their
miseries prolonged. Perhaps they do wish it, nevertheless.... I claim only that they can have no
good reason to wish that life were longer than it is.
A. J. AYER, THE MEANING OF LIF 187 (1990).
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sons"'" - that have an inherent dignity and preeminent moral status. This sta-
tus is sometimes expressed by saying that "persons" must be treated as "ends"
not "means,"'' or that persons are "sacred," or "inviolable,"' 2 or perhaps (in a
nontechnical but familiar locution) "infinitely precious."' 3 The second premise
asserts that because persons are sacred or inviolable, they enjoy certain "rights"
that others, including government officials, are obligated to respect. "Rights"
may not be overridden on merely utilitarian grounds.
These two premises mean, in turn, that discussions in the "persons and
rights" approach will revolve around two central questions. Perhaps the most
common question is, "what rights do persons have?" So we argue about the
existence and nature of rights to express ourselves, marry, procreate, act on
conscience, be free of torture, and so forth. But of course there is a prior ques-
tion - one brought most sharply into focus by "borders of life" controversies
such as abortion or "mercy killing" of those who are permanently comatose -
about "who counts as a 'person'?"
This latter question generates a huge variety of responses, of course, but
the leading responses are sometimes classified into two main groups. 4 One
kind of response emphasizes genetics and biology; so it urges that even a fetus,
even a zygote, is a "person" because it is alive and possesses the full genetic
endowment of a human being. The other set of responses selects certain distin-
guishing characteristics or capacities of the mature human being - self-con-
sciousness, for example, or rationality, or linguistic capacity, or the ability to
enter into relationships with others - and uses these characteristics to define
what a person is.15
Of course, each of these approaches provokes familiar objections. For
example, the more biological approach suggests that there is no moral differ-
ence between terminating the life of a fetus and killing a newly born baby;
either action takes the life of a "person" and hence should be regarded as mur-
der. Those who believe that abortion is not inherently immoral, or at least that
10 More precisely, Kant argued for the preeminent moral status of "rational" agents, but in
modem moral discourse this category is treated as being pretty much coterminous with
human beings or "persons": other kinds of ostensible rational beings, such as angels, do not
figure prominently in contemporary academic reflections.
I I See, e.g., Bernard Yack, The Problem with Kantian Liberalism, in KANT & POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY: THE CONTEMPORARY LEGACY 224, 224 (Ronald Beiner & William James
Booth eds., 1993).
12 See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 24-25 (1994).
13 Cf. Antony Flew, Tolstoi and the Meaning of Life, in THE MEANING OF LIFE 209, 213
(E.D. Klemke ed., 2d ed. 2000) (quoting Pierre-Henri Simon) ("a life ephemeral but infi-
nitely precious"). The phrase cannot be taken too literally: it is easy to show that we do not
treat life as infinitely valuable, and that in fact we routinely engage in calculations and trade-
offs involving sacrifices of life in favor of other kinds of values, even including convenience.
See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 17-
18 (1970).
14 James Walters describes these two approaches to the question as "physicalism" and "per-
sonalism." JAMES W. WALTERS, WHAT IS A PERSON? AN ETHICAL EXPLORATION 17-53
(1997).
15 See id. at 41-50. Ronald Dworkin describes a "complex set of capacities: to enjoy or fail
to enjoy, to form affections and emotions, to hope and expect, to suffer disappointment and
frustration." He adds that "it is these more complex capacities, not the capacity to feel pain,
that ground a creature's interests in continuing to live." DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 17-18.
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there is a vast moral difference between abortion and infanticide, will thus find
the biological approach problematic. They may adopt the capacities-based
approach, consequently, and argue that a fetus is not in any meaningful sense a
"person": it does not speak, reason, or consciously form relationships, which
are the essential qualities of personhood. 16 But this response may seem to
prove too much, because the newborn baby also lacks these qualities. 7 So it
might seem that the capacities approach leads us back to what we might call the
"Peter Singer problem": it leaves us with no objection in principle to infanti-
cide (though of course we might come up with practical reasons - the need for
"bright lines," for example - for prohibiting the killing of babies).
Advocates of the capacities approach sometimes attempt to deflect this
objection by seizing upon the notion of "potential personhood" or, as James
Walters puts it, "proximate personhood."' 8 Neither a fetus nor a newborn
exhibits the qualities of personhood, Walters argues, and so neither can be said
to have "maximal moral status," or to possess the rights of actual "persons."
But each approximates, to differing degrees, personhood; so each should have
a corresponding moral status. "IT]he more a fetus, a newborn, or an infant
approximates - or is proximate to - personhood, the greater his or her moral
value and hence the greater the implicit claim to life."' 9
The Supreme Court took a somewhat similar position in Roe v. Wade. A
fetus is not a person, the Court held, and accordingly enjoys no rights under the
Constitution. Nonetheless, states have an interest in protecting "the potentiality
of human life," and this interest becomes more compelling as the fetus grows
and approaches birth.2" The Court's pronouncement in Roe amounted to little
more than an intuition that remained notoriously bare of justification.2 ' But
Ronald Dworkin, among others, has attempted a more sustained justification of
the Court's intuition about the increasing value of "potential" persons. Indeed,
Dworkin has extended the intuition into a more elaborate argument for what we
might call a "sliding scale" of personal value - or of the loss of value when a
given life is terminated - based on a notion of lost "investment."2 2
16 Cf. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 127 (1980) ("A liberal
community ...asks whether the creature can play a part in the dialogic and behavioral
transactions that constitute a liberal polity. The fetus fails the dialogic test - more plainly
than do grown up dolphins.").
17 Id. at 129 (asserting that "a day-old infant is no more a citizen than a nine-month fetus").
18 WALTERS, supra note 14, at 54-77.
19 Id. at 63.
20 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
21 Mark Tushnet has described "Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe as an innovation.., the
totally unreasoned judicial opinion." MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 54 (1988).
22 See DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 84-89. Dworkin explains the basic claim in this way:
It is a waste of the natural and human creative investments that make up the story of a normal
life when this normal progression is frustrated by premature death or in other ways. But how bad
this is - how great the frustration - depends on the stage of life in which it occurs, because the
frustration is greater if it takes place after rather than before the person has made a significant
personal investment in his own life, and less if it occurs after any investment has been substan-




The effort to avoid morally monstrous results by asserting the value or the
claims of "potential" persons provokes a serious objection, however, the whole
argument may appear to turn on a blatant non sequitur. Rights belong to per-
sons, after all, and "potential persons" are by definition not actual persons; so
why do they have any "implicit claim to life," as Walters contends? As non-
persons, why do they have any rights at all? Joel Feinberg offers an analogy:
"In 1930, when he was six years old, Jimmy Carter did not know it, but he was
a potential president of the United States. That gave him no claim then, not
even a very weak claim, to give commands to the U.S. Army. ' 3 By the same
token, the mere potential of a fetus (or, for that matter, a newborn) to acquire
the capacities needed to constitute a person does not seem to support even a
weak claim to the moral or legal rights of "persons."
There may be a plausible rejoinder to this objection but, as I will shortly
discuss, the rejoinder leads to an even more disconcerting perplexity that is
central to my purpose in this essay. To see how this happens, we need to look
more closely at one prospect for vindicating the "potential persons" position.
II. THE LOGIC OF UNREALIZED VALUE
In many contexts, we do recognize (at least when we are paying attention
to the question) that the loss of a potential good - or the failure to realize a
potential good24 - is as real a detriment as the loss of a previously-acquired
good. The twenty-dollar bill that was given to me yesterday but fell out of my
pocket is neither more nor less valuable than the twenty-dollar bill that I failed
to notice on the sidewalk. Each is worth twenty dollars; consequently, each
misfortune leaves me exactly twenty dollars poorer than I would otherwise
have been. "Realizable but unrealized" value, in short, is as substantial a harm
as "temporarily realized but then lost" value.
Economists are perfectly comfortable with the logic of unrealized value;
indeed, under the heading of "opportunity costs," they insist upon it.2 5 Let us
say I decide to start a photography business. My "costs" include not just the
time and money I put into that business, but also the profits I would have
earned if I had devoted my resources to writing a steamy romance novel
instead. These unrealized benefits (whatever they would have been) are not as
visible and consequently not as quantifiable as the debits in my checkbook
reflecting the purchase of cameras and film, but they are just as real - just as
much "costs" - as the more visible expenditures. And insofar as I fail to take
them into account in making a business decision, I am behaving "irrationally."
I am being a foolish businessperson, in other words; I am failing to achieve my
purpose of maximizing economic gain.
23 Quoted in WALTERS, supra note 14, at 66.
24 I will usually use the term "loss" in this essay in the way in which lawyers speak of "lost
profits" - that is, as including failures to realize potential gains that would have been
obtained, and not merely as the loss of already acquired "goods in hand." Readers who insist
on a narrower usage and who associate the term "loss" only with the latter kind of misfor-
tune - with "out of pocket" loss - are free to substitute some other term, such as "depriva-
tion," "forfeiture, sacrifice," "cost," or "failure to realize."
25 For a brief explanation of the concept, see C. E. FERGUSON & S. CHARLES MAURICE,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: THEORY AND APPLICATION 215-16 (3d ed. 1978).
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To be sure, this kind of irrationality is pervasive. In a much discussed
series of studies, psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky discov-
ered that people respond very differently to objectively identical choices
depending on whether the alternatives are described in terms of losses or, con-
versely, of unrealized potential gains. An option that people will reject when it
is described as involving a loss, that is, will often be chosen when it is
redescribed as a potential but unrealized gain.2 6 Reactions to such choices thus
depend heavily on "the vagaries of framing,"'27 and those vagaries in turn
reflect the presence or absence of imagination in visualizing the goods in ques-
tion - goods to be gained, or not gained, or lost - as real or merely possible.
"An individual's experience of pleasure or frustration may therefore depend on
an act of imagination that determines the reference level to which reality is
compared." 28
This observation resonates with everyday experience. The twenty-dollar
bill that I touched, rubbed, and put into my pocket entered into my conscious-
ness and figured in my plans: so I feel its loss. But the largish green bill that I
failed to notice (or knew about but never actually held or owned) was not part
of my life anyway, so I am less inclined to miss it. "Out of sight is out of
mind." Appreciating the loss involved in a potential but unrealized gain would
require a conscious act of imagination, a picturing of what could have been,
while the loss of what was already ours requires no similar mental effort. The
difference in required mental effort produces the kind of distortions in judg-
ment that Tversky and Kahneman describe as "biases of imaginability."2 9
So one might say that "reason" is the slave not (or at least not only) of the
"passions," as Hume famously observed, but of "imagination." Pascal
remarked in this vein that imagination is "the dominant faculty in man, master
of error and falsehood," against it, "[rjeason may object in vain. '"30 A corollary
is that rationality is constrained by lack of imagination. Thus,
[w]ho would think himself unhappy if he had only one mouth and who would not if
he had only one eye? It has probably never occurred to anyone to be distressed at not
having three eyes, but those who have none are inconsolable.
3 1
These reflections may help to account for our subjective reactions to dif-
ferent forms of lost value. But they do nothing to show that the failure to
26 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, Sci. AM., Jan. 1982,
at 160.
27 Id. at 172.
28 Id. at 170. See also POSNER, supra note 1, at 20 (footnotes omitted):
[W]e are prone to succumb to the "endowment effect" - valuing what we have more than we
would value the identical thing if we didn't have it. For example, we might refuse to sell for
$100 a wristwatch for which we would not pay more than $90. We also engage in "hyperbolic
discounting"; that is, we weigh present pains and pleasures more heavily than future ones to a
degree that is irrational, as when we overeat (present pleasure) knowing that we will soon regret
it (future pain). We also give too much more weight to immediate vivid impressions than to
what we read about (the "salience heuristic").
29 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 38, 47-48
(Hal R. Arkes & Kenneth R. Hammond eds., 1986).
30 BLAISE PASCAL, PENSEES 38-39 (number 44) (A.J. Krailsheimer trans., Penguin ed.
1966).
31 Id. at 59 (number 117).
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realize a potential benefit is not a real loss - or to negate the observation that
ignoring such benefits in our calculations is a kind of irrationality. Nor is it to
the point (though it is probably accurate) to say that "objective" gains or losses
in economic value may not correlate with gains or losses in "subjective" or
actually experienced happiness; that is because the logic of unrealized value
applies in either domain - the "objective" or the "subjective." An unrealized
(subjective) happiness that "might have been" is still a loss of happiness, that
is, even for one who did not contemplate the possibility of what went unreal-
ized - just as the (objective) loss of a twenty-dollar bill that we did not notice is
a loss of twenty dollars. In each case the loss is real, even if we are not aware
of it.
With this logic in mind, let us return to the problem of "potential persons."
The "persons and rights" approach assumes that personhood is a valuable good
- indeed, a good so valuable that adjectives like "sacred" or "infinitely pre-
cious" are commonly invoked to give a sense of its magnitude. Moreover, it is
surely not merely "personhood" as some sort of ethereal or abstract universal
that is deemed valuable, but rather persons - or the instantiation of personhood
(person by person) in individuals. Each individual person is a separate locus of
value, so that the loss of any person (through untimely death, for example) is a
loss of that value - even when there is no overall shortage of persons.
These observations are mundane enough. But now the logic of unrealized
value kicks in to suggest that if personhood is a valuable good, and if each
individual person reflects distinct and "infinitely precious" or "sacred" value,
then every failure to realize that value is as much a loss as the extinguishing of
an existing instantiation of personhood. The failure to bring into being a person
who could have enjoyed existence (but did not) represents a loss just as real as
that entailed by the termination of a person who could have continued to enjoy
existence but does not (through untimely death). Indeed, if anything the former
loss is greater, because total, than the latter.
To be sure, this conclusion still may not permit us to say that potential or
"proximate persons" have the rights enjoyed by actual persons already in
being. But the conclusion does let us say something that seems to have approx-
imately the same practical and moral force: that there is a huge moral loss, a
sort of moral catastrophe, in choices that prevent the "sacred" or "infinitely
precious" value of a person from being realized.
III. RIGHTS AND THE MORAL IMAGINATION
Why then do we rarely lament or even notice this loss of value? One
reason, most likely, is that to accept the logic of unrealized value in this domain
would have very disturbing implications. Some of these implications are prob-
ably already apparent. I will consider them shortly, and so I ask you to defer
those difficulties for a moment. For now, let us notice one powerful reason for
our failure to notice this problem: as a psychological matter we are subject in
this context to the same limitations that we have already noticed in more mun-
dane domains. That is, the person who is born and lives for a time is readily
visible; she becomes a part of our world and our life, and so when she dies we
notice and lament her absence. By contrast, it would require an act of imagina-
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tion to appreciate the value that could have been realized with a potential per-
son who never actually came into living, breathing existence. Rarely do we
exercise that sort of imagination.
In this respect, our failure to lament the non-existence of potential persons
is akin to the familiar phenomenon whereby we overlook or devalue the lives
and deaths of persons not readily present to us as persons - foreigners, or
enemy soldiers or civilians in war, or members of racial or socioeconomic clas-
ses removed from our own.32 Nazi concentration camp officials devised a vari-
ety of techniques to avoid noticing that the subject matter of their genocidal
activities consisted of human beings; they concentrated on describing and
viewing their actions in terms not of "killing" but rather of "checking lists,
driving vehicles, flipping switches, giving instructions, and the like."3 3 In this
way they were often able to look past the humanity of their victims, and thus to
live what were in many other respects regular and even decent lives in relative
equanimity. 34 "Out of sight is out of mind."
This observation permits us to appreciate a different dimension of the dis-
course of "rights." As discussed above, one motive for adopting the "persons
and rights" approach is the desire to avoid the morally monstrous consequences
that might attend a straightforward utilitarian approach to moral questions. But
a discourse of rights has its own morally numbing propensities. Insofar as we
treat "rights" as something attaching to a restricted class of existing "persons,"
a focus on "rights" allows us to insulate ourselves against the fact of losses in
value, losses that might amount to moral catastrophes, because those losses do
not come attached to any "person" within the restricted class.3 5 So slaves may
suffer, foreigners may starve, and animals may be afflicted with awful cruel-
ties; but these losses can be depreciated or ignored because the sufferers do not
belong to the class of those who enjoy "rights." Neglect of the loss of value
associated with "potential persons" seems to be an even more momentous man-
ifestation of the capacity of a focus on "rights" to deaden our moral
sensibilities.
I have been suggesting that our failure to appreciate the colossal loss asso-
ciated with unrealized "potential persons" reflects a failure of our moral imagi-
nation. But in this case the failure is so severe - so overwhelmingly successful,
so to speak - that it is difficult even upon reflection to accept the logic of
unrealized value in this context. We are tempted to believe that there must
have been some mistake, or some conceptual confusion in the preceding analy-
sis of the problem. Some theorists, Ronald Dworkin for instance, assert that
there is a conceptual flaw in the analysis. So before proceeding, it is worth
32 See Roy F. BAUMEISTER, EVIL: INSIDE HUMAN VIOLENCE AND CRUELTY 314-16 (1999).
33 Id. at 339.
34 Rudolph Hess and Albert Speer were notorious examples of people who, by adopting
techniques to avoid noticing the humanity of their victims, were able to combine the incon-
gruous roles of mass executioner and loving family man. Id. at 336-37; MIKE W. MARTIN,
SELF-DECEPTION AND MORALITY 38 (1986).
35 Cf Robin West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 69, 72
(1990) (contrasting "the atomistic focus on rights characteristic of Western liberal legalism"
with a "Havelian" emphasis on "living in truth" - an ideal that would foster the "communi-
tarian virtues of compassion, sympathy, fellow-feeling, and love").
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retracing our steps to see whether the path really leads to the current
embarrassment.
IV. LOGIC AND PERSONS
Consider three likely objections to the foregoing argument. The first two
objections can be addressed quite quickly, I think; the last requires lengthier
consideration. One objection insists that the value of "persons," unlike the
value of the sorts of "opportunity costs" economists usually consider, is not
quantifiable in dollars, or in numbers. This assertion seems right, but also irrel-
evant. There is an understandable reluctance (which I entirely share) to quanti-
fying the value of a person, or to treating a person as a "commodity. 3 6 But
nothing in the logic of unrealized value depends on whether or how a particular
unrealized value can be quantified; what is crucial, rather, is only that what
goes unrealized is something of value. A valid analytical point does not lose its
force merely because economists, or consequentialists, happen to acknowledge
and use it. So you can apply whatever concept or adjective you like to describe
the value of a person ("sacred," or "infinite," or whatever label seems appropri-
ate). The fact remains that when a person who could have come into existence
does not, that value remains unrealized. And unrealized value, by whatever
label, is a real loss.
Ronald Dworkin attempts to deflect the logic of unrealized value with a
different argument, which consists of a distinction supported by examples.
More specifically, Dworkin distinguishes between "instrumental value" and
what he calls (somewhat oddly37 ) "sacred" value. His highly idiosyncratic def-
inition of "sacred" value is crucial to his argument.
The hallmark of the sacred as distinct from the incrementally valuable, is that
the sacred is intrinsically valuable because - and therefore only once - it exists. It is
inviolable because of what it represents or embodies. It is not important that there be
more people. But once a human life has begun, it is very important that it flourish
and not be wasted.3 8
Dworkin goes on to support this distinction by offering examples of various
good things - great paintings, great lives, national flags - which we value when
they exist even though we may not want more of them. For example, he
declares: "I do not myself wish that there were more paintings by Tintoretto
than there are. But I would nevertheless be appalled by the deliberate destruc-
tion of even one of those he did paint.""
This pronouncement amounts to a flat denial of the logic of unrealized
value within the realm of what Dworkin calls the "sacred." But Dworkin does
36 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 56 (1996) (arguing that "[t]o
understand [the qualities of personhood] as monetizable . . . is to do violence to our deepest
understanding of what it is to be human"). Cf. Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the "Cri-
sis": A Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 775
(1987) (arguing that "applying a market value approach to such matters merely appears
grotesque or obtuse").
17 For a critical examination of Dworkin's use of the term "sacred," see MICHAEL J. PERRY,
THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 25-29 (1998).
38 DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 73-74 (emphasis added).
39 Id. at 74.
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not identify any error or limitation in that logic. Rather, his argument amounts
to an attempt to defeat the logic of unrealized value by definitional fiat - by
simply declaring into existence a kind of good that is said to be valuable only if
and because it has been realized. Dworkin provides no reason to believe, how-
ever, that goods with this peculiar quality exist; he offers no account of how or
why something would be "valuable because, and therefore only once, it exists."
Nor do Dworkin's examples strengthen his case. We can take it as a true
report, I suppose, that Dworkin himself would be appalled by the loss of an
existing Tintoretto painting but cares not at all that Tintoretto did not leave us
with more paintings. In the same way, we can take it as a true report that many
people regret losing a twenty-dollar bill they already had but do not regret
failing to notice the bill they could have had - or that the less than astute
business person notices the "out of pocket" costs but not the "opportunity
costs" of his or her business. As noted, the phenomenon is perfectly common,
and it simply reflects what Tversky and Kahneman call "biases of
imaginability." Moreover, this is a bias that many people manage to overcome.
It is hardly uncommon for people to lament, for example, that Mozart or Cho-
pin died at such young ages, thereby depriving the world of masterpieces that
they might have composed.
A more challenging objection would acknowledge the force of the logic of
unrealized value with respect to many potential but unrealized goods - Tinto-
retto paintings for example - but deny that this logic can properly be applied to
potential but unrealized persons. Value, the objection asserts, does not exist
impersonally or in the abstract. Rather, value exists only to persons.4" "A
good state of the world must be good to someone," as Arthur Leff argued.'"
So, the failure to realize a business profit, or the premature death of a Mozart,
represents a real loss because the unrealized potential goods - more money,
more symphonies - are losses to persons - or to us. But the failure to bring
potential persons into existence is not a real loss because the persons in whom
value would have adhered are not real; they are mere abstractions, or
illusions.42
Though some thinkers have resisted the premise of this objection -
namely, that we can only talk meaningfully about value to persons 43 - the
premise seems to me sound. Indeed, I have elsewhere argued for it.4 4 But the
conclusion seems a non sequitur. After all, the potential goods that we are
considering are (potential) persons. There should be no difficulty in accepting,
first, that those persons (or some of them) can as a practical matter be brought
into being and, second, that if they are brought into being then they will have
40 The objection would be unaffected, I think, by expanding the category of "persons" to
include animals, for instance, or perhaps "sentient beings."
41 Arthur A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1239 (1979).
42 I am grateful to Michael Perry, who in correspondence has vigorously pressed this objec-
tion. I have tried to state the objection as accurately as I can even though, obviously, I
remain unconvinced by it (and perhaps have not fully understood it).
" See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Good Without God, in NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM, AND
MORALITY 221, 238-41 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
4 Steven D. Smith, Review Essay: Natural Law and Contemporary Moral Thought: A
Guide from the Perplexed, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 299, 310-16 (1997).
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value. It follows of necessity that if they are not brought into being, that value
will go unrealized.
Suppose we have a choice between a and b; a but not b will produce
result X, which (at least once X is realized) will admittedly have value. It
follows that choice a will produce the value associated with X, and there is no
way to avoid the conclusion that choice b will entail the loss of that value. If X
is a person, and if choice b represents a choice not to bring that person into
existence, then there is no avoiding the conclusion that the value of X has been
lost.
In this respect it is misleading to say that X (or the "potential persons" that
we could choose to bring into existence) are mere abstractions. In a sense they
are, at present, abstractions - just as all realizable but unrealized goods are
abstractions. The crucial point is that these are abstractions that can be made
real. So in acting to avoid realizing those abstractions, we inescapably lose the
value associated with them.
In sum, there seems no good way of deflecting the logic of unrealized
value in the context of potential persons. Nonetheless, I expect that this logic
will continue to seem counterintuitive. The objection that potential persons are
mere abstractions, though it does not defeat the logic of unrealized value, surely
does identify a limitation in our ability imaginatively to apprehend what is at
stake. And my own discussion to this point may have inadvertently reinforced
this tendency to discount or ignore the losses of value that can be perceived
only by an (uncommon and difficult) act of imagination. My discussion, that
is, has employed bland or abstract terms - as, bs and Xs, "instantiations of
personhood," "unrealized value," "losses," "opportunity costs" - and this
bloodless vocabulary might tempt us to dismiss the argument thus far as a
merely "theoretical" or "academic" point (and a very counterintuitive point at
that). Before proceeding with the argument, therefore, it may be helpful to
consider the problem in a more concrete and human context in which we some-
times do at least come close to appreciating the staggering loss associated with
unrealized "potential persons."
V. WHAT MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN
I have argued above that we often fail to appreciate the logic of unrealized
value, especially the unrealized value of potential persons, because we usually
do not engage in the imaginative appreciation of what "might have been."45
But we come close to such an imaginative exercise with a more familiar sort of
counterfactual reflection that is easier to perform. We sometimes pause to
reflect, that is, about what "might not have been." With considerable uncer-
tainty, maybe, you decide to take a job in Peoria rather than one in Cleveland,
and as a result you meet someone who becomes a close friend, or perhaps even
your spouse. Every once in a while, perhaps, you find yourself wondering,
"What if I hadn't taken that job ... ?" And so you imagine your life unfolding
45 Occasionally we do engage in this sort of exercise. As I was completing this essay, I
happened to see the movie "The Family Man," in which the character played by Nicholas
Cage engages in just the sort of counterfactual imagination I am interested in here.
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without that person, and you ponder what a wealth of experience and under-
standing and mutual affection would have been missed.4 6
To be sure, this sort of familiar reflection still falls far short of the kind of
imaginative exercise required to appreciate the unrealized value associated with
potential persons. The person you would not have met if you had moved to
Cleveland would still have existed, after all, even if you had never met him.
Moreover, by taking the Cleveland job you would probably have met other
people who might have become friends. Perhaps your life would have been
even happier with them.
So do we ever engage in reflection about the lost value associated with a
person who might never have existed at all? Rarely, I suppose; but we some-
times do this. One not so fanciful case begins with a couple trying to decide
whether to have a child. Ex ante, the couple may think about the question
largely in terms of costs and benefits to themselves. These costs and benefits
will inevitably be abstract. They include the reputed joys of seeing a child
grow, taking care of her, teaching her, playing with her. But these anticipatory
joys will have a hazy, impersonal aspect; there is no actual child with a particu-
lar giggle, with dimples and unruly hair and a homely toothless grin, for the
couple's reflections to distill around. On the debit side, there will be expenses
and time commitments, not to mention unpleasant things like diapers and lost
sleep and, later on, quarrels and loud music with screeching electric guitars.
Though in some respects more susceptible to quantification, these prospective
burdens are likewise, for the most part, indistinct and immune to measurement.
Suppose that the couple decides, with deep misgivings perhaps, to have a
child. Ten or twenty years pass. What began as an ex ante assessment of
indistinct benefits and burdens now assumes a totally different aspect. In part,
of course, the difference is that both the costs and benefits are now much more
concrete. They will almost certainly be completely different in magnitude from
what was anticipated: both benefits and burdens, joys and sorrows, will likely
far outstrip anything the couple could have anticipated. And the relative pro-
portions of each may be different as well.
But these observations fall far short of capturing the radically different
aspect of the ex post reflection. Now, if the parents pause to think about the
matter, it will be wonderfully (or perhaps painfully) clear that it is not simply a
question of value to them. Now there is another, real person in the picture - a
person who is, once again, "sacred," or "infinitely precious." If the couple had
invested in IBM and the investment had turned out to yield consistent losses,
they could have unloaded it without compunction. But they would be aghast if
anyone were to suggest similar loss cutting with a child who turns out (if they
are candid) to bring more sorrow than joy. Such an action would be unthink-
able - not just because the law creates obstacles or because the child has "inter-
46 Of course, the personal relationship that "might not have been" sometimes involves cur-
rent, acute misery, not realized happiness. ("If only I hadn't gone to that party,.... I'd never
have met the creep.") Indeed, some studies suggest that "counterfactual thinking is more
likely to follow negative outcomes than positive outcomes." Neal J. Roese & James M.
Olson, Counterfactual Thinking: A Critical Overview, in WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN: THE




ests" or "rights," but because such an action would be a moral atrocity. It
would be an absolutely unconscionable negation of value - of the value that we
try to express with terms like "sacred" or "infinitely precious."
Yet it is true that this same sacrifice of value would have occurred if, ten
or twenty years earlier, the parents had decided (as perhaps they almost did - or
ineffectually did) not to have the child in the first place. Some parents do on
occasion think back and wonder, perhaps with a mixture of horror and relief,
"What if we'd decided not to have her ... ?" (Or, perhaps, "Imagine, if we'd
been more careful ... ?") And for a moment they glimpse the possibility of a
different unfolding of events - one in which not only their own lives but indeed
the cosmic economy itself may seem incomparably poorer, tragically bereaved.
This tragic counterfactual might easily have been the actual, of course, and
if it had been they conceivably might now ask the converse counterfactual
question: "What if we'd decided to have a child . . . ." Realistically, though,
this counterfactual question about "what might have been" is less likely to
arise, or to arise with any vividness of feeling, because the potential value that
was there to be realized or, as things in fact turned out, not realized is harder to
imagine and appreciate in that context.47 Once again, it is far easier to visual-
ize what was at stake when the concrete particulars - the first steps and the
birthday parties and the heart-to-heart talks - are actual memories and not just
conceptual possibilities.
This is why the occasional counterfactual reflection of the parents who
might not have been parents is helpful, I think - because it may be easiest in
that context to appreciate that the logic of unrealized value is not merely an
abstract academic point, even (or perhaps especially) where persons are
concerned.
VI. INTOLERABLE IMPLICATIONS
The argument thus far has suggested that the logic of unrealized value,
which we readily accept in more mundane contexts, applies with equal force to
the issue of "potential persons," and that this is not merely an academic point
but rather a valid one that in some contexts we actually come close to appreci-
ating. But I have been deferring the really difficult problem - which is that in
this context the logic of unrealized value also appears to have implications that
no one (not even the most extreme or deeply committed pro-life activist) seems
prepared to accept.
Probably the most immediately obvious implication is that abortion, at any
stage of pregnancy, is as much a deprivation of the sacred value of life, and so
presumably as immoral, as the killing of a child (or, for that matter, the killing
of a teenager or an adult). Some "pro-lifers" already believe this, of course.
But notice that from this perspective the immorality of abortion does not rest on
the more common argument that a fetus has the full genetic endowment of a
human being and hence is a "person." Abortion is immoral, rather, because
whether or not we classify the fetus itself as a "person," the occurrence of an
47 Cf id. at 29 (describing research indicating that "it is easier to generate counterfactuals
based on the deletion of a factual action than it is to imagine an action that was not in fact
performed"). But cf id. at 30-31 (discussing complexities and contrary data).
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abortion prevents the realization of the "sacred" or "infinite" value of a human
person.
For many, this conclusion will already provoke ardent resistance to the
logic of unrealized value in this domain. But of course that logic produces the
same disquieting conclusion when it is applied to the question of contraception.
Contraception, that is, prevents a person who could have come into existence
from doing so, and thereby results in the loss of the value of a person. So if the
logic of unrealized value erases the moral line between abortion and infanti-
cide, it wipes out the moral line between abortion and contraception as well.
Contraception, it seems, is as immoral as abortion.
Even pro-life advocates who already equate abortion with infanticide may
balk at this further implication. But the argument has not yet run its trouble-
some course. We might pause to admire the absurdities (or what to our con-
ventional assumptions and common sense will seem absurdities). By the logic
of unrealized value, every time a human being could but deliberately does not
act so as to bring a new person into existence, he or she makes a conscious
choice in favor of the same sacrifice of value that occurs when someone dies or
is killed. Suppose you and your partner decide to have only two children, or
only twelve, when as a matter of physical possibility you could have more: you
have brought about the same diminution of value as a murderer does. Or you
decide not to be a parent in order to devote yourself to pursuing the life of an
artist, or a scholar, or a priest; your decision makes you responsible for the
same sacrifice of "sacred" or "infinite" value, the same moral calamity as
someone who throws a bomb into a crowded room. Celibacy becomes as mor-
ally costly as serial murder.
To be sure, even the logic of unrealized value would have some limits in
this realm. At some point - and people will disagree about when that point is
reached - the earth would become so saturated with human beings that not one
could be added without subtracting someone else. At that point the moral duty
to procreate would end. But it seems clear that no one, not pro-lifers or the
most conservative Catholics, will endorse a duty that comes anywhere near
such a "break even" point.4 8 In short, no one seems willing to follow the logic
of unrealized value to its logical conclusion, or even to follow it very far along
its route.
So what should we make of this awkward situation? It would seem intel-
lectually lazy and morally irresponsible just to remark that no one accepts the
results of this logic and then leave the matter at that. After all, we do acknowl-
edge the force of the logic of unrealized value in many contexts. To be sure,
we understand that due to "biases of imaginability" people often fail to appreci-
48 In addition, as noted, we do not in fact treat life, or persons, as infinitely valuable; rather,
we make trade-offs between lives and other kinds of goods. See supra note 13. The present
argument does not speak to whether or how such "life vs. other values" trade-offs should be
made. The argument suggests only that when and if such trade-offs occur, there is no ade-
quate justification for ascribing high value to persons-in-existence while ignoring (or ascrib-
ing minimal value to) unrealized but realizable persons. But even this conclusion is radically
incongruent with our usual approach to such matters: people who regard the achievement of
an optimal population level through the use of contraceptive measures as morally
unproblematic would likely be horrified at the suggestion that the same optimum level be
reached by liquidating the "excess" population.
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ate or act on that logic; but we say these biases produce distortions in judg-
ment.4 9 So how do we account for our flagrant defiance of the logic of
unrealized value here?
VII. BLOCKED ESCAPE ROUTES
It would be tempting at this point to retreat into the safe, reassuring dis-
course of "persons and rights." So we might just reiterate that "potential per-
sons" have no "interests," or no "rights." 50 But the discourse of "rights" does
nothing to disclose any fallacy in the logic of unrealized value; it simply pro-
vides a convenient way of shifting our attention away from that disconcerting
logic. As discussed earlier, moreover, we know that the discourse of rights can
be used, and sometimes is used, to induce a kind of moral numbness. 5 So I
submit that merely to assert at this point that "potential persons" have no
"right" to life, or to be born, is simply to close our eyes to the problem.
Is there any other way to explain what is wrong with the logic of unreal-
ized value as applied to potential persons? I think there is, but the possible
explanations carry objectionable features of their own. For example, we might
rethink and then relinquish our assertions about individual persons having
"maximal moral status" or "sacred" value. These time-honored assertions
might be reclassified as mere sentimental pieties, or as manipulative devices
employed by some to secure their own interests in a world that is really a
Darwinian struggle for survival.
We could solve the problem in this way. But nothing in the preceding
discussion warrants this nihilistic conclusion. The discussion has emphasized
what seems to be one major limitation or blind spot in the persons and rights
approach, but it has not criticized that approach for its positive claims - for its
claims, that is, that persons have sacred value, or that persons have rights. The
criticism, in essence, has asserted that the persons and rights approach has
failed to ponder its own commitments to persons seriously enough, not that
those commitments are flawed in themselves. Hence, to respond to the predica-
ment presented by "potential persons" by abandoning the commitment to the
sacred value of persons would be like curing a problem of nearsightedness by
gouging out our eyes.
There are also more exotic solutions to the problem of "potential persons."
For instance, we might adopt the sort of mystical or pantheistic view, offered in
different forms in religious texts like the Bhagavad-Gita and by philosophers
like Spinoza, which suggests that even if life (or perhaps something like
"being") has great moral worth, what we perceive as individuals (or individual
"persons") are really evanescent manifestations or glimpses of some larger and
unified being, like the sparkles of moonlight on a rippling lake. So whether any
particular manifestation, any particular "person," comes into or passes out of
existence seems of slight moral consequence.
Or we might avoid the problem by adopting the common belief in what
might be called "the anterior substantial soul." We could hypothesize, that is,
49 See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
50 Cf DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 18-19.
" See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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that the soul is a sort of "spiritual substance," existing before birth and indepen-
dent of the body, that joins with the body to form a person. On this assump-
tion, it seems that decisions for celibacy or contraception do not prevent any
potential person from coming into existence. Instead, these decisions mean that
a soul that might have achieved personhood by joining with a particular body at
one time and place will instead become a person by uniting with a different
body at a different time and place. Such decisions have important conse-
quences, to be sure: they alter the cast or at least the placement of characters in
the human drama. But they do not prevent the realization of any person who
might but does not achieve existence. Or, if you prefer, such actions prevent
the realization of one particular person who might have existed, but in doing so
permit the realization of a different person who otherwise would not have
existed. So there is, so to speak, a sort of moral set-off.
These more exotic possibilities, we should note, have seemed plausible to
millions or probably billions of people over the course of human history wholly
independent of any concern about the conundrum we are considering here. For
example, religions and philosophies that accept the idea of reincarnation - Hin-
duism, Buddhism, Platonism, and Pythagoreanism - have endorsed the idea of
the anterior substantial soul. Nor is that notion necessarily tied to reincarna-
tion. It might be that the soul exists before a person's conception and birth but
that each soul passes through this temporal sphere only once, like a leaf that
waits all summer for its one fluttering journey from branch to earth. The Mor-
mon religion currently teaches something like this idea. And an occasional
person will come to this conclusion without the assistance of any particular
religious teaching. For example, through poetic reflection and introspection,
William Wordsworth developed a conviction that "the soul that rises with us,
our life's star, hath had elsewhere its setting, and cometh from afar""2 (though
in his later years, as he gravitated toward Christian orthodoxy, Wordsworth
became more tentative about this assertion).53 Any of these positions would
avoid the conundrum under consideration here - and without defying the logic
of unrealized value or denying that logic's application to persons.
Still, the plain fact is that these solutions will be unacceptable in our cur-
rent academic environment, which rigorously (if sometimes witlessly) enforces
the law of parsimony in metaphysical matters. Almost a century ago, William
James observed that "souls are out of fashion,"54 and the dictum still holds.
For example, the idea of the anterior substantial soul seems unavoidably to
entail "substance dualism," and as Richard Swinburne observes, "few philo-
sophical positions are as unfashionable as substance dualism."55
So although most people in the world's history might have had easy ways
to avoid the conundrum of "potential persons" (and although even now most
people not burdened by the metaphysical restrictions that obtain in academic
52 William Wordsworth, Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early
Childhood.
5 See MELVIN RADER, WORDSWORTH: A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH 166-74 (1967).
54 Quoted in WILLIAM MCDOUGALL, BODY AND MIND XXiV (Bacon Press 1961) (1911).
55 RICHARD SWINBURNE, THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOUL iX (rev. ed. 1997). Swinbume none-
theless defends that position, though perhaps not in a version that would avoid the conun-
drum of "potential persons" discussed here.
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settings might have no difficulty with that conundrum), there is no very conve-
nient way for academicians to avoid the difficulty.
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE REIGN OF IMAGINATION
So what are we left with? It seems to me that if we are candid, we should
begin by acknowledging a profound dissonance - it might not be too strong to
say a gaping incoherence - in our leading approaches to central moral ques-
tions. We concede and indeed proclaim the logic of unrealized value in many
domains. We have no very good explanation for why that logic should not
apply in the matter of "potential persons." We nonetheless cannot accept the
implications of that logic in this context. And we have no very satisfactory
account that would reconcile these disparate convictions and judgments.
If this admission of incoherence in such central matters operates to shake
our confidence in our prevailing ways of addressing vital moral questions, per-
haps that would not be such a bad thing. In a related context, the philosopher
Richard Swinburne suggests that "if in some sense it is a mystery how [the
mind or soul relates to the body] ... then we should be humble and accept that
there just are some things we cannot understand. -. 6 Or, once again, Pascal:
"Reason's last step is the recognition that there are an infinite number of things
which are beyond it. It is merely feeble if it does not go so far as to realize
that."'57 If that recognition meant that academicians became less self-assured
about writing prevailing moral theories into "philosophers' briefs" to be sub-
mitted to the Supreme Court (directly or indirectly, through legal scholarship),
or that the Court became a bit more hesitant than it sometimes has been about
forcibly imposing the conclusions of those moral theories on society, those
results might not be such a bad thing either.
More generally, the failure of our moral theories with regard to the
momentous problem of "potential persons" might lead us to question the
entrenched assumption, central to moral theories of both the consequentialist
and Kantian varieties, that our central and defining feature is "reason," or that
our species is cogently described as that of the "rational animal." It may be
time to cope with the fact that, as Pascal said, we seem to be driven less by
reason than by imagination.
56 Id. at xiii.
57 PASCAL, supra note 30, at 85 (number 188).
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INSUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS AND
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A FOOTNOTE
TO THE TERM-LIMITS DEBATE
Jonathan L. Entin*
In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,' the Supreme Court held that the
Qualifications Clauses2 prevent the states from restricting the length of service
of members of Congress. 3 Some states have sought unsuccessfully to evade this
result by seeking to compel candidates for the House of Representatives and the
Senate to support a constitutional amendment permitting congressional term
limits.
4
Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied on Term
Limits to invalidate a California law requiring congressional candidates to be
registered voters in the state when they file nomination papers, a requirement
that prevented a Nevada resident who asserted an intention to relocate to the
Golden State from running in a special election to fill a vacancy in the House of
Representatives.5 The California law required congressional candidates to
* Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University.
514 U.S. 779 (1995).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 ("No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have
attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be
chosen."); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 ("No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to
the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall
not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.").
3 The Court reached this conclusion despite the state's characterization of the restriction at
issue as a limitation on ballot access rather than on eligibility for continued membership in
the federal legislature. This was, according to the majority, a distinction without a difference.
See Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 829-31.
4 Under these proposals, the ballot would contain a statement noting which candidates had
refused to support such an amendment. The prospect of a pejorative ballot description label-
ing them as disdainful of the voters' hostility toward career politicians presumably would
supply an incentive for candidates to promote term limits. The Supreme Court recently inval-
idated one of these measures. See Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001). Every other court
that considered the issue before the Supreme Court's ruling also found this approach to be
unconstitutional under the Qualifications Clauses or other provisions. See Gralike v. Cook,
191 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 1999), aff'd, 531 U.S. 510 (2001); Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119
(8th Cir. 1999); Barker v. Hazeltine, 3 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (D.S.D. 1998); League of Women
Voters of Me. v. Gwadosky, 966 F. Supp. 52 (D. Me. 1997); Donovan v. Priest, 931 S.W.2d
1119 (Ark. 1996); Bramberg v. Jones, 978 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1999); Morrissey v. State, 951
P.2d 911 (Colo. 1998); Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. re Term Limits Pledge, 718 So.
2d 798 (Fla. 1998); Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 15 P.3d 1129 (Idaho
2000); Simpson v. Cenarrusa, 944 P.2d 1372 (Idaho 1997); In re Initiative Petition No. 364,
930 P.2d 186 (Okla. 1996).
5 See Schaefer v. Townsend, 215 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2000), cert denied sub nom. Jones v.
Schaefer, 532 U.S. 904 (2001).
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establish residency before the election, whereas the applicable Qualifications
Clause mandates only that Representatives be state inhabitants at the time of
the election.6
The term-limits debate has not been confined to federal offices. Many
jurisdictions have adopted restrictions on the tenure of state and local legisla-
tors, executives, and judges. While the case law involving state curbs on tenure
in federal offices is consistently hostile, the picture with respect to voter-
imposed term limits for state and local offices is decidedly mixed. Term limits
for state and local officials have survived challenges based on federal law,7
although some of those efforts have foundered on the shoals of state law. 8
6 See id. at 1034. On the possible constitutional significance of the difference between
"inhabitant" and "resident," see Sanford Levinson, 2 Texans, Not 1, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,
2000, at A27 (noting Republican vice-presidential nominee Richard Cheney's attempt to
establish himself as an inhabitant of Wyoming after many years' residence in Texas, the
home of Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush, to avoid conflict with the
Twelfth Amendment). Cf Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex.) (dismissing, for
lack of standing, an action by three Texas voters who invoked the Twelfth Amendment in an
effort to enjoin Texas electors from casting their votes for both Bush and Cheney on the
ground that both men were inhabitants of Texas, and concluding on the merits that Cheney
was not an inhabitant of Texas), affd mem., 244 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 1062 (2001).
7 See, e.g., Citizens for Legislative Choice v. Miller, 144 F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 1998) (state
legislators); League of Women Voters v. Diamond, 965 F. Supp. 96 (D. Me. 1997) (state
legislators and executive officers); Dutmer v. City of San Antonio, 937 F. Supp. 587 (W.D.
Tex. 1996) (members of city council); Miyazawa v. City of Cincinnati, 825 F. Supp. 816
(S.D. Ohio 1993) (members of city council), aff'd, 45 F.3d 126 (6th Cir. 1995).
Perhaps the only exception to this statement is Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d 839 (9th Cir.
1997), in which a divided panel found term limits for California legislators invalid under the
United States Constitution. The panel ruling was reversed when the case was reheard en
banc. See Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1021 (1998).
8 See, e.g., Alaskans for Legislative Reform v. State, 887 P.2d 960 (Alaska 1994) (per
curiam) (holding that term limits could be enacted only through constitutional amendment,
not by statute or initiative); Allred v. McLoud, 31 S.W.3d 836 (Ark. 2000) (invalidating
locally adopted term limits for county officials); Polis v. City of La Palma, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d
322 (Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that state law preempted municipal term-limit ordinance);
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 641 N.E.2d 525 (Ill. 1994) (per curiam)
(finding improper a proposed constitutional amendment limiting terms of state legislators);
Minneapolis Term Limits Coalition v. Keefe, 535 N.W.2d 306 (Minn. 1995) (concluding
that term limits for city officials would violate state constitution); Cottrell v. Santillanes, 901
P.2d 785 (N.M. Ct. App.) (finding term limits for members of city council inconsistent with
state law), cert. denied, 900 P.2d 962 (N.M. 1995); Lehman v. Bradbury, 37 P.3d 989 (Or.
2002) (striking down term limits for State legislators and state executive officers for failure
to comply with the separate-vote requirement for the adoption of amendments to the state
constitution); Gerberding v. Munro, 949 P.2d 1366 (Wash. 1998) (rejecting proposed initia-
tive that would have imposed term limits on state constitutional officers).
At the same time, many term limits for state and local officials have survived chal-
lenges based on state constitutions and statutes. See, e.g., Ray v. Mortham, 742 So. 2d 1276
(Fla. 1999) (upholding term limits for state legislators and cabinet officers while severing
invalid term limits for members of Congress); City of Jacksonville v. Cook, 765 So. 2d 289
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam) (upholding term limit for clerk of municipal court),
review granted, 786 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2001); Pinellas County v. Eight Is Enough in Pinellas,
775 So. 2d 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding term limits for county officers), review
granted, 786 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 2001); Abramowitz v. Glasser, 656 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. Dist.
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In two of the cases involving term limits for state legislators, there have
been suggestions that the federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction. A
Ninth Circuit concurring opinion in Bates v. Jones9 was based on this premise.
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit panel in Citizens for Legislative Choice v. Miller'°
took note of this argument but ultimately put it aside because the state failed to
raise a jurisdictional defense at any stage of the litigation." Both suggestions
were based on the Supreme Court's summary dismissal, "for want of a substan-
tial federal question," of the appeal in Moore v. McCartney,12 a case involving
a state constitutional provision limiting the governor of West Virginia to two
consecutive terms.
The suggestions concerning the absence of jurisdiction were not disposi-
tive in either case, but they are nevertheless significant because both cases were
decided by federal courts of appeals. They are also noteworthy because they
misperceive the concept of a "substantial federal question." These judicial
statements reflect confusion between the precedential weight of the Supreme
Court's summary disposition of an appeal and the power of lower federal courts
to hear cases involving the same or similar issues. Although the Court's docket
now consists almost exclusively of certiorari cases rather than appeals, there are
enough summary dispositions of appeals to cause mischief if district and circuit
judges share the confusion shown in these two term-limits cases. At a time of
increased judicial sensitivity to federalism, 3 that confusion might lead to mis-
taken refusals to hear cases on jurisdictional grounds.
Ct. App.) (upholding term limits for elected city officials), review denied, 664 So. 2d 248
(Fla. 1995); Maddox v. Fortson, 172 S.E.2d 595 (Ga. 1970) (upholding term limit for gover-
nor); Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, 38 P.3d 598 (Idaho 2001) (upholding term limits for statewide
officers, state legislators, and county elected officials); Nev. Judges Ass'n v. Lau, 910 P.2d
898 (Nev. 1996) (upholding term limits for judges but noting that ballot summary must be
clarified so that voters would understand the full ramifications of approving judicial term
limits). Cf Woo v. Superior Ct., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156 (Ct. App. 2000) (narrowly construing
term limits in a newly adopted city charter to comport with the outcome of an earlier referen-
dum on municipal term limits); Kuryak v. Adamczyk, 705 N.Y.S.2d 739 (App. Div. 1999)
(holding municipal term limits to be prospective only).
9 131 F.3d 843, 847-48 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (O'Scannlain, J., concurring in the result),
cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1021 (1998).
10 144 F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 1998).
1" See id. at 919-20.
12 425 U.S. 946 (1976).
'3 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (concluding that Congress had not
validly abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the civil
rights remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act for exceeding federal power
under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62 (2000) (finding that Congress had not validly abrogated the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity in extending the protections of the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act to employees of state and local governments); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898 (1997) (holding that Congress may not commandeer state executive officials to imple-
ment a federal regulatory program); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)
(holding that Congress may not abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in fur-
therance of its Article I powers); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating
the Gun Free School Zones Act for exceeding federal power under the Commerce Clause);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress may not comman-
deer state legislatures into enacting federally dictated laws).
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This article seeks to clear up the confusion over "substantial federal ques-
tions." Part I provides an overview of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, distin-
guishing between appeal and certiorari. Part II examines the precedential
weight of the Court's summary dispositions, contrasting summary disposition
of appeals with denials of certiorari. Part III explains why the suggestions that
the lower courts lack jurisdiction over cases presenting issues in which the
Supreme Court has dismissed appeals "for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion" are mistaken.
I. APPEAL, CERTIORARI, AND THE SUPREME COURT
Today, virtually all of the Supreme Court's appellate docket is discretion-
ary. 14 That is, the Court decides for itself whether to hear a case that was
decided by a lower federal court or the highest state court in which review was
available. A party seeking Supreme Court review generally has no right to
appeal but must instead obtain a writ of certiorari.15
Despite the dominance of certiorari, this procedure is of comparatively
recent vintage. The Court's certiorari jurisdiction was not created until 1891, in
the statute that also established the federal courts of appeals.16 The availability
of certiorari was expanded incrementally in several stages that culminated in
the passage of the Judges' Bill in 1925."7
The other, now rare, means of securing Supreme Court review is by direct
appeal, which is a matter of right in certain types of cases. The appeal mecha-
nism existed virtually from the Court's beginning. The Judiciary Act of 1789
provided for review by writ of error in several classes of cases.18 Specifically,
section 13 gave the Court appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the old circuit
courts and state courts. 9 Section 22 authorized the Court to review decisions of
the circuit courts in civil cases and equitable suits involving amounts in excess
of $2,000. Section 25 empowered the Court to review rulings by state courts
involving certain federal questions, particularly those in which a federal statute
or treaty was ruled invalid or in which a state law or policy was upheld against
a challenge based on the Constitution or other federal law.2° A 1914 statute
expanded the Court's power to review state rulings that upheld a federal law or
14 I use "appellate" here in contrast with "original" jurisdiction. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2
(dividing the Supreme Court's jurisdiction into these two categories).
15 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257-59 (1994).
16 See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828. See generally Peter Linzer, The
Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1227, 1233-36 (1979).
17 See Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936; see also Webb Act, ch. 448, 39 Stat. 726
(1916); Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790. These provisions were codified in Title 28
by the Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869. See generally Linzer, supra
note 16, at 1237-44.
18 See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 1, 13, 22, 25, 1 Stat. 73.
19 One sentence of § 13 was later found to have impermissibly expanded the Court's origi-
nal jurisdiction. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
20 The validity of § 25 was upheld in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304
(1816). See also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (holding that § 25 gave
the Court jurisdiction to review state criminal cases). The Supreme Court did not get juris-
diction over federal criminal cases until 1889, and then only in proceedings involving capital
crimes. See Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, 25 Stat. 655. The new courts of appeals were given
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invalidated a state law that was challenged on constitutional or other federal
grounds.2" In 1928 Congress eliminated the writ of error, denominating the
nondiscretionary cases coming before the Court as appeals. Almost all
appeals were eliminated in 1988; since then cases that previously arose as
appeals have become part of the Court's discretionary docket and are handled
through writs of certiorari.2 3
Why does the distinction between appeal and certiorari matter? If the
Court accords plenary consideration to a case and issues a formal opinion, it
makes no real difference whether the case reached the docket as a matter of
right or through the exercise of judicial discretion. A ruling on the merits binds
the parties to the case and serves as a precedent for future disputes.
The question arises because the Court cannot and does not accord plenary
consideration to every case. Indeed, the whole point of certiorari was to allow
the justices to refuse to hear cases that do not warrant further review. Even
before the adoption of the certiorari process on a wide scale, the Court also
developed mechanisms to give less than full treatment to appeals. This sum-
mary treatment of appeals arose from the same concerns that led to the creation
of the circuit courts of appeals and the use of certiorari: the Court's docket was
being overwhelmed by an excessive number of cases. 24 As a result, the justices
necessarily exercised a measure of discretion in deciding which appeals war-
ranted plenary consideration, and they did so in ways that blurred the distinc-
tion between appeal and certiorari.25
A denial of certiorari, the Court has often explained, has no precedential
weight. This "orthodox view" of certiorari denials 26 is reflected most famously
jurisdiction over criminal cases in 1891. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826,
828.
21 See Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790. Such cases were placed within the Court's
certiorari, or discretionary, jurisdiction rather than within its appeal, or mandatory, authority.
This particular change was made in response to a state-court decision invalidating New
York's pioneering worker's compensation law. See Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry., 94 N.E. 431
(N.Y. 1911). Supreme Court review was impossible because § 25 limited the Court's juris-
diction over state decisions to cases in which the federal claim was rejected, whereas in this
case the federal claim was upheld and resulted in the abrogation of the state law. See WIL-
LIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT
THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 82-84 (1994); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 4012, at 217-18 (2d ed.
1996). Earlier, Congress had amended § 25 in less substantial ways. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867,
ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
22 See Act of Jan. 31, 1928, ch. 14, 45 Stat. 54. See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
21, §§ 4002, 4006.
23 See Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662.
24 For example, the Court's docket nearly quadrupled between 1860 and 1880, and the 1890
term began with a backlog of more than 1,800 cases. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M.
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 60, 86 (1928); Francis J. Ulman & Frank H.
Spears, "Dismissed for Want of a Substantial Federal Question ": A Study in the Practice of
the Supreme Court in Deciding Appeals from State Courts, 20 B.U. L. REv. 501, 508 (1940).
25 See Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October
Term, 1929, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1, 12, 14 (1930).
26 See Linzer, supra note 16, at 1251, 1255, 1260, 1302.
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in Justice Frankfurter's opinion "respecting the denial of the petition for writ of
certiorari" in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show:
27
Inasmuch ... as all that a denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari means is that
fewer than four members of the Court thought it should be granted, this Court has
rigorously insisted that such a denial carries with it no implication whatever regard-
ing the Court's views on the merits of a case which it has declined to review.
2 8
If denials of certiorari are not precedents and the Court has treated appeals
analogously to certiorari cases, we might then wonder whether dispositions of
appeals with less than plenary consideration also have no precedential signifi-
cance. That is the subject of the next section.
II. THE PRECEDENTIAL VALUE OF SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS OF APPEALS
The Supreme Court could summarily dispose of appeals in several ways.
The two most common methods were summary affirmance and dismissal "for
want of a substantial federal question." Traditionally, the Court reserved sum-
mary affirmances for appeals coming from federal courts when the ruling in
question was correct and the case presented no legally troublesome issue; if a
case came from a state court in similar circumstances, the appeal was "dis-
missed for want of a substantial federal question." 29
Whether appeals came from federal or state courts, the overwhelming
majority received summary treatment.30 The precedential weight (if any) to be
accorded to summary dispositions generated widespread uncertainty. Justice
Clark, sitting by designation on the Fourth Circuit after his retirement, thought
that such rulings should have minimal weight. He opined that, during his tenure
on the Supreme Court, summary dispositions of appeals were "treat[ed] simi-
27 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
28 Id. at 919. For other statements of the orthodox view, see, e.g., Singleton v. Comm'r, 439
U.S. 940, 942-45 (1978) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certio-
rari); Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 364 n.1 (1973); Parker v.
Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 576 (1960) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds by Carafas v.
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 228 n.10 (1955);
Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 180 (1947); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 48 (1945) (per
curiam), overruled on other grounds by Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998). But see
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 443 (1973) (finding "not without some significance"
dissents from a denial of certiorari); Linzer, supra note 16, at 1277-91 (discussing Kras and
other cases in which certiorari denials have been accorded precedential value).
29 See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 266 (7th ed. 1993). We will
also briefly consider a third approach, dismissal "for want of jurisdiction." See id. at 267-68.
See also infra Part III. A fourth technique for summarily disposing of appeals was the "ade-
quate state ground," under which appeals from state courts were dismissed without plenary
consideration where the decision rested on nonfederal grounds that were sufficient to resolve
the case. See STERN ET AL., supra at 267-68. See generally WRICHT ET AL., supra note 21,
§§ 4019-33. The adequate-state-ground doctrine is beyond the scope of this article.
30 See STERN ET AL., supra note 29, at 210, 211; Ulman & Spears, supra note 24, at 523-24,
n.112; Pamela R. Winnick, Comment, The Precedential Weight of a Dismissal by the
Supreme Court for Want of a Substantial Federal Question: Some Implications of Hicks v.
Miranda, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 508, 517-18 n.52 (1976); Note, The Discretionary Power of the
Supreme Court to Dismiss Appeals from State Courts, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 688, 694 n.54
(1963). See also Note, Supreme Court Per Curiam Practice: A Critique, 69 HARV. L. REV.
707, 708, n.9 (1956).
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lar[ly]" to certiorari denials. 3 Leading scholars disagreed about the question.
Some argued that summary dispositions were entitled to precedential weight
because the Court had a constitutional obligation to reach the merits of every
case within its appellate jurisdiction.3 2 Others maintained that summary dispo-
sitions reflected prudential concerns as much as substantive ones and therefore
should not count as precedents.3 3
The Supreme Court resolved the debate in favor of treating summary dis-
positions as precedents in Hicks v. Miranda,34 a 1975 decision involving the
validity of the California obscenity statute. The owner of an adult theater who
was prosecuted for showing the movie "Deep Throat" filed a First Amendment
challenge to the statute.35 A three-judge federal district court invalidated the
statute under the standard established in Miller v. California.3 6 Before that rul-
ing became final, however, the Supreme Court dismissed, for want of a sub-
stantial federal question, an appeal from a state-court ruling upholding the same
statute under the Miller test.37 On direct appeal from the district court in Hicks,
the Supreme Court held that the summary dismissal constituted a binding pre-
cedent. Justice White's majority opinion explained that "[tihe three-judge court
was not free to disregard this pronouncement."3 Because that appeal presented
a federal question, the Court "had no discretion to refuse adjudication of the
case on its merits as would have been true had the case been brought here under
our certiorari jurisdiction"; the justices "were required to deal with its merits,"
and lower courts were obliged to follow this summary disposition.
39
Concluding that summary dispositions in appeals have precedential value
does not resolve the question of how much weight these rulings have. The
Court provided its answer the year before Hicks, concluding in Edelman v.
Jordan4" that appeals decided summarily have less "precedential value" than
do cases resolved after plenary consideration and a full opinion.4 Edelman
involved a class action alleging that Illinois welfare officials had improperly
administered public assistance programs and wrongfully withheld benefits from
eligible recipients.4 2 The officials asserted an Eleventh Amendment defense,
31 Hogge v. Johnson, 526 F.2d 833, 836 (4th Cir. 1975) (Clark, J., concurring), cert. denied,
428 U.S. 913 (1976).
32 See Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues" - A Comment on Princi-
ple and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10-13 (1964); Herbert Wechs-
ler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1959).
33 See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term - Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 46 (1961). For additional sources on both sides of the schol-
arly debate, see United States ex rel. Epton v. Nenna, 318 F. Supp. 899, 906 n.8 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 948 (1971).
34 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
11 During the pendency of these proceedings he was also charged with violating the same
obscenity statute for showing "The Devil in Miss Jones." See id. at 341 n.10.
36 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
31 See Miller v. California, 418 U.S. 915 (1974).
38 Hicks, 422 U.S. at 344.
39 Id.
40 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
41 See id. at 671. This conclusion was anticipated and more fully elaborated in David W.
Brown, Note, Summary Disposition of Supreme Court Appeals: The Significance of Limited
Discretion and a Theory of Limited Precedent, 52 B.U. L. REV. 373, 407-10 (1972).
42 See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 653-55.
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arguing that any payment of back benefits would come from the state treasury
even though the state was not named as a defendant.4 3 The Court accepted this
argument despite the existence of three district-court rulings awarding similar
relief that had been summarily affirmed on appeal over Eleventh Amendment
objections. 44 Because those cases did not explicitly address the Eleventh
Amendment, they could not of their own force control the disposition of
Edelman.4
The Court took a similar approach in Caban v. Mohammed,46 which inval-
idated a New York law that allowed the mother of a child born to unmarried
parents to give unilateral consent to the child's adoption. The state relied in part
on Orsini v. Blasi,4 7 which had dismissed an appeal, for want of a substantial
federal question, from a state-court ruling upholding the same statute. The
Court explained that Orsini "was a ruling on the merits, and therefore [was]
entitled to precedential weight,"4 8 but was "not entitled to the same deference
given a ruling after briefing, argument, and a written opinion."'49 Full consider-
ation of the issue on the merits led to the conclusion that Orsini should be
overruled.5°
There are other cases in which appeals decided summarily have not been
followed,5" but they are the exception rather than the rule. This is quite predict-
able. Summary dispositions typically reflect the Court's views on the merits,
and "the Justices are not likely to change their minds after they have once come
to such a conclusion."52 But establishing that summary decisions have at least
limited precedential value does not resolve the matter. Whatever weight sum-
43 See id. at 668.
44 See id. at 670, n.13 (citing Sterrett v. Mothers' & Childrens' Rights Org., 409 U.S. 809
(1972); State Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918 (1972);
Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970)). The Court also noted that the Eleventh Amendment
was raised, but not discussed in the opinion, in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969),
which upheld an order for retroactive welfare payments to recipients who had been denied
assistance under an unconstitutional residency requirement. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 670-
71.
45 See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 671.
46 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
47 423 U.S. 1042 (1976).
48 Caban, 441 U.S. at 389 n.9 (citing Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975)).
41 Id. (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974)).
50 See id. ("Insofar as our decision today is inconsistent with our dismissal in Orsini, we
overrule our prior decision.").
"' For other instances, see, e.g., Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 849 (1997) (refusing to treat
dismissal for want of a substantial federal question of a state ruling on ERISA preemption as
dispositive of the preemption question in a later case); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 497 U.S.
916, 920 (1990) (per curiam) (refusing to regard a dismissal for want of a substantial federal
question as "the 'overruling [of] clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied"')
(quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971) (brackets in original));
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 500 (1981) (treating summary affir-
mances and dismissals for want of a substantial federal question of appeals from rulings
upholding billboard regulations as having less precedential weight than full opinions on the
merits).
52 STERN ET AL., supra note 29, at 217. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366-67
n.16 (1975) (emphasizing the precedential value of a summary affirmance in a case raising
almost identical Establishment Clause issues), overruled on other grounds by Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 53 (1974) (relying in part
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mary dispositions of appeals should receive, there remains the problem of
determining exactly what such rulings decided. Because they contain little or
no reasoning, this can be a most daunting task. The Court has struggled with
this problem on several occasions.
The leading case on the subject is Mandel v. Bradley,5 3 a challenge to
Maryland's ballot-access rules for independent candidates. The three-judge dis-
trict court gave dispositive weight to the summary affirmance of a decision
invalidating Pennsylvania's access rules for independents.54 The Supreme
Court held that the lower court erred in doing so. The Pennsylvania law
required independents to obtain their signatures within a twenty-one day win-
dow and submit them 244 days before the general election.5 5 The Maryland
law required independents to file their signatures almost as far in advance but
did not restrict when the signatures had to be collected.5 6 The summary affirm-
ance in the Pennsylvania case did not necessarily control the Maryland dispute
because the Free State's access rules differed somewhat from the Keystone
State's.
The summary disposition, in other words, "affirm[ed] the judgment but
not necessarily the reasoning by which it was reached."' 57 The Court added that
"[s]ummary affirmances and dismissals for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion without doubt reject the specific challenges presented in the [jurisdictional]
statement [and] prevent lower courts from coming to opposite conclusions on
the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions."'58 Such
rulings do not "break[ ] new ground" but simply "apply[ ] principles estab-
lished by prior decisions to the particular facts involved" in those cases. 59 The
Court has repeatedly endorsed this restrictive view of the precedential effect of
summary dispositions of appeals.6 °
Determining the "specific challenges" presented and the "precise issues"
that were "necessarily decided" in a summary disposition can be quite diffi-
cult.6 The task can be especially daunting with respect to dismissals for want
of a substantial federal question, because such dispositions might be viewed as
either substantive or jurisdictional in nature. Indeed, the term-limits cases dis-
on two summary affirmances in rejecting a constitutional challenge to laws disenfranchising
convicted felons).
53 432 U.S. 173 (1977) (per curiam).
51 See id. at 175 (citing Tucker v. Salera, 424 U.S. 959 (1976)).
55 See id.
56 See id. at 177. Maryland's filing deadline could be as much as 240 days before a presi-
dential election. See id. at 174.
17 Id. at 176 (quoting Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring)).
58 Id. (emphasis added).
59 Id.
60 See, e.g., Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 180-83
(1979); Wash. v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463,
477 n.20 (1979).
61 This analysis presumably requires access to "most if not all of the appeal papers in the
earlier proceedings." STERN ET AL., supra note 29, at 220. See also Winnick, supra note 30,




cussed at the outset suggest that the jurisdictional interpretation retains vitality.
For that reason, we now turn to this subject.
III. UNTANGLING THE MEANING OF "SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL QUESTION"
Corrigan v. Buckley,62 an early case involving racially restrictive cove-
nants,6 3 demonstrates how the Supreme Court has elided the distinction
between jurisdiction and the merits when the substantiality of a federal question
is at issue. Irene Corrigan, a white woman, agreed to sell her home in Washing-
ton, D.C., to an African American woman named Helen Curtis. The property
was subject to a covenant prohibiting its sale, occupancy, lease, or gift to "any
person of the negro [sic] race or blood."' A white neighbor, John Buckley,
sought to enjoin the transaction, and Corrigan moved to dismiss his complaint.
The trial court denied the motion and was affirmed by the United States Court
of Appeals sitting as the highest local court for the District of Columbia.65
Corrigan then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Corrigan argued that the covenant violated the Fifth, Thirteenth, and Four-
teenth Amendments as well as various Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes.
A unanimous Court, in an opinion by Justice Sanford, concluded that the con-
stitutional claim was "entirely lacking in substance or color of merit"6 6 because
the case involved only private rather than governmental action. The statutory
argument was "equally unsubstantial" for the same reason.67 Because neither
contention raised a substantial federal question, the appeal was "dismissed for
want of jurisdiction. '68 Despite this formal statement of the grounds for dispo-
sition, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Court had rejected the
claim on the merits. The jurisdictional defect was intimately connected to the
flaws of the substantive claim.
The Corrigan Court's invocation of jurisdiction as a basis for dismissing
an appeal that was regarded as weak on the merits reflected common practice at
the time. That approach differs from cases like Moore v. McCartney, where the
appeals were summarily dismissed for want of a substantial federal question,
because Corrigan was dismissed after a detailed analysis of the merits. Under-
standing how this practice arose can nonetheless help us more clearly under-
stand the correct meaning of summary dismissals for want of a substantial
federal question. That understanding emerges from both early case law (all of
which comes from cases with reasonably detailed opinions) and the evolution
of the Supreme Court's rules. This article considers each of these topics, then
examines the Court's more recent summary dispositions of appeals.
62 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
63 As the following text explains, Corrigan rejected the challenge to the racial covenants at
issue. This ruling was effectively circumvented in Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948),
which held that judicial enforcement of such covenants violated the Fifth Amendment. See
also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that enforcement of similar covenants
by state courts violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
64 Corrigan, 271 U.S. at 327.
65 See id. at 328-29; 299 F. 899 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
66 Corrigan, 271 U.S. at 330.
67 Id. at 330-31.




The Supreme Court first announced that a substantial question was neces-
sary to invoke its jurisdiction on appeal in Millingar v. Hartupee,69 an 1867
case that had its roots in the Union blockade of the Confederacy during the
Civil War. Hartupee sued Millingar in a Pennsylvania state court for the value
of cotton that Millingar had sold. The cotton was seized by the federal govern-
ment during the Union blockade and released to Millingar by the United States
District Court for the Northern District of New York. Hartupee had earlier
obtained a judgment against a man named Gearing and claimed that Gearing
was the true owner of the cotton. Millingar denied Gearing's interest, but the
state courts ruled for Hartupee.7 ° Millingar then appealed to the Supreme
Court, contending that the state courts had denied effect to the federal district
court's release of the cotton to him and that this brought the case within the
Court's jurisdiction.7 1
Hartupee successfully moved to dismiss the appeal. Chief Justice Chase
found nothing in the federal district court's order that addressed the ownership
of the cotton; the order simply released the government's claim.7 2 Accordingly,
there was no federal action involved in the dispute between Millingar and Har-
tupee. "Something more than a bare assertion of such an authority seems essen-
tial to the jurisdiction of this court," Chase explained.73 Because there was not
even a colorable claim of federal action, the Court lacked jurisdiction over the
appeal and granted the motion to dismiss."
The next development, in 1872, was actually a slight detour from Millin-
gar. In Pennywit v. Eaton,7 5 the Court denied a motion to dismiss for want of
jurisdiction despite a strong suspicion that the appeal lacked merit. Seeking to
enforce a Louisiana judgment, Eaton had sued Pennywit in an Arkansas state
court. Pennywit contested the validity of the judgment on the ground that the
Louisiana judge had been appointed by the military governor at the height of
the Civil War. This arrangement, Pennywit claimed, violated Article IIl (in that
the Louisiana court had not been created by Congress) and the Appointments
Clause (in that the President had not nominated the judge and the Senate had
not confirmed him). 76 The Arkansas state courts rejected Pennywit's argu-
ments. The Supreme Court, in a brief opinion by Chief Justice Chase, con-
cluded that Pennywit had raised a federal question, "though somewhat
obscurely," and therefore declined to dismiss the appeal on jurisdictional
grounds despite its obvious weakness.
77
69 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 258 (1867).
70 See id. at 259.
71 See id. at 260.
72 See id. at 262.
73 Id. at 261.
74 See id. at 262.
7- 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 380 (1872).
76 See id. at 380-81.
77 Id. at 381. After hearing arguments on the merits, the Court dispatched Pennywit's claim
in a single paragraph and assessed him damages because the appeal seemed to have been
prosecuted only for delay. See Pennywit v. Eaton, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 382, 384 (1872).
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The Court overcame its reluctance to dispatch frivolous appeals in City of
Chanute v. Trader.7 8 This 1889 case still reflected uneasiness over treating
substantively weak cases as jurisdictionally flawed, however. Trader won a
lawsuit in a federal court against the city for overdue payment of municipal
bonds, then prevailed in a second action to compel satisfaction of that judg-
ment.7 9 The city appealed to the Supreme Court, and Trader moved to dismiss
or affirm. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Blatchford, the Court con-
cluded that the case was technically within its jurisdiction but that the appeal
was patently frivolous. Exercising "its inherent power and duty to administer
justice," the Court affirmed the lower court's ruling without briefs or arguments
on the merits.
8 °
Two years later, the Court returned to Millingar's jurisdictional approach.
City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works Co. 81 dealt with an alleged
violation of the Contracts Clause. Although the 1877 statute chartering the
company purported to give the city free water service, an 1884 law required the
city to pay for water.82 When the state courts rejected the claim that the 1884
action breached a contract embodied in the 1877 legislation, the city appealed
to the Supreme Court. Relying on Millingar, the Court dismissed the appeal on
the company's motion. Justice Brown explained that the 1877 statute did not
create a legal contract.83 Accordingly, the "bare averment" of a contract was
entirely insufficient to invoke the Contracts Clause and thereby bring the
appeal within the Court's jurisdiction.8" In the absence of a properly presented
federal question, the motion to dismiss was granted.85
The cases discussed so far all dealt with extremely weak, if not frivolous,
claims. Even in those situations, the Court was sometimes reluctant to treat
clearly fanciful contentions as jurisdictionally defective. Early in the twentieth
century, however, the Millingar approach came to be applied to plausible but
ultimately unpersuasive arguments, especially ones that had been addressed in
earlier cases. The first example of this phenomenon was New Orleans Water-
works Co. v. Louisiana, 6 a challenge to the forfeiture of the charter of the
same company that was involved in the City of New Orleans dispute a decade
earlier. The state contended that the company had failed to provide pure water
to its customers and had charged excessive rates for its services.8 7 After the
state courts upheld the forfeiture, the company appealed to the Supreme Court
on the grounds that the state had impaired its contractual rights and taken its
78 132 U.S. 210 (1889).
79 See id. at 211.
80 Id. at 214.
81 142 U.S. 79 (1891).
82 See id. at 80-81, 84.
83 See id. at 88-89, 92 (explaining that the state courts had held the alleged contract ultra
vires, the city had repudiated whatever contract might have existed, and the Contracts Clause
does not protect municipalities because their charters are subject to revision or revocation by
the state legislature at any time).
84 id. at 87.
85 See id. at 93.
86 185 U.S. 336 (1902).
87 See id. at 338.
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property without due process.8 8 After invoking Millingar for the view that the
Court's jurisdiction cannot arise from the "mere claim" of a federal question,8 9
Justice Peckham devoted six pages to discussing several cases that foreclosed
the company's claims90 and almost four more to applying those precedents to
the facts of the case.9" This extensive analysis led to the conclusion that the
company's federal claims were "so clearly without color of foundation that this
court is without jurisdiction in this case," so the appeal was dismissed.9 2
A few months later, the Court combined its analysis of dismissal and
affirmance in substantively weak appeals. The move came in Equitable Life
Assurance Society of the United States v. Brown,9 3 a dispute over a life insur-
ance policy. After the policy owner died, competing claims were filed: one on
behalf of his daughter in a Hawaii territorial court, and another by a relative of
the decedent in New York. The company refused to pay the daughter, the legal
heir, because of the pendency of the New York action. The territorial courts
ruled in favor of the daughter, and the company appealed to the Supreme
Court. 94 Her representative moved to dismiss or affirm.
The Court concluded that the company's position had been squarely
rejected in a previous case.95 Like New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana,
therefore, this appeal involved "a question adequate, abstractly considered, to
confer jurisdiction," but that question was "so explicitly foreclosed by a deci-
sion or decisions of this court as to leave no room for real controversy. '96 The
federal question, then, was "devoid of any substantial foundation or merit," and
this case was controlled by the New Orleans Waterworks Co. rule.97
In other words, the dispositive motion should be granted, but which dispo-
sition was appropriate? Then-Justice Edward White explained that "it [was]
obvious that on this record either the motion to dismiss should be allowed or
the motion to affirm granted, and that the allowance of the one or the granting
of the other will ... finally dispose of this controversy." 98 Jurisdiction and the
merits were inextricably intertwined: "the unsubstantiality of the [f]ederal
question for the purpose of the motion to dismiss and its unsubstantiality for the
purpose of the motion to affirm are one and the same thing." 99 The Court chose
to grant the motion to dismiss, because "the better practice is to cause our
decree to respond to the question which arises first in order for decision."' '
88 See id. at 343-44.
89 Id. at 344.
90 See id. at 346-51 (quoting extensively from Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U.S.
574 (1885)).
9' See id. at 351-54.
92 Id. at 354.
93 187 U.S. 308 (1902).
14 See id. at 309-10.
95 See id. at 312 (discussing New Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, 111 U.S. 138
(1884)).
96 Id. at 311.
97 Id. at 314.





The Supreme Court followed a similar approach in Zucht v. King, 10 ' a
1922 case that would be included for many years afterward in the Court's rules.
This was a challenge to a San Antonio ordinance requiring children to provide
proof of vaccination as a prerequisite for attending school. Although Rosalyn
Zucht properly raised constitutional objections to the ordinance, her contentions
were plainly foreclosed by Jacobson v. Massachusetts,10 2 which had upheld an
almost identical requirement.'0 3 Under the circumstances, Justice Brandeis
wrote, the federal questions were not substantial, so the Court had no jurisdic-
tion over the appeal. 10 4 Like Equitable Life Assurance Society, then, the juris-
dictional issue was closely connected to the merits. A dismissal for want of a
substantial federal question in these cases meant that the claim lacked merit
because it was either very weak or foreclosed by precedent. As a practical mat-
ter, such a dismissal amounted to an affirmance on the merits.
We can observe the close relationship between dismissal for want of a
substantial federal question and affirmance on motion by examining the evolu-
tion of the Supreme Court's rules. Those rules came to embody a pattern that
emerged from the cases: appeals dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question came from state courts, 10 5 whereas those affirmed on motion came
from federal courts.
B. Supreme Court Rules
The Supreme Court's general rules relating to disposition of appeals on
motion date from the 1870s. In 1878 the Court amended paragraph 5 of what
was then Rule 6 to provide:
There may be united, with a motion to dismiss a writ of error or appeal, a motion to
affirm, on the ground that, although the record may show that this court has jurisdic-
tion, it is manifest the appeal or writ was taken for delay only, or that the question on
which the jurisdiction depends is so frivolous as not to need further argument.' 0 6
lo 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
102 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
103 See Zucht, 260 U.S. at 176.
104 See id. at 177. The Court conceded that Zucht had raised a substantial equal protection
question, but that question entailed a claim that the ordinance was unconstitutional as
applied. Unfortunately, such a claim was then reviewable only on certiorari, see id., and her
certiorari petition had been dismissed for failure to comply with the rules for such petitions,
see id. at 176.
105 Equitable Life Assurance Society came from a territorial court, but the rules governing
appeals from that court were the same as those applicable to appeals from state courts. See
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S. v. Brown, 187 U.S. 308, 309 (1902).
106 97 U.S. vii (1878). The 1878 amendment built on similar language that had been
adopted two years earlier. That language governed writs of error to state courts. See 91 U.S.
vii (1876). The 1878 amendment extended the provision to cover appeals from federal
courts.
The Court concluded that the appeal in City of Chanute was "frivolous, and that it was
taken for delay only," City of Chanute v. Trader, 132 U.S. 210, 214 (1889), but found that
the circumstances of the case did not warrant invocation of Rule 6. See id.; Ulman & Spears,
supra note 24, at 512. The ruling therefore rested on the Court's inherent power. See City of
Chanute, 132 U.S. at 214. As we have seen, even before the adoption of Rule 6 the Court
invoked its inherent power to assess damages against a party who had prosecuted an appeal
only for delay. See Pennywit v. Eaton, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 382, 384 (1872).
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This provision was slightly reworded in ways that had no substantive effect in
the Court's 1911 rules.'" 7 Of particular significance, this provision suggests
that the Court lacks jurisdiction over frivolous or dilatory appeals. Paragraph 5
incorporates the Millingar approach, under which an appeal that has no basis
whatever can be dismissed without plenary consideration. The language does
not explicitly reach appeals that are foreclosed by prior decisions, such as New
Orleans Waterworks, Equitable Life Assurance Society, or Zucht, and none of
those cases mentioned Rule 6. The next revision of the rules, in 1925, changed
the word "frivolous" to "unsubstantial."'
'0 8
Significant change came in 1928, when the Court promulgated a new set
of rules. The new Rule 12 required appellants to file a statement "particularly
disclosing the basis on which it is contended this court has jurisdiction to
review on appeal the judgment or decree below."10 9 Specifically, the statement
had to "distinctly refer to the statutory provision believed to sustain the juris-
diction" 1 ° and "the cases believed to sustain the jurisdiction." '  Appellees
could file a responsive statement "disclosing any matter making against the
jurisdiction asserted by the appellant."' 12 Nothing in Rule 12 specified that
jurisdiction depended on the existence of a substantial federal question,
although new Rule 7 retained the essence of the 1925 amendment of old Rule
6, authorizing motions to dismiss any appeal where the determinative question
was "so unsubstantial as not to need further argument."' 13
The requirement of a substantial federal question was added to Rule 12 in
1936, with a specific reference to Zucht v. King. The revised paragraph 1 of
Rule 12, describing the contents of the jurisdictional statement, continued to
require a distinct reference to "the statutory provision believed to sustain the
jurisdiction.""' 4 There followed this inserted language:
107 The revised provision read, in relevant part, as follows:
The court in any pending cause will receive a motion to affirm on the ground that it is manifest
that the writ [of error] or appeal was taken for delay only, or that the questions on which the
decision of the cause depend [sic] are so frivolous as not to need further argument.
SuP. CT. R. 6(5), 222 U.S. (App.) 10 (1911).
1os The relevant portion of the revised rule then read:
The court will receive a motion to affirm on the ground that it is manifest that the writ [of error]
or appeal was taken for delay only, or that the questions on which the decision of the cause
depends are so unsubstantial as not to need further argument.
SuP. CT. R. 6(5), 266 U.S. 657 (1925).
"o9 Sup. CT. R. 12(l), 275 U.S. 603 (1928).
110 SuP. CT. R. 12(l)(a), 275 U.S. 603 (1928).
... SuP. CT. R. 12(l)(d), 275 U.S. 603 (1928).
112 SuP. CT. R. 12(2), 275 U.S. 604 (1928). This rule was revised four years later. Most of
the changes were unrelated to the matters discussed here. The only relevant change for our
purposes was the addition of the following language immediately after the passage quoted in
text: "There may be included in, or filed with, such opposing statement, a motion by appel-
lee to dismiss or affirm." SuP. CT. R. 12(3), 286 U.S. 603 (1932).
113 Sup. CT. R. 7(4), 275 U.S. 599 (1928). This paragraph provided, in relevant part:
The court will receive a motion to affirm on the ground that it is manifest that the appeal was
taken for delay only, or that the questions on which the decision of the cause depends are so
unsubstantial as not to need further argument. . . .A motion to affirm may be united in the
alternative with a motion to dismiss.
114 SUP. CT. R. 12(1), 297 U.S. 733 (1936).
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The [jurisdictional] statement shall show that the nature of the case and of the rulings
of the court was such as to bring the case within the jurisdictional provisions relied
on, including a statement of the grounds upon which it is contended the questions
involved are substantial (Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 177), and shall cite the
cases believed to sustain the jurisdiction. 1 15
The amended rule did not provide any further insight into the definition of a
substantial question, but the reference to Zucht (as well as the retention of the
paragraph in Rule 7 about cases involving questions that were "so unsubstantial
as not to require further argument") 116 made clear that the Court welcomed
motions to dispose of appeals where the issues were foreclosed by prior
decisions.' 17
Any doubt that the decision to dispose of an appeal on motion implicated
the merits should have evaporated with the promulgation of the Court's 1954
rules. The new Rule 15 distinguished between appeals from state courts (which
were governed by paragraph (1)(e)) and appeals from federal courts (which
were governed by paragraph (1)(f)). A careful reading shows that all appeals
received similar treatment whether they came from state or federal courts.
Rule 15(1)(e) provided:
If the appeal is from a state court, there shall be included a presentation of the
grounds upon which it is contended that the federal questions are substantial (Zucht v.
King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 177), which shall show that the nature of the case and of the
rulings of the court was such as to bring the case within the jurisdictional provisions
relied on [as required by Rule 15(b)(iii)] and the cases cited to sustain the jurisdiction
[as required by Rule 15(b)(iv)], and shall include the reasons why the questions
presented are so substantial as to require plenary consideration, with briefs on the
merits and oral argument, for their resolution. 
118
Rule 15(1)(f) provided:
If the appeal is from a federal court, there shall similarly be included a statement of
the reasons why the questions presented are so substantial as to require plenary con-
sideration, with briefs on the merits and oral argument, for their resolution. 119
The most striking feature of these provisions is the more expansive con-
cept of substantiality. Indeed, they use the word "substantial" in two different
senses. First, all appellants, whether seeking to overturn state or federal judicial
rulings, must demonstrate that the question presented is sufficiently important
to justify plenary consideration. Second, appellants from state courts must also
satisfy the traditional requirement, embodied in the reference to Zucht v. King
in Rule 15(e), that the issue not be frivolous or foreclosed by precedent. 20 To
115 Id.
116 SUP. CT. R. 7(4), 286 U.S. 598 (1932).
11 See Sup. CT. R. 12(1), 297 U.S. 733 (1936). Rule 12 was revised again in the Court's
1939 rules. The requirement of demonstrating the existence of a substantial question
remained, as did the reference to Zucht v. King, but the new version of the rule applied only
to cases involving appeals from state courts. See SuP. CT. R. 12(1), 306 U.S. 694 (1939).
That limitation was removed in 1942, and a reference to appeals from federal courts was
added to the one to Zucht. See SuP. CT. R. 12(1), 316 U.S. 715 (1942).
118 SUP. CT. R. 15(1)(e), 346 U.S. 962 (1954).
"9 Sup. CT. R. 15(1)(f), 346 U.S. 962 (1954).
120 See Comment, The Significance of Dismissals "For Want of a Substantial Federal
Question ": Original Sin in the Federal Courts, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 785, 786-87 (1968). The
reference to original sin is from Walter Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the
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understand the implications of these two meanings of "substantial" in Rule 15,
we need to examine the procedures for disposing of appeals without plenary
consideration.
Rule 16 authorized motions to dismiss or affirm appeals. The rule denomi-
nated such motions differently depending on whether the appeal was from a
state or a federal court, but the differences in nomenclature could not conceal
the fundamental similarity of the legal consequences of granting the motion. 121
In an appeal from a state court, Rule 16(1)(b) allowed the appellee to move to
"dismiss" because the case "does not present a substantial federal question." 122
In an appeal from a federal court, Rule 16(1)(c) allowed the appellee to move
to "affirm" because "it is manifest that the questions on which the decision of
the cause depends are so unsubstantial as not to need further argument."'
123
These provisions remained on the books unchanged for more than a quar-
ter-century. 124 In 1980, Rule 15(1) was rewritten to make clear that appeals
from state and federal courts received the same treatment. The 1980 version
removed the reference to Zucht and the requirement that appellants from state
courts demonstrate the substantiality of the federal questions presented. Instead,
all jurisdictional statements, regardless of the court from which the appeal
came, had to include "[a] statement of the reasons why the questions presented
are so substantial as to require plenary considerations, with briefs on the merits
and oral argument, for their resolution." 125 The relevant portions of Rule 16,
governing motions to dismiss or affirm appeals, were retained with only cos-
metic changes. 126 All of these provisions were superseded by the rules adopted
following the effective elimination of the Court's appeals docket in 1988 and
the transfer of almost everything that had previously been dealt with on that
mandatory docket to the discretionary certiorari docket.1 27
Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 337 (1933) ("The tendency to assume that a word which
appears in two or more legal rules, and so in connection with more than one purpose, has and
should have precisely the same scope in all of them, runs all through legal discussions. It has
all the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded against.").
121 Rule 16(1) contained a provision authorizing motions to dismiss, whether the appeal
came from a state or a federal judgment, if the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction because
the appeal was not taken consistently with a relevant statute or other provisions of the
Court's rules. See SuP. CT. R. 16(l)(a), 346 U.S. 963 (1954).
122 SUP. CT. R. 16(l)(b), 346 U.S. 964 (1954). The appellee could also move to dismiss
because "the federal question sought to be reviewed was not timely or properly raised, or
expressly passed on [in state court]; or [because] the judgment rest[ed] on an adequate non-
federal basis." Id.
123 SUp. CT. R. 16(1)(c), 346 U.S. 964 (1954).
124 See Sup. CT. R. 15(1)(e)-(f), 16(1)(b)-(c), 388 U.S. 944-45 (1967); 398 U.S. 1026-28
(1970).
125 SUP. CT. R. 15.1(h), 445 U.S. 999 (1980).
126 See SuP. CT. R. 16.1, 445 U.S. 1000-01 (1980).
127 See Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662; supra note 23 and accom-
panying text. Under this statute, the few cases that remain within the Court's mandatory
appeals jurisdiction (as opposed to the discretionary certiorari jurisdiction) arise from United
States district courts. The Court's post-1988 rules governing appeals appear in Rule 18.
This new rule eliminated most of the details specifying that the jurisdictional statement
demonstrate the necessity for plenary consideration, saying only that the statement must
"follow, insofar as applicable, the form for a petition for a writ of certiorari." SuP. CT. R.




This background shows why we should reject the suggestions in Bates v.
Jones and Citizens for Legislative Choice v. Miller that the dismissal, for want
of a substantial federal question, of the appeal in Moore v. McCartney means
that the federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over challenges to state
term limits.' 2 8 The case law and the Supreme Court's rules governing appeals
evolved in parallel fashion. That evolution shows that dismissals of Supreme
Court appeals for want of a substantial federal question do not have broader
jurisdictional implications.
Early cases, notably Millingar v. Hartupee, spoke in terms of jurisdiction
as the basis for rejecting substantively weak appeals from state courts. 129 Weak
appeals from federal courts, on the other hand, were affirmed on motion. This
practice is exemplified by City of Chanute v. Trader. 3 ° It is unclear why the
Court used jurisdictional language to dispose of marginal appeals from state
courts but not from federal courts. After all, one of the early cases discussed
above, Pennywit v. Eaton, affirmed a state-court ruling rather than dismissing a
substantively weak appeal on the merits."' The leading treatise on Supreme
Court procedure observes that "[o]nly history would seem to have justified this
distinction."' 3 2 The problem was accentuated when the Court began to dismiss
plausible but legally foreclosed arguments, granting motions to dismiss appeals
from state courts in cases like New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana,
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Brown, and Zucht v.
King when the questions presented were controlled by prior rulings.'
33
Meanwhile, the Court's rules also contained language that appeared to
combine jurisdiction and the merits in certain appeals. Old Rule 6, dating from
the 1870s, provided for dismissal on jurisdictional grounds for frivolous
appeals; the 1925 revision of that rule explicitly introduced the notion of sub-
stantiality into the process for disposing of appeals without plenary considera-
tion. 134 The 1936 amendment to Rule 12 of the 1928 rules and the 1939 rules
specifically required appellants to demonstrate the existence of a substantial
federal question in the jurisdictional statement. 135
details on the grounds for such motions. See Sup. CT. R. 18.6, 493 U.S. 1119 (1990). These
provisions were retained verbatim in the 1995 and 1999 versions of the rules. See 515 U.S.
1216, 1218 (1995); 525 U.S. 1210, 1212 (1999).
128 Judge O'Scannlain's suggestion that the court of appeals had no jurisdiction "to review
this case," Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 1997) (O'Scannlain, J., concurring in
the result) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1021 (1998), looks like a slip of the pen.
The federal courts of appeals have power to review all final judgments of the district courts.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994). If the Ninth Circuit had no jurisdiction, the district court could
not have had jurisdiction, either. Accordingly, the discussion proceeds on the assumption
that Judge O'Scannlain meant to suggest that no federal court had jurisdiction over the chal-
lenge to term limits for state legislators.
129 See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
130 See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
131 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
132 STERN ET AL., supra note 29, at 266.
133 See supra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
134 See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
131 See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
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If this were all that we had to go on, it might make sense to view the
dismissal of an appeal from a state court for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion as implying that the federal courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over
cases presenting similar issues. There is language in many cases suggesting that
the federal courts may not hear cases involving frivolous or foreclosed
claims. 13 6 But this approach, which the second Justice Harlan characterized as
"more ancient than analytically sound,"' 3 7 confuses jurisdiction with the mer-
its. As then-Justice Rehnquist explained, a complaint that lacks all merit should
be dismissed at the threshold for failure to state a claim, not for want of subject-
matter jurisdiction.' 38
Treating dismissals for want of a substantial federal question as jurisdic-
tional could also raise doubts about the precedential value of summary disposi-
tions of appeals, which in turn could imply that the Court got it wrong in Hicks
v. Miranda and other cases that treat such dispositions as having some, albeit
limited, precedential effect.' 39 If the absence of a substantial federal question
means that federal courts have no jurisdiction, then presumably a Supreme
Court dismissal for want of substantiality would not be a ruling on the merits
and could not bind other courts.' 4 ° It would also prompt questions about the
need for this category of disposition when the Court dismisses other appeals
"for want of jurisdiction."'' Those other jurisdiction-based dismissals do not
decide the merits and therefore have no precedential weight. 142 Conflating
jurisdiction and the merits therefore would add unnecessary complexity to an
already difficult field of law.
One last consideration counsels against treating dismissals for want of a
substantial federal question as having jurisdictional implications. If we take
seriously the notion that such a dismissal means that the federal courts have no
authority to hear cases presenting the same questions, we will effectively - and
unnecessarily - freeze the development of legal doctrine in the federal courts.
All such cases would have to be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdic-
136 See Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-011 v. Falvo, 524 U.S. 436, 440 (2002); Hagins v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-38 (1974) (collecting cases). See also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3564 (1984 & Supp. 2001).
137 Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 404 (1970).
138 See Yazoo County Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Suthoff, 454 U.S. 1157, 1160-61 (1982) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). See also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682
(1946). Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) (dismissal for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter) with FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted).
139 See supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.
140 See J. Timothy Eaton et al., Petitions for Writ of Certiorari from the United States
Supreme Court to the Illinois Courts (28 U.S. C. § 1257), in ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR CONTIN-
UING LEGAL EDUCATION, ILLINOIS CIVIL APPELLATE PRACTICE § 31.12 (1997).
141 See, e.g., Moore v. Dupree, 510 U.S. 1068 (1994); Watkins v. Fordice, 507 U.S. 981
(1993). The categories "for want of a substantial federal question" and "for want of jurisdic-
tion" are not coterminous. Some appeals dismissed for want of jurisdiction were filed out of
time or have some similar procedural defect that does not go to the existence of a substantial
federal question. See STERN ET AL., supra note 29, at 267. On the other hand, appeals from
state-court rulings that rested on an adequate nonfederal ground have also been dismissed for
want of jurisdiction, even though the nonfederal ground might suggest the absence of a
substantial federal question in the particular case. See id. at 267-68.
142 See, e.g., Hopfman v. Connolly, 471 U.S. 459, 460-61 (1985) (per curiam).
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tion. To be sure, these claims could be asserted in state courts, with Supreme
Court review ultimately available. It is far from clear that the Supreme Court
has the practical ability to monitor interpretations of federal law in the state
courts, and some commentators have raised efficiency objections to such an
arrangement. 14 3
More important, actual practice is inconsistent with the no-jurisdiction
scenario described in the previous paragraph. On several occasions, the lower
federal courts have entertained claims involving issues that were seemingly
resolved by summary dismissals of Supreme Court appeals for want of a sub-
stantial federal question. Perhaps the most notable example is Minersville
School District v. Gobitis,'" the first compulsory flag-salute case. Despite sev-
eral cases in which the Supreme Court had dismissed, for want of a substantial
federal question, appeals from state courts upholding requirements that school-
children salute the flag, 4 5 the Supreme Court addressed the merits of the case
without the slightest hint that the lower courts had erred in exercising jurisdic-
tion. '46 The difficulty of the flag-salute issue is also shown by the brief life of
Gobitis, which was overruled only three years later in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette.14 7
Even if there were more basis for the view that a dismissal for want of a
substantial federal question has jurisdictional implications, the Supreme
Court's summary dispositions are open to a very different interpretation. We
can see this from Rule 15(1)(e) adopted in 1954, which reflected the Court's
previous practice and remained on the books without meaningful revision until
after the elimination of appeals from state courts in 1988.148 That rule governed
the contents of jurisdictional statements.
143 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Artful Pleading: A Doctrine in Search of Definition, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 1781, 1820 (1998).
]- 310 U.S. 586 (1940). The challenger's name was misspelled in the official report. The
correct spelling is "Gobitas." See PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT 338 (1999).
"' See Hering v. State Bd. of Educ., 303 U.S. 624 (1938), dismissing appeal for want of a
substantial federal question from 194 A. 177 (N.J. 1937); Leoles v. Landers, 302 U.S. 656
(1937), dismissing appeal for want of a substantial federal question from 192 S.E. 218 (Ga.
1937). The Court had also summarily affirmed an appeal from a federal court on the same
question. See Johnson v. Town of Deerfield, 306 U.S. 621 (1939), summarily affig 25 F.
Supp. 918 (D. Mass. 1939). In all of these cases, the Court cited Hamilton v. Regents of the
University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934), which upheld a military-training requirement
for university students over religious objections.
146 The opinion, by Justice Frankfurter, did note the conflict between the rulings by the
district court and court of appeals in Gobitis and the earlier summary dispositions, See 310
U.S. at 592 n.2. In light of Frankfurter's long record as a student of the Court's jurisdiction
even before his appointment to the bench, see, e.g., FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 24;
Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 25, the failure even to allude to a possible jurisdictional
problem cannot be regarded as a judicial oversight.
147 319 U.S. 624 (1943). For other examples of situations in which the Supreme Court
considered issues that had previously arisen in appeals that had been dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question, see Arthur D. Hellman, Error Correction, Lawmaking, and the
Supreme Court's Exercise of Discretionary Review, 44 U. PIrr. L. REV. 795, 818-19 (1983);
Comment, supra note 120, at 788.
148 See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
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As explained earlier, Rule 15(l)(e) used the word "substantial" in two
distinct ways.' 4 9 First, appellants from state courts were expected to show that
"the federal questions are substantial"; this instruction was accompanied by a
reference to Zucht v. King. Second, appellants had to explain "why the ques-
tions presented are so substantial as to require plenary consideration, with
briefs on the merits and oral argument, for their resolution." Identical language
appeared in Rule 15(l)(f), which was directed at appellants from federal courts.
Appellants in cases coming from state courts who sought a ruling upholding the
judgment below without plenary consideration were instructed by Rule
16(1)(b) to file a motion to dismiss for want of a substantial federal question,
while Rule 16(1)(c) told appellants from federal courts to move to affirm.150
If the Court granted a Rule 16(l)(b) motion to dismiss for want of a sub-
stantial federal question, then, the grounds for the summary disposition of the
appeal from a state court would remain ambiguous. Perhaps the case presented
a frivolous or foreclosed question, in which event the dismissal might have
jurisdictional implications for the lower federal courts. But the terms of Rule
15(1) made it equally plausible to infer that the motion to dismiss had been
granted because the questions presented, while not utterly lacking in merit,
were not sufficiently important to justify the time, energy, and expense of ple-
nary consideration. 5 ' Because summary dismissals typically appear in one-
sentence orders unaccompanied by even a citation, let alone a skeletal explana-
tion, it is impossible to tell why an appeal from a state court was dismissed. If
we cannot tell the grounds for decision, we cannot determine, as the Court
explained in Mandel v. Bradley, "the precise issues presented and necessarily
decided" by the summary dismissal for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion. 52 This in turn militates against reading too much into such a disposition.
To return to the suggestions of jurisdictional problems in Bates v. Jones
and Citizens for Legislative Choice v. Miller, there were neither citations nor
reasoning in the order dismissing the appeal in Moore v. McCartney. 5 3 For
this reason, we have no way of knowing which concept of substantiality
prompted the Court to dismiss the appeal summarily. The federal question
might have been frivolous or foreclosed, but it might also have been regarded
as less urgent than other matters on the Court's docket that warranted plenary
consideration. We are left to speculate about the grounds for the disposition.
With no clues from the Supreme Court's unadorned dismissal order, there is no
justification for treating the order as resting on some jurisdictional defect.
Accordingly, the notion that the challenges to term limits for state legislators
may be heard only in state court (with the possibility of discretionary review by
the Supreme Court) should be rejected.
149 See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
'5o See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
151 Chief Justice Warren made this point explicitly in a speech to the American Law Insti-
tute shortly after the 1954 rules were promulgated. See Frederick Bemays Wiener, The
Supreme Court's New Rules, 68 HARv. L. REV. 20, 51 (1954). The rules were promulgated
on April 12, 1954. See 346 U.S. 943 (1954). The Chief Justice's talk took place on May 19.
See Wiener, supra, at 50 n.135.
152 See supra text accompanying note 58.




With the effective elimination of the mandatory appeal jurisdiction in
1988, it is easy to lose sight of the meaning of summary dismissals for want of
a substantial federal question. These dismissals, in appeals from state courts,
were the equivalent of summary affirmances of appeals from federal courts. In
other words, the questions presented by such appeals did not require plenary
consideration. Summary dismissals for want of a substantial federal question
therefore should have no jurisdictional implications for subsequent cases
presenting the same issues in federal district courts. If the same issue is subse-
quently presented in a federal district court and there is no reason to believe
that intervening doctrinal developments have undermined the summary dismis-
sal, the correct response is to dismiss the new complaint for failure to state a
claim, not for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Before closing, however, we should briefly consider the Supreme Court's
most recent dismissal of an appeal for want of a substantial federal question. In
Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives,154 two
sets of plaintiffs challenged the Census Bureau's plan to use statistical adjust-
ment to correct for undercount in determining the population used for appor-
tioning congressional seats among the states. After upholding one set of
plaintiffs' statutory challenge to the plan,' 55 the Court turned to the claims
asserted by the House. Concluding that the legal issues raised by the House had
been resolved in the companion case, the Court determined that the House's
case "no longer present[ed] a substantial federal question" and dismissed the
appeal. 1
56
At first blush, the disposition of the appeal in the House's case is remarka-
ble. Unlike the typical appeal that is dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question, the House's case came up on appeal from a federal court, not from a
state court.' 57 This novel procedural gambit can best be explained as a creative
judicial response to the extraordinarily sensitive jurisdictional issue lurking in
the case. It is not clear that the House of Representatives had standing to bring
its lawsuit in the first place. After many years of avoiding the issue, 58 the
Court only recently had concluded that individual members of Congress gener-
ally lack standing to challenge laws or policies of dubious constitutionality or
legality. That ruling came in Raines v. Byrd,159 a challenge to the Line Item
Veto Act. That statute was invalidated the following year in Clinton v. City of
154 525 U.S. 316 (1999).
115 See id. at 343.
156 Id. at 344.
157 See U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 11 F. Supp. 2d 76
(D.D.C. 1998) (3-judge court).
158 See, e.g., Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987) (declining to determine the standing of
members of Congress because the case had become moot); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,
721 (1986) (avoiding a ruling on the standing of a congressional plaintiff because another
challenger clearly had standing to sue); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (directing
the dismissal of a complaint filed by members of Congress but not specifying the basis for
that ruling). Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (allowing a member to chal-
lenge his exclusion from the House of Representatives).
"9 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
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New York, 16 0 a case brought by other parties. Raines v. Byrd did not resolve
whether either or both chambers of Congress could ever have standing, but the
decision at least implied the plausibility of that potentially difficult question.
Stretching the "substantial federal question" doctrine to the House's appeal
from a federal court in the census case enabled the justices to avoid a possible
confrontation with a coequal branch if they ruled that the House lacked stand-
ing while at the same time resolving the substantive question on the merits in
the case brought by the other plaintiffs.
We should not, therefore, read more into this unusual ruling than the
unique circumstances of the case justify. At a general level, the confusion over
the meaning of summary dismissals of appeals for want of a substantial federal
question further attests to the wisdom of the effective elimination of the
Supreme Court's mandatory appeal jurisdiction in favor of discretionary certio-
rari review. Unfortunately, as the misleading jurisdictional suggestions in Bates
v. Jones and Citizens for Legislative Choice v. Miller demonstrate, we continue
to live with the mischief caused by the former procedures.
160 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
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During the summer of 1999, I was working on an article about Planned
Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists,' a case in which Planned
Parenthood and several abortion providers sued a radical anti-abortion group
and some of its members for violating the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act, I presented my preliminary thesis to a group of colleagues. My
thesis was and is that the defendants' conduct is not entitled to First Amend-
ment protection.
My thesis produced a strong, negative reaction from many of my col-
leagues. One colleague, frustrated by what he no doubt thought was a seriously
misguided position, asked, "on your theory, Marc Antony would not be entitled
to First Amendment protection?" Taken aback, I dodged the question like a
first year law student stumped by a hypothetical that seemed to trap him in his
own illogic. Had I hit a dead end in my thesis? My colleague, a Constitutional
law scholar and First Amendment expert, seemed to suggest that the law was
settled that Marc Antony would indeed be entitled to a First Amendment
defense for his funeral oration.
I survived the evening with my colleagues, refined my thesis to address
some of their objections, finished my article2 and went on to other topics. But I
continued to reflect on my colleague's question about Marc Antony. When
Professor Carl Tobias asked me whether I might submit an article to the
Nevada Law Journal, I decided to take the opportunity to consider the question
posed by my colleague in more depth than was possible in my earlier article.
As a Criminal Law professor, I began considering the question by reflecting on
what two other Shakespearean characters tell us about the First Amendment.
This essay develops my thoughts about lago, the villain in Othello, and
Lady MacBeth, obviously one of the villains in MacBeth. To do so, I first
discuss principles of accomplice liability. No competent lawyer in America
would argue that either Iago or Lady MacBeth was entitled to a First Amend-
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; J.D., University of
Pennsylvania, 1974; B.A., Swarthmore College, 1969. I wish to thank my colleague Brian
Landsberg for sharing his insights into the First Amendment.
1 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Or. 1999), vacated by Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of
Life Activists, 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001).
2 Michael Vitiello, The Nuremberg Files: Testing the Outer Limits of the First Amendment,
61 OHIO STATE L.J. 1175 (2000).
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ment defense. In fact, our legal system would find both of them guilty of mur-
der despite the fact that their only conduct involved speech.3 While Marc
Antony may appear to have a more plausible First Amendment defense, I argue
that, consistent with the Supreme Court's First Amendment case law, he could
nonetheless be found guilty of inciting violence or encouraging murder.
II. SPEECH As CRIME
Under traditional criminal law doctrine, a person may be guilty of a crime
based only on speech in a number of settings.4 In examining the possible crim-
inal conduct of lago, Lady MacBeth, and Marc Antony, this section focuses on
principles governing accessory or accomplice liability.
As stated by Professor Dressler in his leading criminal law treatise, "a
person may be held accountable for the conduct of another person if he assists
the other in committing an offense."5 Accomplice liability has posed some of
the most interesting analytical problems in the criminal law and has become the
topic of a number of important scholarly articles.' Somewhat anomalous in the
criminal law, a person becomes an accessory based upon another's conduct,
rather than one's own chosen acts.7 Instead, if a person associates himself with
the acts of another person, he derives liability from the actor.8 Liability is for
the act that the accomplice has encouraged the principal to commit.9
A person may become an accomplice in innumerable ways. One might
provide a murderer with the murder weapon or serve as a lookout or getaway
driver for a robber."1 But as long as evidence of an intent to aid is sufficient, a
person may become an accomplice merely by offering words of encourage-
' In Macbeth, after Lady MacBeth exhorts her husband to kill Duncan, the King, she tells
him that she will get the King's guards drunk, allowing him to get past the guards. While
that assistance alone would also make her an accomplice, as discussed in this essay, she
would be liable for murder as an accomplice based on her speech alone. See WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, act 1, sc. 7 (John F. Andrews ed., GuildAmerica Books 1990)
[hereinafter MacBeth].
4 Solicitation and conspiracy are two obvious examples. The Model Penal Code states that
a person is guilty of a criminal offense if "he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to
engage in such conduct" or "with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of
the offense, he solicits such other person to commit it." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06.
5 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 30.01, at 427 (2d ed. 1995) (cita-
tion omitted).
6 See, e.g., Joshua Dressier, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Lia-
bility: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91 (1985); Sanford H. Kadish,
Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV.
323 (1985); Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609 (1984).
7 Dressier, supra note 6, at 103; see also Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for
the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. REV. 689, 702 (1930).
8 Kadish, supra note 6, at 337-42.
9 Id.
1" See, e.g., People v. Hughes, 161 P.2d 285 (Cal. App. 2d 1945) (serving as a lookout
sufficient to be liable for the crime committed by the principal); see also DRESSLER, supra




ment. ' Hence, shouting "attaboy" as an offender prepares to shoot his victim,
or cheering a person who is committing an offense, may be sufficient to make
the offender an accomplice.'
2
A variety of interesting analytical problems arise because liability is deriv-
ative. For example, at common law, a person who aids an undercover police
officer will not be guilty of the underlying offense because the principal (the
officer) will not be guilty of a crime. 3 Hence, despite obvious culpability, the
accomplice escapes liability. Similar problems exist at common law if the prin-
cipal is acquitted of the underlying offense.' 4 Because to the formalistic mind
an accomplice cannot derive liability from an acquitted principal, the accom-
plice must also go free. Similar conundrums abound in the common law's
treatment of accomplices.15
While the common law, at times, acquits dangerous accomplices on for-
malistic grounds, the common law and modern accomplice liability law, at
times, criminalize those whose role seems quite minor. Remember that the
accomplice has the same liability as the principal, even if the accomplice's role
is minor. A wife, who provides her husband dinner, fortifying him to commit
serious felonies, may be equally liable for his completed crimes. 16 Leading
criminal law texts include a case that routinely outrages law students, Wilcox v.
Jeffery, 7 in which the defendant paid for a ticket to a concert where Coleman
Hawkins, famous American jazz musician, performed in England without
securing proper work papers. Wilcox, according to the court,
paid for his ticket. Mr. Hawkins went on the stage and delighted the audience by
playing the saxophone. The appellant did not get up and protest in the name of the
musicians of England that Mr. Hawkins ought not to be here competing with them
and taking the bread out of their mouths and the wind out of their instruments. It is
not found that [the appellant] actually applauded, but he was there having paid to go
in, and, no doubt, enjoying the performance .... 18
Unfortunately, cases like Wilcox may give accomplice liability a bad name.
"' Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S. 442 (1893) (reversing conviction for murder because
evidence of intent was ambiguous; but the Court stated that words of encouragement may be
sufficient to sustain a conviction).
12 See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES
647 (6th ed. 1995). The answer to their hypothetical, a variation of the facts of Hicks, 150
U.S. 442, is almost certainly that, had Hicks shouted "attaboy" as Rowe threatened his vic-
tim, he would have been guilty as an accomplice to murder.
11 See, e.g., Vaden v. State, 768 P.2d 1102 (Alaska 1989) (relying on "the long-standing
common law rule that the act of a feigned accomplice may never be imputed to the target
defendant for purposes of obtaining a conviction").
" See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 30.03[B][5], at 434 (citing the common law to the effect
that acquittal of the principal meant that an accessory could not be prosecuted).
15 See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 6, at 339-41. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06, cmt. 9
(dealing with cases involving whether a victim, for example, a victim of extortion, becomes
an accomplice).
16 State v. Duran, 526 P.2d 188 (N.M. 1974) (holding perpetrator's child while he commits
the crime is sufficient assistance); Alexander v. State, 102 So. 597 (Ala. App. 1925) (deliver-
ing dinner to husband while he is engaged in a felony is sufficient aid to make the witness an
accomplice, requiring state to corroborate her testimony).
17 1 All E.R. 464 (K.B. 1951).
'8 Id. at 466.
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Accomplice liability is also anomalous in the criminal law because a pros-
ecutor does not have to prove that an accomplice caused the crime to occur. 9
Indeed, were causation a requirement, a prosecutor would face formidable theo-
retical and practical constraints. As a theoretical matter, as developed in Pro-
fessor Kadish's important article on accomplice liability, the criminal law
generally refuses to treat one person's act as the cause of another's conduct.
That is so because of the criminal law's insistence that we are all free-will
actors.20 Hence, the accomplice does not cause the principal to act when she
encourages his conduct; the principal remains free to choose to commit the
crime. As a practical matter, requiring a prosecutor to prove that, but for the
accomplice's encouragement, a principal would not have committed a particu-
lar crime is almost certainly a matter of pure speculation, not subject to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Despite hard cases like Wilcox, perhaps better described as the result of
the poor judgment of an excessively zealous prosecutor, and despite ways in
which accomplice liability departs from traditional criminal law doctrine,
accomplice liability serves an important role in the criminal law. As is the case
with co-conspirators, accomplices increase the danger that a crime will be com-
mitted.2 ' Accomplices may provide the necessary encouragement to push the
doubting principal to the point of action and may provide meaningful assistance
that allows the crime to be completed.22
Some of the debate about accomplice liability understates the protection
the law provides those accused of accomplice liability. Unlike many areas of
the criminal law, accomplice liability turns on proof of intent. 23 Typically, an
accomplice must intend to promote or facilitate the actual offense; knowledge
that his words or actions may aid the commission of the offense is
insufficient.24
That requirement has, at times, raised concerns in particularly hard cases.
In first proposing that knowledge be sufficient, the first tentative draft of the
Model Penal Code cited a variety of examples where a person might provide
substantial aid, but lack criminality because of the intent requirement. For
example, the drafters cited the case of "[a] lessor [who] rents with knowledge
that the premises will be used to establish a bordello. A vendor [who] sells
with knowledge that the subject of the sale will be used in the commission of a
",25crime....
19 See SANFORD KADISH, A Theory of Complicity, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL
PHILO-SOPHY: THE INFLUENCE OF H.L.A. HART 288 (1987). See also Dressier, supra note 6
(criticizing the absence of a requirement of causation).
20 KADISH, supra note 19.
21 Fuller v. State, 198 So. 2d 625, 630 (Ala. App. 1966) (accomplices' presence may
encourage by adding numbers). See also DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 29.03[B], at 395.
22 Fuller, 198 So. 2d at 630.
23 In many areas of the criminal law, even if a statute requires the state to prove "intent," the
mens rea element is satisfied if the state proves that the defendant knew that the harm would
result. See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 10.04, at 105-06, for examples.
24 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (requiring "purpose" as the mens rea) and § 2.06, cmt.





The Model Penal Code eventually rejected the extension of liability to
those who lacked purpose, but knew their conduct would result in the further-
ance of the underlying offense.26 Commentators have offered various justifica-
tions for the position taken by the drafters of the Code. For example, Professor
Fletcher has argued that extending liability to those who act with knowledge,
but not purpose, is akin to asking whether to impose a duty to act to prevent
impending harm.2 7 Typically, the criminal law imposes no such duty. Others
have emphasized concern about imposing unfair inconvenience to legitimate
business transactions.2 8 For various reasons, courts tend to retain the stringent
intent or purpose requirement.
The strict mens rea requirement also serves an important role in cases
involving accomplice liability where the accomplice's conduct consists only of
words of incitement or encouragement. 29 The criminal law does not articulate
concern about the First Amendment as a rationale for the strict mens rea
requirement. However, modem First Amendment law has imposed a similar
strict mens rea requirement on cases where a speaker interposes a credible First
Amendment defense.3 ° Courts developing accomplice liability may not have
been influenced by First Amendment concerns. At least as a matter of history,
the law imposed a strict mens rea requirement in accomplice liability cases long
before the Supreme Court imposed a similar mens rea requirement in its mod-
em case law. 3' My point here is that at least some concerns about imposing
proper limitations on accomplice liability are answered when we focus on the
mens rea requirement. The mens rea requirement allows an accomplice a plau-
sible defense in many cases. For example, in the kind of case that troubles
Professor Dressier,32 a wife who aids her husband by serving him dinner to
fortify him to commit his criminal offense, may force the state to prove not
only that she knew that her husband was going to commit the offense but that
she encouraged that offense, i.e., that she actively desired that he commit the
offense and that is why she provided the aid. Passive acquiescence is insuffi-
cient to demonstrate intent. Or where a speaker's words incite a mob to vio-
lence, he can force the state to prove not just that he was aware that his words
might incite the crowd but also that he spoke the words with the desire that his
speech would produce that result.33
These background principles of the criminal law help develop my thesis,
that Marc Antony would not only be subject to prosecution for inciting the
mob's murder of Brutus and his co-conspirators, but also that he should be
subject to prosecution. To develop my thesis, I want first to explore how the
26 Id.
27 GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 676 (1978).
28 See, e.g., GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 369-70 (2d ed.
1961).
29 See infra discussion at notes 94-99.
30 See infra discussion at notes 94-99.
3' See Dressier, supra note 6, at 96-97 (discussing legislative reform of accomplice liability,
beginning in the mid-nineteenth century). By contrast, a specific intent requirement, as part
of the Supreme Court's First Amendment case law, emerged in the late 1960s and early
1970s. See infra discussion at notes 131-38.
32 Dressler, supra note 6, at 102.
33 See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
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traditional principles play out for lago and Lady MacBeth where, as in
Antony's case, the offenses consisted solely of words.
III. IAGO AND LADY MACBETH
lago is not just pure evil; he is a criminal. And yet, his conduct consists of
nothing but words. Despite that, under modern criminal law doctrine, he would
be guilty of murder.
For those unfamiliar with Shakespeare's Othello, lago is a false friend to
Othello, a successful warrior and Moor of Venice.3 4 lago intentionally turns
Othello against his faithful and loving wife, Desdemona.3 5 He does so by con-
vincing Othello that Desdemona is carrying on an affair with Cassio, one of
Othello's faithful lieutenants.3 6 In the end, Othello murders Desdemona.3 7
In their leading criminal law textbook, Professors Kadish and Schulhofer
use the facts of Othello to explore issues of accomplice liability. They ask, "If
Othello would be guilty of no more than manslaughter, should it follow that
lago cannot be convicted of first-degree murder? ' 38
A word of explanation is necessary to understand both why Othello may
be guilty of manslaughter instead of murder, and then why lago's precise crime
- murder or voluntary manslaughter - is open to question. The law has long
recognized provocation as a partial defense to murder. Sufficient provocation
reduces murder to voluntary manslaughter. The formal argument is that provo-
cation negates the malice necessary for the killing to be murder.39 As a matter
of policy, courts view the provoked actor as less culpable than the actor who
acts rationally.4 °
At common law, courts limited cases in which a defendant might interpose
a provocation defense.4 ' Quite typically, for example, a defendant could not
raise the partial defense unless he witnessed his wife in the act of intercourse.42
Modern courts have rejected such narrow definitions of the defense and have
allowed it in a far wider range of cases.4 3
Obviously, Othello never saw the faithful Desdemona in flagrante delicto
with Cassio. Iago arranged for Othello to witness Desdemona and Cassio talk-
ing intimately together.' He also arranged for his wife to take a scarf that
Othello gave Desdemona and then had the scarf planted among Cassio's pos-
sessions.45 Even though those events would be insufficient to provide Othello




37 Id. at act 5, sc. 2.
38 KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 680.
31 See, e.g., State v. Thornton, 730 S.W.2d 309 (Tenn. 1987).
40 See Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212 (1862), overruled on alternative grounds by People v.
Woods, 416 Mich. 864 (1982).
41 See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 31.07[2][a], at 491.
42 See, e.g., Holmes v. Pub. Prosecutions, 2 All E.R. 124 (K.B. 1946).
43 See, e.g., Maher, 10 Mich. at 212; Commonwealth v. Berry, 336 A.2d 262 (Pa. 1975);
People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976); People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310 (N.Y. 1980).
'4 Othello, supra note 34, at act 3, sc. 3, In. 1-38.
41 Id. at In. 293-319.
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a provocation defense at common law, were Othello charged with murder in a
jurisdiction following more modern rules governing provocation, he might be
found guilty of voluntary manslaughter if the jury found that a reasonable per-
son would have been provoked under similar circumstances.46
lago's criminal liability poses interesting legal questions. Almost cer-
tainly, a prosecutor would charge lago with murder based on principles of
accomplice liability. Accomplice liability poses courts with some of the most
interesting analytical questions in the criminal law. As discussed above, the
criminal law criminalizes the accomplice because, by encouraging a particular
crime, he adopts the criminal conduct as his own. Accomplice liability is
derivative liability. At common law, the accomplice could be found liable only
for the same crime as the principal because the accomplice derived liability
from the principal.4 7
Scholars have questioned whether lago might be guilty of murder even if
Othello would be guilty only of voluntary manslaughter.4 8 If lago is guilty as
an accomplice, i.e., he derives his liability from Othello, he would be guilty
only of voluntary manslaughter despite his intent that Othello kill. That result,
perhaps not troubling to formalistic thinkers, is anomalous to modem criminal
law theorists. Professor Kadish has explained how the criminal law may avoid
the anomaly of punishing lago for only voluntary manslaughter despite his pre-
meditation and malice; Othello's actions are not fully volitional because lago
has rendered him partially incapacitated by his poisonous words. Despite the
law's hesitation to treat one person as the cause of another's conduct, this
would be a case in which lago would be treated as the cause of Desdemona's
death because he has rendered Othello incapable of acting with malice.49
For my analysis of the First Amendment and the criminal law, the above
example is especially important. The example represents one in which the law
recognizes the extraordinary power of words alone. Words may render a free-
will actor incompetent. Despite the criminal law's resistance to finding one
person the cause of another's criminal conduct, in this situation, words alone
may be sufficiently powerful to do just that.
No competent criminal lawyer would attempt to interpose a First Amend-
ment defense on behalf of Iago.i ° Too much case law has established that the
accomplices whose conduct consists entirely of encouraging words may be
found guilty along with the principal. Where commentators have objected to
accomplice liability, their objections have usually focused on concerns about
whether an accomplice's punishment is proportional to the underlying, and
occasionally fairly minor role that he may have played, rather than on concerns
46 See, e.g., Maher, 10 Mich. at 212; Commonwealth, 336 A.2d at 262; Berry, 556 P.2d at
777.
17 See supra discussion at notes 13-15.
" See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 680.
'9 SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT 183 (1987); see also WILLIAMS, supra
note 28, at 391; GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 374 (2d ed. 1983).
50 Even in their extremely critical assessment of the Supreme Court's First Amendment case
law, David R. Dow and R. Scott Shieldes suggest that when a speaker overwhelms or con-
trols the will of the listener, the state may properly convict the speaker. Dow & Shieldes,
Rethinking the Clear and Present Danger Test, 73 IND. L.J. 1217, 1219 (1998).
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about whether the offender ought to be criminalized at all. 5' And even then, I
doubt that those scholars would disagree with Professor Kadish that Iago would
be and should be guilty of murder.
52
One might object that my example does not prove very much about the
state's ability to criminalize an offender whose conduct consists only of speech.
Iago's words are false and the law gives less protection to those who lie than
those who tell the truth.
For example, despite limiting the ability of a state to impose liability for
defamation because of First Amendment concerns, the Supreme Court has
found that false statements are entitled to less protection than true statements.
Cases like New York Times v. Sullivan53 require a plaintiff to make a higher
showing than state law might otherwise require, if the plaintiff is a public offi-
cial or public figure.54 The Court is concerned with assuring vigorous debate
on matters of public concern and with preventing government from stifling crit-
icism of its policies.55 But the Court leaves the states free to allow such suits
and imposes few restrictions on the states if the plaintiff is not a public figure.
States may legitimately protect a person's reputation from falsehoods.5 6 Thus,
one could argue that a state may legitimately prosecute lago or other false
swearers with little concern about the First Amendment because the First
Amendment's protection of intentionally false statements is non-existent.
Perhaps. But in other areas, the criminal law has fully criminalized speak-
ers whose crime consisted of truthful statements. Here, Lady MacBeth pro-
vides a helpful example. Early in MacBeth, three witches hail MacBeth as the
future king.5 7 He and Lady MacBeth agree that he will kill Duncan, the King,
so that MacBeth can fulfill the prophecy.58 But in his memorable soliloquy,
MacBeth suffers from momentary doubts about whether he should commit
murder.5 9 When Lady MacBeth learns that her husband has lost his resolve,
she delivers one of the most famous speeches in all of Shakespeare, 60 a speech
5 Dressier, supra note 6. Dressler also argues that ignoring the general requirement that the
state must prove that a defendant caused a particular result before he may be found guilty
leads to disproportionate punishment. Id. at 103-08.
52 For example, Professor Dressier would impose liability for acts done by others if the
accomplice caused the actor's conduct. Id. at 120-30. See also Dow & Shiledes, supra note
50, at 1219.
5' 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
51 While the Court has extended First Amendment protection to public figures, it has more
often than not found that the particular plaintiff was not a public figure. See, e.g., Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979);
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1970).
" Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
56 See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48 (recognizing a state's interest in protecting individu-
als from injury to their reputations).
57 Macbeth, supra note 3, at act 1, sc. 3, In. 46-48, 60-67.
58 Id. at act 1, sc. 7.
51 Id. at act 1, sc. 7, In. 1-28.
6 When Macbeth tells his wife that he has changed his plans, she counters with:
What Beast was't then/That made you break this Enterprise to me?/When you durst do it you
were a Man;/And to be more that what you were, you would/Be so much more the Man. Nor
Time, nor Place/Did then adhere, and yet you would make both./They've made themselves, and
that their Fitness now/Does unmake you. I've given Suck, and know/How tender 'tis to love the
Babe that milks me;/I would, while it was smiling in my Face,/Have pluck'd my Nipple from his
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which demonstrates why we criminalize conspiracy and aiding and abetting.
The single actor may lose his resolve; the presence of additional parties
increases the likelihood that a planned crime will take place. In response to her
exhortation to "screw your courage to the sticking-place,' MacBeth
announces that "I am settl'd. ' 62 Thereafter, he commits the crime.6 3 Unlike
lago's speech, hers is not false.
As discussed above, accomplice liability is demonstrated by a showing
that the accomplice assisted the commission of the crime.6 4 Assistance is
defined broadly to include mere encouragement of the crime. In theory, an
accomplice derives her liability from the actor. By encouraging the act, the
accomplice makes the act her own. As a result, unlike the law governing con-
65spiracy, she is not guilty of a separate offense of aiding and abetting. She is
fully liable for the completed, intended offense.6 6
Commentators have raised a variety of criticisms of accomplice liability.
67
But the MacBeth hypothetical is an easy case in which, despite criticism of
accomplice liability generally, critics of accomplice liability should have no
trouble recognizing that criminalizing Lady MacBeth is an appropriate result.
One might hesitate to criminalize an accomplice because in some cases the
accomplice's intent may be uncertain. In this case, however, Lady MacBeth's
forceful speech leaves no doubt about her intent.68
Commentators also express concern that the encouragement or assistance
provided by the accomplice is often insignificant and may be provided by one
who has little choice but to acquiesce. For example, Professor Dressler raises
issues of proportionality in a case involving a wife who serves her criminal
husband dinner which fortifies him to commit his crimes. 69 The aid provided
seems insignificant - for example, her aid seems quite remote and irrelevant to
whether her husband would have committed the crime anyway - but nonethe-
less leads to her conviction for the completed crime as long as the prosecutor
can show that she intended to aid the criminal conduct. In addition, if the law
criminalizes accomplices because they demonstrate their dangerousness by
endorsing the actor's crime, this may not apply in the case of the wife who may
have few options but to serve her husband. She may be trapped in an abusive
relationship and have few skills that would let her leave him even if she had the
resolve to do so.
Boneless Gums/And dash'd the Brains out had I so sworn as you/Have done to this ... We fail?/
But screw your Courage to the Sticking-place/And we'll not fail.
Id. at act 1, sc. 7, In. 47-61.
61 Id. at In. 59-60.
62 Id. at In. 79.
63 Id. at act 2, sc. 2.
64 See supra notes 6-17 and accompanying text.
65 See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 29.03, at 395-96 (discussing approach to conspiracy and
concluding that in most states, a conspiracy to commit a felony is punished less severely than
the target offense).
66 Dressier, supra note 6, at 92.
67 See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 6; Dow & Shieldes, supra note 50.
68 Macbeth, supra note 3. See also supra note 60.
69 Dressier, supra note 6, at 102.
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Lady MacBeth hardly resembles the wife in Alexander v. State.7 ° Her
encouragement is forceful, unequivocal, and rhetorical, delivered at a moment
when MacBeth's resolve wanes.7 But for the criminal law's hesitation to say
that one person causes another person (with his own free will) to act,7 2 one
might be tempted to argue that Lady MacBeth's words did cause her husband
to act. Quite unlike the wife in Alexander, Lady MacBeth is no shrinking vio-
let, unable to escape a domineering husband. She is a forceful participant in a
dangerous plot that results in murder.
Again, as in lago's case, competent counsel would not dream of interpos-
ing a First Amendment defense on behalf of Lady MacBeth, even if her crime
consists of nothing but words. In both cases, society may justly punish both
offenders even though another person committed the immediate act leading to
death. The two examples demonstrate ample historical precedent that we do
criminalize offenders whose conduct consists only of words, and, while some
cases raise moral questions about the appropriateness of punishing accom-
plices, lago and Lady MacBeth's cases prevent no hard moral questions. Their
punishment is deserved.
IV. MARC ANTONY
In the 1920s, Judge Learned Hand and Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr.
first discussed whether Marc Antony would be entitled to a First Amendment
defense if he was charged with inciting violence for his funeral oration for
Caesar. 3 Here, I develop the setting in which Antony delivered his oration
which led to the mob's action against Caesar's assassins and why we may be
disinclined to criminalize Antony. Thereafter, I summarize some of the leading
First Amendment cases that bear on whether Antony's conduct is criminal and
then, after I conclude that the Supreme Court case law does not provide a defin-
itive answer about whether his speech would be protected, I explore why he
should not be entitled to a First Amendment defense as a matter of law.
Despite the fact that Antony's crime consisted entirely of speech, even if possi-
bly construed as political speech, he would not be entitled to a judgment of
acquittal as a matter of law.
Brutus, one of Caesar's trusted friends, joins a conspiracy to murder Cae-
sar when his co-conspirators convince him that Caesar intends to become a
king and a tyrant.74 Even before the murder, Brutus convinces his co-conspira-
tors they should not murder Caesar's close friend, Marc Antony. 75 After Bru-
tus murders Caesar, he again convinces his co-conspirators that they need not
fear Antony, that he, Brutus, should give the funeral oration to convince the
70 See cases supra note 16.
71 See supra note 59.
72 KADISH, supra note 49.
73 Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modem First Amendment Doctrine:
Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L, REv. 719, 729 n.41 (1975) (letter from Zechariah
Chafee Jr. to Learned Hand).
74 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, act 1, sc. 2 (William Montgomery ed., Penguin
Books 2000) [hereinafter Caesar].
71 Id. at act 2, sc. 1, In. 181-83.
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people of Caesar's plan to become a tyrant.76 Confident he can defuse the
crowd's desire for vengeance for Caesar's death, Brutus convinces his cohorts
that they can then allow Antony to address the crowd as part of appropriate
burial rites.7 7
Brutus miscalculated his own persuasive powers and underestimated
Antony's. In one of the most famous of all Shakespearean speeches, Antony
plays the crowd to perfection.78 Like the successful trial lawyer, he opens with
a powerful theme: Brutus is an honorable man, as are his cohorts. 79 And so
what Brutus said must be so. But, while he repeats his refrain, that Brutus is an
honorable man and so his statements must be so, he undercuts each one, first by
reference to Caesar's treatment of him,8" and eventually by evidence found in
Caesar's will, evidence of Caesar's concern for the common people. 81
As Antony works the crowd, members of the crowd, not Antony, cry out
for the blood of the traitors. He disclaims his desire to stir up the crowd; for
example, at one point, he states, "Good friends, sweet friends, let me not stir
you up/To such a sudden flood of mutiny. 82 Antony consciously avoids
explicit words urging revenge against the conspirators. Members of the crowd
begin early in his oration to call for revenge upon the traitors and in the end,
when the crowd leaves to do so, again members of the mob, not Antony, speak
the explicit words of vengeance: "Come, away, away!/We'll burn [Caesar's]
body in the holy place,/And with the brands fire the traitors' houses .. "83
Not surprisingly, members of the mob route out the conspirators and kill
them. 84
Why might we be inclined to grant Antony a First Amendment defense?
Within the play, Antony is the hero and seeks justice against a group that has
committed a coup d'etat. Still, whether he and the mob might be justified in
killing the conspirators would be determined by principles of necessity, not, in
Antony's case, a defense grounded in the First Amendment.85
From my perspective, as a Criminal Law professor, Antony's liability
resembles that of Lady MacBeth and lago. Despite his protestations to the
76 Id. at act 3, sc. 1, In. 238-44.
77 Id.
78 Id. at act 3, sc. 2, In. 73-244.
79 Id. at In. 82-83.
80 Id. at In. 178-79.
81 Id. at In. 235-43.
82 Id. at In. 204-05.
83 Id. at act 3, sc. 2, In. 245-47.
84 Id. at act 4, sc. 2, In. 225-32 & act 5, sc. 5.
85 In most jurisdictions, necessity does not provide a defense in cases involving murder.
Under narrow circumstances, the Model Penal Code would recognize such a defense. "Con-
duct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or another is
justifiable, provided that: the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater
than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged .... " MODEL
PENAL CODE § 3.02. The necessity defense way also apply to homicide, though in most
cases the evil to be prevented is likely less than or equal to the evil of an intentional murder.
Yet, the comments state that "it would be particularly unfortunate to exclude homicidal con-
duct from the scope of the defense." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02, cmt. 3. However, many




contrary, he is a forceful orator who plays his audience brilliantly. Unlike lago,
Antony did not render his audience incompetent. As a result, the criminal law
would not treat Antony as the cause of the mob's violence.86 But, as developed
above, the criminal law does not require a prosecutor to prove that an aider and
abettor caused the actors' conduct; it is enough that the speaker encouraged the
conduct (and thereby demonstrated a desire to take the actors' conduct as his
own). 87 Both before and after his oration, Antony makes clear that his goal is
to produce the very result that his words produce.88 Like Lady MacBeth, his
powerful rhetoric results in murder.
Antony's is a difficult case for reasons that relate more to the embarrass-
ing history of our First Amendment case law than with sound principles of
criminal law. Many of the leading First Amendment cases were decided during
the "Red Scare" after the First World War and, later, during the "Red Scare"
that followed the Second World War with the beginning of the Cold War.89
Many of those cases involved what today we would call nothing more than
political speech, entitled to the greatest First Amendment protection. At the
time, political dissent could lead to serious consequences. Debs v. United
States,90 especially for those of us who remember the powerful anti-war rheto-
ric during the Vietnam war, is a low water mark, even in an era of bad First
Amendment law. The Supreme Court affirmed Debs' conviction for violating
the Espionage Act of 1917.91 His conduct amounted to what can fairly be
characterized as an anti-war speech.92 Relying on earlier precedent, Debs
found that the state must prove only that the defendant's words represented a
clear and present danger that they will produce a harm that Congress may pre-
vent.93 Further, it upheld a jury's determination that Debs' "natural and
intended effect" was to frustrate the war effort. 9
4
During the 1920 term, for the first time, Justice Holmes, joined by Justice
Brandeis, began to dissent in a number of cases in which the defendants' "con-
duct" was, at least in large part, political speech. For example, they dissented
in Abrams v. United States, a case in which several Bolshevik sympathizers
dropped leaflets onto the streets of New York.95 The leaflet opposed United
States support of anti-Soviet forces in the Russian revolution and called for a
strike to prevent shipment of weapons to those forces. 96 The Supreme Court
affirmed their conviction based on the Espionage Act, which was amended in
1918 to make it unlawful to urge curtailment of military production with an
86 See KADISH, supra note 49.
87 See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
88 Caesar, supra note 74, at act 3, sc. 1, In. 257-300, & act 4, sc. 1, In. 29-47.
89 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Vitiello, supra note 2, at 1199-217.
90 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
91 Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, § 30, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 2388(a) (1994)).
92 See Debs, 249 U.S. at 213-14 for the text of Debs' speech.
93 Id. at 213-14, 216-17.
94 Id. at 215.
95 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 620-23.
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intent to hinder the war against the Germans.97 According to the majority,
imputing knowledge to the defendants that the strikes they urged would neces-
sarily harm the war effort against the Germans satisfied the intent element. 98
Justice Holmes' dissent argued that the First Amendment prevented Con-
gress from forbidding "all efforts to change the mind of the country." 99 As a
result, the First Amendment required a showing that the defendants had a spe-
cific intent to cause the harm that Congress sought to prevent. While Holmes
read the Espionage Act to require specific intent, he found the evidence of that
intent insufficient.,o Without more, knowledge that one's speech or conduct
may bring about a particular harm is not enough to demonstrate that the speaker
intended that result.
Elsewhere, Justices Holmes and Brandeis continued to object when a state
or the national government criminalized a person's abstract advocacy. For
example, they objected to the Court's affirmance of Anna Whitney's conviction
for criminal anarchy and syndicalism based on nothing more than her presence
at a Communist Labor Party Convention where the party adopted a resolution
supporting the revolutionary working class movement in America. 01 Among
other concerns, Justices Holmes and Brandeis argued that the Court improperly
deferred to the California legislature's determination that the result advocated
by the Convention was a clear and present danger.1 0 2 Instead, they would have
required proof of that fact at trial. As a result, the statute might lead to convic-
tion, as appeared to be the case before the Court, for mere abstract advocacy.
More must be required because of the risk of stifling all political dissent. That
risk exists because "[elvery denunciation of existing law"'103 increases the
probability that the law will be violated. In their view, the First Amendment
allows dissenting voices to challenge existing laws without fear of
prosecution. 104
Holmes and Brandeis insisted that, as a matter of substantive law, a legis-
lature can only criminalize speech when the danger is clear and present.1 05 In
their view, as a matter of procedure, a court is not bound by a legislature's
determination that a danger is clear and present and has a greater than normal
role in reviewing a jury's determination that a harm is sufficiently imminent
and that a speaker has the requisite intent.'0 6
Judge Learned Hand contemporaneously struggled with the same
dilemma, how to protect society without suppressing political dissent. In
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, the publisher of a revolutionary journal
sought an injunction to compel the postmaster to accept plaintiffs journal for
97 Id. at 624. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219, amended by
Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (Comp. St. 1918, § 10212(c)).
98 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 621-22.
99 Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 628-29 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
101 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
102 Id. at 378-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring).






mailing.' °7 The postmaster's defense rested on his claim that the journal vio-
lated the Espionage Act of 1917.1"8 For example, the postmaster argued that
political cartoons and text expressing sympathy for conscientious objectors vio-
lated the act's provision making it unlawful to cause "insubordination, disloy-
alty, mutiny or refusal of duty in the military."'
10 9
Hand sought to draw a clear line between protected and unprotected
speech.''o Even the Holmes-Brandeis interpretation of the clear and present
danger test left the speaker guessing when First Amendment protection began.
Depending on how imminent the harm might be, the same speech might be
protected in one setting but not in another. Unlike Holmes and Brandeis, who
focused on the effect of the speech, Hand focused on the content of the
speech."' For Hand, under the Espionage Act, a speech was not criminal
unless it directly counseled the listener to resist the draft, even if the speech
motivated the listener to resist the draft." 2 Words did not become criminal
unless they were a "direct incitement to violent resistance."1 1 3
The Second Circuit reversed Hand's decision in Masses Publishing. 114
Hence, neither the Holmes-Brandeis view nor the Hand view became the law,
at least until the late 1960s. But certainly from today's view of the First
Amendment, Holmes, Brandeis, and Hand deserve credit for their efforts to
limit the government's ability to criminalize political dissent. At least as devel-
oped in these cases, the defendants did nothing more than speak out in opposi-
tion to policies of the state or federal government. As applied by the Supreme
Court, the First Amendment did not go very far in protecting unpopular speech.
While the Holmes-Brandeis and Hand approaches both offered greater
protection than the Court did at that time, their approaches differed in signifi-
cant ways. In fact, the Marc Antony example served to demonstrate that differ-
ence. Under the Holmes-Brandeis approach, a court would have to determine,
based on an independent review of the record, whether he intended his speech
to result in the unlawful killing of the conspirators and that the risk of harm was
imminent.15 As developed in more detail below, Antony planned the very
harm that took place, and he expected it to take place immediately, allowing
him little protection under the Holmes-Brandeis approach." 16
In correspondence with Judge Hand, Professor Chafee posed the Antony
example.117 Like a true Socratic professor, Chafee posed the example to
demonstrate the weakness of Hand's approach in Masses Publishing." 8 While
107 244 F. 535, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
108 Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217.
109 Masses Publ'g., 244 F. at 539.
110 Id. at 540.
"'I Gunther, supra note 73, at 720-21.
112 Id.
113 Masses Publ'g, 244 F. at 540.
114 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
"15 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
116 See infra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
117 Gunther, supra note 73, at 729 n.41.
118 Id. In one of his letters to Hand, the comment is made that "your test is certainly easier
to apply although our old friend Marc Antony's speech is continually thrown at me in dis-
cussion. After all, we ought to take the best test we can find, even though it will sometimes
break down." Id. at app. 1, doc. 16.
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Hand's approach did not subject the speaker to "the mercy of fact-finders
reflecting majoritarian sentiments hostile to dissent,"'1 9 his approach "could
not easily deal with the indirect but purposeful incitement of Marc Antony's
oration over the body of Caesar."' 2 0 While Hand recognized the social harm
posed by the indirect inciter, focusing on the literal meaning of the speaker's
words allowed a speaker to escape criminal liability through clever
manipulation. '
2
The difference between the two approaches is especially important today
because of their influences on modem First Amendment law. First, before the
Cold War, the Holmes-Brandeis approach gained acceptance,' 2 2 as the
Supreme Court began strengthening its clear and present danger test.' 23 Sec-
ond, after a significant step backwards in Dennis v. United States,124 the Court
again gave teeth to the First Amendment in a series of cases interpreting the
Smith Act,' 25 the 1940 legislation used during the 1950s to target members of
the Communist Party. For example, in Yates v. United States, 12 6 the Court
interpreted the Smith Act to require the jury to distinguish between advocacy of
abstract doctrine, protected by the First Amendment, and incitement or advo-
cacy of action, unprotected by the First Amendment.
While cases like Yates demonstrate increased awareness that the First
Amendment must protect political dissent, 27 the Court's approach to the First
Amendment issues changed even more markedly during the 1960s. For exam-
ple, the Court decided Brandenburg v. Ohio' 28 at the height of the Vietnam
anti-war and civil rights movements.
Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan leader, invited news reporters to a poorly
attended Klan rally.' 29 There, he was captured on film giving a speech at a
cross burning.' 3 ° His speech was remarkably temperate for a Klansman. In
fact, it is hard to determine whether Brandenburg threatened illegal action at
all. He stated, for example, that "[w]e are marching on Congress July the
Fourth, four hundred thousand strong. From there we are dividing into two
groups, one group to march on St. Augustine, Florida, the other group to march
into Mississippi. Thank you.' 13 1 Brandenburg was subsequently convicted of
violating Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute which made it unlawful to advo-
cate the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, or violence as a means
119 Id. at 721.
120 Id. at 729.
121 Id.
122 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-9, at 841-45 (2d ed.
1988).
123 Id. at 845-49.
124 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
125 Smith Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 2385 (1994)).
126 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
127 See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) (defendant's conviction for violating the
membership clause of the Smith Act was reversed, on the ground that the evidence intro-
duced at trial was insufficient to show that the Communist Party engaged in actual advocacy
of governmental overthrow).
128 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
129 Id. at 445.




to accomplish political reform. In the Supreme Court, Brandenburg contended
that his conviction under that law violated the First Amendment.
The Court found that the statute was unconstitutional because it purported
to punish mere advocacy. 132 It read its earlier case law as establishing that the
First Amendment protected advocacy of the use of force unless that advocacy
was aimed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action when that advo-
cacy is likely to produce such action. 133 The Court had no occasion in Bran-
denburg to decide whether the defendant's conduct was protected by the First
Amendment. 134
In the more than thirty years since Brandenburg, the Court has shed little
additional light on the line drawing required by its decision. In Hess v. Indi-
ana,135 a sheriff and his deputies were clearing the streets of anti-war protesters
when Hess, one of the protesters, said, "[w]e'll take the fucking street later," or
"[w]e'll take the fucking street again."' 1 36 Two witnesses testified that Hess
was not urging the crowd to take the street back and that "his statement did not
appear to be addressed to any particular person or group, and that his tone,
although loud, was no louder than that of the other people in the area.'
' 3 7
In a per curiam opinion, the Court overturned Hess's conviction for disor-
derly conduct. To overturn his conviction, the Court conducted an independent
review of the record, not bound by the trial court's factual determination.
Apparently placing on the state the burden of demonstrating that Hess's speech
was not protected by the First Amendment, the Court found the evidence of
both an intent to incite and a call for immediate action insufficient.' 38 As
observed by the Court, the evidence of an intent to incite lawless action was at
most ambiguous.139 The evidence did not reveal whether Hess was making a
call for moderation or, at worst, a call for illegal action at some future time. 140




The only other case decided in reliance on the Brandenburg test was
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware.4 ' There, the African-American community
staged a boycott against white merchants in a small Mississippi town.143 White
merchants sued various defendants for the economic losses occasioned by the
132 Id. at 449.
13 Id. at 447.
134 The Court did not address that issue because it found that the statute was unconstitu-
tional on its face and did not reach the separate question whether Brandenberg's conduct was
protected by the First Amendment. That issue would arise only after Ohio passed a properly
narrowed statute and sought to convict Brandenburg for similar behavior. Then the Court
would have to address whether his conduct amounted to a direct incitement or to mere
abstract advocacy.
135 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
136 Id. at 106-07.
137 Id. at 107.
138 Id. at 108.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 109.
142 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
143 Id. at 889.
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boycott) 44 Most of the damages suffered were caused by lawful conduct, the
decision of those participating in the boycott not to patronize white owned
stores.145 However, the lower court found the NAACP and Charles Evers, its
local leader, liable for the full amount of harm caused by the boycott. 146 Their
liability was based on three speeches that Evers gave.
147
Members of the boycott formed an "enforcement" group and collected
names of African-Americans who violated the boycott. 148 The trial court found
that supporters of the boycott committed ten acts of violence against African-
Americans who patronized white owned businesses. 14 9 Some of those acts of
violence took place after speeches by Evers. 150 In those speeches, Evers made
statements that might have inspired members of the audience to use violence
against members of their community who were violating the boycott.
15
Because, according to the trial court, Evers was responsible for some African-
Americans being intimidated from patronizing white businesses, Evers was also
responsible for the harm suffered by the white plaintiffs. 15' Rather than finding
the NAACP and Evers liable only for the part of the damages that resulted from
his arguably illegal speeches, the trial court found the defendants liable for the
entire amount of the plaintiffs' losses, even though most of those damages were
the result of lawful conduct by members of the community.' 5 3
Again in a per curiam opinion, the Court reversed the judgment against the
NAACP and Evers. In finding that Evers' speech was protected by the First
Amendment, the Court discussed three possible theories by which Evers might
be found liable for the conduct of the enforcement group: if he authorized,
directed, or ratified specific tortious activity; if his speeches were likely to
incite his listeners to commit unlawful acts within a reasonable amount of time;
or if he gave specific instructions to carry out violent acts or threats. 154 The
Court rejected the lower court's finding that Evers did ignite the violent acts of
boycott supporters. It did make clear that, had Evers' strong language "been
followed by acts of violence, a substantial question would be presented whether
Evers could be held liable for the consequences of that unlawful conduct."'
' 55
Review of these three cases, Brandenburg v. Ohio, Hess v. Indiana, and
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, allows a few generalizations. Consistent with
the Holmes-Brandeis view, when the defendant has a First Amendment
defense, an appellate court has a greater than normal role in reviewing the facts
found in the trial court. 1 56 In effect, trial court findings are entitled to little or
no deference. In addition, while the Court seems to give greater substantive
144 Id.
145 Id. at 893.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 894-95.
149 Id. at 901-06.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 893.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 927.
155 Id. at 928.
156 See generally id.
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First Amendment protection to political dissent than did the Court in the "Red
Scare" cases, the extent of that protection is uncertain.
Here, the Marc Antony example demonstrates the uncertainty about the
substantive rule articulated in Brandenburg; uncertainty that remains after the
Court's decisions in Hess and Claiborne. How would that case be resolved
under Brandenburg?
Professor Gunther has argued that Brandenburg combines the best of the
Holmes-Brandeis approach and of Hand's approach in Masses Publishing.'5 7
Specifically, according to Professor Gunther, "[u]nder Brandenburg,
probability of harm is no longer the central criterion for speech limitations.
The inciting language of the speaker - the Hand focus on 'objective' words - is
the major consideration."' 15 8
If Professor Gunther is correct, Marc Antony could not be found guilty of
aiding and abetting murder or inciting violence against the co-conspirators. As
developed above, he carefully avoids any direct exhortation, any explicit call
for violence. For example, after the crowd calls for "Revenge! - About! -
Seek! - Bum! - Fire! - Kill! - Slay! Let not a traitor live!," Antony "appeals"
to the crowd, "let me not stir you up/To such a sudden flood of mutiny. ... '""
If Brandenburg, in fact, requires words of incitement as a necessary condition
for prosecution, Antony would have to be acquitted despite the fact that the
other requirements of the Court's test would otherwise be met. That is, the
harm is imminent - the crowd rushes away from Caesar's funeral and kills the
conspirators immediately, Antony's intent is not in doubt, and, although not
definitively resolved, if the Court requires that the harm threatened must be a
grave one, the killing of another obviously qualifies.
In neither Hess nor Claiborne did the Court indicate whether words of
incitement are necessary before a defendant may be prosecuted. Certainly, in
Claiborne, Evers used words of incitement - for example, he told one audience
that "any 'Uncle Toms' who broke the boycott would 'have their necks broken'
by their own people."' 60 Evers was not liable because the evidence was insuf-
ficient to show that his words caused the harm suffered by the white
merchants. 161
Hess's words might or might not have been words of incitement. 162 The
record did not support an inference of his intent - did he intend to call for
moderation or did he intend to urge some future criminal conduct - and it did
not support a finding that harm was imminent, again because, even if his words
were a call to action, the record did not indicate when the illegal conduct might
take place.163 The Court did not have independent evidence of Hess's intent
beyond his words.' 64 The additional evidence cited by the Court supported an
absence of an intent to bring about the feared harm. 1 6 5
157 Gunther, supra note 74, at 755.
158 Id.
15 Caesar, supra note 74, act 3, sc. 2, In. 199-200, 204-05.
'6o Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 900.
161 Id.
162 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973).
163 ld.
'64 id. at 109.
165 Id. at 107.
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Hence, since Brandenburg, the Court has not elaborated on whether words
of incitement are a necessary condition for conviction or if, absent words of
incitement, a defendant has a First Amendment defense as a matter of law. We
are left only with the Court's language in Brandenburg to try to divine whether
words of incitement are in fact a necessary condition for conviction.
The text is ambiguous. The Court stated that the First Amendment pro-
tects a speaker unless the speaker's advocacy is "directed to inciting or produc-
ing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." '66
Professor Gunther's position, that Brandenburg adopts Judge Hand's view, is
supported by its self-conscious use of the term "inciting," suggesting that words
of incitement are a necessary condition.1 67 No doubt, the Court was aware of
Judge Hand's use of that term. But, of course, the Court did not state explicitly
that a speaker has a First Amendment defense. Rather, it used an additional
term, advocacy directed to "producing" the imminent criminal conduct. Argua-
bly, unless the "producing" language was merely surplusage, the Court recog-
nized that language not explicitly inciting lawless conduct may nonetheless be
sufficiently dangerous that it should be criminalized.
Absent clear resolution in the Supreme Court case law, one ought to ask
whether the policies that support the First Amendment suggest that we ought to
protect speakers like Marc Antony. Most of the cases discussed above have
involved political dissent where the speaker has attacked governmental poli-
cies. While scholars have suggested that the First Amendment advances a
number of policies, most recognize that, at its core the First Amendment pro-
tects political speech necessary in a free society. Majoritarian sentiment
against dissenting voices is likely to be high, demanding prosecution for unpop-
ular ideas. In addition, even if majoritarian sentiment does not demand prose-
cution, those in power may want to silence dissent in order to cement their own
power. Certainly, cases like Brandenburg, Hess, and the Espionage Act and
Smith Act cases all demonstrate the legitimacy of those concerns. Allowing
the state to prosecute a political dissenter creates a chilling effect on the vigor-
ous debate necessary in a free society.
Supreme Court doctrine in a number of areas creates a zone in which a
speaker may advocate without fear of civil liability or criminal prosecution (or
confident that he or she has a defense if the speaker is prosecuted). A speaker
who criticizes a public official or public figure may not be found liable unless
the person claiming to be defamed can demonstrate that the speaker acted with
knowledge that the statements were false or made with reckless disregard of the
truth. 1 68 That burden is not easily met.
Brandenburg and Hess require that the state demonstrate that the speaker
had an intent to incite violence and that the unlawful conduct was imminent. ' 69
Unlike earlier precedent, the Court's current cases do not allow the legislature
to determine whether the harm is imminent; that must be demonstrated on a
166 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
167 Gunther, supra note 73, at 755.
168 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
169 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982); Hess, 414 U.S. at 109.
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case-by-case basis.' 7 ° The case law also demonstrates a commitment to full
judicial review in cases involving First Amendment defenses, apparently based
on a mistrust of jury determinations of fact since those determinations may be
motivated by the passions of the moment.17
Those are significant protections. For example, in Hess, the Court over-
turned a finding that Hess intended to incite the crowd because his statement to
the effect that the protesters would take the streets back later did not allow a
clear inference of his intent to bring about the feared harm.' 72
The Holmes-Brandeis approach has been criticized because the First
Amendment defense seemed to depend on events beyond the control of the
speaker and because it was so susceptible to the passions of the moment.'
7 3
For example, the clear and present danger test did little to protect the defend-
ants in Dennis v. United States,'7 4 a prosecution of Communists during the
height of the Cold War.'
75
I have argued elsewhere that many of the "Red Scare" cases, including
Dennis, would come out differently today, under Brandenburg and more recent
First Amendment cases. 176 Specifically, the intent requirement and the lack of
deference shown to findings in the trial court place a significant burden on the
prosecution. In addition, the modem cases force the prosecutor to show a
meaningful risk of actual harm following the defendant's speech.' 77 No longer
would a federal court sustain a conviction for aiding the Germans under a stat-
ute like the Espionage Act if a defendant merely encouraged resisting efforts to
ship arms to forces opposing the Bolsheviks. The prosecutor would have to
show that the defendants intended to frustrate the war effort against the
Germans. Knowledge that their conduct might have that effect is not enough
under Brandenburg's intent requirement. Similarly, a prosecutor could not rely
on a defendant's membership in an organization like the Ku Klux Klan or the
Communist Party to sustain a conviction; more would be necessary to show
that the defendant intended to support the illegal goals of the organization. 171
That is, earlier cases that seemed so ripe for criticism because they allowed
prosecution of political dissenters without more do not seem to have survived
Brandenburg.
One might argue, if Brandenburg did not adopt the additional requirement
of words of incitement, the objective approach urged by Judge Hand in Masses
Publishing, that the Court should do so. That argument would be grounded on
the need to provide the prospective speaker with certainty of the difference
between protected speech and criminal incitement.
170 This is shown by the Court's review of the trial record, with little deference given and a
high degree of emphasis placed on the facts. See generally Claiborne, 458 U.S. 886; Hess,
414 U.S. 105.
171 Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 915 n.50; Hess, 414 U.S. at 108.
172 Hess, 414 U.S. at 108.
173 Gunther, supra note 73, at 749-50.
174 341 U.S. 494 (defendant convicted for violation of Smith Act).
175 Id.
176 Vitiello, supra note 2.
'17 Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978).
178 See supra notes 38-55, 63-71 and accompanying text.
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A close examination of Marc Antony's speech helps show why that should
not be the case. Before examining Antony's First Amendment defense, one
ought to consider how his conduct would be judged but for the fact that he gave
his speech in a public place. As discussed above, when Lady MacBeth urges
MacBeth to murder the King or when lago deceives Othello into a murderous
rage, neither Lady MacBeth nor lago would have a First Amendment defense
despite the fact that their conduct is exclusively speech. Were Lady MacBeth
charged with murder, the prosecution would not have to prove any express
words of encouragement. It would be enough to show that whatever words
used (or any other aid) were intended to encourage the crime.' 7 9 In addition,
an appellate court would give no special deference to factual findings in the
lower court. Similarly, if Antony delivered his powerful encouragement behind
closed doors, it is inconceivable that a court would seriously consider a First
Amendment defense. Antony obviously encouraged the murder of the co-
conspirators.
Once he speaks in public, he seems to be entitled to First Amendment
protection. I find nothing in the case law which explains why that is so. I
suspect that it is so because those encouraging murder usually do not do so in a
public forum and because people speaking in public are more likely to be
engaging in political discourse than in a criminal conspiracy.
That seems implicit in cases like Brandenburg and Claiborne. Certainly
there is something sound in that position. While some sane people are willing
to admit openly their intent to commit crimes, most people speaking in a public
forum would not do so, suggesting that in fact, even harsh rhetoric is intended
as political dissent.
While scholars have differed about the theory underlying the First Amend-
ment, cases involving political dissent are the ones in which First Amendment
protection is most important.' 8 ° Government officials are most likely to have
an interest in suppressing speech in such cases. 8 ' Whether one believes that
the First Amendment is intended to assure our ability to engage in self govern-
ment, or that its protection is based on distrust of governmental determinations
of truth, cases where criticism of government is involved pose the greatest chal-
lenge for the courts.' 8 2
Despite his feigned praise of Brutus and the other co-conspirators,
Antony's speech certainly could be construed as criticism of the government
(now that the co-conspirators have usurped power). Antony's false praise
shares some of the characteristics of satire, a common form of political com-
mentary in tyrannical regimes.1
83
179 DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 30.04, at 436-38.
180 See Vitiello, supra note 2, at notes 342-47 and accompanying text, at 1221; see also
FREDERICK SHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 34 (1982).
181 See Vitello, supra note 2, at notes 342-47 and accompanying text, at 1221.
182 Id.
183 See DUSTIN GRIFFIN, SATIRE, A CRITICAL REINTRODUCTION 138 (1994) (rebutting the
contention that satire requires freedom of speech as an essential condition and observing that




But does the fact that Antony speaks in public and may be engaged in
political discourse create a risk sufficient to require an additional protection, to
find his conduct criminal only if he uses words of incitement? And here, I
assume that Judge Hand would have required a defendant like Antony to use
words like, "yes, be stirred to mutiny."
I think the additional requirement of words of incitement would be unfor-
tunate and unnecessary. Any marginal gains in First Amendment protection
would be outweighed by the grave social danger. Under this reading of Bran-
denburg and its progeny, that Antony did not use words of incitement would
provide him with a defense, if that is the only evidence of his intent to incite the
crowd to murder the conspirators. He consistently protests, urging the crowd to
desist from mutiny when members of the audience begin to demand revenge.
Like Hess's "[w]e'll take the fucking streets later,"' 84 Antony's intent should
not be inferred from words that allow competing rational inferences. If Antony
were convicted, an appellate court, acting in accord with Hess would exercise
independent review of the record, and would have to find unambiguous evi-
dence of intent.
Antony is unlike the defendant in Hess. Both before and after his funeral
oration, Antony makes his intent clear. Hence, neither the fact finder nor an
appellate court would have to guess whether Antony meant to incite the crowd.
In light of unambiguous admissions of his intent, the risk of criminalizing a
person advocating some abstract and future harm is non-existent. The require-
ment of a clear showing of intent goes a long way to protect against criminaliz-
ing political dissenters while protecting society against dangerous offenders.
IV. CONCLUSION
Thinking about the First Amendment in the context of Shakespearean
characters may suggest that the issues discussed in this essay are not serious,
contemporary problems. But as I have argued elsewhere, the Internet has
opened new avenues of speech, allowing dangerous speakers to share informa-
tion and to encourage social misfits to commit serious crimes. 8 5 lago, Lady
MacBeth, and Marc Antony have a great deal to teach us about speech and
crime.
Speech is powerful and may be dangerous. The criminal law has long
recognized that fact and, in numerous settings, criminalizes offenders whose
speech may consist of nothing but words.' 86 lago and Lady MacBeth more
than amply demonstrate the need to criminalize those whose conduct may con-
sist entirely of speech.
Obviously, speakers whose words may involve political dissent must have
strong First Amendment protection. However, I question whether the Supreme
Court has required, or should require, explicit words of incitement. As argued
above, leaving a speaker like Marc Antony free to manipulate others to commit
serious crimes, simply through the expedience of choosing his words carefully
184 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 106-07 (1973).
'85 Vitiello, supra note 2.
186 See supra note 4.
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is shortsighted and unnecessary.' 87 Forcing the prosecutor to make a clear
showing of the speaker's intent would give political dissenters protection while
allowing society to protect itself against dangerous offenders.
187 See supra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
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INDIANAPOLIS V. EDMOND: ROADBLOCK
TO FOURTH AMENDMENT EROSION OF
INDIVIDUAL SECURITY
Samuel Bateman*
The text of the Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.,
Generally, under the guidance of the Fourth Amendment, every search or
seizure by a government agent must be reasonable. The Supreme Court inter-
preted this requirement to mean that an arrest or search must be based on prob-
able cause and executed pursuant to a warrant.' Courts have created a number
of exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth
Amendment, such as investigatory detentions, seizures of items in plain view,
warrantless arrests, inventory searches, administrative searches, border patrol
searches, vehicle searches, and special needs searches.3
However, in balancing these exceptions, the Court has traditionally
required some level of individualized suspicion to justify government intrusion
on an individual's privacy. 4 In the absence of individualized suspicion or prob-
able cause of wrongdoing, a search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable.5 One
area in which courts have upheld suspicionless searches is that of the roving
police checkpoint.6 In the context of such roadblocks, the Court has tradition-
* William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, J.D., May 2002.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10, 14 (1948).
3 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1968) (held that a police officer may stop an indi-
vidual reasonably suspected of criminal activity); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971) (plain view justified the seizure of an object); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364 (1976) (held that inventory searches following the lawful seizures of automobiles were
constitutional); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984) (warrantless entry justified to
preserve evidence from destruction); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-62
(1976) (warrantless stop of vehicle at fixed checkpoint to question occupants about citizen-
ship is constitutional); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (held that warrantless
search of vehicle valid because police had probable cause); Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (special needs of government can justify searches without war-
rant or probable cause).
4 See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882
(1975) (holding that a roving police unit could not stop a motorist without individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing).
5 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
6 See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543; Mich. Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444
(1990).
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ally used the Brown v. Texas balancing test.7 Michigan Dept. of State Police v.
Sitz, a roadblock case in which the Brown test was utilized, is a recent example
of the Court favoring the government's interests over the interests of the indi-
vidual.8 The Court used the Brown test to uphold sobriety checkpoints in Sitz
and border patrol checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte, where the government's
interests in protecting the United States border trumped the privacy rights of the
individual.9 A recent case, Indianapolis v. Edmond, has finally eliminated
questions as to the constitutionality of drug interdiction roadblocks. 1"
Prior to Edmond, state and federal courts were divided." Many courts
used the holding in Sitz to justify other types of checkpoint stops lacking rea-
sonable, individualized suspicion.1 2 In fact, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
in recent years has significantly reduced the public's Fourth Amendment rights
in a number of search and seizure areas.' 3 In the area of drug interdiction
roadblocks, however, the Court finally attempted to leave behind the old, all-
inclusive reasonableness test for a different, more appropriate test. Under the
new test, a preliminary inquiry into the program's purpose must be made before
the court will apply an all-out balancing based on the Brown three-part test.
14
The aforementioned test is nearly analogous to the standard special needs anal-
ysis, in which it is appropriate to decide first whether there is a "special need
beyond law enforcement" before engaging in the three-part balancing test.
1 5
The Court in Edmond recognized a need for guidance and standardization of
the law pertaining not only to roadblock cases but Fourth Amendment cases in
general.
' See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (the Brown test weighs the state interests, the
degree to which the program furthers that interest, and the intrusion on the individual privacy
interests).
8 See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450.
9 See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543.
l0 Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (held that because the checkpoint program's
primary purpose was standard law enforcement and criminal activity detection, the check-
points violated the Fourth Amendment).
" Compare State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 567 (Mo. 1996) and Merrett v. Moore, 58
F.3d 1547, 1548 (11 th Cir. 1995) (both upholding the constitutionality of a drug interdiction
roadblock), with United States v. Morales-Zamora, 974 F.2d 149, 153 (10th Cir. 1992), and
United States v. Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547, 549 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that a drug interdic-
tion roadblock violates the Fourth Amendment).
12 See, e.g, Romo v. Champion, 46 F.3d 1013, 1020 (10th Cir. 1995) (individual suspicion
not required to stop car at roadblock on public thoroughfare); United States v. O'Mara, 963
F.2d 1288, 1291 (9th Cir. 1992) (individual suspicion not required because police utilized
highway roadblock to stop all cars leaving national park); United States v. McFayden, 865
F.2d 1306, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (individualized suspicion not required because conducted
for principle purpose of traffic enforcement).
" See Chris K. Visser, Comment: Without A Warrant, Probable Cause, Or Reasonable
Suspicion: Is There Any Meaning to the Fourth Amendment While Driving a Car? 35 Hous.
L. REV. 1683 (1999); See generally, Douglas K. Yatter, David E. DePianto, Marisa L.
Megur & Karin Schemer-Kim, Twenty-Ninth Annual Review Of Criminal Procedure: Intro-
duction and Guide for Users: L Investigation and Police Practices: Warrantless Searches
and Seizures, 88 GEO. L.J. 912 (2000).
1" See Edmond, 531 U.S. 32.
15 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313-14 (1997).
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Section I addresses the facts and circumstances of the law leading up to
Indianapolis v. Edmond. Section II explains the facts of Edmond and the hold-
ing of the Court. Lastly, Section III explains why the holding by Justice
O'Connor was correct and just in time to stop or at least slow a continuing
erosion of Fourth Amendment rights.
I. BACKGROUND
Probable cause has long been the standard for upholding searches and
seizures without warrants. Although the Court, in some situations, has allowed
certain searches or seizures to occur without individualized suspicion, it has
consistently found that in those cases the primary purpose of the search and
seizure was not one of standard criminal investigation. 6 This line between
criminal and non-criminal stops is critical. Since 1967, the Supreme Court has
recognized limited exceptions based on this distinction. 17 These exceptions are
as follows:
A. Administrative and Regulatory Searches
Camara v. Municipal Court involved administrative inspections to enforce
building codes.' 8 Courts have upheld such inspections based on administrative
warrants not supported by individualized probable cause. '" The Court specifi-
cally found this type of search to be non-criminal in nature: "[t]he primary
governmental interest at stake is to prevent even the unintentional development
of conditions which are hazardous to public health and safety." 20
While administrative search warrants are generally required for fire,
health, or safety inspections of residential or private commercial property,2 '
regulatory schemes and exigent circumstances may be used to do away with the
warrant requirement.22 Often, specific evidence of an existing regulatory viola-
tion or a reasonable regulatory scheme will justify issuance of an administrative
warrant;23 however, the scope of the search must be reasonable in light of the
16 See infra text accompanying notes 18-71.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 18-71.
18 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)
19 See id. at 531-32.
20 Id. (can uphold administrative searches where the search may turn up evidence of a crim-
inal violation).
21 See, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 291-95 (1984) (warrant required for an
administrative search of dwelling to investigate the cause of fire because owners had an
expectation of privacy in partially destroyed home); Irving v. United States, 162 F.3d 154
(lst Cir. 1998) (warrant required for an administrative search of a business for occupational
safety hazards); Platteville Area Apartment Ass'n v. City of Platteville, 179 F.3d 574, 577-
80 (7th Cir. 1999) (warrant required for an administrative search to check for housing code
violations). But see Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (warrant not required to re-enter
partially destroyed commercial property because the search was a continuation of the origi-
nal authorized search which was stopped due to hazardous conditions).
22 See Tyler, 436 U.S. 499; Clifford, 464 U.S. 287.
23 See, e.g., See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (warrant needed prior to health and
safety inspections of dwellings and commercial premises); Camara, 387 U.S. 523 (same).
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circumstances.24 In Michigan v. Tyler, firefighters entered a building in an
attempt to fight a fire without first obtaining a warrant.25 Ultimately, the exi-
gency associated with fighting fires and the need to stay after the fire is con-
tained sufficed to dispense with the usual warrant requirement.2 6 Notably, the
Court stated that to stay after the fire was contained and investigate if the cause
of the fire was arson would require a warrant.2 The Court in Clifford reiter-
ated the distinction between searching the premises of a fire for the cause ver-
sus having a criminal cause in mind such as arson.2 8 The relevant difference,
according to the Court in Clifford, is that one is a regulatory search - where an
administrative warrant may not be necessary - and the other is a criminal
investigatory search, requiring a warrant.
Administrative searches mark the first clear delineation of a difference
between types of searches and the requirement of a warrant. The Court allows
these types of warrantless searches on the presumption that the purpose of the
search is other than criminal investigation.
B. Inventory Searches
Courts have generally found inventory searches to be constitutionally
valid as long as they are not motivated by a criminal investigatory purpose. 9
Inventory searches are allowed to protect police against claims of misconduct,
to give a general blanket of protection to police from potential dangers, and to
protect the property while it is in the custody of the police.3"
In South Carolina v. Opperman, the Court held that an inventory search
following the constitutional search and seizure of an automobile was constitu-
tional regardless of whether the search was performed absent individualized
suspicion.3" The Court commented on the lack of a necessity for probable
cause, since the "probable-cause approach is unhelpful when analysis centers
upon the reasonableness of routine administrative caretaking functions. 3 2 The
Court found the search reasonable because the search was conducted pursuant
to standard police procedures, which related to an inventory search, not a crimi-
24 See, e.g., Tyler, 436 U.S. 499; Clifford, 464 U.S. 287. But see, e.g., Trinity Indus. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 16 F.3d 1455 (6th Cir. 1994) (an OSHA
inspection was not justified merely by an employee complaint that alleged limited
violations).
25 See Tyler, 436 U.S. at 512.
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 See Clifford, 464 U.S. at 294
29 See infra text accompanying notes 29-35.
30 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); United States v. Lage, 183
F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1999) (an inventory search of a vehicle is valid to protect against danger
and false claims for lost property); United States v. Lewis, 3 F.3d 252, 254 (8th Cir. 1993)
(an inventory search of an engine compartment deemed valid because defendant had cocaine
in his pocket when arrested); United States v. Kornegay, 885 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1989) (an
inventory search valid because police required to secure vehicle's contents).
31 See Opperman, 428 U.S. 364.
32 Id. at 370 n.5.
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nal search. 33 Ultimately, the search must be conducted in good faith and only
if it can be justified by a legitimate inventory purpose.34
The distinction between criminal versus investigatory inventory searches
was reinforced in Colorado v. Bertine, where police regulations allowed for but
did not require the police to search the arrestee's backpack.35 One might think
this distinction could give police a license to rummage through one's property
in an attempt to find incriminating evidence; however, the Court now requires
that all inventory searches be undertaken according to either permissible or
required standardized criteria.3 6
Therefore, the purpose behind the inventory search must be investigatory
in nature, not criminal, and must have a component of standardized care and
procedure. Without these components, the inventory search becomes nothing
more than a judicially rubber-stamped criminal investigation, 'Violating the
Fourth Amendment.
C. Automobile Searches
Generally, the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment does not
apply to searches of automobiles so long as the probable cause requirement is
satisfied.37 The automobile exception eliminates the need for a warrant based
on the impracticability of obtaining one, often due to exigent circumstances
surrounding the use of an automobile and the reduced privacy involved in the
regulation of automobiles.3 8
The Court has deemed vehicle searches constitutional in some cases even
when exigent circumstances have lapsed, as long as they existed at the time of
31 See id at 370.
31 See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 986 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1993) (an inventory search
deemed invalid since officers indicated the purpose of search was to find evidence of crimi-
nal activity); United States v. Blaze, 143 F.3d 585 (10th Cir. 1998) (same). But see, e.g.,
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (inventory search deemed valid because government did
not act in bad faith or for the purpose of investigation). See also United States v. Castro, 166
F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 1999) (inventory search by officer deemed valid when standard proce-
dures were followed).
35 See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 376 (police discretion should be "exercised according to standard
criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of criminal activity").
36 See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1,5 (1990); United States v. Lumpkin, 159 F.3d 983, 987
(6th Cir. 1998) (inventory search did not violate Fourth Amendment because it was con-
ducted pursuant to standard operating procedure); United States v. Patterson, 150 F.3d 382
(8th Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 1998) (same). But see,
e.g., Marshall, 986 F.2d at 1175 (inventory search deemed invalid because no standardized
procedure existed).
31 See, e.g., Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (1999) (probable cause only requirement for
search); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (warrantless search of a vehicle valid
because probable cause based on description of car involved in a robbery); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (warrantless search of vehicle valid because officers had proba-
ble cause to believe there was contraband or other evidence of criminal activity in the vehi-
cle). But see, e.g., United States v. Best, 135 F.3d 1223 (8th Cir. 1998) (warrantless search
of vehicle invalid because no probable cause existed to substantiate search of a vehicle's
door panels for drugs).
38 See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (probable cause enough for search
since expectation of privacy is lower in vehicle); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986)
(same).
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the initial stop.39 Further, with regards to automobile mobility creating exigent
circumstances, courts will not use their hindsight to invalidate a search just
because exigent circumstances, in actuality, did not exist at the time of the
stop.
40
In sum, a warrant is needed in vehicle search cases unless obtaining a
warrant is impracticable. Since such impracticality usually exists, as long as
individual suspicion and probable cause are present, in combination with exi-
gent circumstances, a warrant is not required. However, in Edmond, there was
no probable cause. The lack of probable cause in Edmond takes it out of the
"automobile exception," necessitating a warrant.
D. Special Needs Searches
Special needs cases follow in the same vein as the previous search types,
in that a clear line has been drawn between criminal investigatory searches and
seizures, requiring probable cause, and non-criminal searches and seizures, not
requiring probable cause. In a growing number of situations, the Court has
allowed the state to avoid the normal warrant and probable cause requirements
of the Fourth Amendment when a "special need.., beyond the normal need for
law enforcement" exists that would be jeopardized if the normal individualized
suspicion requirement were held applicable. 4 Additionally, if the government
interest addresses a vital problem that can be handled effectively through the
proposed search, the requirements of probable cause or a warrant may be dis-
missed.4 2 Finally, the government's interest is balanced against the individ-
ual's privacy interests on a case-by-case basis, which is heavily fact-specific.4 3
There exists some debate over the methodology used in the "special
needs" arena. While the Court has traditionally begun the balancing test by
first deciding whether the search was reasonable and applying the balancing
" See, e.g., Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 (1982) (drugs discovered during an inven-
tory search of the glove compartment justified a more extensive warrantless search at later
date); United States v. Kimberlin, 805 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986) (same).
40 See Thomas, 458 U.S. at 261; United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 484 (1985); (warrant-
less search of automobile valid because probable cause existed even though automobile was
impounded); United States v. Ludwig, 10 F.3d 1523, 1528 (10th Cir. 1993) (warrantless
search of automobile valid because probable cause existed even if defendant was not likely
to flee).
4" Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) (The Court
noted that "our cases establish that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special
governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance
the individual's privacy expectations against the government's interests to determine
whether it is impractical to require a warrant .....
42 See id.
43 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649-50 (1995) (special needs of
the public school system in discouraging drug use by school children justifies suspicionless
drug testing of students participating in athletics); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)
(special needs of state in operating probation system justify warrantless searches of proba-
tioners' homes in accordance with terms of probation). But see, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520
U.S. 305 (1997) (special needs of state insufficient to allow suspicionless drug testing of
candidates for public office; however, the Court found it was required to "undertake a con-
text-specific inquiry" to determine whether special needs search is justified).
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test, the Edmond Court' ruled that the appropriate approach is to first look to
the purpose of the search or program.45 If the court found the purpose of the
search appropriate, then, and only then, would the court balance the interests of
the parties involved.46
The Court has found special needs searches permissible when there is drug
testing in the employment context based on public safety concerns;4 7 in the
public school arena, where the students' privacy interests are diminished in
favor of order and discipline; 48 in situations where individuals are under gov-
ernment control or supervision, eliminating the need for probable cause;49 and
in the area of public employment where the government's interest in an effi-
cient workplace is great.5 °
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, the Court allowed suspi-
cionless drug tests when "special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impractica-
ble."'', To do this, the Court used a test similar to the Brown test, which bal-
anced the interests of the government against the privacy interests of the
individual in connection with the nature of the overall intrusion.52 However,
the drug tests could only be upheld if the government interest or "special need"
was "beyond the normal need for law enforcement." The term "beyond law
enforcement," suggests that the need at issue is not law enforcement at all;
rather, an administrative, inventory, or other similar need.53
E. Immigration Checkpoints
While certain government officials are statutorily obligated to conduct
border searches and immigration checkpoints, the Fourth Amendment does not
require a warrant to protect the United States from illegal immigration and ille-
I See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
15 See Recent Cases, Constitutional Law - Fourth Amendment - Seventh Circuit Holds That
Drug Interdiction Roadblocks Violate the Fourth Amendment - Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183
F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1999), 113 HARV. L. REV. 828 (2000); See also Robert D. Dodson, Ten
Years of Randomized Jurisprudence: Amending the Special Needs Doctrine, 51 S.C. L.
REV. 258 (2000).
46 See Dodson, supra note 45.
17 See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (warrantless and
suspicionless drug testing of railroad employees permitted so long as it is conducted pursu-
ant to government regulations); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989) (warrantless and suspicionless drug testing of Customs Service employees permitted
when applying for a promotion). But see Chandler, 520 U.S. 305 (statute requiring candi-
dates for public office to pass drug test before being eligible to run for election deemed
invalid).
48 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646 (public school officials are permitted to exercise "a degree of
supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults"); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985) (warrantless search of student's purse by school authorities valid).
41 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (warrantless search of probationer's home
valid if conducted pursuant to state regulation); Portillo v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Ariz.,
15 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 1994) (probationers and parolees have a diminished expectation of
privacy).
10 See Skinner, 489 U.S. 602.
5' See id.
52 See id. at 617-22
13 See generally Dodson supra note 45.
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gal importation and exportation.54 What can be searched without a warrant,
probable cause or suspicion are persons, luggage, personal effects, and vehi-
cles. 5 Immigration checkpoint stops are often routine and follow a certain
regulatory scheme.56 However, if the stop is not routine in nature, probable
cause or individualized suspicion is again necessary.5 7 The court should con-
sider the intrusive nature of the stop and the surrounding circumstances when
deciding whether probable cause is needed.5 8
Interestingly, as in Martinez-Fuerte where the immigration checkpoint
was operated some distance away from the border itself, the so-called "border
search" exception can be construed to apply to an area that is the practical or
"functional equivalent."5 9 Government officials must look to a variety of crite-
ria to determine what constitutes the "functional equivalent" of the border and
when such a search can be conducted.6 °
In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court balanced the individual's privacy interests
against the government's interests in conducting the search.6 t In the end, the
Court allowed the roadblock, even without individualized suspicion, based on
the government's interest in protecting its borders.62 After Martinez-Fuerte,
immigration and border checkpoints could be operated for brief primary and
secondary questioning without probable cause or individualized suspicion, but
any detention beyond that point must be supported by probable cause.6 3
4 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c) (1999) (immigration officials may conduct warrantless rou-
tine searches); 19 U.S.C. § 1496 (1994) (customs officials may inspect the luggage of per-
sons arriving in United States). See also United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S.
531 (1985) (executive branch has authority to conduct warrantless routine searches).
15 See, e.g., Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531; United States v. Charleus, 871 F.2d 265
(2d Cir. 1989) (probable cause not required for customs officials to conduct routine searches
of personal effects); United States v. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1991) (no probable
cause required for search of luggage at border); United States v. Machuca-Barrera, Jr., 261
F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2001).
56 See United States v. Martinez Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
17 See Charleus, 871 F.2d 265 (probable cause required for nonroutine border search); Saf-
fell v. Crews, 183 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 1999) (same).
58 See United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364, 367 (5th Cir. 1998).
19 See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (border search exception
applies to search at functional equivalent of border); Rivas, 157 F.3d at 367 (same).
60 See Yatter, DePianto, Megur & Schemer-Kim, supra note 13
To determine whether a search occurs at the functional equivalent of a border: 1) a reasonable
certainty that the person or thing crossed the border, 2) a reasonable certainty that there was no
change in the object of the search since it crossed the border, and 3) that the search was con-
ducted as soon as practicable after the border crossing .... The search may be conducted if 1)
the officials have "reasonable certainty" or a "high degree of probability" that a border was
crossed; 2) they also have "reasonable certainty" that no change in the object of the search has
occurred between the time of the border crossing and the search; and 3) they have "reasonable
suspicion" that criminal activity was occurring.
See id. at 971.
61 See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562.
62 See id.
63 See id. at 556-63 (warrantless stop of a vehicle at a checkpoint to question occupants
valid and the vehicle may be referred to secondary inspection even without probable cause as
long as no pretext); see also Norwood v. Bain, 166 F.3d 243, 251 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999) (further
questioning requires probable cause).
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The Court distinguished regulatory searches from criminal searches, in
that criminal prosecution is not the principal or ultimate goal of the regulatory
search. Even though those who violate border controls were subject to arrest
and prosecution, the primary purpose of the checkpoint was to decrease illegal
immigration and increase the deportation of such individuals. In fact, Marti-
nez-Fuerte focused on the purpose behind the roadblock and plainly called it
"legitimate and in the public interest."64
Even before Martinez-Fuerte, the Court noted that immigration check-
points were "undertaken primarily for administrative rather than prosecutorial
purposes."65 The Court stressed the difference between searches designed to
gain evidence of criminal wrongdoing and the United States' authority to con-
duct a search was based "on its inherent sovereign authority to protect its terri-
torial integrity." 6 6 A court, having before it an immigration related search,
should balance interests only after the true purpose of the program is ascer-
tained and adjudged not to be investigatory in nature.
F. Traffic Safety Checkpoints and Drunk Driving Roadblocks
The Supreme Court has implied that states could stop vehicles absent indi-
vidualized suspicion in a programmatic manner, if designed for the non-investi-
gatory purpose of insuring traffic safety based on driver compliance with
licensing, registration, and inspection requirements.67 However, the plan or
program must be neutral when dealing with privacy concerns and individual
officer discretion.6 8 The Brown balancing test was constructed for just these
situations, 69 because again, generally speaking, some degree of cause is neces-
sary for a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to take place.7 °
The court deemed the brief sobriety checkpoint as operated in Sitz v.
Michigan Department of Police constitutional, based on the State's interest "in
64 See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562.
65 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 278 (1973).
66 Id.
67 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (All these requirements "are essential
elements in a highway safety program.").
68 See id. Holding that:
[E]xcept in those situations in which there is at least articuable and reasonable suspicion that a
motorists is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an
occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detain-
ing the driver in order to check his driver's license and registration of the automobile are unrea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment. This holding does not preclude the State of Delaware or
other States from developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not
involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion.
Id.
69 See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979) ("Consideration of the constitutionality
of such seizures involves a weighting of the gravity of the public concerns served by the
seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interests, and the severity and
interference with individual liberty.").
70 See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (arrest and confession were found
unconstitutional because the defendant had been arrested without probable cause); Penn-
sylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (lawful pat down based on reasonable suspicion);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (Court reversed a conviction because
the defendant was wrongfully stopped).
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preventing drunken driving."' Like Sitz, the Court has found license and
registration stops constitutional, which are primarily instituted for public safety,
not for criminal investigation.72 It is important to note that even though the
Brown balancing test was used in this case, the Court implicitly applied a pri-
mary purpose inquiry as well.7 3
In the end, the Court has not instituted a sobriety or traffic safety "check-
point exception" to the warrant requirement. Instead, the Court has first looked
for probable cause and individualized suspicion. Then in their absence, the
Court focused on the purpose of the program, and only after that balanced the
various interests involved. In fact, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
searches conducted without probable cause have been upheld only "in certain
limited circumstances."74
Importantly, the "vehicle" or "automobile" exception only dispenses with
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment in cases where probable
cause exists. 75 A driver maintains his or her privacy interests unless he or she
encounters a sobriety or traffic safety checkpoint where the purpose is not
investigative in nature and where the seizure is "carried out pursuant to a plan
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of officers."7 6
In conclusion, before a balancing test can be applied - before the Court
can look at the government's interest, the effectiveness of the program, or the
interests of the motorist, be they diminished or fully intact - the Court must ask
if it is appropriate to use the balancing test based on the nature or purpose of
the investigation.
II. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS V. EDMOND
While the Supreme Court has intimated that certain roadblocks initiated to
check for licenses and registration or general traffic safety could be considered
constitutionally valid, provided they adhere to some basic principles (such as
non-discretionary action by government officers),77 the Court has implicitly
stated that these roadblocks cannot exist for the purpose of standard crime con-
trol.78 In 1998, the City of Indianapolis had a different idea. They began to
operate random roadblocks or checkpoints in an effort to halt the influx of
illegal drugs.7 9 Approximately thirty officers were stationed at the check-
points, which were located throughout the city, and operated at six different
times.8° Approximately 1,161 cars were stopped and asked to render their
licenses and registration. 8' The drivers were told the nature of the stop, while a
71 Sitz v. Mich. Dep't of Police, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
72 See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.
73 See id.
74 See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455.
15 See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (1999); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
76 See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
77 See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
78 See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.





drug-sniffing dog was walked around the automobile.82 The officer looked for
signs of impairment and conducted a "plain view" inquiry of the contents of the
vehicle.83 If the dog detected narcotics in the car, the police would then search
the vehicle.8" The dog provided the officers with the requisite probable cause
needed to search the car.
The checkpoints were operated with little discretion on the part of the
police officers.86 Officers were to stop a particular number of drivers through a
pre-determined sequence. 87 Also, the locations of the stops were determined
based on crime statistics and traffic flow, and ultimately, the stops were to be
kept to five minutes or less.
88
The program resulted in fifty-five drug-related arrests and forty-nine
arrests for unrelated offenses.8 9 The hit rate for drug-related arrests was five
percent and the total hit rate, including the remainder of the arrests, resulted in
a total of nine percent.9"
After James Edmond and Joell Palmer were stopped at one of these road-
blocks, they filed a lawsuit on behalf of themselves and all other motorists
similarly stopped. The lawsuit had the support of the Indiana Civil Liberties
Union and challenged the searches on Fourth Amendment grounds. 9 '
The United States District Court ruled that the roadblock program was
constitutional and that the City of Indianapolis did not have to discontinue the
program.9 2 In a 2-1 vote, a divided Seventh Circuit Appeals Court panel
reversed the decision on grounds that the purpose of the roadblock was criminal
in nature, violating motorists' Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unrea-
sonable search and seizure.93
Judge Posner wrote, "Indianapolis does not claim to be concerned with
protecting highway safety against drivers high on drugs .... Its program of
drug roadblocks belongs to the genre of general programs of surveillance which
invade privacy wholesale in order to discover evidence of crime." 9 While the
majority was "not enthusiastic about the use of the Constitution to squelch
experiments in dealing with serious social problems," Posner wrote that,
"[w]hen urgent considerations of the public safety require compromise with the
normal principles constraining law enforcement, the normal principles may
have to bend.., the Constitution is not a suicide pact. But no such urgency has











91 See Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1999).
92 See id.
9' See id.
94 See id. at 664.
95 See id. at 663, 666.
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Judge Posner explicitly stated what the Supreme Court had been implicitly
stating for some time: the purpose of the program or search must be realized
and passed on before any balancing can be done.9 6 He went further to identify
four situations in which the purpose of the search was constitutional.97 First, a
roadblock may be instituted to catch a fleeing criminal, since these stops would
necessarily have to be made absent individualized suspicion. 9 8 The stops
would not include an attempt to infiltrate criminal activity on the part of motor-
ists; rather, its only purpose would be to identify the fleeing criminal.99 A
second constitutional roadblock would be one designed around an urgent con-
sideration of public safety. The example used by Judge Posner would be a tip
to police that a car carrying a substantial amount of dynamite was entering the
city with sinister motives."0o Thirdly, an administrative search, not centered on
detection of criminal activity, could be constitutional.' ° ' Lastly, the overall
prevention of illegal importation of either people or goods, the purpose of
which would not be for criminal prosecution, would be constitutional.'0 2 The
Indianapolis checkpoint, as the majority found, failed to fall into any of these
categories.
In Judge Easterbrook's dissent, he focused on the effects of the roadblock
rather than the purpose, stating, "[o]ver and over, the Supreme Court says that
the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is objective; it
depends on what the police do, not on what they want or think."1 3 Judge
Easterbrook conceded the law in this area is at best inconsistent, but insisted
that the only check on such roadblocks is the political process and the ability to
"throw the bums out" if they become too tyrannical."°
On November 28, 2000, the Supreme Court decided this case in favor of
the respondents.'0 5 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor agreed that the
Court has never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was
detection of standard criminal activity.'0 6 The majority's decision rests prima-
rily on two points: 1) an interpretation of the primary purpose of the road-
blocks as investigatory in nature; and 2) the urgent nature of addressing issues
directly related to traffic safety and border control such as curbing drunken
driving, checking for licenses and registration, and indicting illegal aliens and
goods within purview of the border.'0 7
The petitioners suggested that since, in the cases of sobriety stops and
border stops, individuals could be, and were subject to criminal charges and
prosecution, that those cases primarily involved curbing criminal wrongdoing
96 See id.
97 See id. at 665.
98 See id. at 666.
" See id.; see, e.g., United States v. Davis, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (E.D. Ala. 2001).
zoo See Edmond, 183 F.3d at 663.
'o" See id. at 666.
102 See id.
103 Id. at 667.
104 See id. at 668, 671 ("If this [Indianapolis' roadblock scheme] strikes the wrong balance,
the people may throw out of office those who adopted it.").
105 See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).




and were indistinguishable from Edmond's checkpoint scheme." °8 However,
the majority dismissed this argument, stating:
If we were to rest this case at this high level of generality, there would be little check
on the ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks for almost any conceivable
law enforcement purpose. Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily
to serve the general interest in crime control, the Fourth Amendment would do little
to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of American life. 10 9
Next, Justice O'Connor used roadway safety concerns to distinguished the
roadblocks both in the present case along with the former border patrol cases,
from the sobriety checkpoint and license and registration checkpoints in Sitz
and Prouse." She stated that the connection in Martinez-Fuerte, "is very
different from the close connection to roadway safety that was present in Sitz
and Prouse.""' She also distinguished the border patrol case of Martinez-
Fuerte stating that "[wihile the difficulty of examining each passing car was an
important factor in validating the law enforcement technique employed in Mar-
tinez-Fuerte, this factor alone cannot justify a regime of suspicionless searches
or seizures." '112
The majority did not let the problem of illegal drugs affect its decision nor
would it analogize the case to the immediate traffic safety problems existing in
Sitz, or the difficulties presented in Martinez-Fuerte.'1 3 Additionally, petition-
ers' argument that including a secondary constitutional purpose to the search,
such as checking for license and registration, would thus convert the illegal
search to a constitutional one was soundly rejected by the Court on the grounds
that "law enforcement authorities would be able to establish checkpoints for
virtually any purpose so long as they also included a license or sobriety
check." 1
14
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent suggested that checkpoint programs can
be instituted "if they are 'carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit,
neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.'1 5 He also believed
that the majority took a new and unprecedented approach to dealing with road-
block and checkpoint problems, by looking first at the primary purpose of the
program before balancing the reasonableness of the program. 116
However, the majority's approach is not unprecedented, and instead puts
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence back on track, lending some badly needed
substance to search and seizure protections.
10 See id. at 42.
109 Id.
l"O See id. at 42-43.
"I Id. at 43.
112 Id.
113 See id. at 42. Stating that:
Petitioners also emphasize the severe and intractable nature of the drug problem as justification
for the checkpoint program. There is no doubt that traffic in illegal narcotics creates social
harms of the first magnitude. The law enforcement problems that the drug trade creates likewise
remain daunting and complex, particularly in light of the myriad forms of spin-off crime that it
spawns.
Id. (citations omitted).
114 Id. at 46.




It is well established that "[a]n unconstitutional seizure may render an oth-
erwise constitutional search invalid under the Fourth Amendment if the search
resulted from the illegal seizure or detention."' "17 It is also "well established
that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment."' 1 8 If a government official performs a
warrantless search or seizure without probable cause and it does not fall within
one of the specified exceptions, the court will likely find the search or seizure
invalid. While "[t]he subjective intent of the law enforcement officer is irrele-
vant in determining whether that officer's actions violate the Fourth Amend-
ment,"" 9 this principle only applies to individual police conduct based on
legitimate probable cause. It does not apply to programs designed and operated
by law enforcement for suspicionless criminal investigation.' 2 ° Obviously, if
the suspicionless search characterized as non-investigatory is nothing more
than a pretext for criminal investigation, it cannot stand. To conclude whether
a search is a pre-text, a court must engage in a purpose-inquiry before any other
analysis.
As discussed in Part II, the Court's own precedent suggests that a "pur-
pose inquiry" must be made. In Colorado v. Bertine, an inventory search that
disclosed narcotics was upheld because "there was no showing that the police,
who were following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole
purpose of investigation."' 2 1 In South Dakota v. Opperman, marijuana was
found after a routine inventory search was conducted and the search was
deemed proper because "there [was] no suggestion whatever that this standard
procedure, essentially like that followed throughout the country, was a pretext
concealing an investigatory police motive."1 2 2 In Michigan v. Clifford, an
administrative search, conducted after a fire, was allowed; however, the Court
had to determine, "whether the object of the search [was] to determine the
cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity."' 2 3 Again, the
Court suggested the necessity for a purpose in New York v. Burger. In Burger,
a statute authorizing searches of auto junkyards was deemed constitutional
since the statute was not a "'pretext' to enable law enforcement authorities to
gather evidence of penal law violations. "124 Even in the context of the "plain
view" doctrine, the Court was careful. In Texas v. Brown, after a motorist was
"I United States v. Arreola-Delgado, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1245 (D. Kan. 2001).
118 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40.
"I Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 339 n.2 (2000).
120 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811-12 (1996) ("[T]he exemption from the
need for probable cause (and warrant), which is accorded to searches made for the purpose
of inventory or administrative regulation, is not accorded to searches that are not made for
those purposes.").
121 Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987).
122 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976).
123 Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293 (1984) ("The object of the search is important
even if exigent circumstances exist. Circumstances that justify a warrantless search for the
cause of a fire may not justify a search to gather evidence of criminal activity once that cause
has been determined.").
124 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716 n.27 (1987).
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stopped and the officer asked for the motorist's license, the officer noticed nar-
cotics in the car. 125 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted there was "no suggestion
that the roadblock was a pretext whereby evidence of narcotics violation might
be uncovered in 'plain view' in the course of a check for driver's licenses., 126
While none of these cases explicitly instructed lower courts in how to
conduct an appropriate analysis, they did recognize the necessity for courts to
look first to the purpose of the roadblock and determine if the program itself
was a pretext to discover evidence of criminal law violations.
Thus, the Court created a blueprint to help lower courts determine the
legality of a search and/or seizure. First, other than the standard exceptions, all
other searches and seizures must be supported by probable cause or individual-
ized suspicion. Secondly, and intrinsically connected to the first, the Court
must determine the purpose of the search or seizure in light of the type of
search and/or seizure in question. In doing this, the overall government pro-
gram must be examined to decide if probable cause is necessary.
The Supreme Court in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond did precisely this.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent accused the Court of "lifting" a "non-law-
enforcement primary purpose test" from another area of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, namely searches of homes and businesses, which are afforded
more protection.' 2 7 Of the three dissenters, Justice Scalia did not join in this
part of the dissent's opinion. 128 It seemed that the dissent was particularly
rankled by the majority's decision not to apply the Brown balancing test, which
as the dissent suggested, was used in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte.l2 9 The dis-
sent's admonishment to follow stare decisis, however, is a bit over-the-top, as
jurisprudence in this area is random and arbitrary in nature.' 30 In an attempt to
lend force to its argument, the dissent suggested the Court already "rejected an
invitation to apply the non-law-enforcement primary purpose test" in Treasury
Employees v. Von Raab. 131 However, in Chandler v. Miller, the majority noted
that Von Raab should be read narrowly and "in its unique context."' 32 These
types of inconsistencies can be found in a variety of areas, especially in the area
of "special needs."'
133
125 See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743 (1983).
126 Id.
127 Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 53 (2000).
128 See id. at 48.
129 See id. at 52-53. ("These stops effectively serve the State's legitimate interests; they are
executed in a regularized and neutral manner; and they only minimally intrude upon the
privacy of the motorists.").
131 See generally Dodson, supra note 45; Michael S. Vaughn & Rolando v. del Carmen,
"Special Needs" in Criminal Justice: An Evolving Exception to the Fourth Amendment
Warrant and Probable Cause Requirements, 3 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 203 (1993).
131 Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (In Rehnquist's
dissent, he states that this case cites with approval Martinez-Fuerte and further states that it
was "in no way designed to repudiate our prior cases dealing with police stops of motorists
on public highways.").
132 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 321 (1997).
133 See Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the
Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1991) (suggesting special needs has been uti-
lized in an inconsistent manner).
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Prior to the publication of the Supreme Court decision in Edmond, a num-
ber of articles were written on the circuit court's opinion. One scholar sug-
gested that a purpose inquiry would be difficult to manage and would open the
door to further confusion and erosion of Fourth Amendment rights. 134 Addi-
tionally, that scholar argued that an important governmental interest, such as
the interest existing in Chandler, was to be the basis of the analysis, not the
overall purpose of the program.
1 3 5
Another publication suggested the majority's analysis showed a relation to
"special needs" analysis, where the "special need" or purpose must be "beyond
the normal need for law enforcement."1 36 Of the two theories, the latter is the
most useful; however, it is interesting that nowhere in Justice O'Connor's anal-
ysis of the present case does she elude to special needs.' 3 7 Instead Justice
O'Connor engages in a step-by-step analysis of case law in the search and
seizure arena, alluding to various aspects and highlights, but never lumping all
areas such as administrative, inventory, and the like together in one cate-
gory. 138 After noting these areas and their relevance in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, she suggests there is a theme running throughout the precedent
case law: primary purpose.' 3 9
The dissent counters that the primary purpose inquiry is common place for
home and business intrusions but not automobiles, because of the reduced pri-
vacy interests while driving. 4 ' The dissent's distinction is irrelevant and one
that Justice Thomas astutely questions in his separate dissent, stating his "doubt
that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have considered 'reasonable'
a program of indiscriminate stops of individuals not suspected of
wrongdoing." 141
The fact of the matter is that the "non-law-enforcement primary purpose"
test is the only test that should be used in special needs and roadblock contexts.
The Court has contoured the "reasonableness" test over time, expanded it in the
late 1980s with National Treasury Employees Union and Skinner.142 Strangely
enough, the results of this "reasonableness" test have almost always been in the
state's favor. 14' This phenomenon would seem to suggest that privacy interests
"I See Shannon S. Schultz, Note, Edmond v. Goldsmith: Are Roadblocks Used to Catch
Drug Offenders Constitutional?, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 571, 583-84 (2000) (arguing that while
Fourth Amendment rights should not be eroded further, the Circuit Court, "in an unprece-
dented move," failed to use the Brown reasonable test, thus "opening itself up to a more
subjective analysis ... opening the door for abuse").
135 See id. at 582.
136 See Recent Cases, supra note 45, at 831-33 (suggesting that the Circuit Court's analysis
poses a "threshold inquiry" into the "special need" for the program with the "purpose" of the
program).
13 See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
138 See id.
139 See id. at 39-40. ("[W]hat principally distinguishes these checkpoints from those we
have previously approved is their primary purpose.").
140 See id at 53.
141 Id. at 56.
142 See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
143 See, e.g., Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Roberts, 9 F.3d 1464 (9th Cir. 1993)
(upheld drug testing of federal prison guards); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Dep't of Transp.,
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in this country, are not particularly important to the Court when weighed
against the government's interests. In fact, other than Chandler v. Miller,
where political candidates were forced to submit to drug testing, the Court has
never invalidated a search program under the special needs balancing test prior
to Edmond. Interestingly and perhaps clairvoyantly, the Chandler Court,
refrained from using the balancing test until a preliminary showing of a "spe-
cial need" was made. 4 ' Nonetheless, the "special needs" test should be
scrapped and replaced with a primary purpose test. By employing a "primary
purpose" test, the Court can provide some predictability to what formerly
existed as "special needs" and roadblock searches.
Since the Court has not defined what a "special need" is, the Court has
allowed lower courts to arbitrarily weigh governmental interests against virtu-
ally non-existent private interests, essentially condoning continued violations of
the Fourth Amendment.' 4 5 Usually, the government interest is the publicly
supported and popular "war on drugs."' 14 6 In fact, Justice Marshall's dissent in
Skinner, argued against the "special needs" balancing test and pointed out that
courts have allowed, "basic constitutional rights to fall prey to momentary
emergencies." '4 7 The Court adopted Justice Marshall's view in the case of
Ferguson v. City of Charleston,1 18 where the Court struck down a South Caro-
lina hospital's policy of turning over urine samples showing cocaine use in
pregnant women to the authorities. While the lower court attempted to ration-
alize the Fourth Amendment violations away as nothing more than special
needs, the Supreme Court did not. 49 Not only did the majority dismiss the so-
called urgency of the drug problem, it also followed Edmond's test and other
precedent, ultimately deciphering the program's purpose and finding an uncon-
stitutional investigatory purpose.
150
Like with drugs and "special needs," the Court has used public safety as
an excuse to disregard Fourth Amendment protections, specifically in the con-
text of roadblock cases. s5 Courts have upheld "special needs" searches based
on public safety in some circumstances; however, there is nothing particularly
"special" about public safety laws.' 52 In fact, the "special needs" doctrine
developed from public education cases, where the Court considered school dis-
cipline a "special need." Public education cases, however, did not deal with the
kinds of public safety laws that subsequent cases have, such as criminal laws,
traffic laws, and others.' 53 Using public safety as an inroad to destroy Fourth
932 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1991) (upheld drug testing of commercial truck drivers); Bluestein
v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1990) (upheld drug testing of airline employees).
144 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
145 See Dodson, supra note 45.
146 See id.
141 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 635.
148 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
149 See id.
'50 See id.
151 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (roadblock stops would be lawful in terms
of highway safety); Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (sobriety check-
point constitutional since it was aimed at reducing traffic hazards created by drunk drivers).
152 Dodson, supra note 45, at 272.
153 See id. at 271-72.
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Amendment rights will result in legislatures passing laws allowing warrantless
searches and seizures, and will require courts to uphold these laws based on
public safety needs. 5 4 This slippery slope argument is particularly strong in
the "special needs" arena because it has, for the most part, come true. "Special
needs" has become a complete authorization of judicial tolerance towards gov-
ernment entities violating Fourth Amendment protections.
If public safety concerns always override Fourth Amendment require-
ments in the Court's collective view, it is worth questioning, as Justice Thomas
did in his dissent, 5 5 whether Sitz was decided correctly given the only differ-
ence between Sitz and Edmond is the distinction between traffic safety and
criminal investigation.
Justice Thomas rightly questioned the border cases such as Martinez-
Fuerte,'5 6 where the primary purpose behind the search in Martinez-Fuerte
was a criminal investigation using immigration laws against the transporters of
undocumented immigrants and the immigrants themselves.' 57 It is true that
individuals who violated the border controls were subject to arrest and prosecu-
tion, just as those who violated other regulatory schemes were subject to arrest
and prosecution. In fact, the Court has said that as long as there is a legitimate
non-investigatory purpose, and evidence of a crime is found in the process of
the so-called legitimate search, then that evidence can be used against the indi-
viduals for criminal prosecution.1 5 8
This result demonstrates the Court's willingness to manipulate the "rea-
sonableness" test in order to obtain the outcome it wants, and is why "special
needs" tests should be abandoned entirely and replaced with a primary purpose
test. Some might argue that the primary purpose of the programs in Sitz,
Prouse, and Martinez-Fuerte, was not criminal law-enforcement. However, if
government officials collect evidence of criminal wrongdoing, and that evi-
dence can be used in a criminal proceeding, then the Fourth Amendment
requirements of warrant and/or probable cause should be followed
unmercilessly.
Roadblocks are conducted largely for the purpose of investigating criminal
activity, and courts have readily followed that premise in their decisions.' 59 As
previously noted, it is not inconsistent with precedent to look at the purpose of
the program before conducting a reasonableness analysis. 160
154 See id. at 274.
"I See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 56 (2000).
156 See id.
"I See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
151 See id.; Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
159 See, e.g., Wrigley v. State, 546 S.E.2d 794 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (roadblock held constitu-
tional because its primary purpose was not to interdict illegal drugs); United States v.
Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 1998) (evidence seized at roadblock unconstitutional
because the primary purpose of the program was to interdict illegal drugs); United States v.
Morales-Zamora, 974 F.2d 149 (10th Cir. 1992) (seizure of drugs unconstitutional regardless
of the fact that the stop checked licenses as well). But see State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565
(Mo. 1996) (roadblock designed to interdict drugs upheld); United States v. Yousif, 2000
WL 1916534 (E.D. Mo. 2000).
'6o See Chandler v. Miller. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
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Moreover, there is no confusion about whether a program can have a valid
secondary purpose, overriding its invalid primary purpose as some have wor-
ried the circuit court left open.' 6' The City of Indianapolis unsuccessfully
argued that the checkpoints in this case had a valid secondary purpose, check-
ing licenses and registrations. This regulatory purpose, possibly valid under
Prouse, would then validate the roadblock program and invoke the Brown bal-
ancing test. The Circuit Court left this question open, suggesting that only one
of the purposes need be constitutional; 62 however, both parties in Edmond
stipulated that the purpose of the primary program was to interdict drugs.
163
There is further objective evidence referred to in the opinion by Justice
O'Connor, dispelling any doubt about the primary purpose of the road-
blocks. 164 Use of a drug-sniffing dog would hardly be helpful in identifying
unlicensed and unregistered drivers.
Even if the City had a valid secondary purpose, checking licenses and
registration - which could pass the Brown-balancing test - the majority
answered the question as to whether a valid secondary purpose is enough to
deem the entire program constitutional. If secondary purposes could justify
illegal primary purposes, the Court noted that "law enforcement authorities
would be able to establish checkpoints for virtually any purpose so long as they
also included a license or sobriety checkpoint."' 65 Therefore, the only way to
combat such a situation would be to first evaluate the primary purpose of the
program. While the majority, "recognize[d] the challenges inherent in a pur-
pose inquiry," they also suggested that, "courts routinely engage in this enter-
prise in many areas of constitutional jurisprudence as a means of sifting abusive
governmental conduct from that which is lawful."' 16 6 Therefore, a secondary
purpose that is valid after balancing the governmental interests against the pri-
vate interests, simply will not override the primary and unconstitutional pur-
pose of conducting drug-interdiction roadblocks.
Since Indianapolis' purpose is clearly to catch drug traffickers, a standard
criminal investigation, continuing the analysis to the Brown balancing test is
not appropriate. Thankfully, in Edmond, determining the purpose was not par-
ticularly difficult. The dissent suggested that looking into the subjective inten-
161 See Schultz, supra note 134, at 583-84.
162 See Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 665 (7th Cir. 1999). Stating that:
If the purpose of the roadblock program were to discover such violations, and if a program
having such a purpose could be justified under the cases that allow searches and seizures without
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, then the seizure, in the course of such searches, of drugs
that were in plain view would be lawful.
Id.
163 See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 39-40 (2000).
'64 See id.
In their stipulation of facts, the parties repeatedly refer to the checkpoints as "drug checkpoints"
and describe them as "being operated by the City of Indianapolis in an effort to interdict unlaw-
ful drugs in Indianapolis." In addition, the first document attached to the parties' stipulation is
entitled "DRUG CHECKPOINT CONTACT OFFICER DIRECTIVES BY ORDER OF THE
CHIEF OF POLICE."
Id. (citations omitted).
165 See id. at 46.
166 See id. at 46-47.
[Vol. 2:654
INDIANAPOLIS v. EDMOND
tions of personnel is impracticable and not warranted based on case law. 16 7
However, looking into the mental state of those establishing the program is
certainly no more impracticable than balancing undefined state interests against
apparently non-existent individual privacy interests.
At the end of the day, while drugs are of serious concern in today's envi-
ronment, a checkpoint exception to the Fourth Amendment must not be created,
nor should any other exceptions. Prior cases have made the argument that the
urgency of the drug problem should produce some leeway in the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment,' 68 but the Court has been leery to explicitly state
such a proposition.' 69 The Court should also be mindful that "'the reasons for
creating an exception in one category can, relatively easily, be applied to
others,' thus, allowing the exception to swallow the rule."' 170 While the Court
may be ready to create a "traffic safety exception," it should be cognizant of the
fact that the drug problem does not directly relate to traffic safety in the same
way that sobriety checkpoints and license and registration checkpoints do. If,
at the dissent's insistence, the Brown balancing test were to be the start of the
analysis, the balancing test could continue to be used as a weapon against indi-
vidual rights, and would most certainly, in the case of drugs, weigh in favor of
the government. On the other hand, if the program's primary purpose is the
starting point, the Court would acknowledge the illegality of schemes such as
Indianapolis' roadblocks, irrespective of the societal problems that substance
abuse creates.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the Court's inclination to balance factors in favor of the government
in a substantial amount of Fourth Amendment cases, and with the "war on
drugs" supplanted firmly in the minds of several of the Justices, the majority in
Edmond reached a prudent decision. Realizing the inconsistency in prior deci-
sions, the Court has set forth a roadmap which lower courts are able to follow
and has taken a step forward in re-establishing the Fourth Amendment.
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has become nothing more than a hodge-
podge of policies, rules, and exceptions, rarely working in a cooperative fash-
ion. Further, readers of the Fourth Amendment who suggest that reasonable-
ness be the standard, fail to realize that with few exceptions, the government's
167 See id. at 50-51.
168 See generally Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989);
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
169 See Torres v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 474 (1979). Stating that:
Puerto Rico's position boils down to a contention that its law enforcement problems are so
pressing that it should be granted an exemption from the usual requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. Although we have recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement when specific
circumstances render compliance impracticable, we have not dispensed with the fundamental
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizure simply because of a
generalized urgency of law enforcement.
Id.; Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 392 (1997) ("It is always somewhat dangerous to
ground exceptions to constitutional protections in the social norms of a given historical
moment.").
17o See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273 (2000) (quoting Richards, 520 U.S. at 393).
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interest outweighs that of the individual especially when the warrantless search
and seizure occurs outside the home or inside the car.
In Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court explicitly stated what for years had
been the obvious underlying theme of many cases involving search and
seizures: that the underlying purpose cannot be one of a criminal investigation.
If that purpose were the case, it is unreasonable in this context to seize motor-
ists without individualized suspicion and search their automobiles through the
use of plain view tactics and drug-sniffing dogs, to look for drugs and drug
paraphernalia. Not only is the conduct unreasonable, for those who read the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment as controlling, it is even more
unreasonable because no warrant was obtained for any stop. One might argue
that it is impracticable for the police to secure warrants for all cars being
stopped in what is a random roadblock. And since the automobile exception
cannot be extended without probable cause, the only option is to develop a
"checkpoint exception" or deem these stops constitutional. The Court chose
the latter.
LAW OF THE CASE IN NEVADA:
CONFUSING RELATIVES
Scott Doney*
Law of the case belongs to the family of preclusion doctrines including,
collateral estoppel, res judicata, and stare decisis. 1 Under the law of the case
doctrine, when an issue is decided in a particular case, the parties of that case
cannot relitigate the same issue in any subsequent proceeding.' For example,
consider Lenny, a defendant in a criminal case who is convicted of murder and
decides to appeal an evidentiary ruling of the trial judge. Once the appellate
court decides that particular issue on appeal, Lenny cannot relitigate that same
issue in a petition for post-conviction relief in the trial court below, or in any
further proceeding in the appellate court. The decision of the first appeal
becomes the "law of the case" precluding further consideration of that issue.
The purpose of the doctrine is to ensure efficient resolution of issues.3 Once a
court decides a legal issue, it is generally "inefficient" to reconsider that issue.4
"Simplicity is achieved by narrowing the scope of review" of issues presented
to courts in subsequent proceedings. 5
Jurisdictions vary on how strictly they apply the doctrine. Some jurisdic-
tions absolutely refuse to consider an issue once decided regardless of the rea-
son.6 This Note refers to this view as the "no power theory," meaning the court
has no power to reconsider the issue.7 Hence the nickname, "the right or wrong
doctrine," signifying adherence to the prior ruling even though the court
believes the ruling was wrongfully decided.8 In other jurisdictions, the doctrine
is less strict, providing departures in certain circumstances.9 These jurisdic-
tions reject the no power theory in favor of correcting a possible erroneous
outcome. 10
* J.D. 2002, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
Joan Steinman, Law of the Case: A Judicial Puzzle In Consolidated and Transferred
Cases and in Multidistrict Litigation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 598 (1987).
2 Id. at 597-98; Note, An Alternative Analysis of Law of the Case: Rethinking Loveday v.
State, 44 MD. L. REv. 177, 180 (1985).
1 Brett T. Parks, McDonald's Corp. v. Hawkins and "The Law of the Case" Doctrine in
Arkansas, 50 ARK. L. REV. 127, 136-37 (1997).
4 Steinman, supra note 1, at 602.
5 Parks, supra note 3, at 127.
6 E.H. Schopler, Erroneous Decision As Law of the Case On Subsequent Appellate Review,
87 A.L.R.2d 271, §§ 3(a), 6 (1999).
7 Wright v. Carson Water Co., 39 P. 872, 874 (Nev. 1895).
8 Parks, supra note 3, at 136.
9 Schopler, supra note 6, § 3(a).
10 Id. §§ 3(a), 6.
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Depending on the particular view adopted, courts compare their interpreta-
tion of law of the case to a related preclusion doctrine." Some courts explain
law of the case as res judicata; other courts explain law of the case as stare
decisis.' 2 Law of the case is related to stare decisis because both entail con-
formity of law to prior decisions: law of the case applying to the immediate
case between the parties, and stare decisis covering any future case as well.' 3
Another commonality between the two is the principle of departure, which per-
mits courts to overrule erroneous decisions.' 4
Res judicata' 5on the other hand, is generally not subject to departure prin-
ciples.' 6 Law of the case also differs from res judicata because it lacks the
"necessary to the judgment" standard required by res judicata.' 7 Law of the
" Parks, supra note 3, at 130-31 (comparing law of the case with res judicata, collateral
estoppel, and stare decisis) (for examples of cases dealing with these issues, see the endnotes
on these pages). Res judicata holds that a party may only sue on a single claim once. Collat-
eral estoppel prevents relitigation of issues litigated and decided in the first case. Finally,
stare decisis, also known as the doctrine of precedent, requires that all future decisions fol-
low a particular rule of law set forth by an appellate court. RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY C.
PURDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 647-48 (2d ed. 1997). For
an historical perspective concerning the family of preclusion doctrines, see SPENCER BOWER,
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA (1924).
12 See Schopler, supra note 6, § ](a) (discussing cases that mesh law of the case with the
preclusion doctrines res judicata and stare decisis).
13 Parks, supra note 3, at 131.
'4 Steinman, supra note 1, at 599 n. 10; Greene v. Rothschild, 402 P.2d 356 (Wash. 1966).
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the court is not obligated to perpetrate its own errors. This
doctrine means that the rule laid down in any particular case is applicable to another case involv-
ing identical or substantially similar facts .... We see no reason why this principle should not
apply where the allegedly erroneous decision is one which was rendered on a prior appeal of the
same case.
Id.
15 Throughout this note, res judicata will refer to both res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Res judicata actually encompasses both doctrines. Citizens for Prot. of N. Kohala Coastline
v. County of Hawaii, 979 P.2d 1120, 1128 (Haw. 1999); In re the Marriage of Mallon, 956
P.2d 642, 644 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998); In re Estate of Hinderliter, 882 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1994); Babcock v. State, 768 P.2d 481, 486-87 (Wash. 1989).
16 FREER & PURDUE, supra note 11, at 648-49; Schopler, supra note 6, § 3(a) ("There is a
difference between the principle of the law of the case and the doctrine of res judicata: the
former 'directs discretion,' the latter 'supersedes it and compels judgment'; in other words,
the latter is 'a question of power,' the former one 'of submission.'") (citing S.R. Co. v. Clift,
260 U.S. 316, 319 (1922) to discuss the difference between res judicata and law of the case);
Greene v. Rothschild, 402 P.2d 356 (Wash. 1966) (distinguishing res judicata, a "uniform
rule," from law of the case, a "discretionary rule") (citing United States v. U.S. Smelting
Refining & Mining Co., 339 U.S. 186 (1950)). The Ninth Circuit, in Moore v. Jas. H.
Matthews & Co., 682 F.2d 830, 833-34 (9th Cir. 1982), provided that:
[t]he law of the case principle is analogous to, but less absolute a bar than, res judicata. [citation
omitted]. Although the law of the case rule does not bind a court as absolutely as res judicata,
and should not be applied "woodenly" when doing so would be inconsistent with "considerations
of substantial justice," ... the discretion of a court to review earlier decisions should be exer-
cised sparingly so as not to undermine the salutory policy of finality that underlies the rule.
Id.
'7 Steinman, supra note 1, at 598 n.8; Harris v. Harris, 591 P.2d 1147, 1148 n.1 (Nev. 1979)
(describing the "essential to the judgment" element under collateral estoppel); Clark v.
Clark, 389 P.2d 69, 71 (Nev. 1964) (stating that under collateral estoppel an issue must be
"necessarily determined").
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case may apply to any issue presented, deliberated, and decided while res judi-
cata requires a decisive issue. 8 For this reason, res judicata is more narrowly
applied. '9
The preclusion doctrine to which courts relate law of the case is significant
to litigants. An example illustrates this significance. Consider Lenny, the con-
victed murderer who appealed his conviction. The appellate court decided
against his claim of error on the evidentiary ruling in the trial court. Suppose
on that issue, the court decided that hearsay is admissible if the hearsay is a
victim's written statement about the defendant. Suppose, however, the same
court heard that issue again only a year later, in a different case, and held to the
contrary - a victim's written statement about the defendant is hearsay and inad-
missible. Meanwhile, after hearing the outcome of this case, Lenny filed a
second appeal again raising the issue of the victim's written statement. Facing
these contradictory opinions, the court must decide how to treat Lenny's second
appeal.
Whether law of the case operates like stare decisis or res judicata is vital in
this hypothetical. If law of the case operates like stare decisis, the court may
recognize the erroneous conclusion and reconsider Lenny's issue. On the other
hand, if the law of the case operates like res judicata, the court would simply
estopp Lenny from raising the issue.
This note argues that law of the case in Nevada should operate more like
stare decisis than the other preclusion doctrines and allow for instances of
departure from prior rulings. Currently this is not so. In Nevada, "[t]he law of
the first appeal is the law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the
facts are substantially the same."2 ° Moreover, the Nevada Supreme Court
claims it has no power to revisit prior issues already decided.2 ' Hence, even if
the prior ruling is erroneous, no longer sound, or might work a manifest injus-
tice, the court refuses to reconsider the issue.22 In Nevada, law of the case is
treated like res judicata.2 3 Law of the case, however, should be treated like
stare decisis; the court should have the discretionary power to overrule.
If Nevada's version of law of the case is applied to Lenny's situation, he
loses miserably. Even if the Nevada Supreme Court openly admitted that its
prior decision was wrong, it could not entertain the issue on Lenny's second
appeal since it claims to have no power to do so. Also unfortunate is the fact
that the court's intervening ruling, which changed precedent under the second
appeal, will not be applied to Lenny's case for the same reason. Both of these
results are unfair to Lenny.
Part One of this Note tracks law of the case as it developed in Nevada and
discusses why the court adopted the no power theory. The history of law of the
case in Nevada illustrates the inconsistencies prevalent in the doctrine. Part
Is Compare Clark, 389 P.2d at 71, with State v. Loveless, 150 P.2d 1015, 1017-18 (Nev.
1944).
19 Id.
20 Hall v. State, 535 P.2d 797, 798 (Nev. 1975).
21 Loveless, 150 P.2d at 1017 (quoting Walker v. State, 455 P.2d 34, 38 (Nev. 1969)).
22 The litigant's only recourse lies in a petition for rehearing, which, for all intents and
purposes, is meaningless in the above hypothetical. See id. at 1017; NEV. R. App. P. 40.
23 Cartan v. David, 4 P. 61, 65 (Nev. 1884).
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Two summarizes the main elements of Nevada law of the case doctrine, then
offers a critique of the Nevada approach, which highlights some of these incon-
sistencies and provides an alternative approach.
I. LAW OF THE CASE IN NEVADA: THE FOUNDATIONAL CASES
Interestingly, in early Nevada law, the Nevada Supreme Court had the
opportunity to treat law of the case like stare decisis. Instead, the court chose
to adopt the no power theory.
A. Linn v. Minor
The 1869 case, Linn v. Minor,24 was one of the first cases to discuss stare
decisis in Nevada. In this case, the court was called upon to consider (1)
whether a particular act of the Nevada legislature was repugnant to an act of
Congress, and (2) if not, whether the court should overrule cases that say the
Nevada act is repugnant to the act of Congress. On the first issue, the court
found that the Nevada act was not repugnant to the Congressional act.2 1 It
therefore, with some reservation, overruled prior cases that said otherwise.
"[A] decision once made upon due deliberation ought not to be disturbed by the
same Court, except upon the most cogent reasons and upon undoubted manifes-
tation of error.",2 6 The court discussed the need for the finality of the issue, yet
argued that finality and stability of the law should sometimes capitulate to pro-
gress in the law.27 "[E]ven this backwardness to interfere with previous adjudi-
cations does not require us to shut our eyes upon all improvements in the
science of the law, or require us to be stationary while all around us is in pro-
gress."'28 Ripe before the court was the struggle between finality of decision
and correctness of decision. The court did not employ a rule that unduly
restricted its review of these competing principles, but rather, the court pre-
ferred treating these cases on an ad hoc basis.2 9 "Circumstances of each partic-
ular case . . . whether it may only be doubtful or clearly against principle,
whether sustained by some authority or opposed to all: these are all matters to
be judged of whenever the Court is called on to depart from a prior
determination."3
The court's foregoing admonition necessarily includes law of the case.
The court, however, did not heed the admonition. Instead, it chose to restrict its
power to revisit an issue already decided.
A few years later, in Winston,"' the petitioner sought relief from his con-
viction of gaming on the Lord's Day. The petitioner argued that a law passed
in 1869 repealed an 1861 law that empowered criminal prosecution for gaming
24 4 Nev. 462 (1869).
25 Id. at 463.
26 Id. at 465-66.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 466.
29 Id. at 466-67.
30 Id. (emphasis added).
31 9 Nev. 71 (1873).
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on the Lord's Day.3 2 The court held that the petitioner's writ for habeas corpus
was not the same as a writ of error.3 3 The justice of the peace, by expressed
provisions, had jurisdictional authority to determine whether the 1869 law
repealed the 1861 law.34 Having found that it did not, the appropriate remedy
for petitioner was a writ of error to the district court, not a re-determination of
the issue already decided by a competent magistrate with jurisdictional
power.35 "The judgment of a court of record, whose jurisdiction is final, is as
conclusive on all the world as the judgment of this Court would be." 36 The
court held that a habeas corpus petition to the Nevada Supreme Court is tanta-
mount to asking the court to rehear that legal issue. Law of the case precluded
revisitation because the court "ha[d] no power to say whether it is right or
wrong."3 7
By restricting its power to revisit issues, the court threw a blanket of
approval over past decisions whether rightly or wrongly decided. The "right or
wrong" view of law of the case is a public policy notion rooted in principles of
finality and efficiency.38 As such, law of the case in Nevada drifted from its
brother stare decisis and followed its cousin res judicata.3 9 In State v. Consoli-
dated Virginia Mining Co.,40 the appellant argued that the doctrine better
resembles res judicata than stare decisis because it is not triggered by strength
or correctness of argument, but by applicability of estoppel principles to bar
successive issues. 41 Two years later, in Cartan v. David,42 the Nevada
Supreme Court deemed law of the case - "res judicata between the . . .
parties.
B. Wright v. Carson Water Co.
Before 1895, the court failed to articulate with any depth, its reasons and
policies for adopting a stricter construction than called for in Linn v. Minor.
This all changed with the seminal cases - Wright v. Carson Water Co. I" and
Wright v. Carson Water Co. H.45 In the original case of Wright v. Carson
Water Co. [hereinafter Wright I], Wright brought an action in the Nevada
courts to enforce a promissory note allegedly executed by the president and
secretary of Carson Water Co.46 The trial court, in a bench trial, awarded
32 Id.
33 Id. at 75.
34 Id. at 76.
35 Id. at 78.
36 Id. at 76.
37 Id. at 75.
38 Parks, supra note 3, at 136-37.
31 Id. at 131 n.36; Allen D. Vestal, Law of the Case: Single-Suit Preclusion, 12 UTAH L.
REv. 1, 2 (1967) (referring to law of the case as twin brother of stare decisis).
40 16 Nev. 432 (Nev. 1882).
41 Id. at 432.
42 4 P. 61 (Nev. 1884).
43 Id. at 65.
4 39 P. 872 (Nev. 1895) [hereinafter Wright I].
45 42 P. 196 (Nev. 1895) [hereinafter Wright H].
46 Wright 1, 39 P. at 873.
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Wright judgment on the note.47 The district court granted a new trial and
Wright's estate (Wright was by then deceased) appealed.48  The Nevada
Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the district court.49 In the second trial,
this time by jury, Carson Water Co. moved to exclude the note from evi-
dence.5 ° The trial court excluded the note and Wright's estate appealed the
judgment.5
Wright argued that since a witness did not testify in the second trial they
should be allowed to reargue the issue of the note's validity.52 The court found
that the issue was "properly presented, argued, and contested on the former
hearing. 53 Furthermore, the decision "went to the essence of the case."54
After establishing that the doctrine is applicable to a distinct set of facts adjudi-
cated between distinct parties, the court addressed the binding nature of the
prior decision on all future decisions:
[T]he law of the case [is] not only binding on the parties and their privies, but on the
court below and on this court itself. A ruling of an appellate court upon a point
distinctly made upon a previous appeal is, in all subsequent proceedings in the same
case upon substantially the same facts, a final adjudication, from the consequences of
which the court cannot depart. The supreme court has no power to review its own
judgments in the same case, except upon petition for rehearing, in accordance for the
rules established for the purpose. Such are the decisions of more than two hundred
cases, decided in more than thirty states of the Union, besides a great number of the
federal courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States.
5 5
Important to note from this excerpt is that the court reaffirmed its no
power stance regarding revisitation of issues. 56 It adopted this construction
from the majority view at the time, as outlined in a book by Herman entitled,
Estoppel and Res Judicata.5 7 This book indicates that some two hundred
cases favored the no power theory.58
The Nevada Supreme Courts' fixation on this construction will be shown
in later cases throughout the twentieth century until today.5 9 This occurred
despite the fact that many of the jurisdictions Nevada relied upon in Wright I









55 id. at 873-74.
56 See Ex parte Winston, 9 Nev. 71 (1873).
57 Wright 1, 39 P. at 874 (citing HERMAN ON ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA).
58 Id.
59 See State v. Loveless, 150 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Nev. 1944); Sherman Gardens Co. v. Long-
ley, 491 P.2d 48 (Nev. 1971); Emeterio v. Clint Hurt and Assoc., Inc., 967 P.2d 432 (Nev.
1998).
6 For example, the federal circuits and the U.S. Supreme Court abandoned this view.
United States v. Paquette, 201 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2000); Counsel of Alternative Political Par-
ties v. Hooks, 179 F.3d 64 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Aramony, 166 F.3d 655 (4th Cir.
1998); Gates v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 881 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1989); Holloway v. Brush, 220
F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2000); Creek v. Vill. of Westhaven, 144 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 1998); Little
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In the sequel, Wright v. Carson Water Co. [hereinafter Wright II],
Wright's estate filed a petition for rehearing to the Nevada Supreme Court
arguing that the second appeal disclosed a different set of facts from the set of
facts disclosed on the first appeal.6 1 The court evidently found the basis for its
decision concerning the note, which it skimmed over in Wright I, and went into
depth on the ratification process to form an implied contract absent express
authorization of corporate board members.6" The court held that law of the
case precluded revisitation of the issue because the new alleged facts, immate-
rial at best, related to decisive issues presented in the first appeal.6 3
In his dissent, Chief Justice Bigelow criticized the majority's decision
concerning law of the case on two points. First, he asserted that law of the case
only binds decisive issues presented before the court, not dicta.64 On the first
appeal, the decisive factor was review of the district court's grant of a new
trial.65 Conversely, the decisive factor presented in the second appeal was the
court's ruling on an evidentiary matter.66 He, therefore, found the decision on
the first appeal was "uncalled-for expressions of opinion" not binding in the
second appeal.67 Second, he stated that whether the corporation's conduct
amounted to an implied contract was a question of fact for the jury to decide.68
"It is upon questions of law, and not upon questions of fact, that the decision of
the court becomes law of the case."' 6 9 Evidence surrounding the validity of the
note should not be precluded by law of the case, when appellants are arguing
mutated facts.7 °
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
Not much has changed in the years following the Wright cases. The court
has worked on fine-tuning the doctrine. The heated discussion about applying
the doctrine lingered and although the court started making exceptions, it left
the rule essentially intact.
Earth of United Tribes, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 807 F.2d 1433 (8th Cir.
1986); Coleman v. Calderon, 210 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2000); Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
210 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2000); Royal Ins. Co. v. Latin Am. Aviation Serv., Inc., 210 F.3d
1348 (11 th Cir. 2000); Gould, Inc. v. United States, 67 F.3d 925 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Kimberlin
v. Quinlan, 199 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983).
61 Note that the court is revisiting its decision in Wright I because of the nature of the
petition. This is not a subsequent appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court, but a petition for
rehearing. In Wright I, the court allowed revisitation of issues upon a petition for rehearing.
39 P. at 874.
62 Wright H, 42 P. 196, 197-98 (Nev. 1895).
63 Id. at 198.
6 Id. at 200 (Bigelow, C.J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 200-01.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 200.




A. Law of the Case & Dictum
One important mid-century case discussed the posture of law of the case
on issues of dicta. In State v. Loveless,71 the jury convicted the defendant of
murder.72 The defense appealed the judgment, and the Nevada Supreme Court
reversed sua sponte rather than by points brought on appeal.7 3 The court
refuted, in all respects, the points raised by the defense.7 ' The jury again con-
victed the defendant on the identical charge, and again the defense appealed.75
This time, in conjunction with oral argument, the state moved to strike points
made by the defense on the first appeal. 76 The defense responded by arguing
that issues rejected in the first opinion were merely dictum, as the court ulti-
mately raised the decisive issue, and should be heard again.7 7 In response to
the defense's claim, the court defined obiter dictum as "an opinion expressed
by a Judge on a point not necessarily arising in a case."7 8 Such issues relate to
"some point not discussed at bar."' 79 Distinguished are those types of issues for
which actual questions were raised in the former appeal which "the court delib-
erately considered and decided."8 ° Since issues were briefed, argued, deliber-
ated upon, and decided in the first appeal, they were not obiter dictum and
therefore amenable to law of the case.8 1 This was true despite the fact that
reversal occurred on different grounds.82 The issues decided on the first appeal
were necessary "to establish the law of the case on all points involved, and for
the guidance of the lower court."83
Necessarily then, some dictum binds a subsequent appeal. True, obiter
dictum will not carry authority to the next appeal, and hence is not part of law
of the case. However, judicial dictum will. While obiter dictum relates to col-
lateral matters not raised on appeal, judicial dictum relates to questions raised
and decided on appeal albeit having no bearing on the outcome of the case.84
Logically, issues decided by an appellate court must transmit to the lower court
as mandatory authority for guidance purposes.8 If so, then the same issues
ought to bind any subsequent appeal.
71 150 P.2d 1015 (Nev. 1944).





77 Chief Justice Bigelow argued similarly. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.






84 See Lanigir v. Arden, 450 P.2d 148 (Nev. 1969) (holding that the issue raised on the
second appeal is not precluded because it was only indirectly mentioned in the first appeal,
and the issue was not "specified" as error); Sherman Gardens Co. v. Longley, 491 P.2d 48
(Nev. 1971) (holding that the trial court cannot imply from the previous opinion "law of the
case" unless the issue was presented, considered, and deliberately decided).
85 This is probably the most valuable component of the doctrine. If a district or trial court
on remand were able to sidestep the higher courts instructions, chaos would ensue. This
occurrence, interestingly, is not infrequent. See, e.g., LoBue v. State, 554 P.2d 258 (Nev.
[Vol. 2:675
Summer/Fall 2002] LAW OF THE CASE IN NEVADA
Stare decisis differs from law of the case because it arguably implicates
neither type of dictum. In other words, only decisive issues would fall under
stare decisis analysis. Law of the case, on the other hand, abounds under judi-
cial dictum and the decisive issue in the case. Therefore, law of the case tends
to be broader in application. Loveless, however, changed this distinction:
We are aware that it has been held that judicial dictum is not of equal binding force
as an authority, as the point on which the decision of the case turned. But we think
this is a rule too rigid to be recognized as the law of this jurisdiction .... "So it has
been held, with respect to a court of last resort, that all that is needed to render its
decision authoritative is that there was an application of the judicial mind to the
precise question adjudged; and that the point was investigated with care and consid-
ered in the fullest extent."
86
Because the court put judicial dictum and the decisive issue of the case on
the same level, there is no real fundamental difference between stare decisis
and law of the case. Hence, cases establishing the law of the case doctrine
should have followed the principles outlined in Linn v. Minor. If the court is to
be consistent, there is no reason why the case at bar deserves stricter treatment
regarding principles of departure than future cases with similar issues. Law of
the case should not apply in erroneous decisions.
B. The Family Feud Continued
The debate regarding the integrity of law of the case continued in Hotel
Riviera, Inc. v. Short,87 wherein the majority held to its nineteenth century
roots.88 Upon reversal of summary judgment for defendants on a particular
theory of law, the trial continued on remand and a jury awarded compensatory
and punitive damages for plaintiff.89 Defendants appealed.90 The court found
that the facts remained substantially the same from the summary judgment rul-
ing to the end of the trial.91
On appeal, defendants claimed, inter alia, that the rule of law adopted
from the appeal of the summary judgment was erroneous and should be over-
ruled.92 Plaintiff responded stating, "the prior ruling was not so 'clearly and
palpably erroneous' and the alleged error was not 'so unjust' as to justify this
court to reverse the ruling in that decision."93 The plaintiff largely based his
argument on stare decisis principles from the cases cited in the opinion.94 The
plaintiff s counsel improvidently equated Nevada law pertaining to stare decisis
with law of the case, conceding that the court may have power to overrule a
prior decision in the same case. 95 Fortunately, for the plaintiff, the court better
1976); Molino v. Asher, 618 P.2d 878 (Nev. 1980); Andolino v. State, 662 P.2d 631 (Nev.
1983); State v. Alper, 706 P.2d 139 (Nev. 1985).
86 150 P.2d at 1019 (quoting in part 1 BOUVIER's LAW DICTIONARY 83 (3d ed.)).
87 396 P.2d 855 (Nev. 1964).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 856.
9 Id.
91 Id. at 856.
92 Id. at 859.
93 Id. at 861.
94 Id.
95 Id.
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understood the Nevada doctrine and held in his favor.9 6 Distinguishing law of
the case from stare decisis, the court commented, "[t]his weight falls even more
heavily in the present case, for our ruling in the previous case became the law
of this case."97 Apparently, the court loosely interpreted the strict construction
of Wright I, as it seemed to describe the difference between stare decisis and
law of the case as only a matter of degree.
The dissent, written by Justice Thompson, criticized the majority's use of
law of the case. Justice Thompson argued that the doctrine "should never be
invoked to require the perpetuation of error."9 8 He continued, "[a] court need
not be ashamed to acknowledge its mistake and correct it before damage
results. Though embarrassing, it is the only honorable course."99 The argu-
ment was of course, nothing new. Peculiar to Justice Thompson's approach,
however, was that for the first time since Wright I, an often-cited publication
supported the argument. This publication, written by E.H. Schopler, was an
annotation entitled, Erroneous Decision As Law of the Case On Subsequent
Appellate Review." This annotation contained the divergent views regarding
law of the case, and especially important, the numerous jurisdictions' departure
from the no power theory."° t If the court in 1895 adopted the no power theory
because of federal and sister court recognition, the Nevada Supreme Court
should not continue with the antiquated no power theory in light of a majority
shift to a less rigid standard.
96 Id. at 861-62.
97 Id. at 866.
98 Id. (Thompson, J., dissenting).
99 Id. at 866 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
100 See supra note 6.
101 The Annotation explains the divergent views in some detail. The following excerpt por-
trays the Nevada interpretation.
On the one hand are cases which hold the doctrine of the law of the case applicable, irrespective
of whether the decision on the former appeal is right or wrong, and apply this rule even in
situations in which the court, upon the later appeal, specifically finds or strongly intimates that
the decision on the former appeal was erroneous. Cases of this kind express the view that the
doctrine of the law of the case is inflexible, that an appellate court, having lost its jurisdiction
over the case and its former decision constituting a final adjudication, has no power to revise its
own decision on a former appeal, that this decision is "res judicata," and that the only remedy
available to correct the error is a petition for rehearing seasonably made after the decision on the
former appeal.
Id. § 3(a).
The argument on the other side is that law of the case is more of a principle of adher-
ence than a principle of estoppel. Notice from the following excerpt how law of the case
better resembles stare decisis than res judicata.
[T]he doctrine of the law of the case as applied to appellate courts is not an inexorable or abso-
lute command, and not inflexible; that the doctrine is founded upon expediency, and not upon the
principle of estoppel by former adjudication, and is subject to exceptions. Under this view the
doctrine of the law of the case, as applied to appellate courts on successive appeals, is a mere
rule of practice, but not a limitation on the courts' power. It is, however, recognized that an
appellate court's power to depart from its own ruling on a former appeal may be invoked not as a
matter of right, but of grace and discretion, and should be exercised only sparingly or rarely, and
for cogent reasons, after careful consideration of the situation involved in individual cases, or,
more specifically, in a clear case under extraordinary or exceptional circumstances, in the inter-
est of justice.
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C. A More Detailed Argument Or Different Facts?
An appellant losing on the first appeal may try to refine the issue or some-
how bolster the argument for another try at the court. This occurred in Hall v.
State, 10 2 where the defendant in a murder case cleverly raised the issue of lack
of competence to enter a guilty plea a second time. In the first appeal, the court
found the defendant competent to enter a plea.' 0 3 In the second appeal, the
defense failed to apprise the court of the previous hearing as required by
Nevada Revised Statute 177.335."° On appeal from his denial of petition for
post-conviction relief, the defense fine-tuned the competence argument.105
Having discovered the first appeal, the court barred the issue, and held that
"lt]he doctrine of the law of the case cannot be avoided by a more detailed and
precisely focused argument subsequently made after reflection upon the previ-
ous proceedings. '
This case may appear trivial, but it introduced an important element in
Nevada law of the case. The defendant did not add facts or evidence or argue
different issues on the second appeal; instead, defendant placed more emphasis
on an issue already argued in the first appeal. "The law of the first appeal is the
law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the facts are substantially the
same." 1
0 7
This leaves the question of whether new facts are barred under law of the
case. The Nevada Supreme Court examined this issue in Paine v. State,"°8 in
which Paine was convicted of murder in two robbery operations. Paine killed a
cab driver and wounded another."o The court decided on the first appeal that
Paine committed murder at random and without apparent motive, which the
court found an aggravating circumstance for capital punishment purposes."o
On the second appeal, Paine argued that "new evidence" adduced at the second
penalty hearing indicated that the murders were necessary to accomplish the
robberies."'' Hence, no aggravating circumstances should carry." 2 The court
found that the new evidence fell under law of the case principles because the
new evidence "[was] not substantially different from that which was introduced
at the first penalty hearing."" ' 3 Accordingly, the court found that it "need not
reconsider" the issue." 4
102 535 P.2d 797 (Nev. 1975).
103 Id. at 798.
1o4 Id. at 798 & n.1. NEV. REV. STAT. 177.335 (1991) repealed by Acts 1991, ch. 44, § 31,
p. 92 (at the time stating in pertinent part, "The petition must identify any previous state or
federal court proceedings taken by the petitioner to secure relief from his conviction or
sentence").
105 Hall, 535 P.2d at 798.
106 Id. at 799.
1o7 Id. at 798 (quoting Walker v. State, 455 P.2d 34 (Nev. 1969)).
1o8 877 P.2d 1025 (Nev. 1994).
109 Id. at 1026-27.
11o Id. at 1026.
Il Id. at 1028.
112 Id. at 1028-29.
113 Id. at 1029.
114 Id. As pertaining to "new evidence," law of the case does not control. Usually newly
discovered evidence is only allowed under Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 60 on motion at
the trial judge's discretion. New facts argued on appeal are generally not allowed because
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D. Inconsistencies in the Doctrine
The Paine court's consideration of the substantially similar facts element
is not the only principle derived from the case. It also presents a clear break
from prior rulings on the law of the case doctrine and, therefore, provides a
segway into some of the inconsistencies the Nevada Supreme Court introduced
into the doctrine. After ruling on the "new evidence" issue, the court elected to
revisit prior issues of the case because of the gravity of Paine's sentence." 5
The court, notwithstanding its reservations about weakening the doctrine,
decided to revisit an issue even though it supposedly had no power to do so." 6
In so doing, the court departed from its long-standing no power theory.
In its later cases, the court engaged in efforts almost simultaneously to (1)
uphold the integrity of the no power doctrine and (2) ignore departures from the
doctrine. In addition, the court struggled with law of the case, a judicially
created doctrine, and legislatively enacted procedural bars. Interestingly, the
legislative procedural bars provide exceptions for departure while law of the
case does not.' 7 In a very convoluted case, the court provided examples of
these phenomena.
1. Lozada v. State
In Lozada v. State," 8 a jury convicted Lozada of four controlled substance
violations.1" 9 Lozada failed to perfect an appeal.' 20 Subsequently, Lozada
filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the state district court, arguing that
his counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of the right to appeal.12 1
The district court denied Lozada's petition and the Nevada Supreme Court dis-
missed his subsequent appeal.' 2 2 Lozada then filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the federal district court.1 23 After his petition failed in the Ninth
Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded to the Ninth
Circuit because two circuits recognized a presumption of prejudice in Lozada's
case. 124 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the U.S. Supreme Court that prejudice
is presumed when a petitioner establishes that counsel's failure to file a notice
the appellate court cannot look outside the record. Carson Ready Mix, Inc. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 635 P.2d 276, 277 (Nev. 1981).
"-' Paine, 877 P.2d at 1029.
116 Id. at 1028-29.
l7 NEV. REv. STAT. 34.810(2) (1985) provides: "a second or successive petition must be
dismissed if ... the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds
are alleged, the judge or justice finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds
in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ." Id. § 34.810(3) requires petitioners to
establish good cause for rearguing issues that have been rejected on their merits in a previous
petition. NEV. REV. STAT. 34.726(1) (1991) requires good cause for failing to file a petition
within one year of the final resolution of the direct appeal, or conviction if no appeal was
taken.
118 871 P.2d 944 (Nev. 1994).
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of appeal was without the petitioner's consent. 25 The Ninth Circuit remanded
to the federal district court for a determination of whether Lozada's trial coun-
sel failed to pursue an appeal without Lozada's consent. 12 6 Lozada filed a
notice of appeal in the Nevada Supreme Court pursuant to the instructions of
the federal district court. The court found that it lacked jurisdiction on
Lozada's direct appeal because the notice of appeal was filed well after the
thirty-day appeal period prescribed by Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure
4(b) (despite the Ninth Circuit's offer to allow a delayed appeal). 127 However,
the court decided to change its ruling on the appeal of the petition for post-
conviction based on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision. 1 8 The court noted,
however, that the appellant must first overcome certain procedural bars to be
able to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus (post-conviction) in the district
court.' 29 Each required a showing of good cause for the successive or belated
issues.' ° The court stated that Lozada met the good cause requirement:
Because Lozada filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, his claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel was properly presented to the district court. If that claim
had merit, the denial of relief by the district court, and the subsequent denial of relief
by this court, would constitute an impediment external to the defense that would
excuse appellant's default in presenting the same claim in a successive petition.
Therefore, we must determine whether appellant presented a viable claim for relief in
his petition for post-conviction relief. 13'
Law of the case doctrine is not mentioned at all in the court's opinion."'
If the court had applied its construction of the law of the case doctrine, Lozada
would not have been able to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus (post-
conviction) in the district court. 133 The first decision made on the appeal of the
petition for post-conviction relief must stand according to the Nevada law of
the case doctrine.134
It is entirely inconsistent in law to provide a detour around legislative
procedural bars for good cause while the court leaves its judicially created pro-
cedural bar without exception. Only by not considering one could the court
reconcile the two. The Lozada court may have chosen the favorable statutory
procedural bars over the judicial doctrine because of the formers' flexibility. In
this way, the court could hold tight to its rigid construction for the doctrine law
of the case, but limit its scope to cases it deemed proper.
Limits in the doctrine's applicability came not only from arbitrary deci-
sions like Lozada, but also from restrictions on who may invoke the doctrine.
In Winston, 13 the court held that as long as a court has absolute jurisdiction
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 945-46.
128 Id. at 946.
129 id. at 946; see NEv. REv. STAT. 34.810(2), 34.810(3), and 34.726.
130 Lozada, 871 P.2d at 946.
131 Id. at 946.
132 Id. passim.
133 Cf Mazzan v. Whitley, 921 P.2d 920 (Nev. 1996) (equating law of the case with the
statutory procedural bars allowing both an exception for a showing of "good cause").
134 See Wright 1, 39 P. 872, 873-74 (introducing the no power theory).
135 9 Nev. 71 (1873).
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over an issue, its decision is the law of the case from which even a higher court
cannot deviate. This did not mean that the higher courts had no jurisdiction for
appellate review. But Winston stood for the proposition that higher courts'
review was restricted to certain appellate functions. 136 At that time, Nevada
law of the case had not fully developed and the issue of its applicability
lingered. Did law of the case apply to horizontal and vertical appellate court
treatment, binding the subsequent appellate court and the trial court below? Or
could law of the case bind horizontal trial courts as well? 37 Would the court
cling to its ruling in Winston, where a trial court binds an appellate court? The
language employed in Wright I, provided clues on this issue. The court stated
that the "ruling of an appellate court" is a "final adjudication."' 3 8 Did that
statement overrule Winston?
2. McKague v. Whitley
The scope of law of the case remained an issue until McKague v.
Whitley. 13 9 In that case, a jury convicted McKague of murder and he was
sentenced to death.' 4 ° McKague appealed and the court affirmed the convic-
tion.14 1 He then filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the district court
arguing ineffective assistance of counsel.' 42 The district court denied the peti-
tion and McKague's counsel failed to perfect an appeal of the denied peti-
tion.' 4 3  Thereafter, the court dismissed McKague's untimely appeal.
' 44
McKague filed another post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.' 4 5
The district court dismissed the petition with prejudice invoking law of the case
doctrine. 14 6 On appeal from that decision, the court held that the doctrine is
136 Id. at 75.
137 For an elaborate article on the application of law of the case in various court settings see
Vestal, supra note 39. In his article, Professor Vestal first discussed an appellate court
binding an inferior court. Id. at 5. In such cases, the higher court's mandate carries the
strictest requirement of observance. Id. The lower court generally has no power to deviate
from the instructions given. Id. In this situation, problems generally do not arise other than
deciphering the instructions to be followed or an inconsistent mandate. Id. at 6-10. Next, he
covered an appellate court binding itself. Id. at 10. As discussed previously, there are two
prevailing views: one favoring the no power theory and the other interpreting law of the
case as a flexible rule of adherence. Next, he discussed a trial court binding a trial court. Id.
at 10-11. Some courts treat horizontal authority at the lower level as binding. Id. at 15.
However, most courts view the first trial court's decision non-binding to a subsequent trial
court on the same issues. Id. A number of variables shape this view: "(1) whether there has
been an intervening, inconsistent or controlling decision; (2) whether the same or different
judge is involved; (3) whether rehearing en banc is authorized." Id. at 15. Finally, he dis-
cussed the anomalous inferior court binding an appellate court. Id. at 20. These situations
involve lack of objection in the lower court or improper appellate review of the issues. In
other words, the lower court has general jurisdiction and the remedy sought by appellant is
not an appellant remedy. See Ex pane Winston, 9 Nev. 71 (1893) discussed in text.
138 Wright 1, 39 P. 872, 874 (Nev. 1895).
139 912 P.2d 255 (Nev. 1996).
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inapplicable to horizontal trial court decisions "because only appellate court
decisions may constitute the law of the case."' 147 However, the court stressed
that trial court decisions are still given weight because statutory procedural bars
are applicable in such cases. 48
The result achieved in McKague is inconsistent with Lozada. Why did the
court stress overcoming the statutory procedural bars in Lozada's case without
considering the equally weighted judicial procedural bar of law of the case?
Unlike McKague, Lozada involved an appellate court decision. Some explana-
tions are possible. Either law of the case was purposefully omitted from
inquiry in Lozada in the interests of efficiency or the court did not think to
consider employing the doctrine to the facts of the case. However, a third more
remote explanation is possible. Perhaps the court was attempting to steer away
from its rigid construction to a more liberal view of law of the case. Consider
the following cases.
3. Murray v. State
In Murray v. State,149 a jury convicted Murray on two counts of attempted
robbery with the use of a deadly weapon. " Murray then filed a direct appeal,
which the court dismissed.' 5 ' Murray filed a post-conviction petition for a writ
of habeas in the district court challenging the sentence.' 52 The district court
found merit in Murray's claim and "remanded" to its fellow district court to re-
sentence Murray.' 5 3 The court of remand refused to alter the sentence and
Murray appealed.154 On appeal, the state argued that Murray's claim was
barred under law of the case because it involved a decided issue - the validity
of Murray's sentence.' 5 5 The court held on the earlier appeal that Murray's
sentence was "within the statutory limits,' 156 but refused to apply law of the
case for two reasons. First, the issue apparently was not entirely the same as
argued on the second appeal.' 5 7 Second, and more interesting, a case decided
117 Id. at 259 (emphasis added).
148 Id. at 259-60.
14 803 P.2d 225 (Nev. 1990).




"I Id. This decision pre-dated McKrague. Perhaps the district court did not feel law of the
case bound it to the decision of its fellow court. The law proved inconclusive as yet on this
issue. If law of the case did weigh against the court, on "remand" several factors are rele-
vant according to Professor Vestal: "the distaste judges have for repeated work which has
already been done; the general respect that one judge has for another; [and] the desire for
stability in the law." Vestal, supra note 39, at 16-17. In this case, however, the first district
court has no power to remand to a fellow district court so law of the case is inapplicable.
Murray v. State, 803 P.2d 225, 226 (Nev. 1990). In a dissenting opinion in a case written by
Justice Springer, a district judge reconsidered and overruled a prior district judge's decision.
Masonry & Title Contractors Ass'n of S. Nev. v. Jolley, Urga, & Wirth, Ltd., 941 P.2d 486
(Nev. 1997) (Springer, J., dissenting). The judge refused to adhere to law of the case
because, according to the judge, the decision was clearly erroneous. Id. at 492. Ironically,
the judge was clearly erroneous in his interpretation of Nevada law of the case!




between Murray's first appeal and his second appeal offered clarity or, in the
court's words, "explained the law."' 5 8 Arguably then, a decision of law fixed
between two appeals in a case, not appertaining to the case or its proceedings,
might offer clarifying or explanatory rules that govern the second appeal.' 59
This rationale sounds too much like the law of the case as a principle of adher-
ence as opposed to the no power theory of Nevada law of the case.' 60 A shift
was occurring. Applying this rationale to the hypothetical illustrated in the
Introduction, Lenny might argue on a second appeal that "explanatory law"
changed the result on the hearsay issue and, therefore, the court should recon-
sider the issue. This result might defeat a practical efficiency interest, but it
favors the right decision.
4. Mazzan v. Whitley
In Mazzan v. Whitley, 6 ' the court continued to find exception to law of
the case. In 1979, Mazzan was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.
16 2
Several petitions and appeals followed this conviction.' 63 The court noted it
had already decided a few of Mazzan's assertions in previous proceedings.'
1
The court then introduced the normal statutory bars like the ones used in
Lozada and other cases, namely Nevada Revised Statute 34.810(2) and (3). 165
These statutes require a showing of good cause. 16 6 Mixed in with these stat-
utes, the court injected law of the case doctrine as an additional procedural
element Mazzan must overcome. 167 Not present in the discussion, however,
are any distinguishing factors from these statutory bars and law of the case.
168
It appeared from the reading that Mazzan overcame all his procedural hurdles
by a showing of "good cause."
' 16 9
E. Summary of Nevada Points on Law of the Case
From the foregoing analysis of the history of law of the case, several
points about the Nevada doctrine are apparent. A list of these points will facili-
tate the following section entitled Criticism and An Alternative Route.
158 Id. at 227.
159 Indeed, if two cases are positioned on the same point of law but with inconsistent results
and without significantly varied facts, it would seem quite logical that "neither is the law of
the case." Greene v. Rothschild, 402 P.2d 356 (Wash. 1966) (citing Gage v. Downey, 29 P.
635 (Cal. 1892)); In re Estate of Walker, 181 P. 792 (Cal. 1919) (emphasis in original).
16o Cf Barrett v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1987); Counsel of Alternative Political
Parties v. Hooks, 179 F.3d 64 (3d Cir. 1999).
161 921 P.2d 920 (Nev. 1996).
162 Id. at 920.
163 Id. at 920-21.
164 Id. at 922.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. Note the similarity produced in this case and Lozada. However, the Lozada court
failed to implicate law of the case while Mazzan did.
168 Id. passim.
169 Id. at 922.
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1) Nevada courts associated law of the case with res judicata under princi-
ples of estoppel as opposed to stare decisis under principles of correct
application of rules.' 7 o
2) Nevada courts adopted the no power theory of law of the case, mean-
ing, once the court rules it cannot depart from that prior rule except
upon a motion for rehearing. 7 '
3) The scope of law of the case in Nevada is limited to only appellate
decisions. 172
4) Law of the case applies to any issue on appeal properly raised, deliber-
ated, and decided. 1
73
5) Nevada law of the case cannot be avoided by a more detailed and pre-
cisely focused argument subsequently made after reflection upon the
previous proceedings.
174
6) Law of the case applies to all issues where the facts are substantially
the same.' 75
III. CRITICISM AND AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE
This section of the note will compare the law of the case doctrine in
Nevada with the current federal framework. As the court adopted the "no
power theory" from outside cases back in 1895, it is appropriate now to con-
trast the Nevada view with current cases. In Wright I, the court stated that it
looked to the opinions of its sister courts, federal courts, and the U.S. Supreme
Court. A complete analysis calls for comparison of the Nevada interpretation
with those jurisdictions from which Nevada adopted its interpretation. How-
ever, for sake of brevity and to facilitate concentration on current doctrine, this
note will limit comparison to the current federal framework.
One might argue the significance of equating law of the case to res judi-
cata or stare decisis. These doctrines indeed share similar characteristics and
are sometimes confused with one another.' 76 Generally speaking, however,
courts that adopt the no power theory associate law of the case to res judicata, a
strict preclusion doctrine blind to any hindsight. 177 On the other hand, other
170 Cartan v. David, 4 P. 61 (Nev. 1884); Wright 1, 39 P. 872 (Nev. 1895).
171 Wright 1, 39 P. 872; State v. Loveless, 150 P.2d 1015 (Nev. 1944).
172 McKague v. Whitley, 912 P.2d 255 (Nev. 1996).
173 Loveless, 150 P.2d 1015.
174 Hall v. State, 535 P.2d 797 (Nev. 1975).
175 Wright 1, 39 P. 872; Walker v. State, 455 P.2d 34 (Nev. 1969).
176 In Swanson v. Swanson, 5 P.3d 973 (Idaho 2000), the court equated law of the case to
stare decisis. The court, speaking of law of the case noted, "[l]ike stare decisis it protects
against relitigation of settled issues." Id. at 977. This equation is disingenuous to principles
of stare decisis since a court may decide the issue mistakenly on the first appeal. Such a case
is not settled. Idaho is one of the few states like Nevada that adhere to the no power theory.
The court should have related its interpretation of law of the case to res judicata.
177 See supra note 16; see also United States v. ITT Rayonier, 627 F.2d 996, 1004 (9th Cir.
1980) ("The doctrine of res judicata does not depend on whether the prior judgment was free
of error. If it did, judgments would lack finality, the very rationale of the rule of res judi-
cata.") (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940)); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257,
270 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("[T]he doctrine of the law of the case, unlike res judicata but like stare
decisis, does not preclude reconsideration of erroneous decisions.").
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courts view law of the case as a rule of adherence, like stare decisis, allowing
departure under certain circumstances.' 7 8
In the classic case, Linn v. Minor, the court left the following instruction:
"whenever a court is called upon to depart from a prior determination" it must
take into account "all improvements in the science of the law."1 7 9 However,
only a few years later the court failed to follow that instruction and instead
followed a path set by other jurisdictions.' 8 ° The court in Wright I and other
decisions characterized law of the case as kin to res judicata.' 8 '
Law of the case ought to operate more like stare decisis. It cannot act like
res judicata since the doctrine is not limited to decisive issues. Law of the case
extends to a multitude of issues presented, deliberated, and decided in one
case.' 82 To mandate strict preclusionary effect to all these issues is an uncom-
fortable prospect. A court might be prone to lackadaisically dismiss a collateral
issue with little forethought if it is not the determinative issue. This does not
mean that all judicial dictum of the Nevada Supreme Court is flagrantly cur-
sory. But, given the court's extremely pressing burden, overlooking a few col-
lateral issues is not an implausible occurrence.
183
The Loveless court cautioned that a decision is only authority if "there was
an application of the judicial mind to the precise question adjudged; and that
the point was investigated with care and considered in the fullest extent."' 8 4
Does that mean that only carefully considered judicial dictum is binding under
law of the case? Is the issue of "careful consideration" a presumption, an
irrebuttable presumption? If law of the case extends to a multitude of issues, a
power of departure is warranted. Law of the case ought to operate like stare
decisis. Its overreaching effect should demand flexibility. In this way, law of
the case and stare decisis share the same aim, to ensure a consistent body of
law. For example, the hypothetical in the Introduction would allow Lenny to
reargue the issue of hearsay before the court. This result is sound since the
litigant in the intervening case received beneficial treatment on the issue.
In addition to this noted exception to law of the case, the case law is
replete with categorical exceptions including allowing departure when a past
decision is erroneous or would work a manifest injustice.'8 5 These cases fully
178 Schopler, supra note 6, § 3(a) and cases cited therein; see also, Steinman, supra note 1,
at 598-99 nn.8-10.
179 4 Nev. 462, 466-67 (1868).
180 State v. Loveless, 150 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Nev. 1944).
'I Ild. at 1017-18; Wright 1, 39 P. 872 (Nev. 1895).
182 Loveless, 150 P.2d at 1019.
183 There is no doubt that Nevada is one of the fastest growing states in America. Conse-
quently, litigation in Nevada is on the rise. In a matter of just five years, cases appealed to
the Nevada Supreme Court increased dramatically. Susan Wilson, Proper Person Litigation
In The Nevada Supreme Court, 6 NEV. LAW. 24 (1998). A growing state provides an addi-
tional reason to abandon the no power theory. Within a matter of time, Nevada may aug-
ment its court system with intermediate appellate courts. Complications may ensue
regarding applicability of the law of the case doctrine. See Greene v. Rothschild, 402 P.2d
356 (Wash. 1966) (citing Note, Law of the Case, 5 STAN L. REV. 751 (1953)).
"8 Loveless, 150 P.2d at 1019.
185 Steinman, supra note 1, at 599; Schopler, supra note 6, § 6 and cases cited therein.
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elaborate why efficiency must capitulate to accuracy.186 A quick review of
such decisions extols the reasons behind the rule.
Most if not all federal jurisdictions hold to the view that law of the case is
not an "inexorable command." '87 Perhaps one of the most respected and foun-
dational cases espousing this view is White v. Murtha.188 There, the court
faced the question of whether it should adhere to a former decision. In review-
ing the case law pertaining to law of the case, it summarized the competing
principles as follows:
The "law of the case" rule is based on the salutary and sound public policy that
litigation should come to an end. It is predicated on the premise that "there would be
no end to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated appeals, compel a court
to listen to criticisms on their opinions or speculate of chances from changes in its
members," and that it would be impossible for an appellate court "to perform its
duties satisfactorily and efficiently" and expeditiously "if a question, once considered
and decided by it were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any and every
subsequent appeal" thereof. While the "law of the case" doctrine is not an inexorable
command, a decision of a legal issue or issues by an appellate court establishes the
"law of the case" and must be followed in all subsequent proceedings in the same
case in the trial court or on a later appeal in the appellate court, unless the evidence
on a subsequent trial was substantially different, controlling authority has since made
a contrary decision of the law applicable to such issues, or the decision was clearly
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. 1 89
This interpretation of the doctrine is found in many recent federal court
opinions. 19° The Second Circuit takes an even more relaxed approach to the
doctrine.19 1 In Rezzonico v. H & R Block, Inc.,' 92 the court explained that law
of the case is a discretionary doctrine and not a mandatory one. The doctrine
applies, according to the court, absent "cogent or compelling" reasons.' 93 This
is by far the most liberal approach to law of the case as it vests the court with
room for reason; however, the majority of circuits limit departure to the catego-
ries established in Murtha.194
This interpretation is a far cry from Nevada's strict construction. Nevada
saw fit long ago to adopt the current interpretation; it is now years behind the
186 Schopler, supra note 6, § 6 and cases cited therein.
187 See, e.g., Craft v. United States, 233 F.3d 358, 363 (6th Cir. 2000); Greene v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 210 F.3d 1237, 1241 (10th Cir. 2000).
188 377 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir. 1967).
189 Id. at 431-32.
190 United States v. Paquette, 201 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2000); Counsel of Alternative Political
Parties v. Hooks, 179 F.3d 64 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Aramony, 166 F.3d 655 (4th
Cir. 1998); Gates v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 881 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1989); Holloway v. Brush,
220 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2000); Creek v. Vill. of Westhaven, 144 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 1998);
Little Earth of United Tribes, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 807 F.2d 1433 (8th
Cir. 1986); Coleman v. Calderon, 210 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2000); Greene v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 210 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2000); Royal Ins. Co. v. Latin Am. Aviation Serv., Inc., 210
F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2000); Gould, Inc. v. United States, 67 F.3d 925 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 199 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605
(1983).
191 Steinman, supra note 1, at 614-15.
192 182 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1999).
193 Id. at 149.
194 See cases cited in supra note 185.
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existing view in the federal system. Nevada should adopt the Murtha view.
Adoption of the categorical exceptions presented in Murtha would require
Nevada to overturn the no power theory, but such a sacrifice is justified. In
fact, adopting the Murtha categorical exceptions to law of the case will harmo-
nize the law of the case doctrine with Murray, Mazzan, and Lozada.
The first categorical exception in Murtha is that law of the case does not
apply if controlling authority has since made contrary decisions.' 9 5 If a deci-
sion on a first appeal is altered, clarified, or changed by intervening law,1 96 and
the second appellate decision factors in the intervening law, harmony is struck
producing a general consistency in the law. Applying this principle to Murray,
the court could have changed its decision on the second appeal with Odoms v.
State,19 7 an intervening decision, regardless of whether law of the case pre-
cluded the issue. Here, the Murtha exception applies. The court decided that
the issue presented on the second appeal differed from the first justifying a
departure from the doctrine.' 9 8 But had the issue been the same, under the
Murtha exception, the court could follow the Odoms decision. Conversely,
under the no power theory, the court could not account for the intervening
Odoms decision if the issue presented in the first appeal is substantially similar
to the second appeal. Therefore, to ensure consistency in the Nevada case law,
Nevada courts should overrule the no power theory in favor of the Murtha
exception.
The second Murtha categorical exception to law of the case provides for
departure from the doctrine if adherence would result in an erroneous decision
or work a manifest injustice.' 9 9 This principle echoes the underlying theory of
overruling the wrong decision in stare decisis. The Nevada Supreme Court
decisions of Lozada and Mazzan apply these principles in direct violation of
Nevada's law of the case interpretation. In Lozada, the court did not mention
law of the case, yet changed a prior decision because it reached the incorrect
result.2° In Mazzan, the court mentioned law of the case, yet applied the doc-
trine because plaintiff failed to show "good cause" for disregarding the doc-
trine. In both cases, the Nevada legislature drafted procedural bars, and in so
doing, created an exception upon a showing of "good cause. 2 °1 If the Nevada
Supreme Court will adopt the Murtha exceptions, harmony would not only
result in the case law, but also between the Nevada Supreme Court and the
Nevada Legislature. Good cause would allow the court to depart from an erro-
neous ruling. The court must overrule the no power theory. Otherwise, a con-
tinual friction between the legislature and the court will prevail.
195 377 F.2d at 431-32 (5th Cir. 1967).
196 See, e.g., Barrett v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Hooks, 179 F.3d
64.
' 714 P.2d 568 (Nev. 1986).
198 Murray v. State, 803 P.2d 225, 226 (Nev. 1990).
199 377 F.2d at 431-42.
200 871 P.2d at 944.
201 See supra note 117.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Nevada should restructure law of the case to account for recent develop-
ments in the doctrine. The old theory is outdated. The Nevada Supreme Court
adopted the "no power theory" of law of the case as a result of existing case
law prevalent at the time from various jurisdictions, including the federal cir-
cuits. Since then the entire federal system changed its scheme to discount the
no power theory. Categorical exceptions employed by the federal courts pro-
vide a practical solution to the unforgiving result of the no power theory. If a
decision on the first appeal is changed, altered, or clarified by an intervening
decision, or if the first decision on the case is clearly wrong or works a manifest
injustice, law of the case should not hold to perpetuate error. Therefore, the
Nevada Supreme Court should apply the Murtha categorical exceptions. In
doing so, the court will provide not only a workable standard, but also ensure
the integrity of the law of the case remains well within defined limits.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Banegas v. State Indus. Ins. Sys.
19 P.3d 245 (Nev. 2001)
Co-habitant not entitled to death benefits under Nevada statutory law
where not legally recognized as a dependent.
Annabelle and Robert Banegas were unmarried cohabitants. Annabelle
relied on Robert for financial support. Robert was killed in a work-related acci-
dent, and Annabelle sought death benefits from the State Industrial Insurance
System (SIIS). SIIS denied her application, and Annabelle brought suit in dis-
trict court under Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.505(8), arguing that the statute "in all
other cases" was a catchall that allowed non-factual dependants to claim bene-
fits. The district court denied Annabelle's claims and Annabelle appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the legislature only intended to pro-
vide death benefits to persons in legally recognized relationships with the
deceased. By reference to the title of the statute and other subsections, the
court concluded that a cohabitant was not entitled to death benefits under Nev.
Rev. Stat. 616C.505(8).
City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Crockett
24 P.3d 553 (Nev. 2001)
No formal amendment of a redevelopment plan is required for an adminis-
trative interpretation constituting a fair construction of the original plan.
In order to facilitate the transfer of land to the Stratosphere Hotel and
Casino for development, the City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment
Agency (Agency) filed eminent domain complaints against several landowners.
Two of these owners opposed and moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that
the Agency's actions were beyond the scope of its mandate. The district court,
using a "materiality" test to determine if the Agency was required to amend its
redevelopment plan, found that the proposed actions were substantial and
required the Agency to amend its plan. The district court subsequently dis-
missed the Agency's complaint, and the Agency appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that vacating streets and relocating a park did
not constitute a material deviation from or change to the redevelopment plan
such that a formal amendment of the plan was mandated. The court noted that,
while an approved redevelopment plan must be formally amended if materially
changed, formal amendment is not necessary for an administrative interpreta-
tion of the plan's details. Redevelopment that is consistent with the approved
redevelopment plan's express language or a fair construction of that language
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does not require a formal amendment, given that there is no deviation from or
change to the plan's general import.
City of North Las Vegas v. Pardee Constr. Co. of Nev.
21 P.3d 8 (Nev. 2001)
A City of North Las Vegas fee, which passes on the costs of Southern
Nevada Water Authority Improvements, is a "cost-based fee" and not a "devel-
opment impact fee."
Plaintiff Pardee Construction Company (Pardee) signed a development
agreement with the City of North Las Vegas (City), wherein the City agreed not
to impose any additional development-impact fees, and Pardee agreed to pay
existing development-impact fees and any new cost-based fees. Subsequently,
the City participated with six other southern Nevada municipalities to create the
Southern Nevada Water Authority (SNWA). The SNWA developed a capital
improvements plan in order to broaden existing water supply and provide for
increasing demand. The SNWA passed its costs on to the City, and the City
passed its costs directly to its consumers, including plaintiff. Plaintiff asserted
that such costs are related to development, and are therefore prohibited under
the City-Pardee agreement.
In ruling that the City's fee was "cost-based," the Nevada Supreme Court
noted that the fee was based on actual costs, and that only actual costs were
being passed onto consumers. In addition, the definition of "impact fees" must
involve reference to Nev. Rev. Stat. 278B, which allows the City to charge
impact fees to developers only after complying with numerous statutory provi-
sions and in accord with a capital improvement plan. Here, no such plan was
contemplated, and the court ruled the SNWA's improvements were not suffi-
ciently related to the City's efforts to strengthen or build its own infrastructure.
City of Reno v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of the City of Reno
34 P.3d 120 (Nev. 2001)
Civil Service Commission approval is not required to lay off a city
employee who can no longer fulfill an essential job requirement.
In 1996, the United States Congress amended the Gun Control Act of
1968, making it illegal for individuals convicted of domestic violence to carry
firearms. An arbitrator allowed the City of Reno to lay off police officers that
could no longer carry firearms as a result of this amendment. When the Civil
Service Commission of the City of Reno refused to approve the layoffs, the
City of Reno filed a writ of mandate, petition for judicial review, and complaint
for declaratory judgment. The district court denied the writ of mandate and
petition for judicial review, but granted declaratory judgment for the City. The
City of Reno appealed and the Civil Service Commission cross-appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the City was not required to gain
approval from the Civil Service Commission to lay off officers in this circum-
stance. The court found that, while the Civil Service Commission has authority
over layoffs resulting from reductions in staff, the Commission's authority does
not extend to layoffs of police officers who could no longer fulfill a job qualifi-
cation, such as being unable to carry a firearm under federal law.
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
Chief Justice Maupin dissented, joined by Justice Agosti. The dissent
asserted that the action constituted a dismissal, not a layoff, which can be
appealed to the Civil Service Commission under section 9.050 of the City
Charter. The City Charter gives the Commission authority over the selection,
appointment, and promotion of employees in the civil service and gives
employees the right to appeal regarding dismissals, demotions, suspensions,
and disciplinary actions.
Clark v. Columbia/IHCA Info. Servs., Inc.
25 P.3d 215 (Nev. 2001)
Immunity under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA) does
not extend to a hospital and its peer review board when decisions are not made
in furtherance of quality health care.
Appellant Clark was a child psychiatrist who practiced intermittently at
Truckee Meadows Hospital (now known as West Hills Hospital). Clark was
concerned that the hospital was not following established procedure in that it
discharged patients prematurely, providing deficient child psychiatric care.
Clark wrote letters and provided reports to outside agencies in an effort to bring
the hospital's practices to light. He also complained that the hospital used his
superior credentials to qualify an affiliate facility for accreditation, though the
hospital knew that Clark was not employed there. The hospital reacted by
holding peer review board meetings and subsequently revoking Clark's hospital
privileges. The hospital alleged that Clark engaged in "activities or profes-
sional conduct which are disruptive to Hospital operations."
Clark filed an action in United States District Court, alleging violation of
various antitrust provisions and claims based on state tort and contract law.
The hospital filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion was granted on
federal antitrust claims, stating that Clark did not produce evidence to support
his claims and, even if he had, the defendants were immune under the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§11111-11112.
A three-judge panel of the Nevada Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
Defendants petitioned for rehearing, and the case was transferred for en banc
consideration.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the defendants were not immune
because the peer review decision to revoke the plaintiffs staff privileges was
not made in furtherance of quality health care. The court determined that
Clark's privileges were revoked because of his whistle-blowing activities,
which did not meet the objectives of § 11112 (a)(1).
Diamond v. Swick
28 P.3d 1087 (Nev. 2001)
A manufactured home dealer violates Nevada law by providing false infor-
mation to a lender, even in the absence of dealer fraud or actual reliance by the
lender.
Diamond, the administrator of the Nevada Manufactured Housing Divi-
sion (Division), filed a complaint against the employees of Silver State Mobile
Homes, Inc., seeking to revoke their dealer licenses for submitting false infor-
mation to lending institutions by representing dealer rebates as actual cash
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down payments on credit applications. On seventy-three credit applications,
Silver State represented all, or part of, a dealer's rebate as a cash down pay-
ment. The applications were submitted to three lending institutions, only one
of which was unaware of Silver State's practice.
The hearing officer concluded that knowledge of the information's falsity
precluded a lender from receiving "false" information under Nev. Rev. Stat.
489.401(7). Furthermore, because of the lender's knowledge, the financing
statements did not contain fraudulent information that would lead a lender to
finance a home sale it would not otherwise have financed. The district court
affirmed the administrative determination and denied the Division's petition for
judicial review. The Division then appealed, contending the hearing officer
based his decision on an error of law.
The Nevada Supreme Court first addressed the question of whether a man-
ufactured home dealer's submission of a contract to a lender, which represented
a dealer rebate as a cash down payment, would be deemed "false" for purposes
of the statute, even if the lender knew of the falsity of the information. The
court concluded that a plain reading of the statute does not require fraud or
reliance because the statute was designed to protect all lenders, including those
in the secondary market. Thus, by misstating the actual cash down payment,
interest rate and credit standards would differ, artificially affecting the lending
market.
Second, the court considered whether the Division was required to estab-
lish that the dealer intended to defraud, or that the lender relied on the incorrect
information. The court concluded that neither intent nor reliance were neces-
sary elements because the misrepresentations alone could result in increased
lender losses, which would in turn result in higher interest rates on future loans,
thereby affecting the integrity of the entire mobile and manufactured home
lending system.
Employers Ins. Co. of Nev. v. State Bd. of Exam'rs
21 P.3d 628 (Nev. 2001)
A state entity's lease-purchase agreement is not a public debt where the
lease contains a nonappropriation clause, limits recourse to the leased prop-
erty, and does not create a long-term obligation binding future legislatures.
The State Board of Examiners (Board) decided not to review the merits of
Employers Insurance Company of Nevada's (EICON) lease-purchase agree-
ment with the State Department of Administration Buildings and Grounds Divi-
sion (Department). The Board contended that the agreement was a public debt,
and that it improperly lent the state's credit in violation of the Nevada Constitu-
tion. EICON, the lessor, disagreed, and petitioned the Nevada Supreme Court
for a writ of mandamus compelling the Board to review the agreement.
The court ruled that the writ of mandamus application was an appropriate
method to challenge the Board's decision, because the petition presented legal
issues that implicated the Nevada Constitution and public policy. The court
noted that although mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, it is appropriate
when an important issue of law needs clarification and invocation of the court's
original jurisdiction serves public policy, even though other remedies might be
available. The court granted EICON's petition and ordered a writ of manda-
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mus to be issued, finding that the agreement did not violate the Nevada
Constitution.
The court first examined whether the lease-purchase agreement was a
"public debt" and thus prohibited by Article 9, Section 3 of the Nevada Consti-
tution. The court defined a public debt as an obligation that binds future legis-
latures to successive appropriations. The disputed agreement contained
provisions specifically tailored to avoid binding future legislatures. For exam-
ple, the EICON lease-purchase agreement contained an express nonappropria-
tion clause, providing that, in the case of future nonappropriation, EICON
could retake the office space. The agreement also provided that no recourse
was available against the state or its agencies in the event the legislature should
fail to appropriate necessary funds. Based on these provisions, the court held
that the agreement was not a public debt in violation of Article 9, Section 3.
The court overruled State ex rel. Nevada Building Authority v. Hancock, 468
P.2d 333 (Nev. 1970) and expanded on its more recent reasoning in Business
Computer Rentals v. State Treasurer, 953 P.2d 13 (Nev. 1993), holding that, as
a general rule, similar lease-purchase agreements will be upheld where the
lease: (1) contains a nonappropriation clause; (2) limits recourse to the leased
property; and (3) does not create a long-term obligation that is binding on
future legislatures.
The court then addressed the Board's second assertion that the agreement
lent the state's credit in violation of Article 8, Section 9 of the Nevada Consti-
tution. This contention stemmed from a provision allowing EICON to assign
its right to receive lease payments from the Department in order to obtain
financing. The Board argued that this effectively placed the state's credit
behind EICON's ability to obtain financing. The court ruled that the state vio-
lates Article 8, Section 9 only when it acts as a surety or guarantor for the debts
of a company, corporation, or association. Here, no such situation existed,
because the agreement did not make the state legally liable for EICON's debts.
Kintzler v. IRS
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15266 (D. Nev. 2001)
Where taxpayers failed to follow appropriate procedures in challenging
an Internal Revenue Service levy, summary judgment was appropriate for a
resulting civil rights violation complaint.
Taxpayers requested a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing in a timely
fashion after notification of penalties assessed for filing frivolous tax returns.
Following receipt of the Notice of Determination from the CDP hearing officer,
the taxpayers filed an appeal in Tax Court rather than filing the appropriate
petition in United States District Court. The Tax Court dismissed the action for
lack of jurisdiction. The taxpayers then filed suit, claiming violation of civil
rights because the CDP hearing officer refused to discuss the merits of the levy
with them at the hearing.
The district court granted the Internal Revenue Service's motion to dis-
miss, holding that CDP hearings offer a taxpayer the opportunity to request
judicial review of process, not a review on the merits. Therefore, the hearing
officer acted appropriately. Further, plaintiffs had ample opportunity to prove
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the penalties were improper or, in the alternative, to refile corrected returns,
and failed to do so.
McClanahan v. Raley's, Inc.
34 P.3d 573 (Nev. 2001)
An administrative officer's decision that is supported by substantial evi-
dence is not open to appellate review by a district court.
Plaintiff McClanahan slipped and fell while working for the defendant.
As a result, he developed avascular necrosis, a deteriorating hip condition, and
filed a worker's compensation claim. In total, the parties sought four medical
opinions regarding the cause of the hip condition. Two of these concluded that
the fall was the cause of defendant's condition and two said the cause of the
condition could not be determined.
Raley's denied McClanahan's claim, but an appeals officer decided that
the claim was supported by substantial evidence. This decision was then over-
ruled by a state district court. The district court reweighed the evidence and
held that the claim was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence, since
the medical opinions were evenly divided. McClanahan appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the district court's opinion, holding
that the court could only reweigh the evidence if the administrative officer's
decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The court found that,
although the number of medical opinions was evenly split, the preponderance
of the evidence does not rely on the number of witnesses. Further, the adminis-
trative officer also relied on other witnesses, including the plaintiffs supervi-
sor, whom he found to be credible. The court held that the evidence supporting
the administrative officer's decision met that standard.
Rogers v. Heller
18 P.3d 1034 (Nev. 2001)
Initiative petition, which seeks to make an appropriation or to require
expenditure, must also seek to constitutionally raise such funds.
Several businesses challenged an initiative petition that sought to increase
the state's funding for elementary and secondary public schools. The initiative
petition called for setting the level of funding for such schools at fifty percent
of the state's projected revenue for the year. The initiative sought to raise the
funds through a proposed four percent tax on the taxable income of each
Nevada business. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief in district
court, claiming both deficiencies in the initiative's qualification process and
substantive constitutional deficiencies in the initiative itself. The court denied
relief, holding that the initiative was intended as a supplement to school fund-
ing and, thus, not clearly unconstitutional. Plaintiffs appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that Article 19, Section 6 of the Nevada
Constitution requires that any proposed statute or amendment that includes an
appropriation or expenditure of funds impose a tax or other constitutional
method of raising revenue sufficient to fund the proposal. The court found the
proposed four percent tax would only raise about $270,000,000, while fifty
percent of the state's general fund amounts to about $750,000,000. Although
the new tax would raise sufficient funds to increase current educational spend-
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ing to the proposed level, the court held that the legislature is not required to
fund at the current level. If the legislature were to allot less money to educa-
tion, then the four percent tax would not be sufficient. Therefore, the court
held that the initiative would have to include a proposal to raise enough reve-
nue to sufficiently fund the entire financial requirement ($750,000,000).
Justice Rose dissented, assertng that this would require any initiative peti-
tion to identify an independent source of revenue in order to be constitutional.
He argued that this was too strict a holding for a process that should be liberally
construed to preserve the will of the petitioners.
United States v. State Eng'r, State of Nevada
27 P.3d 51 (Nev. 2001)
The Bureau of Land Management may be granted water permits without
actually holding livestock grazing permits in its own name.
Plaintiff, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), applied to the State
Engineer of Nevada (Engineer) for permits to create nine livestock watering
holes in various locations. The BLM did not claim to actually have any live-
stock; it wanted only to grant the rights to individuals seeking grazing permits
from the BLM. The Engineer denied the permits on the basis that the BLM
was not legally considered an individual authorized to graze livestock on public
land under Nev. Rev. Stat. 533.503. BLM petitioned for district court review
of the Engineer's decision. The district court denied the petition and BLM
appealed.
BLM asserted that the phrase "legally entitled" in the statute means either
the landowner or the person with permission to graze livestock on the land.
The Engineer argued that only those with permits to graze livestock were
legally entitled and that BLM did not possess grazing permits.
The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner that there was only
one reasonable interpretation of the statute, and that the Engineer's interpreta-
tion, requiring the BLM to issue itself a permit, was illogical and unreasonable.
The court reversed, holding that the Engineer had exceeded his authority by
ignoring the plain meaning of the statute.
Justice Becker asserted that the statute was ambiguous, claiming that the
legislature intended "legally entitled" to be interpreted in the manner that the
Engineer read the statute. Justice Becker nonetheless concurred in the judg-
ment, finding that the legislature's intent in Nev. Rev. Stat. 533.503 would
violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev. v. DR Partners
18 P.3d 1042 (Nev. 2001)
The office of community college president is not a public office and, there-
fore, the interviewing of applicants for that office may be conducted in closed
sessions.
Appellant, University and Community College System of Nevada
(UCCSN), appealed from a district court order, enjoining it from interviewing
applicants for the job of community college president in closed sessions.
UCCSN argued that the district court's finding that the office of community
college president is a public office was erroneous and that UCCSN was not
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prohibited from interviewing presidential candidates in a closed session.
Respondent DR Partners, commonly known as the Las Vegas Review Journal
(RJ) newspaper, claimed that the office of community college president is a
public office. RJ argued that although Nev. Rev. Stat. 241, Nevada's open
meeting law, does not define "public office" or "public officer," it prohibits the
presidential search committee from discussing a public officer's appointment
behind closed doors.
The court ruled the position was not created by statute or state constitu-
tion, but by the Board of Regents in its bylaws, and, therefore, could not be
viewed as a public office. Crucial to the court's ruling was Nev. Rev. Stat. 281,
which governs public officers and defines a public officer as "a person elected
or appointed to a position" that either is established by state constitution or
statute, or by charter or ordinance of a state political subdivision, and involves
the continuous exercise of a public power, trust, or duty as part of regular and
permanent government administration.
Further, the court reversed the district court's injunctive order and dis-
agreed with the RJ's reasoning that important presidential functions made the
position a public office. The court held that, although the community college
president holds an important position, it is ultimately the Board of Regents and
the chancellor who maintain control over higher education.
Chief Justice Maupin, joined by Justices Young and Leavitt, dissented,
agreeing with the RJ that the office satisfied the statutory criteria. The dissent
argued that UCCSN and its governing Board was a political subdivision of the
state and that their governing documents were analogous in purpose to a munic-
ipal body's charter. The dissent also argued that the position met the second
statutory criteria, as the president has been entrusted by law with a significant
part of the state's functions of higher education, a fact acknowledged by the
majority.
BUSINESS LAW
Mallard Auto. Group, Ltd. v. LeClair Mgmt. Corp.
153 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (D. Nev. 2001)
Commingling of a married couple's personal funds with those of a corpo-
ration owned by the wife creates genuine issues of material fact as to whether
husband and corporation are alter egos.
David Smith owed the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) over $1,000,000.
His wife owned LeClair Corporation but employed her husband as manager,
allowing him to make all the decisions concerning the operation of the busi-
ness. During LeClair's existence, Smith and his wife paid their personal
expenses out of LeClair's account and did not maintain any personal bank
accounts.
When LeClair was sold to Mallard, the IRS claimed the proceeds, assert-
ing that the doctrine of alter ego should allow reverse piercing of the corporate
veil, and that LeClair's assets should be used to satisfy part of Smith's debt.
Mallard filed an interpleader, and LeClair moved for summary judgment, argu-
ing that the money belonged to Mrs. Smith and the corporation.
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The court denied the motion, holding that genuine issues of material fact
existed concerning whether the government could establish the three elements
of the alter ego: 1) that Smith dominated and controlled LeClair; 2) that LeClair
and Smith had unity of interest; and 3) that maintaining the fiction that Smith
and LeClair were separate entities would result in a fraud on the public.
Trs. of the Cement Masons & Plasterers Health & Welfare Trust v.
Fabel Concrete, Inc.
159 F. Supp. 2d 1249 (D. Nev. 2001)
Alter-ego status makes a company responsible for the commitments and
obligations of its counterpart.
Old Republic posted a bond for Fabel Concrete (Concrete Bond) with the
Nevada State Contractors Board and, approximately five months later, posted a
second bond for Fabel Enterprise (Enterprise Bond). The application for Enter-
prise listed the company as a new business and made reference to the Concrete
Bond and the common owner, Robert Fabel. Before issuing the bond, Republic
reviewed the personal finances of Robert and Susan Fabel. After the first bond,
but before the second bond, Fabel Concrete signed a labor agreement, requiring
payments to the Trust Fund on behalf of covered employees. After signing the
labor agreement, the Trust Fund sought delinquent payments from Fabel Con-
crete on behalf of the employees covered by the fund. In the interim, Fabel
Concrete had closed operations and re-formed as Fabel Enterprise (a non-union
shop), which refused to make the past payments. Old Republic, who stood as
Fabel's surety, also refused to pay. The Trustees then brought an action to
force payment.
Old Republic argued that it should not be liable for the Enterprise Bond
because of Enterprise's fraud in listing itself as a new business on the bond
application. However, the Nevada Supreme Court found that the parties had
stipulated to the alter-ego status of Faber Enterprise and Faber Concrete. Thus,
the court found that it only needed to determine if the alter-ego status required
Old Republic to pay the Enterprise Bond.
The court found that, under Nev. Rev. Stat. 624.273(1), a surety bond
must be available to benefit any employee of a contractor who performed labor
on or near the construction site covered by a contract, or is injured by an unlaw-
ful act or omission of the contractor in the performance of the contract. Old
Republic issued the surety bond to cover labor performed, regardless of
whether Enterprise was or would enter into any labor agreement. As an alter-




34 P.3d 584 (Nev. 2001)
A motion to dismiss does not constitute a "trial" for purposes of Nev. R.
Civ. P. 41(e).
Plaintiff Allyn contended that her lawyer, McDonald, while representing
Allyn in a divorce action against her husband, promised to file a separate per-
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sonal injury claim against the husband. When McDonald did not do so, Allyn
filed a malpractice claim against McDonald. In the course of that litigation, the
district court held that the issue of the husband's abuse towards Allyn had been
litigated in the divorce action and could not be re-litigated in any new action
under the res judicata doctrine.
McDonald subsequently moved to dismiss the malpractice claim, arguing
that the resjudicata holding gave Allyn's husband a complete defense and, as
such, the failure to file a separate tort action did not cause Allyn damage. After
the district court found for McDonald, Allyn sought leave to amend her com-
plaint but did not submit the motion for several months. When she finally did
submit the motion, McDonald moved to dismiss because Nev. R. Civ. P. 41(e)
requires that an action be brought within three years of the remittur from the
previous appeal. The court granted the motion and Allyn appealed.
The plaintiff contended that, when she challenged the defendant's motion
to dismiss on res judicata grounds, the action was "brought to trial" for pur-
poses of Nev. R. Civ. P. 41(e).
The Nevada Supreme Court determined that Nev. R. Civ. P. 41(e) required
that an "action" be brought within three years, not just an "issue" involved in
the case. Therefore, the defendant's motion to dismiss resolved only one issue
and did not settle the entire action, requiring the application of the three-year
time restriction. In addition, the court recognized the need for strict adherence
to the guidelines set forth in Nev. R. Civ. P. 41(e), indicating that the time
frame was a mandatory obligation for the court, regardless of the equities or
circumstances surrounding the order of dismissal.
Anderson v. Kahre
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8180 (D. Nev. 2001)
Tax lien sale was proper where challenging party could offer no evidence
that the sale was not proper or in accordance with United States Code or
Nevada Revised Statutes.
Anderson bought Kahre's property at an Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
auction. After the required six-month redemption period, Anderson received
the deed and recorded it. Kahre contested the sale. Both sides filed actions to
quiet title and Anderson moved for summary judgment.
The district court held that Kahre offered no evidence that the sale was
improper or that the sale violated federal or state statutes governing tax lien
sales. Since Kahre showed no interest, right, or title that he may have held
when the IRS lien attached the property, the court granted Anderson summary
judgment.
Badillo v. Am. Tobacco Co.
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10233 (D. Nev. 2001)
Plaintiffs' motions for class certification in lawsuits against several
tobacco companies were denied because individual determinations required to
reach a decision in the cases predominated and defeated the purpose of a class
action suit.
The federal district court denied class certification for plaintiffs in four
separate lawsuits against tobacco companies. The plaintiffs, smoking and non-
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smoking casino workers exposed to second hand smoke during their employ-
ment, sought class certification in suits alleging various claims against their
former employers, including continuing medical monitoring of developing
disease.
On its own motion, the Nevada Supreme Court certified that Nevada com-
mon law does not recognize a cause of action for medical monitoring. The
Nevada Supreme Court further noted that medical monitoring may be available
as a remedy, but neither party had briefed the issue or set forth a cause of action
for which it would provide a remedy.
In considering whether plaintiffs' motions for class certification should be
granted, the federal district court concurred with the Nevada Supreme Court
that Nevada common law does not recognize a medical monitoring cause of
action and that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a viable cause of action
to which medical monitoring could properly be tied as a remedy.
On the issue of class certification, the court reviewed each of the proposed
classes under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, the governing rule for certifying a class. The
court held that, although the plaintiffs did not specify the size of the respective
classes, defendants did not contest the assertion that each plaintiffs' class would
be so numerous that joinder of all members would be impracticable. However,
the court held that the plaintiffs did not meet the commonality and predomi-
nance requirements, and the members of the proposed plaintiffs' classes
presented many individual issues, making certification improper. Since these
issues would necessarily be based on an individual assessment in each case, the
ability to establish commonality and predominance was frustrated. Similarly,
the typicality requirement was frustrated by plaintiffs' inability to demonstrate
that the claims were typical of the entire class. Because plaintiffs failed on the
commonality and typicality requirements, they could not adequately represent
the interests of all members within their proposed classes, and certification was
improper.
Cal. Retail Natural Gas & Elec. Antitrust Litig. v. S. Cal. Gas Co.
170 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (D. Nev. 2001)
Cases regarding California gas and electrical company trade practices
were properly heard in state court, as they lacked federal subject matter
jurisdiction.
In eight consolidated actions, the plaintiffs (representing various Califor-
nia natural gas and electric rate payers) sued to recover damages on behalf of
those rate payers. They alleged defendants' conduct resulted in unfair business
practices and unfair competition. The defendant removed the actions to federal
district court. The plaintiffs moved to remand to state court.
The federal district court found that, while there is strong federal interest
in the regulation of electricity and natural gas, there was no federal law at
question sufficient to allow the federal court to exercise its limited jurisdiction
over the matter. In denying federal subject matter jurisdiction over the claims,
the court could not find any applicable federal law with language expressing
complete exemption from state law. The court held that the claims fell within
the strict guidance and power of the State of California and not under federal
statute, and any applicable federal statute played only a limited role in the case.
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Canterino v. Mirage Casino-Hotel
16 P.3d 415 (Nev. 2001)
Questions asked by jurors during deliberation must be presented to
counsel.
Plaintiff Canterino was beaten and robbed while staying at the Mirage
Hotel and Casino. Canterino alleged the Mirage's security efforts were defi-
cient and the cause of his injuries. At trial, Canterino presented evidence of
permanent physical, neurological, and psychological damage. Mirage denied
liability and presented no evidence that contradicted plaintiff's characterization
of his injuries. Six of the eight jurors found the defendant liable for those
injuries.
The jury then requested instruction as to whether the two remaining jurors
should participate in the determination of damages. After a failed attempt to
contact counsel, the judge informed the jury that only those finding liability
should determine damages. The jury awarded the plaintiff $5.7 million. The
judge found the jury's award excessive and influenced by prejudice, due to
inflammatory comments made by Canterino's counsel at trial. The court
entered a conditional order of remittal, reducing the verdict to $1.5 million.
Canterino refused to accept the remittur and appealed, arguing that the
remittur was improper and that the court had erred in not informing counsel of
the jurors questions regarding damages.
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court found the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering remittur where the defendant did not present evidence
that the damages were excessive. Rather, the court found that the damages
were amply supported by the evidence and that, while appeals to the jury by
Canterino's attorney were improper, they were not sufficiently pervasive as to
taint the jury's verdict. The court also noted that Mirage's counsel had not
objected to opposing counsel's remarks.
The court found that Nevada law requires questions asked by the jurors
during deliberations to be presented to counsel. However, if the judge answers
the question correctly without first submitting it to trial counsel, the judge's
actions are held to be harmless error. In this case, though, the court found that
the judge's response was incorrect and ordered the case remanded for a damage
determination with all jurors participating.
Justice Rose dissented in part, finding the attorney's misconduct influ-
enced the jury's award and should be considered, even in the absence of an
objection by counsel.
Chief Justice Maupin, in a concurring opinion, cautioned lower courts to
exercise restraint in reviewing a record to determine attorney misconduct when
there are no objections. He distinguished this case from the court's recent deci-
sion in DeJesus v. Flick, 7 P.3d 459 (Nev. 2000), finding misconduct when it
was clear from the record that the jury disregarded evidence. Since no evi-
dence on damages was presented by the defense in this case, that was clearly
not the case. Justice Agosti concurred to note that the lower court had found
the jury's damage determination to be amply supported by the evidence, while
the jury in DeJesus had disregarded the evidence in arriving at its damage
verdict.
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Dahya v. County of Washoe
19 P.3d 239 (Nev. 2001)
Where service on an individual in a foreign country that has signed the
Hague Convention is not performed under the methods prescribed by the con-
vention or those methods acceptable within the foreign country wherein pro-
cess is served, such service is not effective.
Casmyn Corporation (Casmyn) filed suit in Reno against Dahya, Cas-
myn's former president and CEO, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and fraudu-
lent use of corporate expense accounts during Dahya's employment by
Casmyn. Dahya was a naturalized Canadian citizen, and resided in Spain when
San Pio, Casmyn's Spanish attorney, served process personally upon Dahya.
Since no Spanish court had authorized San Pio to serve process, Dahya filed a
motion, arguing that service was improper under the Hague Convention and
failed to satisfy Spanish law. The court denied Dahya's motion, stating that
Casmyn was entitled to bypass provisions for service specified in the Hague
Convention because Casmyn complied with Article Nineteen. Article Nineteen
permits a method of transmission allowed by the internal laws of the country
wherein service is effectuated; since Spain did not object to the method of
service, the district court held that Spain had "permitted" Casmyn to serve
Dahya. Dahya appealed.
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court found in favor of Dahya, and
reversed the trial court's decision. The court refuted the district court's inter-
pretation of the Convention, holding that Article Nineteen's "permits" wording
cannot be construed as broadly as attempted by the district court. The court
noted that the Hague Convention was adopted with uniform guidelines on ser-
vice in order to avoid the confusing patchwork of rules that would make litiga-
tion frustrating and difficult for foreign litigants. The court held that the
Convention's intent to streamline service issues would be frustrated by an inter-
pretation of "permits" that would allow for any service not objected to by the
foreign state where service is effectuated. Such an interpretation would also
impinge upon the sovereignty of foreign states. Moreover, the court's opinion
that the district court's interpretation of "permits," "objects," and "opposes" is
inconsonant with the purpose behind the Convention, is supported by different
treatment of the words in other Articles of the Convention.
The Court also determined that, while personal service is allowed in
Spain, Spanish law is silent regarding foreign service by an individual upon a
resident who is not a Spanish citizen. Although both sides argued that Spain's
silence on the matter favored its position, the court found that the weight of
Spanish law supported Dahya's construction, that Spain does not permit service
in such instances, and therefore San Pio's service was ineffective.
Dugan v. Gotsopoules
22 P.3d 205 (Nev. 2001)
A party may testify as to the value of their own vehicle and the cost of a
rental car in a personal injury action.
Dugan sued Gotsopoulos for injuries and damages resulting from a car
accident in which both were involved. Dugan won, but appealed the calcula-
tion of damages, claiming the court erred in refusing to allow her to testify as to
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compensatory damages resulting from the accident. The testimony rejected
included her own testimony as to the value of her vehicle, the Kelley Blue
Book price, and the cost of a rental vehicle.
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed, holding that Dugan should have
been allowed to testify as to the value of her real or personal property because
the value of the property was at issue in the action. Expert testimony is not
required to value personal property. In addition, the court found the Kelley
Blue Book to be an acceptable and reliable publication in the automobile indus-
try for determining the value of an automobile, and evidence based on it should
have been admitted. Finally, the court held that Dugan was entitled to recover
damages for loss of use of her vehicle for the period of time she was unable to
use the property, since the loss resulted from the subject of the action. A mea-
sure of such damages may be rental car costs for the period required to repair
the vehicle. If the party does not actually rent a substitute vehicle due to lack
of financial capacity, they may still provide evidence of the cost, in order to
demonstrate the financial inconvenience and deprivation the owner suffered
from the inability to use their property.
Graziose v. Am. Home Prod. Corp.
202 F.R.D. 638 (D. Nev. 2001)
Permissive joinder of plaintiffs is only allowed when the right to relief
asserted by each plaintiff arises out of the same transaction or occurrence and
there is a common question of law or fact.
Consumers who alleged they sustained injuries from over-the-counter
medications sued various manufacturers and sellers of the medications. The
claims varied in the type of medication and the nature of the damages. The
plaintiffs did not name the exact same defendants in their various actions,
although the claims were connected by the same ingredient in each of the medi-
cations. The defendants moved to sever the plaintiffs.
The district court stated that Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a) required the right to
relief asserted by each plaintiff to arise out of the same transaction or occur-
rence and that there be a question of law or fact common to all parties. If these
requirements are not met, the actions may be severed as long as there is not
substantial prejudice to the plaintiffs. The court found that the claims of the
plaintiffs did not meet the requisites for joinder.
Meyer v. Sunrise Hosp.
22 P.3d 1142 (Nev. 2001)
District court has the right to review decisions made by private hospital
review boards.
Plaintiff Meyer, a physician, saw a homeless patient in the hospital for
seven minutes and released him. Within hours, the patient died of pneumonia.
The hospital conducted a review of Meyer's care for the patient, and a hearing
was held regarding the incident. As a result, plaintiff's medical privileges were
suspended with eligibility to reapply in twelve months. Plaintiff subsequently
filed an action in district court against the hospital for breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, as well as breach of contract.
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The hospital's motion to dismiss was granted by the trial court, which
ruled that the hospital's procedures were followed and that the decision was
reasonable.
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the dismissal. The court
held that the district court had the right to review decisions made by private
hospital review boards, the peer review committee adequately reviewed the evi-
dence, and the committee acted with reasonable belief that suspension was war-
ranted. Plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption that the review committee
acted with reasonable belief and that the suspension was warranted based on
the evidence. Therefore, the hospital was entitled to immunity under the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act.
Michel v. Nevada
17 P.3d 1003 (Nev. 2001)
Although attorney liens have priority over hospital liens, the entire funds
in dispute must first be turned over to the court in an interpleader action in
order to determine the rights of such interest parties.
Attorney Herbert L. Michel, Petitioner, filed a personal injury action on
behalf of Yolanda B. Cervantes (Real Party in Interest) for which Cervantes
agreed to pay forty percent of any amount recovered. Cervantes was awarded
$14,705.00, which was insufficient to pay her $28,346.26 in medical expenses.
Since the medical providers could not agree on a pro-rata share of the arbitra-
tion award, Michel deducted his fees, interpleaded the remaining $8,193.27,
and named Cervantes and the medical providers as defendants. The district
court refused his subsequent request to be discharged from the interpleader
action, and he sought an extraordinary writ from the Nevada Supreme Court,
directing the district court to discharge him.
Based on substantial case law, the court determined that an attorney's lien
does, in fact, have priority over a medical provider lien when the award is
insufficient to pay all liens against the award. The court held that, although
there is an important public policy interest served by enforcing medical pro-
vider liens, there is no authority that supports giving them priority over attorney
liens. Furthermore, Nev. Rev. Stat. 108.600(2) specifically gives attorney liens
priority over "hospital liens," which the court likened to medical provider liens.
However, although the court determined that the interpleader action is the
appropriate procedure to determine the rights of the interested parties, the entire
funds in dispute must first be turned over to the court. Once the funds have
been submitted, the court must make certain findings and conclusions before
the money is distributed. Since Michel failed to submit the entire funds to the
court, the court could not make these findings and, therefore, Michel's writ
requesting extraordinary relief was denied.
Mineral County v. Nevada
20 P.3d 800 (Nev. 2001)
Disputes involving various claimants to water rights, including adjacent
states, local political subdivisions, and an Indian Reservation, are best settled
in federal court when litigation has already commenced there.
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Due to the depletion of water levels in Walker Lake, petitioners Mineral
County and the Walker Lake Working Group sought writs of prohibition and
mandamus to prevent the respondents from granting additional rights to with-
draw water from the Walker River system. They also sought to compel the
respondents to comply with their obligations to protect Walker Lake.
The Nevada Supreme Court ruled that mandamus and prohibition are
extraordinary measures, to be used sparingly and in the court's discretion. The
court noted that the United States Supreme Court has ruled that the allocation
of water rights is essentially a question of property rights and is best disposed
of in unified proceedings. Related litigation on water rights in the Walker
River system had already begun in United States District Court. Given that
fact, and that there was an action pending in Decree Court, the court ruled that
federal district court was the proper place to decide the issues. The court fur-
ther ruled that the petitioners did not meet the burden of showing that manda-
mus or prohibition was warranted.
Roll v. Tracor, Inc.
140 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (D. Nev. 2001)
Federal court ruled that, although Nevada had not yet ruled on the issue,
Nevada would follow California's approach to successor liability in products
liability case.
Roll, an airman at Nellis Air Force Base, was injured when flares unex-
pectedly exploded. The flares were part of an inventory manufactured by a
company that had since been acquired by another. Roll brought suit against the
new owner of the defective flares' original manufacturer. Roll was stationed at
Nellis at the time of the injury; however, as a member of the military, he main-
tained his New York residency when he joined the military. He brought the
action in the Western District of New York. It was then transferred to Nevada
for the convenience of the parties.
The dispute centered on what liability, if any, the succeeding company
held for products defectively designed by the company originally producing the
flares.
The court found that a transferee court in a diversity action must apply the
laws of the state in which the action was originally filed. New York courts
apply the law of the jurisdiction with the greatest interest in the dispute, and the
court found that, in this case, that jurisdiction was Nevada. The court then
found that New York law required the court to decide the successor liability
issue without regard for the case's other issues.
The federal court attempted to predict how the Nevada Supreme Court
would rule on the case. The court based its surmise on the Nevada Supreme
Court's decisions in other products liability cases, using similar California
cases. Since the Nevada Supreme Court had not previously ruled on the ele-
ments of the "mere continuation" exception to successor liability, the court dis-
cussed the relationship of the domiciled state of the plaintiff (New York), the
primary place of business for the defendant (Texas), and their application to the
products liability case.
The federal court reasoned that, since California followed New York's
version of successor liability and Nevada has looked to California decisions in
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previous (similar) product liability cases, Nevada would probably rule that: the
mere continuation exception to successor liability refers to corporate reorgani-
zations where only one corporation remains and the predecessor organizations
are extinguished; the successor-buyer is not in existence prior to the purchase
of the predecessor's assets; and the predecessor-seller does not survive the sale
of the assets. Moreover, if the business of the successor is the same as the
business of the predecessor, the business employs the same work force, and the
predecessor's officers and directors become the officers and directors of the
successor organization, then the mere continuation exception to the successor
liability rule will apply.
Stafford v. County of Washoe
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3183 (D. Nev. 2001)
Issue preclusion requires federal courts to preclude identical arguments
made previously by a party in state court.
The state district court held that the appellants failed to state a claim in a
complaint and also denied the appellants' proposed amendment to a complaint.
The appellants failed to state a claim because a person cannot bring suit against
a political subdivision of Nevada. An amendment to a complaint to add a
plaintiff that is barred by the statute of limitations would be useless. The same
appellants raised these identical issues in federal court, claiming that the district
court erred in its decision. The court held that the appellants are subject to
issue preclusion where identical issues are raised in the federal court that have
already been decided in state court. Issue preclusion requires federal courts to
respect state court rulings.
Vega v. E. Courtyard Assocs.
24 P.3d 219 (Nev. 2001)
Violation of a properly adopted building code is negligence per se if the
plaintiff belongs to the class of persons the code was intended to protect and
the injury suffered is the type the adopted code was intended to prevent.
Ms. Vega was injured as she attempted to negotiate a ramp to the main
entrance of the Eastern Courtyard medical facility. Vega charged negligence
per se because the slope of the ramp exceeded the slope allowed under the
Uniform Building Code (UBC). The district court rejected the claim because
Vega only alleged violation of an ordinance, not a statute. Ms. Vega appealed
the district court's failure to instruct the jury on the negligence per se doctrine
as it related to her case.
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the district
court. The court concluded that the district court must determine as a matter of
law whether a particular statute, administrative regulation, or local ordinance is
utilized to define the standard of care in a negligence action. The court held
that violation of a statute constitutes negligence per se when the injured party is
part of the class of persons the statute was intended to protect and the injury
suffered is the type that was intended to be prevented. In so ruling, the court
reversed its holding in Ashwood v. Clark County, 930 P.2d 740 (Nev. 1997),
which concluded that violation of the UBC may be used to establish negligence
per se.
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Chief Justice Maupin dissented. He argued that a jury should be allowed
to hear evidence of a building code violation when considering negligence, but
that the lack of uniform application of building codes made a negligence per se
finding improper.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes v. City of Fallon
174 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (D. Nev. 2001)
Motion for summary judgment on numerous federal statutory and consti-
tutional provisions concerning tribal land issues granted in part and denied in
part.
The Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe acquired property which was trans-
ferred to the United States in trust as part of its reservation, pursuant to section
103 of Public Law 101-618. The property is located within the City of Fallon,
which operates the only publicly-owned sewer treatment facility in the area and
also provides electrical service. The Tribe requested services from the City,
which the City denied. The Tribe filed an action seeking utilities service and
alleging multiple statutory and constitutional violations, and moved for sum-
mary judgment on each violation.
The Tribe argued that the City's denial of services violated 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which creates a cause of action for rights conferred by federal statutory
and constitutional provisions. The Tribe also claimed a violation of the equal
protection clause, alleging that the City did not similarly require that other
landowners have their land annexed to the City before utilities service would be
provided. The Tribe also asserted substantive due process and takings clause
claims.
The district court held that the federal government assumed a guardian-
ward relationship with respect to tribal Indians and must protect trust property
from state interference. Because the United States was required to accept the
land into trust under § 103, the Tribe has a federal right to have its land held in
trust and the City's denial of services interfered with the Tribes' right to enjoy
the beneficial use of such land. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on
§ 1983 was therefore granted.
Because the City failed to provide any evidence refuting the allegations
that it treated similarly situated parties differently from the Tribe, summary
judgment was granted on the equal protection claim. Summary judgment was
denied on the substantive due process claim, because the Tribe failed to specifi-
cally identify their substantive right and because of the highly destructive
potential of overextending substantive due process protection. The Tribe's
motion for summary judgment on its takings clause claim was also denied
because it failed to provide sufficient evidence that the refusal of service
amounted to anything more than a diminution of value. The court found that
issues of material fact remained regarding the details of the contract between




150 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (D. Nev. 2001)
Although § 1983 claims are totally subsumed under Title IX, a gay student
could bring a claim against school administrators under the First Amendment's
protections offree speech and could seek punitive damages from the officials in
their individual capacities.
Plaintiff was an openly gay high-school student. After his appearance on
a television show announcing his sexual orientation, he claimed to experience
harassment from other students at his school, and alleged the administration
failed to intervene. Plaintiff was twice transferred by school administration to
new schools and told not to inform his new classmates about his sexual orienta-
tion, but continued to suffer harassment. Plaintiff was eventually placed in an
adult education program, in which he could not receive a high school diploma.
Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title IX, alleging school administra-
tors violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Ninth Circuit found that a cause of action may not be brought under
§ 1983 when another statute provides a comprehensive remedial scheme for the
alleged wrong. The court found Title IX to be sufficiently comprehensive and
remedial to disallow a § 1983 claim against school officials. Title IX provides
for hearings and judicial review. Although the circuit courts were split as to
whether Title IX subsumed a § 1983 claim, the court held it would be inconsis-
tent to allow a plaintiff to circumvent Title IX's remedial scheme by bringing a
§ 1983 action.
The court found that students do not leave all constitutional rights at the
schoolhouse door, and the right to free speech should not be unduly restrained.
The school officials' attempts to suppress the plaintiffs speech regarding his
sexual orientation were sufficient to permit the plaintiff to withstand the motion
to dismiss. Further, the plaintiff presented a sufficient claim of retaliation
based on his First Amendment rights to refute a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim.
The court held that school officials were not entitled to qualified immu-
nity. The Supreme Court has clearly established a student's First Amendment
right to freedom of speech and expression. The officials should have known
that students are entitled to free speech, and thus were precluded from arguing
qualified immunity. Additionally, the court found the plaintiff could seek puni-
tive damages against the officials in their individual capacities, but not in their
official capacities.
The court granted defendant's motion to dismiss based on the § 1983
actions and claims for punitive damages against the officials in their official
capacities. However, the court denied the motions to dismiss on the First
Amendment and Title IX claims.
Mangarella v. Nevada
17 P.3d 989 (Nev. 2001)
A statute that imposes mandatory probation conditions on convicted sex-
ual offenders and is limited in specific questions asked does not violate protec-
tion against self-incrimination and is not unconstitutionally vague.
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Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of lewdness with a minor and was
sentenced to serve 36 to 120 months in prison. The sentence was suspended
and defendant was placed on a five year probation, with conditions required by
Nev. Rev. Stat. 176A.410. Defendant challenged the constitutionality of the
statute, arguing that the polygraph provision was overbroad, requiring defen-
dant to submit to polygraph examinations violated his Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination, and the statute was vague in its failure to
specify guidelines for what constitutes acceptable employment, curfews, or
residences.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the statute was not vague because it
required the scope of the polygraph examination to be limited to questions
related to defendant's drug use. The court wrote that the statute required the
supervising probation officer to set requirements that are reasonably related to
the purpose of the statute and that the statute did not give the probation officer
the discretion to impose conditions that were arbitrary, capricious, or discrimi-
natory. The court also held that compelling a probationer to answer questions
in a polygraph examination as a condition of probation did not violate the Fifth
Amendment because it was not a waiver of the privilege against self-
incrimination.
Nevada v. Harvey
32 P.3d 1263 (Nev. 2001)
The Clerk of Court is a ministerial office, and its duties may be performed
by the district court
Washoe County Clerk Harvey brought suit against the Second Judicial
District Court, asserted that she was the sole person designated by the Nevada
Constitution as responsible for performing the duties associated with the court
clerk, and that the court had usurped her position as ex officio court clerk. The
district court argued that the office of clerk is a ministerial function of the
judicial branch and, as such, the district court was entitled to supervise, control,
or operate the office of district court clerk.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the district court had not usurped
Harvey's authority, and dismissed the complaint. The office of the district
court clerk is not a constitutional office, but rather a ministerial office inherent
to the judicial branch of government. The court specified that the office's sole
purpose is to perform clerical and record-keeping functions necessary to the
district court's operation. The clerk's duties may be performed, in whole or in
part, either by the county clerk pursuant to legislative enactment, or by the
district court pursuant to court rule.
Justice Leavitt, joined by Justice Young, dissented. Justice Leavitt wrote
that only the Nevada legislature can change the duties of the office of County
Clerk. Because the legislature had named the County Clerk as the Clerk of the
Court, and counties are legislative subdivisions of the state that derive their
authority from the state, the majority was in error in specifying the Clerk's
duties and who may fulfill them.
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Nev. Mining Ass'n v. Erodes
26 P.3d 753 (Nev. 2001)
For purposes of the Nevada constitutional deadline for legislative
adjournment, midnight Pacific Standard Time is not the same as midnight
Pacific Daylight Savings Time.
During the 71st session of the Nevada Legislature, Assembly Bill 661 was
returned to the Assembly, in a form which concurred with the Senate's three
amendments after 12:00 a.m. Pacific Daylight Savings Time (PDST), but
before 12:00 a.m. Pacific Standard Time (PST) on June 5, 2001. In addition,
Assembly Bill 94 Conference Committee Report was similarly adopted by the
Senate after midnight PDST but before midnight PST on June 5, 2001. There-
after, the state legislative counsel declined to enroll both bills and refused to
deliver the bills to the Governor for his action. In response, the plaintiffs, a
non-profit mining association and a non-profit association of counties, peti-
tioned the court for a writ of mandamus to compel the defendant, a public
officer, to perform the legal duty of her office.
In order to determine the issue, the Nevada Supreme Court was asked to
resolve whether the 120-day durational limit included the first day of regular
session and whether midnight Pacific standard time is the same as midnight
Pacific Daylight Savings Time. Giving effect to the intent of those who
enacted the durational limit, the court determined that the durational limit con-
stitutionally mandated under Nevada Constitution, art 4, § 2(2) restricted the
regular sessions to no more than 120 days. Therefore, this 120-day regular
session limit had to include the first day in the tally.
Secondly, the court defined the difference between the terms "Pacific
Standard Time" and "Pacific Daylight Savings Time." By looking to the com-
monly understood meanings, as well as the historical development of the terms,
the court determined that these terms were clearly different and distinct, Pacific
Standard Time being one hour earlier than Pacific Daylight Savings Time.
Taking this into consideration, the Supreme Court converted the 120-day
durational limit into hours, hence establishing that the legislature had 2,880
hours before it must adjourn. Consequently, when Nevada changed its clocks
in April, the day was shortened to twenty-three hours. By tacking these
twenty-three hours on to the adjournment date, the last available hour for regu-
lar session would occur at 1:00 a.m. on June 5, 2001.
In light of this conclusion, Assembly Bills 94 and 661 were passed during
the regular session of the 71st session of the Nevada Legislature. The Supreme
Court granted the petitions and required the defendant, under her constitutional
and statutory duty, to enroll the bills and deliver them to the governor.
Nylund v. Carson City
34 P.3d 578 (Nev. 2001)
The emergency management immunity statute shields a city from liability
for pre-emergency negligence that contributes to damage caused by later emer-
gency management activities, and the city could declare the emergency and
need not wait for the governor's formal emergency determination to claim
immunity.
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Heavy rains and melting snow created a flood in Carson City, which
caused the city's storm drainage system to overflow. The city declared the
situation an emergency disaster, and employees diverted water down Fifth
Street by employing sandbags. This flooded the Nylund's condominium, caus-
ing serious damage. The Nylunds sued the city, their homeowners' association,
and the Fraternal Order of the Eagles, claiming trespass, nuisance, wrongful
channeling of waters, and negligence against plaintiffs. Carson City moved for
summary judgment, claiming statutory immunity. The city produced affidavits,
indicating that the city had declared the flood an emergency. Plaintiffs opposed
the motion and requested more time for discovery. Plaintiffs alleged that the
city had notice as early as 1983 that the storm drainage had design and mainte-
nance defects, and the city should be held liable.
The court denied plaintiffs' request for additional discovery and granted
Carson City's motion for summary judgment, claiming there was no issue of
material fact due to the city's immunity. On appeal, plaintiffs alleged that the
district court misapplied the emergency management immunity statute by fail-
ing to distinguish pre-flood activities, such as design, operation, and mainte-
nance of storm drains, from handling the flood.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the district court properly read and
applied the law and summary judgment was appropriate. The court stated that
the immunity statute covered both negligent emergency management activities
and previous negligence that contributed to the damage caused by the emer-
gency management activities. The court also held that Carson City was
allowed to declare an emergency itself, in accordance with its municipal code,
and thereby claim immunity under Nev. Rev. Stat. 414.110.
In dissent, Justice Rose stated that the purpose of the emergency manage-
ment immunity statute was to grant protection to those who were taking imme-
diate action in a crisis situation. He alleged that the majority gave the
immunity statute an expansive interpretation not justified by the statute itself.
He also argued that the emergency management statute specifically required an
emergency called by the Governor; and since the Governor had not done so, the
immunity statute was inapposite.
Perrin v. Gentner
177 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (D. Nev. 2001)
Municipal governments are not immune from suit for state law claims
arising out of operational tasks.
The court reviewed defendants' motion for summary judgment arising out
of a shooting incident between a Las Vegas Metropolitan police officer and a
pedestrian shot and killed by the officer. Prior to the shooting, the officer
ordered the pedestrian to show his hands, but never warned him that he would
use deadly force. The officer subsequently fired several rounds, hitting the
pedestrian more than once, stopped, and fired again when the pedestrian turned
towards the officer. The officer then reloaded his weapon and radioed for help.
At least six of the fourteen rounds fired hit the pedestrian, resulting in his death.
The only object retrieved from a subsequent search of the victim was a glass
jar.
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The decedent's estate filed private rights of action against the officer and
municipality for violations of the decedent's Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights. The estate also brought suit against defendants for violations of
state law claims based on wrongful death, negligent hiring, negligent supervi-
sion, and negligent retention. All issues were subsequently disposed of except
those related to negligent training, negligent supervision, and wrongful death.
Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.032(2) states that a legal action may not be brought
against a state, or an officer of the state, based upon the performance or failure
to perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion involved is
abused. The question of governmental immunity depends upon whether the
actions of the officer were discretionary or ministerial in nature. The district
court relied on Lewis v. St. Petersburg, 260 F.3d 1260 (1 1th Cir. 2001), in
which the court found that "when an officer has made an initial discretionary
decision to conduct a stop and then proceeds to carry out that decision, the
officer is no longer exercising a 'discretionary' function, but is engaged in an
'operational' task." Accordingly, the officer could be held liable for negligence
in the use of deadly force. Applying the Eleventh Circuit's rationale to the
facts of this case, the district court found that the officer's use of deadly force
in furtherance of the discretionary stop was an operational task pursuant to the
police department's profiling policy, which could subject the municipality to
liability.
In determining the municipality's liability based upon negligent training
and supervision, the court looked to Nevada case law, as stated in State v.
Webster, 504 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Nev. 1972). The Webster court held that subse-
quent retention and supervision are "the type of operational functions of gov-
ernment not exempt from liability if due care has not been exercised and an
injury results." Because the police department assumed the obligation to
ensure that the officer's employment did not pose an unreasonable safety risk to
those he stopped, the department's training and supervision constituted an
"operational function" for which they do not enjoy immunity under Nev. Rev.
Stat. 41.032.
Reinkemeyer v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am.
16 P.3d 1069 (Nev. 2001)
Nevada statutory law prohibits cancellation or non-renewal of home-
owner's insurance, and such law is facially constitutional under the United
States and Nevada Constitutions.
Dr. and Mrs. Reinkemeyer were insured by Safeco Insurance Company of
America under a homeowners' insurance policy. Between 1989 and 1993, the
Reinkemeyers submitted three claims under the policy, totaling over $200,000.
Although the losses were not the fault of the Reinkemeyers, Safeco declined to
renew their policy in 1994.
The Reinkemeyers sued Safeco in federal district court for failing to renew
the homeowner's policy, claiming Safeco violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 687B.385.
Safeco argued that the statute only applied to automobile insurance, not home-
owner's policies. Both sides based their arguments on the Nevada Legisla-
ture's intent when it amended Nev. Rev. Stat. 687B.385 in 1997.
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The United States District Court of Nevada certified two questions con-
cerning the legislation to the Nevada Supreme Court: (1) whether former Nev.
Rev. Stat. 687B.385 prohibited cancellation or non-renewal of certain home-
owners policies; and (2) whether, as the statute applied to homeowner's poli-
cies, it violated the United States and Nevada Constitutions.
Relying on the plain language of the statute which stated that the statute
applies to casualty and property insurance, the Nevada Supreme Court held that
the pre-1997 version of the statute applied to homeowner's insurance policies.
The court also held that the statute was not facially unconstitutional under the
Nevada Constitution because the statute did not require that every individual
policy guarantee a fair rate of return.
CONTRACTS
Sunrise Suites, Inc. v. Eric Nelson Auctioneering
266 B.R. 895 (D. Nev. 2001)
Oral modification of a contract under a confirmation order from the bank-
ruptcy court is a violation of the bankruptcy court's registration requirements.
Attorney Harry M. Weiss, Appellant, agreed to represent Carl Icahn at an
auction to bid on the Sunrise Suites Hotel & Casino and RV Park (Properties).
The bankruptcy court had previously entered a confirmation order stating that
Eric Nelson Auctioneering (Nelson) would offer a one percent commission to
Weiss as buyer's broker if he followed certain requirements. Weiss did not
comply with the requirements, and Nelson subsequently refused to pay the bro-
ker's fee. Weiss filed a complaint in bankruptcy court, but the court granted
Nelson's motion for summary judgment. The district court affirmed the bank-
ruptcy court's holding.
In affirming, the court determined that, in order to form a contract, Weiss
had to affirmatively accept the terms of Nelson's offer but failed to do so
because he did not fulfill the written commission requirements. Furthermore,
the contract could not be orally modified, as Weiss contended, as that would
have constituted a violation of the bankruptcy court's registration requirements.
Further, Nelson did not owe a fiduciary duty to Weiss because he was neither
the buyer nor the seller.
Kaldi v. Farmers Ins. Exch.
21 P.3d 16 (Nev. 2001)
A wrongful termination claim involving an exclusive agency agreement
was unsuccessful because it did not contain a "for cause provision."
Kaldi entered into an agent agreement with Farmers Insurance in February
1981. The agreement authorized Kaldi to sell Farmer's insurance in an area
determined by Kaldi. He was to be allowed to submit requests for other insur-
ance companies, but only if it was in an area for which Farmers' did not pro-
vide coverage. Also contained in the contract was a provision that allowed for
termination of the agreement by either party upon written notice three months
in advance. Upon receiving this written termination letter, an agent could
request a review of the termination within ten days and receive a judgement by
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the Termination Review Board. Kaldi construed this provision - allowing for a
review of the termination - as a covenant that the employee relationship would
not be terminated without just cause. Kaldi subsequently brought suit against
Farmers, alleging wrongful termination of their agent appointment agreement,
that Kaldi retained the right to all information on his customers (under trade
secrets), that the contract actually created an employer-employee relationship,
not one of an independent contractor, and that there was a breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court ruled in favor of
Farmers, dismissing Kaldi's claims. Kaldi appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision. The court
held that the contract unambiguously identified Kaldi as an independent con-
tractor, not an employee, and that, absent a contractual provision to the con-
trary, an independent contractor/principal agency relationship is terminable at
any time at the will of the principal or the agent. Furthermore, Nev. Rev. Stat.
683A.290(l) allows for the termination of an agent's appointment at any time.
The court also rejected Kaldi's claims that he was entitled to retain all
information supplied by his customers as trade secrets. The court stated that
the elements needed for a finding of misappropriation of trade secrets are: 1) a
valuable trade secret; 2) misappropriation of the trade secret through use, dis-
closure, or nondisclosure of use of the trade secret; and 3) the requirement that
the misappropriation be wrongful because it was made in breach of an express
or implied contract or by a party with a duty not to disclose. Because all docu-
ments and records are the confidential property of the company, and the con-
tract clearly states that the customer's information is the property of Farmers,
Kaldi's argument failed. Furthermore, Kaldi's assertion that if the agreement is
breached by the company, he is not bound by the provision, also fails because
the court already determined that Farmer's was within its rights to terminate
Kaldi with thirty days notice.
Schwartz v. Wassenburger
30 P.3d 1114 (Nev. 2001)
In cases of anticipatory breach, the statutory period commences either on
the date stipulated for actual performance or on the date that the action is
initiated.
Appellant Schwartz sued on behalf of her late husband's estate, arguing
that respondents breached a purchase agreement entered into by her husband
before his death. The district court dismissed the action as beyond the six year
statutory time limit mandated in Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.190(1)(b), with the statute
being triggered at the moment the defendants allegedly repudiated the contract.
Schwartz appealed, arguing that the trigger date was not correct.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that, in cases of anticipatory breach, the
statutory period commences either on the date stipulated for actual performance
or, if the aggrieved party chooses to bring suit before performance is due, on
the date that the action is initiated. Because appellant's husband filed the com-
plaint before performance under the contract was due, and six years had not yet
lapsed from the initial filing of appellant's suit, the statute of limitations had
not yet run, and the suit was proper.
[Vol. 2:696
Summer/Fall 2002] ANNUAL SURVEY OF NEVADA LAW
Sec'y of State v. Tretiak
22 P.3d 1134 (Nev. 2001)
A claim of statutory securities fraud under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.570 does not
require the common law elements of reliance and scienter.
Tretiak, founder and CEO of a small corporation, made a public offering
that the Securities Division of the Nevada Secretary of State (Division) found
to have involved numerous misrepresentations and securities violations. The
Division imposed sanctions based on an interpretation of Nev. Rev. Stat.
90.570 that did not require the common law elements of reliance and scienter
for a claim of securities fraud. On appeal, the state district court upheld the
Division's findings of fact but found that the Division had abused its discretion
in imposing sanctions. The Division appealed and Tretiak cross-appealed, argu-
ing that the findings of fact should have been set aside.
The Nevada Supreme Court found that there was substantial evidence to
support the Division's findings of fact, and held that the sanctions imposed
were not unreasonable. The court overruled the district court and re-imposed
the sanctions.
The court also denied Tretiak's cross-appeal. The court held that scienter
and fraud are not required to establish a claim of securities fraud under Nev.
Rev. Stat. 90.570. In arriving at that conclusion, the court relied on both case
law from other states and from the United States Supreme Court decision in
Aaron v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), interpreting
the federal statute that parallels Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.570. That holding focused
on the effect of the conduct in question on members of the investing public
rather than upon the culpability of the defendant.
CRIMINAL LAW
Barton v. Nevada
30 P.3d 1103 (Nev. 2001)
Nevada statute, defining manslaughter, is not unconstitutionally vague or
ambiguous.
Barton was involved in a road rage incident, in which Barton intentionally
rammed another car, killing the driver. Barton was subsequently convicted of
second-degree murder in a jury trial, and sentenced to life in prison. Barton
filed a post-conviction petition for habeas, arguing: 1) ineffective assistance of
trial counsel for failing to request a jury instruction on the lesser charge of
reckless driving causing substantial bodily harm; and 2) ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel for failing to argue effectively that Nev. Rev. Stat.
200.070, which defines involuntary manslaughter, is unconstitutionally vague
and ambiguous. The district court denied the petition, and Barton appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial, holding
that, under the traditional elements analysis, reckless driving is not a lesser
offense for murder. Further, the court noted that Barton was not entitled to a
lesser offense instruction regarding reckless driving because the charged
offense of murder could have been committed without committing reckless
driving. The court therefore ruled that trial counsel was not ineffective for
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failing to request the instruction. The court also held that Nev. Rev. Stat.
200.070 adequately defines murder and manslaughter, and that appellate coun-
sel was not ineffective in arguing that the statute is unconstitutionally vague
and ambiguous.
Chapman v. Nevada
16 P.3d 432 (Nev. 2001)
Denial of sexual assault defendant's request for separate psychological
examination of the child victim held to be within trial court's discretion where
family and clinical interviewer gave corroborating evidence and defendant did
not establish a reason to doubt the victim's veracity.
Appellant, Chapman, was convicted on numerous counts of sexual assault
of a minor. Chapman appealed his conviction, asserting the district court
should have granted his motion for an examination by an independent psychol-
ogist. He also charged that the trial court improperly excluded evidence and
improperly discounted a failure by the state to preserve evidence, as required
by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The court denied these claims and
upheld Chapman's conviction.
The court found that Chapman had failed to show a compelling need for
separate examination since: 1) the state's forensic interviewer did not qualify
as an expert; 2) the testimony of the family corroborated the charges; and 3) the
evidence did not establish a reason to suppose that the victim's mental or emo-
tional state may have affected her veracity.
Additionally, the court held that the trial court did not err in excluding
Chapman's evidence of the victim's knowledge of sexual activity and the male
anatomy, since the evidence did not prove that the victim could have fabricated
the charges against Chapman. Regarding Chapman's third charge, the court
noted that the state never had possession of the evidence Chapman accused it of
failing to preserve.
Evans v. Nevada
28 P.3d 498 (Nev. 2001)
Jurors may not prematurely rely on "other matter" evidence to find or
give weight to aggravating factors.
Evans, defendant in a murder trial, was convicted and sentenced to death.
The district court denied defendant's post-conviction petition for habeas
corpus, upon which he filed an appeal. In the appeal, Evans contended that his
trial and appellate counsel were ineffective on several counts. The Nevada
Supreme Court rejected some of the arguments outright and held that, although
counsel was ineffective, Evans failed to establish prejudice.
However, the court found that Evans's claim that counsel was ineffective
for failing to object to the prosecutor's comments during the penalty phase of
the proceeding did have merit. Evans argued that the prosecution made an
improper argument to which defense counsel failed to object. The state argued
that the prosecutor was merely amending a statement of defense counsel,
wherein defense counsel told the jurors that they could not consider the "other
matter" evidence introduced by the prosecution unless they first found an
aggravating circumstance. The court ruled that, although defense counsel's
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argument was incomplete because she misinformed the jurors regarding what
evidence they could consider, the jurors could have considered other evidence
introduced if they decided the death sentence was not appropriate. However,
the prosecutor's argument erroneously directed the jury to consider other evi-
dence in its determination of death penalty eligibility.
Consequently, Evans's penalty phase was unduly prejudiced because the
jurors relied prematurely on "other matter" evidence in its consideration of enu-
merated aggravating circumstances.
The court upheld the conviction but vacated Evans's death sentence and
remanded the case for a new penalty hearing. It also provided that, in future
capital cases, jurors shall consider evidence relevant to the existence of: 1)
aggravating and 2) mitigating circumstances, as well as 3) other evidence
presented against the defendant. In determining whether any aggravated cir-
cumstance has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury is to only con-
sider evidence relevant to that aggravating circumstance. The same standard
applies to mitigating circumstances that outweigh any aggravating circum-
stances, although that determination is made on an individual basis.
After a unanimous finding beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one
aggravating circumstance exists, and after each juror has determined that any
mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the
defendant is eligible for the death penalty. At that point, the jury is to consider
all three types of evidence. It still has the discretion to impose a lesser sentence
than that of death, and the decision must be unanimous.
Chief Justice Maupin with whom Justice Leavitt joined, dissented in part,
finding that Evans's petition for post-conviction relief should have been denied
in its entirety. The prosecution's attempt to correct defense counsel's misstate-
ment was appropriate. Further, the prosecutor's statement was "related to a
separate defense argument regarding other penalties and did not unequivocally
address the requirements for imposition of the death penalty." Finally, the dis-
sent suggested that any error was harmless, noting how carefully the trial was
conducted, that Evans confessed to murder, and a competent witness described
the murder.
Finger v. Nevada
27 P.3d 66 (Nev. 2001)
Act of the 1995 Nevada Legislature eliminating insanity as an affirmative
defense is unconstitutional and, therefore, the M'Naghten approach to insanity
controls.
On April 10, 1996, Fredrick Finger was arrested for murdering his mother.
Upon being questioned by the police, Finger gave two disparate versions of the
events. Finger first claimed that his mother's roommate killed his mother;
however, Finger failed to explain the blood on his clothes or his possession of
the murder weapon. Finger then admitted to stabbing his mother, but claimed
he killed her before she could carry out a plot to kill him. Finger subsequently
filed a motion to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. However,
Finger's defense counsel believed that, due to 1995 Nevada legislation, Finger
would be prohibited from arguing for acquittal on the grounds of legal insanity.
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As a result, Finger's motion to enter a plea of insanity was never argued, and
the district court never ruled on the motion.
At arraignment, Finger requested permission to enter a plea of not guilty
by reason of insanity. The state objected to the request, and the district court
denied the request without explanation. Finger then declined to enter a plea,
and the court entered a plea of not guilty. Based on the denial of the request to
enter an insanity plea and Finger's inability to raise insanity as an affirmative
defense, Finger determined there were no issues to be resolved at trial. He
entered a plea of guilty but mentally ill. He was convicted of second-degree
murder, and subsequently appealed on the constitutional issues relating to legal
insanity.
Finger argued that the accused have a fundamental right to pursue a
defense of legal insanity under the due process clauses of the United States and
Nevada Constitutions. Finger argued that Senate Bill 314 (SB 314), a bill
enacted by the 1995 Nevada Legislature that abolished the "not guilty by rea-
son of insanity" plea and created the "guilty but mentally ill" plea, was uncon-
stitutional. Under SB 314, an individual pleading guilty but mentally ill is
subject to the same punishment as someone entering a guilty plea, with the
exception that the district court may suggest certain types of treatment for the
convicted individual. Insanity status is unclear and found only in Nev. Rev.
Stat. 193.220, which generally provides no lesser degree of criminality because
of the defendant's mental condition. However, the finder of fact may consider
insanity when determining purpose, motive, or intent as a necessary element of
a crime. Finger argued that Nev. Rev. Stat. 193.220, together with the elimina-
tion of insanity as an affirmative defense, permits persorfs to be convicted even
though they do not possess the mental ability to form the criminal intent (a
required element of the crime), and that this violates the due process clauses of
the United States and Nevada Constitutions.
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court reasoned that society historically
viewed the insane as incapable of determining when their conduct violates legal
or moral standards; as a result, society has found that such individuals are not
criminally culpable for their actions. The court noted that criminal intent, or
mens rea, is a mental element of every crime, and that a legally insane person
cannot possess the necessary mens rea. The M'Naghten standard for determin-
ing legal insanity is available only where the defendant's mental state is such
that: (1) the defendant does not have the ability to understand what he is doing;
or (2) the defendant does not have the ability to appreciate that his actions are
illegal. Non-descript mental health problems do not necessarily meet this test's
strict guideline. While some states have adopted the Durham standard, which
is more expansive in its definition of insanity, others have adopted the
M'Naghten standard, and yet others have adopted a compromise that lies in
between the two approaches to insanity.
Before SB 314, Nevada courts applied the M'Naghten rule and considered
insanity to be an affirmative defense. If found not guilty by reason of insanity,
a defendant would be immediately committed to a mental health facility, and
would be released only if a judge determined the individual to be no longer
mentally ill. After SB 314, an accused could not argue for acquittal based on
legal insanity, but could only argue that the state has not proven intent beyond a
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reasonable doubt. If a jury acquitted because it concluded the defendant lacked
the mental capacity to form intent, the defendant was no longer immediately
committed to a mental health facility, and could be held only under the provi-
sions of the civil involuntary commitment statutes.
The court reasoned that criminal intent is a fundamental aspect of criminal
law. By association, the court determined that the concept of legal insanity is
also a fundamental principle, and as such, due process protects the concept of
legal insanity. As a result, the court held that the legislature may not abolish
insanity as a complete defense and declared the provisions of SB 314 to be
unconstitutional.
The court held that the M'Naghten rule applies in Nevada. To qualify to
be legally insane, the court requires that a defendant be: 1) delusional to the
extent that the defendant did not know or understand the nature and capacity of
the criminal act; or 2) the delusion is such that the defendant could not appreci-
ate the illegality of the criminal act. Under the court's opinion, legal insanity
now has a precise and narrow definition in Nevada law. The court ruled that,
while lay witnesses may testify about the defendant's actions, they cannot use
the word "insane" to describe those actions. In so ruling, the court expressly
overruled Aldana v. State, 720 P.2d 1217 (Nev. 1986), to the extent it implies
that any mention of mental illness requires the court to instruct the jury on the
issue of legal insanity.
Justice Leavitt concurred in the judgment, writing that requiring a men-
tally ill defendant to plead guilty but mentally ill deprives that defendant of
liberty without due process, tramples on the due process rights of mentally ill
defendants, and is unconstitutional. Moreover, Justice Leavitt noted that the
former reading conflicted with several statutes. The procedure made mental
illness a crime by confining a person who cannot form the required criminal
intent and is only mentally ill. Justice Leavitt argued that this is cruel and
unusual punishment and, as such, in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
Justices Shearing, Maupin, and Chief Justice Rose dissented, arguing that
Finger voluntarily pled guilty but mentally insane. The dissent claimed that the
Nevada law did not violate due process rights because it still considered the
mental state. Moreover, nothing requires the state to provide a not guilty by
reason of insanity plea.
Garcia v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct.
30 P.3d 1110 (Nev. 2001)
Statute restricting sale of alcohol to minors does not require establishment
to ask for identification prior to sale of alcohol.
The Pershing County Sheriff's department conducted a sting operation,
attempting to crack down on illegal alcohol sales to minors. The department
enlisted the help of a twenty year-old individual (subject) to attempt to make
purchases. Petitioners were five individuals who sold alcohol to the subject
and were subsequently convicted under Nev. Rev. Stat. 202.055 in township
court for selling alcohol to minors. The petitioners were charged with failing to
verify age or ask for identification prior to selling alcohol to the subject. How-
ever, the subject appeared to be twenty-four to twenty-seven years old. The
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petitioners appealed to district court, arguing that they must knowingly sell to a
minor in order to violate the statute. The district court affirmed the township
court's convictions, and petitioners filed a writ of certiorari to the Nevada
Supreme Court.
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed, holding that the lower courts
improperly interpreted the word "knowingly" in Nev. Rev. Stat. 202.055 to
require the proprietor of the establishment to ensure the individual was over
twenty-one by identification alone. Nev. Rev. Stat. 202.055 does not require an
establishment to ask for identification before selling alcohol unless the proprie-
tor knows or reasonably should have known the individual was under twenty-
one.
Gallego v. Nevada
23 P.3d 227 (Nev. 2001)
Defendant was not denied Sixth Amendment right of self-representation
where his disruptive behavior during court proceedings precludes dismissal of
court-appointed defense attorney.
Gallego and an accomplice lured two girls into their van, then proceeded
to molest and murder them. Their bodies were found in a remote canyon in
northern Nevada. The jury found Gallego guilty and sentenced him to death.
The death sentence was affirmed in a second penalty hearing fifteen years later.
Gallego subsequently appealed, contending that he should have been allowed to
represent himself at the second penalty hearing and should have been allowed
to substitute counsel during that hearing.
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Gallego's motion for
new counsel, holding a request for new counsel will only be granted to an
indigent defendant when good cause can be shown. Gallego failed to prove
good cause existed merely because he disagreed with the defense strategy of his
public defender. The court noted that the strategy was perfectly reasonable and
that Gallego's alternate strategies would have been largely impermissible under
the rules of evidence.
The court stated that a defendant usually has a Sixth Amendment right to
represent himself, but that the right may be denied if the request is untimely, if
the request is equivocal, or if the defendant's behavior disrupts the court pro-
ceedings. The right may also be voluntarily waived.
The court held Gallego's request to represent himself was timely because
it came almost one year prior to the empanelling of the second jury. No delay
occurred, and the request did not necessitate a continuance. Similarly, the court
found he did not waive his right merely because he used counsel at the original
trial, including the first penalty phase. The court rejected the lower court's
determination that Gallego's decisions at his first trial could have any applica-
tion now, fifteen years later.
The court also found Gallego's request could have been unequivocal. At
trial, Gallego expressed a desire both to represent himself and to change coun-
sel. The lower court held that the latter request made the former request equiv-
ocal. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected that argument, however, because the
essence of both requests revolved around the same desire: to cease his relation-
ship with his current public defender. If the request for new counsel was
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denied, then Gallego had the right to proceed in his motion to represent him-
self. The court did not find this error to warrant relief.
However, the court ruled that Gallego's behavior supported the lower
court's decision to deny his motion for self-representation. When requesting
self representation, a defendant's behavior, even pre-trial, must evidence his
"ab[ility] and willing[ness] to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom proto-
col." McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 173 (1984). Gallego had repeatedly
pretended that he could not hear in the courtroom, often turned his back to the
court, refused to participate in a conference call, and refused to stop claiming
his innocence after the trial judge informed him that such proclamations were
inappropriate during a penalty hearing.
Garcia v. Nevada
17 P.3d 994 (Nev. 2001)
Order of conviction affirmed, and order denying a motion to suppress
affirmed because suppression of evidence is not available for the violation of
an individual's rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
The police arrested Garcia after an alcohol-related car accident. The
police informed Garcia of his Miranda rights, but failed to inform him of his
rights as a foreign national under the Vienna Convention. Garcia moved to
suppress evidence based on this violation. The trial court denied the motion
and a jury convicted Garcia of multiple charges related to the accident.
Garcia appealed his conviction, arguing that the police violation warranted
suppression and requesting an automatic reversal based on "structural error."
The court, after considering the Ninth Circuit's stance and the majority of
federal and state court decisions, concluded a suppression remedy is not availa-
ble under the Vienna Convention. The court also concluded an automatic
reversal of his conviction would be improper, since the violation was not a
"structural error."
Grant v. Nevada
24 P.3d 761 (Nev. 2001)
Court upheld conviction of appellant Grant because improperly admitted
evidence was harmless, amendment of the charges against him was not prejudi-
cial, use of a peremptory challenge was race-neutral, and the evidence fully
supported his conviction.
Therese Wilson had her purse stolen while gambling at the Bellagio Hotel
in Las Vegas. She witnessed a man walking away with her purse and was
unable to stop him. Wilson subsequently reported the incident to hotel Security
Officer Wayne Kimi, who was called to the hotel lobby with Wilson to identify
a possible suspect. That suspect was identified as the man that Wilson saw
steal the purse, Isaiah Grant, III. Security Officer Raymond Brown joined them
in the lobby and confronted Grant. When Brown lifted the suspect's jacket,
Wilson's purse was exposed and Brown and Grant began to struggle. Surveil-
lance cameras captured the event on tape and showed one security officer plac-
ing an object back into Grant's jacket, although the tape did not reveal whether
or not the object fell out of the jacket. The state filed charges against Grant,
including grand larceny and possession of a controlled substance.
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Officer Brown testified in the security room as to items he found in the
jacket. At trial Security Officer Bemardo Figuredo offered testimony as to
what he witnessed on the surveillance tape. The day before the trial began, the
state moved to admit Brown's testimony because he was unavailable to testify
at trial. The trial court granted the motion. Grant was convicted on both
counts.
On appeal, Grant challenged the trial court's admission of Brown's previ-
ous testimony. Grant also contended on appeal that the trial court should not
have amended his charge of grand larceny sua sponte from category B to C.
The Supreme Court of Nevada held for Grant, stating that Nev. Rev. Stat.
171.198(6) did not permit the admittance of prior testimony if the state did not
act with due diligence or good faith to have Brown appear at trial. Neverthe-
less, the court held that the error in admitting the testimony was harmless
because the other testimony offered was virtually identical to that of Brown.
The court also held that the amendment did not prejudice Grant because the
amendment did not involve new charges or offenses. Grant was on notice
before the amendment that he was subject to the category C felony.
Hudson v. Warden, Nevada State Prison
22 P.2d 1154 (Nev. 2001)
D UIplea bargain reversed and remanded for further proceedings because
trial judge did not properly canvass defendant and appellate counsel was
deemed ineffective for failing to raise the issue of the validity of prior
convictions.
Appellant Hudson was at the Burning Man Festival at Black Rock Desert
in Nevada. While there, he ingested methamphetamines, heroin, and ecstasy.
At approximately 6:45 a.m. on September 2, he drove a vehicle while under the
influence, running over two tents, hitting a third tent, and striking a parked
vehicle. Three people were seriously injured as they slept. One victim sus-
tained permanent brain damage after Hudson's vehicle ran over his head.
Another victim sustained a concussion, scrapes and cuts to her face, and a sev-
ered ear lobe. The third victim suffered third degree bums from hot anti-freeze
and battery acid that poured over her as she lay trapped under a vehicle tire.
At trial, the prosecution relied on Hudson's pre-sentence report to prove
prior convictions. Hudson's attorney unsuccessfully challenged the use of the
pre-sentence report to prove past convictions. As a result, Hudson pled guilty
to two counts of causing substantial bodily harm while driving under the influ-
ence of a controlled substance and one count of possession of a controlled
substance. On appeal, Hudson claimed he was not fully informed of the ramifi-
cations of the plea bargain and claimed ineffective appellate and trial counsel.
On appeal, Hudson's counsel failed to contest the use of the pre-sentence report
to prove convictions. The appeal was denied.
Hudson filed a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. He
argued that he did not understand the potential consequences of the plea agree-
ment and, as a result, the enhanced sentence should be set aside. Hudson
argued that he was not aware that the possession charge was upgraded from a
category E to a category D felony. Due to his prior convictions, the third con-
viction increased the amount of time Hudson would spend in jail.
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The Nevada Supreme Court held that, while Hudson's plea was freely and
voluntarily given, the trial judge did not conduct a proper plea canvass before
accepting Hudson's guilty pleas. The judge did not discuss the critical third
page of the plea bargain, which discussed consecutive sentencing. The consec-
utive sentence would have increased the maximum time served from twenty to
forty years.
The court also held defense counsel ineffective for neglecting to challenge
the prosecution's failure to prove Hudson's prior convictions. During trial, the
state has the burden of proving the existence of a sentence enhancing prior
conviction. The court held that counsel's failure to raise the issue on appeal
fell below the objective standard of effective assistance.
Justice Maupin concurred but took the opportunity to press for adoption of
a mandatory oral canvass to minimize the uncertainties in the plea bargaining
process.
Justice Agosti, joined by Justices Rose and Leavitt, concurred in the result.
The concurrence disagreed with the majority's holding that Hudson freely and
voluntarily pled guilty. Justice Agosti asserted that a defendant cannot volunta-
rily plead guilty if the plea is not knowingly made.
Jackson v. Nevada
17 P.3d 998 (Nev. 2001)
A change of appearance jury instruction is proper when the defendant
changes appearance prior to a physical line-up.
On August 15, 1998, Jackson entered and robbed a convenience store.
The police responded to store clerk Perry's activation of the store alarm. Perry
described the robber as a black male with a goatee and beard, approximately
five feet ten inches tall and of a medium build. Perry also indicated the robber
was carrying a pair of orange-handled scissors in his pocket.
On August 18, 1998, police stopped a pedestrian near the robbed store
who matched the description of the robber. The pedestrian was identified as
Jackson, and had a pair of orange handled scissors in his pocket. The police
took two photographs of Jackson.
Perry picked Jackson out of a photo line-up. Upon Jackson's request, a
physical line-up was subsequently conducted. When Jackson appeared for the
physical line-up, he had no facial hair and had made other changes to his
appearance since Perry viewed the photo line-up. Perry was unable to identify
Jackson in the physical line-up.
At trial, the court gave a "change of appearance" instruction to the jury.
The instruction allowed the jury to consider an intentional change of appear-
ance as a factor in determining guilt or innocence. On August 17, 1999, the
jury found Jackson guilty of burglary and robbery.
Jackson appealed the use of a change of appearance jury instruction and
alleged that there was insufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict. Jack-
son contended that, since he was unaware of the physical line-up, conscious-
ness of guilt could not be inferred. The Nevada Supreme Court held the
argument lacked merit because Jackson himself requested the physical line-up,
and was told in advance that someone would be looking at his appearance to
pick him out of a group. Jackson also contended that the change of appearance
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instruction is only proper where a defendant changes his appearance immedi-
ately after the crime. The court found the instruction contemplates two
instances where the instruction is appropriate: immediately after the crime or
after being accused of the crime. The court held that Jackson changed his
appearance to avoid identification for an accused crime, the specific concern
that the second part of the instruction intended to avoid.
The court held that the jury could reasonably infer from the presented
evidence that Jackson was guilty of the crime. The surveillance video showing
the robber with orange handled scissors, the proximity of Jackson's arrest to the
scene of the crime, and Perry's repeated identification of Jackson as the perpe-
trator were all reasons for the jury to find guilt. As a result, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in submitting the change of appearance instruction
to the jury and there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict.
Johnson v. Nevada
17 P.3d 1008 (Nev. 2001)
If a defendant is mentally competent to stand trial, defendant has the abso-
lute right to prohibit defense counsel from interposing an insanity defense.
Johnson shot and killed a man outside of Caesar's Palace. Several wit-
nesses identified Johnson as the killer, and eight surveillance cameras recorded
the murder. Johnson was charged with murder, but facts came to light that
suggested that Johnson's mental health was questionable. Following a psychi-
atric evaluation, Johnson was remanded to the state mental health facility at
Lakes Crossing for a sanity commission evaluation. At the mental health facil-
ity, three psychiatrists found Johnson capable of standing trial. Johnson
pleaded not guilty, and Johnson's public defender attempted to argue an
insanity defense. Angry with the public defender's efforts, Johnson sought to
represent himself pro se; but after an extensive canvass and citing concerns as
to Johnson's mental stability, the court appointed the public defender as John-
son's sole counsel. The public defender argued the insanity defense, but John-
son was subsequently convicted of second degree murder with a deadly
weapon. Johnson appealed on the grounds of ineffective counsel in that his
public defender argued the insanity defense against Johnson's express wishes.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the public defender's presentation of
the insanity defense against Johnson's express objections was per se improper.
The accused has the ultimate authority to specify the pleading to be entered,
and an attorney may not speak for the accused on that subject without consulta-
tion and cannot waive this right over client's objections. The court held that, if
a defendant is mentally competent to stand trial, defendant has the absolute
right to prohibit defense counsel from interposing an insanity defense.
The court stated that the public defendant's actions were not subject to the
harmless error analysis because entering a plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity is a structural defect that affects the framework within which the trial
proceeds. As a result, the court held the assertion of an insanity defense under
the circumstances to constitute reversible error. The court reversed the convic-
tion and remanded for further proceedings.
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Nevada v. Weddell
27 P.3d 450 (Nev. 2001)
A private person attempting to make a citizen's arrest of a felon may only
use the amount of force reasonable and necessary under the circumstances.
Weddell attempted to make a citizen's arrest of Bustamonte. Weddell
believed that Bustamonte had threatened Weddell's daughter and had intention-
ally struck Weddell's employee, Cole, with a vehicle the previous day. Wed-
dell parked his car behind Bustamonte's vehicle to prevent its departure and
ordered Bustamonte, while pointing a gun at him, to place his hands on the
hood of the vehicle. Bustamonte turned and ran and Weddell shot at him sev-
eral times. None of the shots hit Bustamonte. Weddell was subsequently
charged with assault with a deadly weapon and discharging a firearm at
another. The district court granted Weddell's motion to dismiss the charges,
noting that Nevada law permits private persons to arrest a felon even if the
felony is committed outside his presence. The district court determined that
Bustamonte committed a felony by striking Cole, and that Weddell was
attempting to arrest Bustamonte for this felony. The district court also con-
cluded that, as a matter of law, Weddell was not guilty of the charged conduct
because an individual may use whatever force is necessary to effect the arrest
of a fleeing felon. The state appealed the dismissal.
The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court and remanded
the case for trial. The court considered, as a matter of first impression, what
amount of force is allowed under Nevada statutory law. Nev. Rev. Stat.
171.126 provides that a private person may arrest another in three situations: 1)
when an offense was committed or attempted in the arrestor's presence; 2)
when the person committed a felony offense outside the arrestor's presence;
and 3) when a felony has in fact been committed and the arrestor has reasona-
ble cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it.
The court explained that, historically, the "fleeing felon rule" permitted a
private person to use deadly force to apprehend a felon. The rule developed
when the punishment for nearly all felonies was death, and the rule was
designed to prevent the escape of a felon by inflicting the inevitable punish-
ment. The court noted that, today, many felonies do not involve dangerous
conduct and most are not punishable by death. The court reasoned that when
the legislature repealed Nevada's fleeing felon rule in 1993 and simultaneously
enacting a new statute limiting the use of deadly force by police officers in
making or attempting felony arrests, it intended a substantial change in the law.
The court also noted that other states have abandoned the common law version
of the fleeing felon rule.
In light of these factors, the court held that a private person making or
attempting a felony arrest may use only the amount of force that is reasonable
and necessary under the circumstances. The court further held that use of
deadly force is, as a matter of law, unreasonable unless the arrestee poses a
threat of serious bodily injury to the arrestor or others.
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Segler v. Clark County
142 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Nev. 2001)
Summary judgment is not proper in cases alleging medical mistreatment
in violation of the Eighth Amendment at county jail when the exact time and
extent of medical care is in dispute.
Plaintiff Segler was held in the Clark County Detention Center (CCDC)
from October 24, 1997 through December 29, 1997. Prior to his detention,
Segler had three surgeries on his shoulder. On November 4, 1997, Segler
reinjured his shoulder. That evening, a nurse from EMSA, CCDC's health care
provider, treated Segler's shoulder. Segler claimed that the treatment did not
occur until four hours after he sustained the injury, but CCDC maintained that
EMSA treated Segler within an hour of his injury. On November 5, 1997,
EMSA claimed a doctor examined Segler, found no dislocation, and ordered an
x-ray. Segler maintained he was never seen by a doctor and requested addi-
tional treatment which was never given. After Segler's release from CCDC, he
required two additional shoulder surgeries.
Segler brought suit in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claim-
ing violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. EMSA moved
for summary judgment, alleging it was a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and, thus, immune from punitive damages. The court found that, while EMSA
was a state actor, it was still a private corporation. Accordingly, an award of
punitive damages would not punish the taxpayers in the way that such a deci-
sion would if EMSA was a municipality. Moreover, the award of punitive
damages would act as a deterrent for EMSA's future actions.
The court then considered whether the actions of EMSA violated Segler's
Eighth Amendment rights. The court denied EMSA's motion for summary
judgment, holding that determining the sequence of events of Segler's medical
treatment was the essence of the case and best left to the trier of fact to deter-
mine. The denial of medical attention violates the Eighth Amendment if the
"denial amounts to deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prison-
ers." Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Therefore
Segler had to demonstrate that EMSA was deliberately indifferent to his medi-
cal needs. Since there was a dispute as to how long it took for Segler to receive
medical treatment and when Dr. Hoffman actually saw Segler, the court
declined to make a determination on these issues of material fact.
Servin v. Nevada
32 P.3d 1277 (Nev. 2001)
Court cannot use multiple crimes of similar gravamen as multiple aggra-
vating factors in imposition of sentence.
Appellant Servin was convicted of shooting and killing a handicapped
woman and of stealing $35,000 that the woman kept in a safe in her home.
Two others accompanied Servin, who was sixteen years old at the time of the
murder. At trial, evidence was presented that Servin planned to shoot the
woman if he had to, hit the woman in the head to make her stop screaming, and
pointed the gun at her repeatedly. Servin was subsequently sentenced to death
when the jury found five aggravating factors, including that the murder was
committed in the course of a burglary and home invasion.
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Servin appealed, arguing among other grounds that nearly all persons con-
victed of murder are eligible for the death penalty because of the conflicting
provisions of Nev. Rev. Stat. 175.552 and Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.033. Servin
further argued that the imposition of the death penalty upon him violated the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) because he was
only sixteen years old at the time of the murder. Servin next asserted that he
could not be convicted of both burglary and home invasion, so the crimes were
mutually exclusive as aggravators of a crime. Finally, Servin argued that the
imposition of the death penalty was excessive where the evidence presented at
trial was not conclusive in proving that Servin was the direct cause of the vic-
tim's death. In fact, the evidence revealed that the accomplices, one of whom
had pled guilty to avoid the death penalty, may have also been involved.
Based on the these arguments, the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that Nev.
Rev. Stat. 176.025 only forbids the execution of juveniles under the age of
sixteen at the time of the crime. There was no conflict between the ICCPR and
Nevada's statute and therefore no error. The court also ruled that aggravating
and mitigating circumstances of the crime must be evaluated prior to consider-
ing any other circumstances. The conduct that satisfied the elements of bur-
glary and home invasion was the same and, therefore, both aggravators could
not stand under Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.033(4). The court held that the key ques-
tion is whether the gravity of the charged offenses is such that it can be said
that the legislature did not intend multiple convictions. Given Servin's youth
and the questionable evidence regarding the identity of the shooter, the court
vacated the imposition of the death penalty, assigning instead two consecutive
life prison terms.
Justice Rose concurred in the judgment, arguing that Servin's youth
should also justify the vacation of the death penalty under the ICCPR. Chief
Justice Maupin dissented, arguing that the case should be remanded for a new
penalty hearing, one which would still allow the imposition of the death pen-
alty. Justice Leavitt also dissented, supported by Justice Young, arguing that
the court had no reason to believe that the jury failed to consider the possible
weaknesses in the evidence and Servin's youth in imposing the penalty.
Tavares v. Nevada
30 P.3d 1128 (Nev. 2001)
The prosecutor has the burden of requesting that a limiting instruction be
given both at the time evidence is introduced and at the final charge to the jury,
barring the defendant's objection.
On January 31, 1988, Tavares called 911, indicating that his three-month-
old infant, C.T., had stopped breathing. C.T. was brought breathless and pulse-
less to the hospital, where she was later ruled dead. The doctors determined
that she had suffered multiple broken ribs and asphyxiation, which resulted in
brain damage and eventual death. Tavares was charged with first-degree mur-
der under alternative theories of either willful, premeditated, and deliberate
murder or death resulting from child abuse.
April Striggles, the defendant's ex-girlfriend with whom Tavares had
fathered a child, testified at trial. She stated that Tavares once bruised their
son's ribs by squeezing him. In a separate incident, Striggles discovered
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Tavares covering their son's mouth and nose with his hand, causing him to stop
breathing. The testimony was admitted to prove intent and refute an assertion
of accident, although the jury was never instructed on the limited purpose for
which the prior bad acts evidence was admitted. The jury subsequently con-
victed Tavares of first-degree murder.
Tavares appealed the failure to give a limiting instruction on the use of
prior bad act testimony. While Tavares had not asked for the instruction, the
Nevada Supreme Court found that the court may review if the error is plain and
affects the defendant's substantive rights. The court held that, since prior bad
act evidence is limited in its admissibility, the prosecution must prove that the
prior bad acts are admissible as evidence. By extension, the prosecutor also has
the duty to request that the jury be instructed on the limited use of the prior bad
act evidence. However, the defendant may request that the limiting instruction
not be used for strategic reasons. Furthermore, the instruction should be given
at the time the evidence is introduced and as a general instruction at the end of
the trial. The court held that Tavares's rights were prejudiced by the lower
court's failure to inform and instruct the jury on the limited purpose for which
prior bad acts may be introduced. Consequently, the defendant's conviction
was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
United States v. Skuban
175 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (D. Nev. 2001)
Federal law prohibiting firearm ownership by one convicted of domestic
violence misdemeanor does not apply to one convicted of a violent misde-
meanor against a parent.
Skuban was convicted in February 2001 of assaulting his mother, which,
under Nevada law, is considered a domestic violence misdemeanor. Skuban
was later indicted under federal law, which prohibits firearm ownership by per-
sons convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor. Skuban filed a motion to
dismiss his indictment because the federal statute does not list child-parent
among the qualifying relationships.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The court held that the
statute clearly contemplated specific relationships between perpetrator and vic-
tim, and the child-parent relationship was not specified as one that met the
predicate requirements for misdemeanor domestic violence.
Washington v. Nevada
30 P.3d 1134 (Nev. 2001)
Nev. Rev. Stat. 453.323, making the sale of an imitation controlled sub-
stance a misdemeanor, was impliedly repealed by Nev. Rev. Stat. 453.332,
which made the same crime a felony.
Appellant Washington sold a substance he represented as cocaine to an
undercover police officer, although the substance was not actually cocaine.
Washington was arrested for the sale, and charged under Nev. Rev. Stat.
453.323, making his actions a felony. Washington argued that a more recently
enacted law, Nev. Rev. Stat. 453.332, making the same actions a misdemeanor,
should have been applied. The district court rejected Washington's argument,
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holding that, since both statutes had been technically amended in 1995, there
was no repeal by implication. Washington appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in concluding
that a 1995 amendment of both statutes meant that the legislature had not
intended to repeal the earlier statue when they enacted the later one. After
examining the text of both statutes, the court determined that the only true
difference between the two was the degree of penalty. The court noted that the
1995 amendment was part of a revision of all criminal statutes and that the two
statutes shared similar legislative history. As a result, the court concluded that
the legislature must have intended that NRS 453.323 be effectively repealed by
the passage of NRS 453.332.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Crawford v. Nevada
30 P.3d 1123 (Nev. 2001)
Where continued bail is a condition of a plea agreement, defendant is
entitled to withdraw a guilty plea if bail is revoked.
Crawford was charged with the murder of a woman with whom he had
been involved. Crawford subsequently entered into a plea agreement, wherein
he pled guilty to first-degree murder, resulting in back to back life sentences
without the possibility of parole. Crawford then changed his plea to not guilty,
and remained on bail within the community for a period of two years. On the
eve of trial, Crawford again entered a plea bargain, changing his plea to guilty.
Crawford's bail was then revoked, and Crawford was jailed. Crawford alleged
that a condition of his second plea bargain was that he be allowed to remain on
bail, and moved the court to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court denied
the motion, and Crawford was tried and convicted of first degree murder.
Crawford appealed, alleging violation of due process and that the district judge
engaged in ex parte communication with Crawford's counsel.
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed the district court, and held
that the district court's denial of Crawford's motion was an abuse of discretion.
To determine whether the defendant advanced a substantial, fair, and just rea-
son to withdraw a plea, the district court must consider the totality of the cir-
cumstances to determine whether the defendant entered the plea voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently. The court held that Crawford's guilty plea was
not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and defendant was entitled to withdraw
his plea. Since Crawford's plea was conditioned upon the trial court's promise
to allow him to remain out of custody until after Christmas, and the district
court subsequently revoked his bail, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the
district judge effectively gave Crawford what he wanted in order to induce a
guilty plea. In so doing, the judge either insufficiently canvassed Crawford's
guilty plea or violated the terms of the plea bargain. Therefore, Crawford was
entitled to withdraw his guilty plea.
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Hernandez v. Nevada
24 P.3d 767 (Nev. 2001)
While appellate briefs may require more than the standard thirty pages,
they should not render a disservice to the [defendant] by obscuring potentially
good claims.
The defendant made a motion for leave to file a 124 page opening brief in
a direct appeal for a first-degree murder conviction and death sentence. The
Nevada Supreme Court denied the motion and concluded that eighty pages
were enough to present the court with an effective brief. The court noted that
counsel is under no obligation to present every non-frivolous claim. To raise
every non-frivolous issue may detract from more credible issues. However, the
court noted that it is aware that some situations require briefs longer than the
standard thirty pages.
Koger v. Nevada
17 P.3d 428 (Nev. 2001)
Miranda warnings given twelve days prior to an interview are proper
warning when the individual is reminded of such rights and the individual
acknowledges having been advised of such rights.
Defendant Koger was questioned in connection with an armed robbery.
She was first questioned at her place of employment, at which time she was
apprised of her Miranda rights. She was later questioned again the same day at
the detective's office, at which time she was again informed of her Miranda
rights and signed a waiver form. Twelve days later, she was again interviewed
at the police station; police did not offer the Miranda warnings after being told
by the detective and Koger that she had previously been advised. She gave
answers inconsistent with her previous interviews and was charged and ulti-
mately convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery.
Koger appealed, arguing that the district court made a mistake by admit-
ting her interview statements because she was not properly warned of her
Miranda rights. The state argued that Koger had expressed an understanding
of her rights in the first two interviews and that a third warning was not
necessary.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the warnings had been properly
administered and affirmed the conviction. The most relevant factor in analyz-
ing whether the previous admonitions were still in effect was the amount of
time that had passed since the warning was issued for the third interview. In
addition, the court noted that Koger was reminded of her rights and that she
indicated that she remembered and understood the rights during the third
interview.
Lee v. Clark County Dist. Atty.
145 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (D. Nev. 2001)
To obtain the release of evidence in the custody of the Clerk of the Court,
plaintiff must file an action for the release pursuant to Rule 1(3)(b).
Plaintiff Albert N. Lee had exhausted all appeals of his rape conviction by
1996. In 2001, he filed a complaint, seeking the release of all biological evi-
dence collected in connection with the rape of which he was convicted so that it
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could be scientifically tested. He named only the Clark County District Attor-
ney's Office as defendant, but filed a motion to amend to include the Clerk of
Court because the Clerk had possession of the biological evidence in question.
Defendants filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss.
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court examined District Court Rule 11,
which details the procedure necessary to obtain the release of evidence in the
custody of the Clerk of the Court. Rule 11 requires that notice be given to the
adverse party prior to making the motion. Since plaintiff Lee had not filed an
action for the release of the evidence pursuant to Rule 1 1(3)(b), the issue was
not yet ripe for decision. The court held that there was no reason to believe that
such an action would be futile, nor that, if it were, the plaintiff would have
waived his right to pursue the matter in United States District Court.
Moore v. Nevada
27 P.3d 447 (Nev. 2001)
A perpetrator cannot "use" a weapon to reach an agreement to conspire;
as a result, it is improper to enhance a conspiracy charge via the deadly
weapon enhancement.
Moore was one of three perpetrators who conspired to rob the occupants
of an apartment. During the robbery, one of the conspirators shot and killed a
visitor in the apartment. Moore was subsequently convicted of first-degree
murder, robbery, and conspiracy, all with use of a firearm. Pursuant to Nev.
Rev. Stat. 193.165(1), the deadly weapon enhancement, the district judge
enhanced Moore's conspiracy sentence to be served consecutively rather than
concurrently. Moore appealed.
Nev. Rev. Stat. 193.165(1) allows a judge to enhance a sentence based on
use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the crime. Moore argued that he
could not have used a weapon to commit conspiracy. The state called for a
broad construction of the term "uses."
The Nevada Supreme Court found in Moore's favor. In Nevada, the
charge of conspiracy does not require an overt act; rather, the essence of the
crime is reaching an unlawful agreement. Nev. Rev. Stat. 199.490. The court
ruled that a perpetrator could not "use" a weapon to reach that agreement, and
held that it is improper to enhance a conspiracy charge with the deadly weapon
enhancement. The court reversed that portion of the sentence, and ordered the
sentences to be served concurrently.
Nevada v. Quinn
30 P.3d 1117 (Nev. 2001)
With relation to the statute of limitations, "discovery" of a gross-misde-
meanor committed in secrecy occurs when any person, other than the wrong-
doer, has knowledge of the act and its criminal nature.
Respondent Quinn was charged on December 17, 1998 with lewdness
with a minor under fourteen and indecent exposure, in connection with acts that
occurred between January 1, 1993 and December 12, 1996. Quinn moved to
dismiss the indecent exposure charges because the charges were filed beyond
the two-year statute of limitations on misdemeanors. Quinn argues that the
statute of limitations tolled from the day that the minor made her mother aware
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of the acts. The state claimed that the crimes were not reported to authorities
until November 2, 1998, and argued that the statute should not toll until the day
that law enforcement became aware of them. The district court held for Quinn.
The Nevada Supreme Court found that Nev. Rev. Stat. 171.095(1)(a) pro-
vides that the statute of limitations period for gross misdemeanors committed in
secrecy begins to run at the time of discovery of the crime. The court held that
discovery meant the discovery by any person other than the wrongdoer, with
some limited exceptions based on intimidation. The court remanded to deter-
mine if the minor's mother had remained silent out of fear.
Justice Shearing concurred with the result, but argued that the standard
requiring a traumatized child to report the child's own trauma was unreasona-
ble. She also argued that the mother had no legal duty to report, and that the
court should have established a standard that tolled the statute of limitations
until the time a person with a legal duty to report became aware of the crime.
Pellegrini v. Nevada
34 P.3d 519 (Nev. 2001)
Prisoner was denied permission to file his habeas corpus petition because
the one-year limitation for successive petitions had passed; allegations of inef-
fective assistance are properly raised in the first timely post-conviction peti-
tion; allegations of ineffective assistance in post-conviction petition was not a
good cause for relieving procedural bar. Moreover, decisions in other, non-
related cases were not the law of the case under the law of the case doctrine.
Pellegrini was convicted and received the death sentence in a capital mur-
der case. He filed a timely post-conviction petition, which was denied by the
Eighth Judicial District Court and subsequently dismissed by the Nevada
Supreme Court. The Nevada Supreme Court held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.726
applies to all post-conviction petitions. Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.726 provides for
dismissal of the habeas corpus petition based on delay in filing, unless there is
good cause shown for the delay in filing, if the petition was not filed within one
year after entry of the judgment or conviction or one year after the Nevada
Supreme Court issued its remittitur. The court held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.726
applied to successive petitions. The court articulated one exception: those
petitions which were properly filed prior to the passage of Nev. Rev. Stat.
34.726. The court concluded that the intent behind the one year limitation was
to prevent perpetual filing of petitions for relief, reducing the strain on the court
system. The court also concluded that its decision did not nullify the laches
provisions of Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.800 nor the waiver and successive petition
provisions of Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.810.
The Nevada Supreme Court also took the opportunity to clarify the Ninth
Circuit's use of previous Nevada case law in McKenna v. McDaniel, 65 F.3d
1483 (9th Cir. 1995) and Petrocelli v. Angelone, 248 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2001).
The court stated that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are properly
raised for the first time during the first timely post-conviction petition; the
cause and prejudice analysis is not necessary in determining whether these
claims are appropriately considered on the merits. The Nevada Supreme Court
reaffirmed its holding in Daniels v. Nevada, 688 P.2d 315 (Nev. 1984), that the
need for an evidentiary hearing to resolve claims of ineffective counsel, the
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failure to raise that claim on a direct appeal is not a waiver of the claim for
purposes of post-conviction proceedings, provided the claims are brought in a
timely first post-conviction petition for habeas corpus.
The court also clarified that Pertgen v. Nevada, 875 P.2d 361 (Nev. 1994),
does not relax the procedural bars for waiver. However, independent claims
based on the same error are subject to the waiver bars because such claims
could have been presented to the trial court or raised on direct appeal. Moreo-
ver, Nev. Rev. Stat. 178.602 allows the court to review plain errors or defects
affecting substantial rights, whether or not they are brought to the court's atten-
tion. However, this plain error rule is for review on direct appeal and does not
create a procedural bar exception in any habeas proceeding.
The law of the case doctrine states that the law of the first appeal is the
law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the facts are substantially the
same. The court rejected the suggestion that the rare exercise of discretion
must result in a determination that the law of the case doctrine is inadequate to
bar reassertion of a claim in habeas.
Finally, the court overruled Warden v. Lischko, 523 P.2d 6 (Nev. 1974), in
as much as it supported discretionary application of the procedural bar for
waiver: Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.810 is mandatory. Furthermore, the court overruled
Lischko to the extent that it may be read to suggest that the Nevada Supreme
Court "must" review the merits of a post-conviction claim whenever the trial
court has elected to do so. The court concluded that good cause and actual
prejudice are required to overcome the statutory procedural bars.
In order to demonstrate good cause, the petitioner must show an external
impediment prevented him from raising the claims earlier. Actual prejudice
requires a showing, not merely that the errors complained of created possible
prejudice, but that the errors worked to the petitioner's actual and substantial
disadvantage in affecting the state proceeding with error of constitutional
dimensions. The court reasoned that it could excuse the failure to show cause
where the prejudice from considering the claim amounts to a fundamental mis-
carriage of justice. In order to avoid application of the procedural bar to claims
attacking the validity of a conviction, a person claiming innocence must show
that it is more likely than not that no reasonable jury would have convicted him
absent the constitutional violation. However, where the petitioner is claiming
procedural error when the petitioner is ineligible for the death penalty, the peti-
tioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that, but for the constitu-
tional error, no reasonable jury would have found him eligible for the death
penalty.
Randolph v. Nevada
36 P.3d 424 (Nev. 2001)
Where defendant raises a defense that implicates a theory of criminal con-
duct, prosecutors are permitted to instruct the jury as to that theory of criminal
conduct; where a prosecutor mischaracterizes the reasonable doubt standard,
the Nevada Supreme Court will require an explanation from that prosecutor.
Appellant Randolph robbed and murdered a bartender in Las Vegas. Ran-
dolph asserted that Garner, whose car Randolph drove during the night of the
crime, was actually responsible for the murder, and that Randolph had partici-
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pated only in the robbery. At a jury trial, Randolph was found guilty of first-
degree murder with use of a deadly weapon and other offenses. During the
penalty phase, jurors considered several mitigating and aggravating factors.
Although the state originally charged Randolph with the actual murder, at the
end of the guilt phase, the district court instructed the jury on co-conspirator
liability and liability for aiding and abetting. Finding that Randolph's aggravat-
ing circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors, the jury imposed the
death sentence. Randolph appealed, arguing that he was unprepared to argue
against conspirator and abetting liability, that the indictment did not allege aid-
ing and abetting charges, that the prosecutor mischaracterized the reasonable
doubt standard, and that the district court should have granted a mistrial.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that Randolph was on adequate notice
that he could be held liable as a co-conspirator. Several of the criminal counts
brought against Randolph made reference to Randolph's intent to further con-
spiracy. The court also held that, although failing to include a charge of aiding
and abetting in the indictment would ordinarily preclude the state from gaining
jury instructions on the charge, the prosecution was entitled to jury instruction
on aiding and abetting because Randolph raised a defense that implicated a
theory of accomplice liability.
The court held that the prosecutor did mischaracterize the reasonable
doubt standard, but that it was harmless error. While the court reiterated earlier
cautions that prosecutors are in the outer ambit of their authority when they
attempt to quantify, clarify, or supplement the statutorily prescribed reasonable
doubt standard, such incorrect explanations of the reasonable doubt standard is
harmless error as long as the jury instructions correctly define reasonable
doubt. Because the lower court's jury instructions corrected this definition, the
court found the prosecutor's mischaracterization to be harmless. However, the
Nevada Supreme Court noted that the lower court should have firmly admon-
ished the prosecutor for the mischaracterization. Further, the court declared its
intention to call this and future prosecutors before the court to account for such
mischaracterizations.
Robinson v. Nevada
17 P.3d 420 (Nev. 2001)
A person in civil protective custody for public intoxication is not a pris-
oner, for purposes of criminal statutes.
Robinson was held in civil protective custody after being publicly intoxi-
cated. Robinson was unable to be placed in an alcohol treatment facility and
was subsequently taken to jail. While in civil protective custody, Robinson
struck another prisoner and was charged with battery by a prisoner. His status
as a prisoner escalated the normal misdemeanor battery to a category B felony.
Robinson pled guilty on the condition that he could appeal his prisoner status.
The Nevada Supreme Court found that Nev. Rev. Stat. 458.250 made pub-
lic intoxication a civil offense. Nevada law defines a "prisoner" as a person
who is deprived of his liberty and kept under involuntary restraint, confine-
ment, or custody, as applied in the criminal context of Nev. Rev. Stat. 193.022.
The court held that inebriated persons are not subject to the statutory definition
of Nev. Rev. Stat.193.022 because, had the battery been committed at a treat-
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ment center, Robinson would not have been charged with felony battery. The
court reasoned that Robinson should not have been exposed to greater liability
merely because he was taken to the police facility, instead of a treatment
facility.
Salaiscooper v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court
34 P.3d 509 (Nev. 2001)
Justice courts have authority to resolve constitutional issues arising in
criminal misdemeanor cases but do not have authority to sit "en banc" or
make collective decisions.
Woman charged with solicitation of prostitution alleged that the district
attorney's policy violated the equal protection rights of women. The policy
offers plea agreements to criminal defendants charged with buying sex, but not
those soliciting sex, to avoid convictions by attending diversion classes. At the
conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the judge reserved her ruling so that the
other justices of the Las Vegas Justice Court could make a collective decision.
All seven justices of the Las Vegas Justice Court unanimously concluded that
the district attorney's policy was constitutional.
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court held that justice courts do not have
authority to sit "en banc" or make collective decisions. However, the court
held that a justice court's jurisdiction may resolve constitutional issues arising
in criminal misdemeanor cases, overruling In re Dixon, 40 Nev. 228 (1916).
Additionally, the court reasoned that the district attorney has prosecutorial dis-
cretion to treat buyers of sex different than sellers of sex because the policy is
not intended to discriminate, rather to deter acts of prostitution. Therefore, the
court held that the district attorney's policy does not run afoul of the Equal
Protection Clause.
Theis v. Nevada
30 P.3d 1140 (Nev. 2001)
A detainer must be in writing and request that the institution housing the
prisoner hold the prisoner for the detainer-filing agency or notify that agency
of the prisoner's imminent release.
Appellant, Theis, allegedly committed armed robberies in the counties of
Elko and Washoe, Nevada, as well as in Idaho. Idaho authorities apprehended
Theis and he was subsequently convicted for the Idaho robberies. After learn-
ing of Theis's apprehension, Elko County filed a formal, written detainer with
the Idaho prison. Washoe County did not file a written detainer, but did enter
relevant information into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC)
database. Washoe County also called the Idaho prison in which Theis was
incarcerated, requesting that Washoe County be added to Elko County's written
detainer. The Idaho prison officer agreed to do so.
Theis, upon receipt of Elko County's written detainer, requested a final
disposition, which requires all charges be brought within 180 days. Elko
County charged and convicted Theis within the 180-day period. Washoe
County brought charges after the 180-day period had run, and Theis sought to
have the charges dismissed.
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Washoe County claimed the 180-day limitation did not apply to it because
it had not filed a detainer in writing with the Idaho prison. Theis argued that
either the entering of his information into the NCIC, or the phone call from
Washoe County to the Idaho prison, initiated the detainer.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that a detainer must be issued in writing.
Detainers are issued based on inter-state agreement, codified in Nev. Rev. Stat.
178.620. As an inter-state compact authorized under the Compact Clause of
the Constitution, the court found that federal case law controlled. Although
previous federal case law did not address the issue of whether the request must
be in writing, it did require that the request be filed with the institution where
the prisoner was incarcerated. The court found that entering information into
the NCIC does not satisfy this requirement, as the request was not made specif-
ically to the Idaho prison. The court also found that the purpose of a detainer is
to inform a prisoner of charges filed against him. The court held that the
detainer must be in writing to assure that the prisoner is accurately informed of
the charges against him, and to prevent the misinterpretation of an oral commu-
nication. The court found that Washoe County had not filed a formal, written
detainer with the Idaho prison, and affirmed the trial court's denial of plaintiffs
motion to dismiss.
Vanisi v. Nevada
22 P.3d 1164 (Nev. 2001)
District court may refuse to allow defendant to represent himself pro se
where defendant is attempting to delay the proceedings by assuming his own
defense or defendant has demonstrated a likelihood that pro se representation
would disrupt the trial proceedings, but district court may not consider com-
plexity of case and the quality of defendant's defense.
Appellant Vanisi planned and committed the murder of a UNR policeman.
Following the murder, Vanisi committed two burglaries, stole a car, and drove
to Salt Lake City, Utah. Following a standoff with a SWAT team, Vanisi was
apprehended and tried for first-degree murder and three counts of robbery, all
with a deadly weapon, and one count of grand larceny. Before the trial, Vanisi
unsuccessfully moved to represent himself. The jury imposed the death sen-
tence. Vanisi appealed, arguing that he should have been allowed to represent
himself pro se, that the aggravating circumstances of mutilation did not apply,
and that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury according to
Vanisi's version of the reasonable doubt standard.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the district court was within its dis-
cretion to deny Vanisi's motion to represent himself pro se. The lower court
determined that Vanisi was attempting to delay the proceedings and represented
a risk of disruption in the trial's proceedings, inferences that the court found
within the discretion of the lower court and supported by the record. However,
the court rejected the lower court's consideration that the case was complex and
the defendant would be unable to provide an adequate defense. Considerations
of complexity are relevant only in canvassing the defendant to ensure that
defendant is apprised of the obligations and duties of a pro se representation.
The court also rejected Vanisi's assertion that there was insufficient evi-
dence to find aggravating circumstances of mutilation. The court highlighted
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that the forensic evidence indicated that the victim was severely assaulted in
several different manners with a hatchet and "stomping" on the head. Finally,
the Nevada Supreme Court held that the lower court did not err in deciding to
use the statutory instruction as to reasonable doubt in lieu of Vanisi's own
instruction on reasonable doubt.
Villanueva v. Nevada
27 P.3d 443 (Nev. 2001)
Nev. Rev. Stat. 193.161, the "on-school-property alternative," is not
unconstitutionally vague in granting the district court discretionary options in
the sentencing of school-related crimes.
Villanueva shot and injured two high school students, who were members
of a rival gang, at their high school. Some of the charges against Villanueva
were brought under Nev. Rev. Stat. 193.161(2), which allows the court to sen-
tence defendants to longer than usual terms of imprisonment if a crime occurs
on school property. Villanueva moved to strike the charges arising under Nev.
Rev. Stat. 193.161(2), alleging that the statute was void for vagueness. The
court denied Villanueva's motion, and Villanueva subsequently pled guilty
while reserving his right to appeal the motion to strike.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the statute's language, providing that
a felony occurring on school property "may" be punished by imprisonment,
was not overly vague. The court held that the legislature's use of "may" was
not vague as to what the legislature intended to be done, but rather gave the
district court discretion in sentencing. Because the underlying penalties are
clear and unambiguous, the discretion to apply the alternative penalty is not
vague.
Further, the court rejected Villanueva's assertion that the legislature
impermissibly delegated its authority to define crimes and affix penalties. The
court noted that in only two instances has it found an impermissible delegation:
challenges to sentences as cruel and unusual punishment and challenges to the
authority delegated to administrative agencies. The judiciary has long enjoyed
broad discretion in selecting among several sentences specified by the legisla-
ture, and the lower court selected such a sentence.
The court also rejected Villanueva's alternative assertion that Nev. Rev.
Stat. 193.161(2) does not apply to inchoate crimes, such as attempted offenses,
because another statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. 193.330, governs such attempted
crimes. The court noted that Nev. Rev. Stat. 193.330 itself contemplates being
supplanted by other statutes that might be enacted by the legislature, and does
not therefore displace Nev. Rev. Stat. 193.161(2).
EMPLOYMENT LAW
Coast Hotels & Casino, Inc., v. Nev. State Labor Comm'n
34 P.3d 546 (Nev. 2001)
Employer may require employee to reimburse the employer for shortages
if employee voluntarily authorized the withholding in writing.
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Employee Sandra Meranian signed a pre-employment waiver, agreeing
that her casino employer could deduct any shortages in her cash drawer from
her wages. Meranian's cash drawer was short twice. For both shortages, she
signed a shortage slip, acknowledging the missing amounts and authorizing the
casino to withhold the total from her wages. The amounts were subsequently
withheld. Meranian was later discharged for unrelated reasons. After termina-
tion, Meranian filed a claim for the wages from the Labor Commission. The
hearings officer stated that the casino provided insufficient evidence that the
employee was responsible for the shortage, making her authorization invalid.
The hearings officer determined that the $520 that was withheld should be
reimbursed to Meranian and fined the casino $548.
On judicial review, the district court upheld the reimbursement to Mer-
anian but reversed the statutory penalty against Coast. The parties appealed to
the Nevada Supreme Court.
The court held that the language of Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.110 did not require
that withholdings benefit the employee, so long as the employee authorized the
deduction in writing. Thus, it was permissible for cash shortages to be with-
held, as long as the employee authorized it in writing.
The court found that the casino provided sufficient evidence to prove that
Meranian was responsible for the shortages. The casino had strict rules by
which the cashiers were to abide. The cashiers were to count their money
before and at the end of each shift. Further, the cashiers were to lock their
drawers when away from the money. The court determined that when Mer-
anian was short, she admitted she could not account for the shortage. Nor did
she challenge the missing amount when it was discovered at the end of her
shift. The court reversed the reimbursement to Meranian and affirmed setting
aside the penalty against the casino.
GES, Inc. v. Corbitt
21 P.3d 11 (Nev. 2001)
To hold multiple tortfeasors jointly and severally liable under the "con-
certed acts exception," there must be an agreement between tortfeasors to
engage in conduct that is inherently dangerous or poses a substantial risk of
harm to the other.
Respondent Corbitt was employed as a lighting technician for Legends, an
entertainment group scheduled to perform at appellant Powerline/VIP's exhibit
site during the Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas. Corbitt suffered a
fractured skull, sinuses, wrist, and elbow when a collapsing truss, assembled by
employees of both Powerline/VIP and appellant GES, Inc. (an electrical con-
tractor), knocked Corbitt from a forklift to the ground some thirteen feet below.
At trial, the jury awarded damages against Powerline and GES exceeding
$1,100,000, and assessed the comparative fault, by way of a special verdict, at
ten percent against Corbitt; twenty-five percent against GES; and sixty-five
percent against Powerline. GES appealed, claiming that the Nevada Industrial
Insurance Act immunized GES from suit under workers compensation exclu-
sivity, and that the district court erred in finding it jointly and severally liable
with Powerline under the concerted acts exception.
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The Nevada Supreme Court noted that a worker may pursue a common
law tort action against any tortfeasor who is not his statutory employer or co-
employee under the "normal work test" codified in Nev. Rev. Stat.
616B.603(1)(b). The court found that the test would result in immunity to GES
only if GES was in the same trade, business, profession, or occupation as Cor-
bitt's employer, Legends. Since Legends' trade was live entertainment, and
GES supplied electricity and assembly services, GES did not qualify as a statu-
tory employer under the "normal work test" analysis, and the district court did
not err by denying GES's motion for summary judgment.
The court found for GES on the issue of joint and several liability. Nev.
Rev. Stat. 41.141(5)(d) creates a limited exception from joint and several liabil-
ity for defendants who act in concert where comparative negligence is a viable
partial defense. Ordinarily when a plaintiff is no more than fifty percent negli-
gent, defendants found liable are presumed to be severally liable unless they act
in concert to cause an injury. The court found the "concerted acts exception"
requires an explicit or tacit agreement between tortfeasors to engage in conduct
that is inherently dangerous or poses a threat of substantial risk of harm to
others. While both Powerline and GES assembled the truss and knew that the
assembly was incomplete, both were merely negligent in relying upon the other
to perform certain acts in erecting the booth. They did not agree to assemble
together, or to proceed knowing the truss was likely to collapse. The court
reversed the judgment holding GES jointly liable, and held that GES was sever-
ally liable for twenty-five percent of the damages awarded based upon the spe-
cial verdict.
Harris v. Rio Hotel & Casino, Inc.
25 P.3d 206 (Nev. 2001)
If the defendant in a construction case is a landowner that contracted with
a licensed principal contractor, the landowner is immune from suit as a matter
of law for industrial injuries sustained during performance for the construction
contract.
Appellant Harris was injured while working at the Rio Hotel and Casino
(the Rio). Harris received worker's compensation benefits from his employer,
Marnell Corrao Construction, which was the licensed contractor for a project at
the Rio. Harris filed an action against the Rio. The Rio moved to dismiss,
claiming it was immune under the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act (NIIA),
which provides an exclusive remedy for Nevada workers who are injured in an
accident arising out of their employment. The district court granted the Rio's
motion to dismiss.
Harris appealed, arguing that a landowner who constructs improvements
to real property through a licensed general contractor does not enjoy the same
immunity under the NIIA as the contractor.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that if the defendant in a construction
case is a landowner that contracted with a licensed principal contractor, the
landowner is immune from suit as a matter of law for industrial injuries sus-
tained during performance of the construction contract. The court cited several
policy considerations supporting the conclusion. First, worker's compensation
should protect the property owner, who is indirectly paying the cost of the
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worker's compensation coverage. Second, if commercial property owners were
liable to injured construction workers, they would be at a greater financial risk
than if their own employees were to do the work. Finally, property owners who
have little expertise in the area of construction should be encouraged to retain
experienced contractors to reduce the risk of injury.
Justice Rose concurred, but urged the court to recognize the "dual capacity
doctrine," which recognizes that an employer may take on a second role that
confers obligations, including tort liability, independent of those imposed on an
employer. However, Justice Rose conceded that the doctrine would not have
been applicable in this case.
In re Norbert
258 B.R. 459 (D. Nev. 2001)
The Bankruptcy Code's prohibition against private employers terminating
employment of or discriminating with respect to employment against, a bank-
ruptcy debtor does not apply to actions taken by the private employer before
the filing of bankruptcy.
Appellant appealed the bankruptcy court's decision that 11 U.S.C.
§ 525(b), which prohibits a private employer from terminating the employment
of, or discriminating with respect to employment against, an individual who is
or has been a bankruptcy debtor, does not apply to an employer's actions
against an individual who had not yet filed for bankruptcy. The district court
reasoned that interpreting the phrase "an individual who is or has been a debtor
under this title" to include persons who have not filed for bankruptcy prior to
the alleged discriminatory acts by the employer, destroys the plain meaning of
11 U.S.C. § 525(b).
Morrow v. Putnam
142 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Nev. 2001)
Government agency supervisors may be sued as employers under the
Family Medical Leave Act.
Plaintiff Morrow took medical leave from his job with the United States
Postal Service. When he returned to work, he was placed in a new and unequal
position in comparison to his former station. He subsequently sued his supervi-
sors and the Postmaster General, claiming that this action violated the Family
Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The defendants argued that as government
agency employees, they were immune from such suit, though they were the
plaintiff's supervisors.
The district court held that the plain language of the FMLA clearly applied
to government agencies. Further, the language was clear in extending liability
to persons in supervisory positions. Finding no specific exemption for govern-
ment agency supervisors, the court held that such supervisions were liable
under the FMLA.
Although the court did acknowledge that evidence may reveal that some
defendants did not have sufficient authority over the plaintiff to be considered
employers under the FMLA, government agency supervisors may be sued
under the FMLA as a matter of law.
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Trs. of the Constr. Indus. & Laborers Health & Welfare Trust v.
Desert Valley Landscape & Maint., Inc.
156 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (9th Cir. 2001)
General contractors are liable for indebtedness of labor incurred by any
subcontractors working under the general contractor.
General contractor Richardson Construction employed subcontractor
Desert Valley. When Desert Valley failed to require employee benefit contribu-
tions, plaintiff trustees obtained a default judgment against Desert Valley.
Trustees subsequently filed a motion for partial summary judgment against the
general contractor under Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.150(1), which makes general con-
tractor's liable for indebtedness incurred by their subcontractors.
The trustees argued that the default judgment against the subcontractor
had the same legal impact as against the general contractor. The defendant
claimed the default judgment was not applicable to defendant, arguing that,
when a joint claim is made against several defendants, a defendant's failure to
appear only equates to a waiver of the defaulting defendant's standing to
appear. Richardson argued that extending Desert Valley's default to Richard-
son would deprive it of the right to a jury trial.
The Nevada Supreme Court granted partial summary judgment. The court
found that the phrase "indebtedness for labor" in Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.150(1)
includes employee benefits provided for in collective bargaining agreements.
The court rejected Richardson's joint claim argument, finding that the trustees'
claim was against Richardson for Desert Valley's indebtedness. The court also
held that Richardson's request for a jury trial should have been made when they
intervened in the case, not after damages were assessed.
IMMIGRATION LAW
Gato-Herrera v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.
130 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (D. Nev. 2001)
Immigration parole entry into the United States does not constitute entry
for purposes of constitutional protections against continued detention.
Herrera entered the United States from Cuba on an immigration parole.
After being jailed for criminal conduct in the United States, Herrera was found
to be inadmissible into the United States and ordered removed. He remained in
detention by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Federal law
only permits the detention of removable aliens for a reasonable time beyond the
ninety-day period after the order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). Herrera
claimed that his detention was a violation of the Constitution, and petitioned for
release.
The district court ruled that, under immigration parole, there is no true
entry into the United States. Since the petitioner did not enter the country, he
had no claims under the Constitution or federal statutes. The court also stated
that if the federal law in question is in conflict with international law that states
the petitioner's detention cannot be prolonged and arbitrary, federal law dis-
places international law.
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Herrera claimed that the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American
Relief Act of 1997 and the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 automatically
adjusted his status to a lawful permanent resident.
The district court held that none of these acts automatically adjusted his
status merely by their enactment. Each act requires the alien to meet certain
criteria based on the Act. Moreover, both acts require the alien to apply for the
adjustment, which Herrera did not.
Because Herrera was not admitted to the United States other than under
the provisions of an immigration parole, and because he failed to apply to
change his status, the court held that his continued detention did not violate the
United States Constitution.
Hays Home Delivery, Inc. v. Employers Ins. Co. of Nevada
31 P.3d 367 (D. Nev. 2001)
Where a subcontractor is involved in the same trade as the contractor and
the subcontractor's activities would normally be carried out by employees
rather than independent contractors, the subcontractor is considered an
employee for purposes of state workers' compensation law.
Green, an owner/operator who delivered furniture for Hays, was hurt on
the job. After failure to pay his premium, Green submitted a claim to Employ-
ers Insurance Company of Nevada, Hays' insurer, which was eventually
honored. Hays appealed to the district court, arguing that Green was not an
employee. The district court affirmed the claim, and Hays appealed to the
Nevada Supreme Court.
The court found that Green was under a contract of hire and that Green
was in the same trade as Hays. The Nevada Industrial Insurance Act (NIIA)
explicitly allows independent contractors to be considered employees. Nev.
Rev. Stat. 616A.210(1). In addition, the court noted that the case was a non-
construction case, such that the normal work test from Meers v. Haughton Ele-
vators, 701 P.2d 1006 (Nev. 1985), applied. As a result, the NIIA treats Green
as an employee for purposes of workers' compensation, even though Green was
involved in an independent enterprise distinct from that of Hays. The court
reaffirmed the ruling in Meers that, where an independent contractor's indis-
pensable activity is normally carried on through employees of a company or
enterprise, the independent contractor is considered an employee for purposes
of worker's compensation.
Tarango v. State Indus. Ins. Sys.
25 P.3d 175 (Nev. 2001)
Injured, undocumented aliens may be denied some of Nevada's workers'
compensation benefits.
Tarango, an undocumented alien, suffered an industrial injury while at
work. After receiving maximum medical treatment, doctors recommended
vocational rehabilitation. The State Industrial Insurance System (SIIS)
awarded claimant permanent partial disability but required claimant to submit
Immigration and Naturalization Form 1-9 as proof of his right to work in the
United States. Claimant failed to satisfy the verification requirement and SIIS
subsequently suspended his benefits until proof was provided. Claimant argued
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that, under Nevada's workers' compensations laws, an injured worker is enti-
tled to full workers' compensation benefits regardless of immigration status.
SIIS held against Tarango, and he appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the Federal Immigration Reform and
Control Act precludes an employer from modifying employment or vocational
training benefits under Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.530 for undocumented claimants.
The claimant argued that SIIS's denial of vocational rehabilitation benefits vio-
lated the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that, while undocumented
aliens have a right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, cer-
tain benefits may be withheld from undocumented aliens because their presence
in the United States is a crime. Thus, benefits that promote an undocumented
alien's vocational training in the United States will be denied.
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
In re Schaefer
25 P.3d 191 (Nev. 2001)
Supreme Court Rule 182 applies to an attorney, even when representing
himself
After hearing two formal complaints against attorney Michael Schaefer,
the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board concluded that Schaefer violated vari-
ous professional conduct rules and recommended his disbarment. The panel
found various violations of the Supreme Court Rules, including Sup. Ct. R.
182, which prohibits communication with persons represented by counsel.
Schaefer's Sup. Ct. R. 182 violations occurred during Schaefer's litigation with
Mirage Resorts, Inc., when he repeatedly communicated with Mirage officers,
directors, and employees concerning the litigation. General counsel for Mirage
Resorts, Inc., specifically instructed Schaefer to communicate only through
him.
On automatic appeal, Schaefer argued he did not violate Sup. Ct. R. 182
when representing himself pro se. He argued that the rule was unconstitution-
ally vague and unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it was a
content-based restriction. The Nevada Supreme Court determined Sup. Ct. R.
182 was vague in Schaefer's situation and subsequently did not consider three
of the Sup. Ct. R. 182 violations because of the rule's uncertainty. However,
the court warned that the rule applies to lawyers acting pro se and is constitu-
tional. The court also did not consider the Sup. Ct. R. 203(1) violation, Sup.
Ct. R. 203(2) violation, or the four Sup. Ct. R. 203(4) violations because these
violations were not charged in the complaint. The court found the other viola-
tions were supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Schaefer's pattern of misconduct, his numerous ethical violations, and his
denial of guilt supported the panel's findings of aggravating factors and its
recommendation for disbarment. As a result, the court disbarred Schaefer and
ordered him to pay the disciplinary proceeding costs.
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Moran v. Bonneville Square Assocs.
25 P.3d 898 (Nev. 2001)
Failure to provide complete and accurate responses to docketing state-
ment requests resulted in monetary sanctions.
Appellant Moran's counsel, Kirk T. Kennedy, was required to provide
responses to two docketing statement requests as part of an appeal in a personal
injury action. The requests required Moran to show that a motion for a new
trial was filed and rejected, and that Moran included copies of all the last-filed
pleadings, respectively.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that Kennedy failed to provide the appro-
priate responses, and sanctioned Kennedy for that failure. The court found that
both requests pertained to jurisdiction of the Nevada Supreme Court. The
Nevada Supreme Court is a court of limited appellate jurisdiction and the bur-
den of showing jurisdiction rests with the appellant. The docketing statement
requests are designed to facilitate that showing without requiring the court to
issue an order to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed. Further,
the court noted that the first page of the docketing statement form includes a
warning that all requests should be fully and accurately completed or sanctions
may be imposed.
The court held that Kennedy's neglect showed a lack of consideration and
that the requests were not given the proper, careful attention they required. As
a result, he was sanctioned $500 for his conduct.
Mosley v. Nev. Comm'n on Judicial Discipline
22 P.3d 655 (Nev. 2001)
Adjudicators who engage in investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative
functions are entitled to presumption of honesty and, therefore, the combination
of functions does not violate due process.
The Las Vegas Review Journal reported that Judge Donald Mosley used
his judicial office to secure favorable testimony in an attempt to gain custody of
his son. The Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline instituted an investiga-
tion, concluding that sufficient probable cause existed to warrant formal disci-
plinary hearings. In his answer, Judge Mosley claimed that the Commission's
proceedings were unconstitutional because the combined investigative,
prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions deprived him of the property interest
inherent in his position without due process. When Judge Mosley's motion to
dismiss was denied, he filed a motion for extraordinary relief with the Nevada
Supreme Court, which was granted.
The court found that, in order to prove violation of due process, a defen-
dant must overcome the presumption that the adjudicators are honest and prove
there is a risk of actual bias. Since Judge Mosley offered no evidence of actual
bias, the court concluded that his due process rights had not been infringed.
The court did agree with Judge Mosley's assertion that the State Bar had
improperly delegated power to the executive director of the Commission to
appoint replacements for two members who had recused themselves.
Justice Shearing, joined by Justice Agosti, concurred with the due process
holding, but dissented on the holding pertaining to replacement of Commission
members. The majority held that the State Bar's power to appoint replacement
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members of the Comnmission was a specific power that the Bar was precluded
from delegating. Justice Shearing asserted that delegation should be allowed for
the appointment of one-time substitutes.
Justice Leavitt concurred that the appointment process had been improp-
erly delegated but dissented from the majority's solution, which required the
Bar to appoint two new members to hear the Mosley case. Justice Leavitt
asserted that all actions taken by the improperly-constituted Commission
should have been voided and the action begun anew.
PROPERTY
Besnilian v. Wilkinson
25 P.2d 187 (Nev. 2001)
One party to a declaration of homestead cannot alienate a homestead
property without the other party's consent.
In 1975, husband and wife Simon and Glenda Besnilian acquired property
in joint tenancy. In 1990, the couple jointly executed a declaration of home-
stead. Later, and unbeknownst to Glenda, Simon deeded half of the property to
a third party. Simon subsequently died, and when Glenda brought an action to
quiet title some time later, the trial court denied the action as foreclosed under
the doctrine of laches. Glenda appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that a spouse may not alienate a home-
stead without consent of the other spouse. The court ruled that the homestead
law is intended to protect the family home. Prohibiting a spouse from convey-
ing their interest in the homestead/joint tenancy estate, without the knowledge
and consent of the other spouse, furthers the intent of the homestead law.
Justice Agosti concurred, noting the impact of this decision on property
law. Justice Agosti claimed that the decision transmuted property held in joint
tenancy into community property, arguing that the majority's holding subjects
homestead property held in joint tenancy between spouses to the same disposi-
tion as property held by spouses as community property.
Justice Rose dissented, focusing on the fact that the effective changes enu-
merated in the concurrence were not necessary to give full effect to a declara-
tion of homestead. Justice Rose also urged that there was no indication of such
intent in Nevada law.
Churchill County v. United States
199 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (D. Nev. 2001)
Secretary of the Interior's decision to transfer land into trust for the bene-
fit of the Fallon Paiute-Shosone Tribe held lawful.
The Fallon Pauite-Shoshone Indian Tribes acquired thirty-seven acres of
land in Churchill County and the United States took the land into trust. Churc-
hill County disputed the validity of placing the land into trust, arguing that: 1)
the intent of the enabling statute is to allow the tribe to acquire land and water
rights solely for agricultural purposes; 2) the Secretary failed to consider the
factors in 24 C.F.R. § 151.1 when he decided to place the land in trust; 3) the
statute unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the agency; and 4) the
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statute is unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection under the Fifth
Amendment. The Tribes moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss. It held that, while the
enabling statute mentioned water rights, it did not limit the use of the land. The
court also held that the legislature imposed standards for the Secretary of Inte-
rior to follow that were unambiguous and within the boundaries of acceptable
delegation to an administrative agency, making them constitutional.
Mark Props., Inc. v. Nat'l Title Co.
34 P.3d 587 (Nev. 2001)
An escrow agent must inform a party to the escrow of any fraud committed
if facts known to the escrow agent provide substantial evidence of such.
Mark Properties (Mark) consisted of two real estate investors who partici-
pated in a joint venture with other investors. Mark later discovered that the
seller of the parcel they planned to purchase was not an unrelated third party,
but a co-investor. The co-investor falsely informed Mark that the purchase was
only to facilitate acquisition of the property, and that there was no difference in
the purchase price. Mark later learned that the property was indeed purchased
for a lower price, and that their co-investors had obtained a double escrow on
the property at issue. Mark argued that defendant, National Title, knew the
details and should have divulged any potential fraud to them. The district court
granted summary judgment to defendant National Title, and Mark appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed, holding that an escrow agent has a
legal duty to disclose fraudulent circumstances, of which it is aware, to another
party to the escrow if the circumstances present substantial evidence of fraud.
To do otherwise would effectively render the agent a participant in the fraud.
In its opinion, the court disagreed with other jurisdictions, which have refused
to impose such disclosure on the basis that such disclosure would subject the
escrow agent to a high risk of litigation. However, the court also held that an
escrow agent does not have a duty to disclose to a party that is not a party to the
escrow, and moreover, does not have a duty to investigate circumstances sur-
rounding a particular sale to discover fraud.
Nev. Tax. Comm'n v. Nev. Cement Co.
36 P.3d 418 (Nev. 2001)
The primary-purpose test applies in determining if an item, used both in
the manufacturing process and as an ingredient in the finished product, is a
retail sale or a sale for resale.
Nevada Cement manufactures cement by using four pieces of equipment
that gradually disintegrate over time and are incorporated into Nevada
Cement's finished product. As a result, the equipment has the dual purpose of
assisting in the manufacturing process and contributing to the ingredients of the
final product.
A sales or use tax must be paid on all tangible personal property sold at
retail in Nevada. The sales tax applies to property sold at retail in Nevada,
while the use tax applies to property purchased outside the state but stored,
used, or consumed in Nevada. Items purchased for resale are exempt from the
sales and use tax. Nevada Cement's liability depends upon whether its
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purchase constituted a retail sale or a sale for resale. Nevada Cement initially
paid either sales or use taxes on the four pieces of equipment, and then later
requested a refund. The Nevada Department of Taxation denied the request.
Nevada Cement filed a petition for re-determination, claiming that,
because the process eventually incorporates the equipment into the finished
product that was later sold, the equipment purchase was for resale and not
retail, and should be tax exempt. The matter proceeded to an administrative
hearing, and the Department hearing officer denied the refund claim. On
administrative appeal, the Tax Commission determined Nevada Cement pur-
chased the equipment for manufacturing cement and upheld the hearing
officer's decision.
Nevada Cement contended the proper test to apply is the physical-ingredi-
ent test, which states that, where an item becomes a physical ingredient or a
component of the finished product, it is a sale for resale and therefore exempt
from the sales and use tax. The Commission contended that the sole-purpose
test applies, which states that, if any purpose of a dual-purpose item is not for
resale, then the sales and use tax applies.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the primary-purpose test applies.
This test looks to the primary purpose of the purchase to determine if the sale is
at retail or for resale. If one purchases an item primarily to aid the manufactur-
ing process, it is taxable, regardless if it becomes part of the finished product.
If one purchases an item primarily to become part of the finished product, it is
exempt as sale for resale, regardless of whether it assists in the manufacturing
process. Therefore, the district court erred in applying the physical-ingredient
test.
The court held the record demonstrated that Nevada Cement purchased the
equipment for the primary purpose of manufacturing cement. The contribution
to ingredients was only a secondary purpose. Under the primary-purpose test,
the equipment purchased by Nevada Cement was taxable as a retail sale.
Pro-Max Corp. v. Feenstra
16 P.3d 1074 (Nev. 2001)
Under Nev. Rev. Stat. 106.240, liens on real property are presumed extin-
guished ten years after debt is due.
Pro-Max Corporation borrowed money in 1982 from various shareholders
in order to secure funding for real property. Pro-Max signed promissory notes
to those from whom it borrowed, which were secured by deeds of trust on the
purchased property. These notes became due two years after their execution on
May 14, 1984. However, no payment was ever made, including after the sale
of the property in 1996. The trial court interpreted Nev. Rev. Stat. 106.240 to
provide protection to bona fide purchasers and held that the statute did not, in
fact, extinguish the notes.
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in its
interpretation. The court held that the statute was clear and unambiguous and
the notes were extinguished on May 14, 1996, ten years after they became due.
The court remanded the case for a determination of whether Pro-Max should be
estopped from claiming protection under Nev. Rev. Stat. 106.240.
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Sandy Valley Assoc. v. Sky Ranch Estates Owners Assoc.
2001 Nev. LEXIS 82 (D. Nev. 2001)
Although respondent was granted title to land in dispute before the court,
attorney's fees were improperly granted because respondent failed to demon-
strate proximate cause between the fees and the appellant's actions.
Dispute between appellant (developer) and respondents (homeowners'
association and individually-named land owners) arose over property that the
respondents asserted was intended to be conveyed to respondents as common
areas. The appellant argued that the land in question was not included in the
description of land indicating common areas. The appellant further contended
that the lower court erred in awarding attorney's fees because attorney's fees
cannot be recovered unless authorized by agreement, statute, or rule, none of
which applied to this case. Respondent asserted that fees were not awarded as
costs, but as recoverable damages in the underlying action.
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision granting
title, holding that the lower court's determination was based on findings of fact.
However, the court reversed the lower court's decision to grant attorney's fees
to the respondents and remanded the case for further determination of whether
the fees were proximately caused by the conduct of the appellant.
The court agreed with the appellant's assertion that attorney's fees cannot
be recovered as a cost of litigation unless authorized by agreement, statute, or
rule, which was not the case here. However, the court also noted that fees may
be claimed as the foreseeable damages resulting from tortious conduct or a
breach of contract, considered special damages. In order to claim special dam-
ages, Nev. R. Civ. P. 9(g) requires that they be pleaded as such in the complaint
and proved by competent evidence, similar to any other claim for damages.
Further, when attorney's fees are considered as damages, they must be the natu-
ral and proximate result of the injurious conduct, and be proven as to each
claim. Respondents did not allege fees as special damages, but instead men-
tioned the legal fees only in the general prayer for relief. The lower court erred
in viewing affidavits from the respondents as a basis for granting relief rather
than conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine if the fees were a proxi-
mate cause of the appellant's actions.
S.O.C., Inc. v. Mirage Casino-Hotel
23 P.3d 243 (Nev. 2001)
Hotel-casino's conveyance of a pedestrian easement to the county for
sidewalk abutting property did not create a public forum wherein commercial
advertisements may be distributed against the wishes of the property owner.
The Mirage conveyed a perpetual pedestrian easement, in the form of a
sidewalk, along the Las Vegas Strip to Clark County. S.O.C. used the sidewalk
as a place to distribute business advertisements for nude dancers. The Mirage
sought an injunction to enjoin S.O.C. from further distributing literature on the
sidewalk. S.O.C. alleged the First Amendment protected their right to dis-
tribute literature on the sidewalk. The trial court granted a temporary injunc-
tion and S.O.C. appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court found the granting of an easement to be insuf-
ficient to transform private property into a public forum. The right to exclude
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certain persons or activities is one of the chief characteristics of private prop-
erty ownership. Private property does not become public simply because the
public is permitted access. The court found that easements are only as broad as
necessary to accomplish its purpose. Here, Mirage's purpose was to allow
pedestrians to traverse the Strip, not to provide a place where others could
conduct business.
The court also found that, generally, constitutional requirements are not
imposed on a private actor. The First Amendment secures an individual's right
to not have his freedom of speech infringed upon by a state actor, not a private
individual or corporation. Since Mirage is not a government entity, constitu-
tional protections did not apply to their sidewalk.
Justices Maupin and Shearing concurred, but found that the commercial
nature of the plaintiffs business is key to the decision not to permit the distri-
bution of materials on the sidewalk. Commercial speech is not afforded full
constitutional protections.
Justice Rose dissented, asserting that the location and purpose of the side-
walks dictate the degree of control the owners can exercise. In this case, the
sidewalks are the only means of traversing a busy street, and are therefore




19 P.3d 236 (Nev. 2001)
The Firefighter's Rule, codified at Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.139, does not allow
recovery of damages if a police officer sustains an injury while apprehending a
suspect because the suspect's parents did not negligently interfere with the
arrest and the suspect's flight was a reasonably foreseeable component of an
officer's duties.
Robert and Patricia Scanlon were holding a family reunion at a family
owned bar when their son, David, arrived drunk and violent. Robert called 911
and officers Borgenson and Snarr responded. While chasing David, who fled
the scene, Borgenson fell and suffered leg injuries. Borgenson alleged that
Robert and Patricia negligently interfered with David's arrest, allowing him to
flee, leading to the injuries.
The district court granted Robert and Patricia's motion for summary judg-
ment, concluding there was no evidence that either Robert or Patricia instigated
David's flight, and that, therefore, the Firefighter's Rule precluded Borgenson's
recovery because he sustained the injury in the course of his official duties.
Patricia filed a motion for costs pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.005 and 18.050,
Borgenson filed a motion to retax costs, and the district court reduced and
denied costs, awarding $14,209.26 to Patricia. Borgenson appealed the sum-
mary judgment, contending the Firefighter's Rule, as codified at Nev. Rev.
Stat. 41.139, does not preclude recovery because Robert and Patricia's actions
constitute independent acts outside the scope of Borgenson's official duties.
Borgenson also argued that Patricia is vicariously liable for David's acts under
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the duty of the parent-child relationship, and the district court abused its discre-
tion by awarding unreasonable costs to Patricia.
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court held that a district court cannot
determine credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence when resolving a
motion for summary judgment. At common law, the Firefighter's Rule bars
recovery of negligent damages incurred during the scope of official duties
because the officer assumes all normal risks inherent in the employment. Nev.
Rev. Stat. 41.139 limits this common law rule and allows recovery when the
negligence is unforeseeable or an independent or intervening act. The court
concluded the district court correctly determined there was no evidence of neg-
ligent interference and that pursuing a suspect is a reasonable extension of an
officer's official duties; therefore, the Firefighter's Rule bars Borgenson's
claim.
The court also stated that it has only recognized a parent to be vicariously
liable for a child's actions in cases of motor vehicle ownership or negligent
entrustment of motor vehicles where the child is a minor; there is no indication
Patricia had any control of twenty-nine-year-old David. Additionally, neither
party submitted documentation for costs in the appellate record; therefore, vica-
rious liability is not at issue and the court affirmed the district court's award of
costs.
Burns v. Mayer
175 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (D. Nev. 2001)
Tort claims based on sexual harassment are not preempted by Nevada
workers' compensation law.
Plaintiff Bums, an employee of Harrah's Garden Cafd, claimed that she
was subjected to male co-workers simulating male appendages with food prod-
ucts, asking her to have sex with them, touching her buttocks, and commenting
on her breasts, buttocks, and menstrual cycle. She filed suit against Harrah's
and individual co-workers, claiming sexual harassment and retaliation under
Title VII, violation of Nevada's antidiscrimination suit, and respondeat superior
liability for the tort actions of her co-workers.
The defendants filed summary judgment motions as to all the claims. Har-
rah's argued that Burns had not shown that the acts constituted a hostile work
environment, and that Harrah's had no respondeat superior liability for its
employees' acts. In addition, Harrah's claimed that Nevada workmen's com-
pensation law preempted Burns's tort claims.
The district court denied defendant Harrah's motion for summary judg-
ment on the sexual harassment claims, holding that Harrah's had shown insuffi-
cient evidence to deny the hostile work environment claim. The court held that
Harrah's may be held liable for the tort actions of its employees under the
theory of respondeat superior, given that the alleged acts of sexual harassment
fell within the scope of tasks assigned to the employees. Further, the court
found Harrah's had not demonstrated that it took prompt, effective action to
remedy the inappropriate behavior towards the plaintiff.
The court also denied Harrah's contention that the tort claims were pre-
empted by Nevada's worker compensation law, as that law covers injuries sus-
tained by accident during the course of employment. The court found it
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implausible that the alleged acts could have occurred "accidentally." The court
also denied Harrah's contention that plaintiff's emotional distress claims would
be preempted by Nevada's anti-discrimination law, as most courts permit both
a sexual harassment claim under state anti-discrimination laws and an emo-
tional distress claim under common law.
The court denied the individual defendants' motion for summary judgment
on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because other courts
have found that behavior similar to that of the defendants could rise to the level
of extreme and outrageous conduct. Whether or not the behavior constituted
"extreme or outrageous" conduct was to be determined by the trier of fact.
Further, the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence as to her emotional distress
that such could be considered severe.
The court did grant summary judgment for the individual defendants as to
the defamation claim because the plaintiff was unable to prove the claim at the
time of the motion, but claimed she would be able to do so at trial. As plaintiff
could not prove at trial what she was required to show at summary judgment,
and the plaintiff had no supporting testimony other than her own speculation,
the court held that her defamation claim failed.
Krause Inc. v. Little
34 P.3d 566 (Nev. 2001)
Jurors may reenact an expert's experiment using admitted evidence and
objective injuries, such as broken bones, and do not require expert testimony
for the jury to award future pain and suffering damages.
Respondent Don Little used a Multimatic ladder, manufactured by appel-
lant Krause, which he purchased from appellant Home Depot. The ladder col-
lapsed when Little's foot accidentally bumped the release lever, causing him to
fall to the ground. In the fall, Little broke his ankle in two places and was
subsequently unable to resume full activity for two and one-half months. In the
ensuing product liability suit, Little's expert witness testified as to the possibil-
ity that such an accident could occur. During deliberations, the jury recon-
structed the expert's demonstration in order to reach a verdict. The jury
subsequently awarded Little $80,000 in past damages and $20,000 for future
pain and suffering. Appellant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict was denied, and an appeal followed.
Krause argued that the jurors reconstruction of the expert witness's experi-
ment was an improper introduction of new evidence, and that the plaintiffs
failure to present expert testimony regarding future pain and suffering was
improper.
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the trial court verdict. The court
determined that the jury's use of admitted evidence to reenact an expert wit-
ness's experiment did not constitute the introduction of new evidence, but
rather that the jury was merely "examin[ing] the accuracy of Manning's expert
testimony." Regarding the second issue, the court stated that medical testi-
mony is necessary when injuries are subjective and cannot be demonstrated to
others; however, a broken bone is an objective injury that does not require
expert testimony for a jury to award damages for future pain and suffering.
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Justice Becker concurred, but dissented as to the future damages instruc-
tion. In dissent, Justice Becker stated that the cases cited to by the majority did
not hold that an expert testimony is unnecessary to prove future pain or suffer-
ing when the injury is objective, but rather hold that expert testimony is unnec-
essary where the cause of future pain, suffering, or disability is objectively
demonstrable to the trier of fact.
Lee v. GNLV Corp.
22 P.3d 209 (Nev. 2001)
Restaurant employees did not breach their duty of care to a restaurant
patron by failing to perform the Heimlich maneuver.
The Carson Street Caf6, located in downtown Las Vegas, is a restaurant
owned by GNLV Corp. Mr. Sturms and his companion went to the Carson
Street Caf6 for dinner after drinking alcohol earlier that evening.
Shortly after beginning their meal, Mr. Sturms appeared ill, vomited in his
lap, and afterward slumped over in his chair. Security officers and a waitress
were summoned to the table and checked Sturms' pulse, that first appeared
normal, but quickly began to deteriorate. The Las Vegas Fire Department
paramedics were called to the restaurant. In the meantime, security personnel
attempted to give Mr. Sturms CPR, as well as oxygen, but did not perform the
Heimlich maneuver.
When the paramedics arrived, they attempted unsuccessfully to revive Mr.
Sturms. Sturms was then rushed to the hospital where doctors also attempted
unsuccessfully to clear his airway. Sturms was pronounced dead at 10:10 pm.
The autopsy report concluded Mr. Sturms death was caused by food lodged in
his upper airway.
Mr. Sturms' wife, Ahiliya Lee, sued GNLV for negligence, arguing failure
on the part of GNLV to exercise reasonable care. GNLV moved for summary
judgment, alleging it fulfilled its duty by taking reasonable measures to aid Mr.
Sturms when his condition appeared to deteriorate.
The Nevada Supreme Court found that there is a special relationship
between the restaurant and its patrons, requiring that the restaurant take reason-
able steps to fulfill its duty. The court held that GNLV's employees fulfilled
their duty by summoning professional help, and were under no legal duty to
perform the Heimlich maneuver.
Lubin v. Kunin
17 P.3d 422 (Nev. 2001)
Statements published by defendants could be construed as defamatory and
were for the jury to determine.
Appellant Lubin served as a director of a private school. The parents of
several students believed Lubin's mismanagement caused, among other
problems, high teacher turnovers. The disgruntled parents printed flyers and
handouts, reproducing statements from a judicial complaint arising out of a
lawsuit between the director and the school's Board of Trustees. The flyers
implied child abuse occurred at the school and, as a result, a lawsuit alleging
child abuse was filed.
[Vol. 2:696
Summer/Fall 2002] ANNUAL SURVEY OF NEVADA LAW
Lubin filed a defamation suit. The defendant parents filed a motion to
dismiss. They claimed the statements were opinions and protected by privi-
lege. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, finding the director
failed to allege a false and defamatory statement of fact. Lubin appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the district court erred in granting
the motion to dismiss because the statements in question were capable of a
defamatory construction. The court held that a jury must determine whether
statements are false. The court reasoned that, since the statements by the par-
ents implied the existence of factual information to backup the allegations, the
parents were not merely stating opinion. The flyers contained mixed statements
of opinion and fact that lent an air of accuracy; thus, the court concluded that
the falsity of the statements was for the jury to determine. The court also held
that the statements were not privileged because the one-sided nature of the
statements excluded them from consideration as fair and accurate reporting.
Woosley v. State Farm Ins. Co.
18 P.3d 317 (Nev. 2001)
The comparative negligence standard articulated in Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.141
is integrated into the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Douglas Adams was killed in an automobile accident when he swerved to
avoid a ladder lying in the middle of his lane on the highway and collided with
a truck stopped in the emergency lane. Based upon Adams' auto insurance
policy, the estate filed a claim to collect uninsured motorist benefits, alleging
negligence on the part of an unknown driver for dropping the ladder. State
Farm refused to pay the claim, and the estate filed a breach of contract claim.
The estate contended that it was entitled to uninsured motorist benefits
because the accident was substantially caused by the negligence of the
unknown driver, in reliance on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. State Farm
countered that Adams' contributory negligence was greater than the unknown
driver and, therefore, prevented the recovery of uninsured motorists' benefits.
The estate requested a jury instruction pertaining to res ipsa loquitur. The dis-
trict court refused to give the jury instruction because Adams was contribu-
torily negligent and, therefore, in violation of the third element of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine (requiring that plaintiff make no contribution to the event).
The estate appealed, arguing that modem comparative negligence law and Nev.
Rev. Stat. 41.141, passed in response to changes in the common law, required
that the third prong of res ipsa loquitur be enforced only where the plaintiffs
negligence is greater than that of the defendant.
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the lower court, recognizing the need
to incorporate the statute into the res ipsa loquitur jury instruction. The ruling
expressly overrules Bialer v. St. Mary's Hospital, 427 P.2d 957 (Nev. 1967),
which previously set forth the three elements for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
Wynn v. Smith
16 P.3d 424 (Nev. 2001)
Defamation verdict reversed and remanded for second trial because the
district court erred by allowing an inaccurate malice jury instruction.
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Wynn filed an action for defamation against Smith, Barricade Books, Inc.,
and Barricade Books' principal, Stuart, because of a statement published in an
advertisement for Smith's unauthorized biography of Wynn. The trade catalog
advertisement said the book "details why a confidential Scotland Yard report
called Wynn the front man for the Genovese family." The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Smith. Wynn subsequently brought suit against
Barricade Books and Stuart. The district court in the second suit entered judg-
ment in favor of Wynn, totaling over $3.3 million for costs, compensatory, and
punitive damages. Wynn, Smith, Barricade Books, and Stuart appealed for dif-
ferent reasons.
Wynn appealed the summary judgment entered in favor of Smith, arguing
Smith was the source of the statement and should be liable. The Nevada
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment in favor of Smith after
deciding that Smith only provided his manuscript to the other defendants and
did not represent his opinions as facts in the advertisement.
Smith appealed the denial of attorney's fees, claiming the district court
reached the wrong conclusion under the Beattie factors. According to Beattie
v. Thomas, 668 P.2d 268 (Nev. 1983), the district court must evaluate specific
factors when deciding on attorney's fees. While finding that the district court
failed to specifically address each Beattie factor, the Nevada Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment because there was no abuse of discretion.
Barricade Books and Stuart appealed the defamation judgment, claiming
the fair report privilege afforded them protection from liability, the jury instruc-
tion on malice was improper, and the statement at issue was non-actionable
because only statements of fact, not opinions, constitute defamation. The court
refused to apply privilege under the fair report privilege because the report
from Scotland Yard was not official. The court followed the Third Circuit's
reasoning that unauthorized or confidential reports do not qualify as official
reports. However, the court reversed and remanded the decision because the
jury instruction on malice failed to qualify the degree of doubt required for
malice, essentially reducing the required standard of proof: the instruction
required a finding of "doubt" and should have required "serious doubt." Addi-
tionally, the court ordered that, on remand, the district court submit the ques-
tion of the statement's factual nature to the jury for determination. The court
remanded the matter for a new trial against Barricade Books and Stuart.
Justice Leavitt voluntarily recused himself.
Justice Becker concurred, but expressed disagreement with the court's
"serious doubt" standard and a preference for the United States Supreme
Court's standard imposed in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
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